El presente artículo aborda la historia de la educación argentina desde una perspectiva ligada a la historia de las ideas filosóficas/pedagógicas (Roig, 1993, 2009; Arpini, 2003; Ramaglia, 2020), tomando como objeto de estudio la representación de la infancia presente en los trabajos sobre criminología infantil del pedagogo positivista Víctor Mercante (1870-1934). Analizamos los elementos epistemológicos que articulan el discurso positivista e higienista del pedagogo normalista argentino y su relación con el complejo universo discursivo que lo entrama y promueve. Realizamos (...) una lectura filosófica de la representación de la infancia y de la función del higienismo en el despliegue de dispositivos y estrategias biopolíticas por parte del Estado en la educación en torno a la infancia anormal. Nuestro objeto de estudio es construido a partir de una reflexión acotada, centrada en los trabajos sobre criminalidad infantil producidos por Víctor Mercante en la cárcel de Mercedes en Buenos Aires durante el transcurso de tres años (1902 - 1905) y publicados luego como “Notas sobre criminología infantil” (1902), “Estudios de criminología infantil” (1902a) y “Estudios sobre criminalidad infantil” (1905) en la revista “Archivos de psiquiatría criminología y ciencias afines”. (shrink)

Una de las graves dificultades para entender la filosofía de Ramon Llull es fijar las claves hermenéuticas de su pensamiento. Unos han valorado excesivamente sus formación latino-escolástica. Otros han buscado sus raíces arábicas. El presente artículo hace una revisión crítica de la bibliografía al respecto y considera que la formación científica del pensamiento luliano, siempre fuera del marco universitario de su época, es el resultado del contacto con la lengua y la ideología de los musulmanes de la post-conquista de Mallorca, (...) de la lectura directa o indirecta de textos latinos y de su presencia en las escuelas de Medicina de Montpellier. (shrink)

In order to understand Llullian apologetics of tolerance we must situate the Llibre del gentil within the context of the Mall orca of the three religions, that of the Judea-Christian disputes, of the JudeaMuslim sectarisms, of the schism and of the Christian heterodoxies. Only by taking all this into account, can we study in Llullian apologetics concepts such as "tolerance of benevolence" or "rational tolerance". Llullian apologetics doesn't try to change a belief by another but to lay the bridge of (...) rational tolerance to understand the truth of faith in the search of the utopia of religious unity. The aim would be therefore, to look for a solution to the Judeo Christian conflict of messianism, by means, for example, of a rapprochement through the common concept of hope, even though respecting the semantic differences of both systems of thought. (shrink)

Para entender la apologética luliana de la tolerancia debemos situar el "Llibre del gentil" (1274 / 76) en el contexto de la Mallorca de las tres religiones, de las disputas judeo-cristianas, de los sectarismos judíos y musulmanes y del cisma y heterodoxias cristianas. A partir de ahí se estudian los conceptos de "tolerancia de benevolencia" y de "tolerancia racional" en la apologético de Llull. Esta no pretende cambiar una creencia por otra, sino tender el puente de la tolerancia racional para (...) comprender la verdad de la fe, buscando la utopía de la unidad religiosa. Se trata de buscar solución al conflicto judeo-cristiano del mesianismo, por ejemplo, buscando un acercamiento a través del común concepto de esperanza, respetando las diferencias semánticas de uno y otro pensamiento. (shrink)

v. 1. Dels orígens al segle XIX -- v. 2. Temes marginals del segle XIX i el segle XX.

The hermeneutic keys of Ramon Llull's thought. One of the greatest difficulties to understand Ramon Llull's philosophy is its hermeneutic approach to his thought. Some have valued extremely his latin scholastic Studies, others have searched for his Arab background. This article gives a critical review of his bibliography with regard to the subject under discussion and takes into account that the scientific knowledge of Ramon Lull's thought was never part of the university world of his time.It is the result of (...) the close union with the language and the Arab ideas during the post-conquest days in Mallorca, the acquisition of first and second hand information of latin texts and his presence at Montpellier's Medicine schools. (shrink)

Tanto en Francisco de Vitoria como en Domingo de Soto, cofundadores de la llamada Escuela de Salamanca, encontramos un cuidadoso tratamiento acerca de la gnoseología jurídica. El objeto del presente estudio consiste en el análisis de una serie de pasajes textuales en los que se demuestra la raíz iusnatural de ambas doctrinas. Vitoria y Soto, al mismo tiempo que consideran los preceptos de la ley natural como obligatorios e indispensables, enseñan que existe una serie de grados de conocimiento iusnatural. Con (...) todo, no conviene perder de vista que la ley y el derecho naturales no son, para estos autores, unos elementos extrajurídicos; la ley positiva civil debe derivar de la ley natural y debe ser conforme al derecho natural. En esto estriba, pues, la importancia del acceso cognoscitivo del hombre a dicho fundamento iusnatural, fuente primera de toda deontología legal y jurídica. (shrink)

This book offers a critical examination of those theories and advances a new argument for punishment's justification, calling it the 'duty view'.

The Criminalization series arose from an interdisciplinary investigation into criminalization, focussing on the principles that might guide decisions about what kinds of conduct should be criminalized, and the forms that criminalization should take. Developing a normative theory of criminalization, the series tackles the key questions at the heart of the issue: what principles and goals should guide legislators in deciding what to criminalize? How should criminal wrongs be classified and differentiated? How should law enforcement officials apply the law's specifications of (...) offences? The sixth volume in the series offers a philosophical investigation of the relationship between moral wrongdoing and criminalization. Considering the justification of punishment, the nature of harm, the importance of autonomy, inchoate wrongdoing, the role of consent, and the role of the state, the book provides an account of the nature of moral wrongdoing, the sources of wrongdoing, why wrongdoing is the central target of the criminal law, and the ways in which criminalization of non-wrongful conduct might be permissible. (shrink)

This book provides a systematic, philosophically informed account of criminal responsibility. It begins by providing a general account of criminal responsibility based on the relationship between the action that the defendent has performed and their character. It then moves on to reconsider some of the central doctrines of criminal responsibility in the light of that account.

Many philosophers endorse the Transparency Thesis, the claim that by introspection one cannot become aware of one's experience. Recently, some authors have suggested that the Transparency Thesis is challenged by introspective states reached under mindfulness. We label this the Mindfulness Opacity Hypothesis. The present paper develops the hypothesis in important new ways. First, we motivate the hypothesis by drawing on recent clinical psychology and cognitive science of mindfulness. Secondly, we develop the hypothesis by describing the implied shift in experiential perspective, (...) the scope of introspectable qualities, and the level of skill. Thirdly, we defend the hypothesis against various philosophical arguments. We conclude that the Mindfulness Opacity Hypothesis is empirically and theoretically well motivated and supported. (shrink)

A widespread view in moral, legal, and political philosophy, as well as in public discourse, is that responsibility makes a difference to the fair allocation or distribution of things that are valuable or disvaluable independently of responsibility. For example, the fairness of punishing a person for wrongdoing varies with her responsibility for wrongdoing; the fairness of requiring a person to pay compensation varies with her responsibility for the harm that she caused; the fairness of one person being worse off than (...) another varies with her responsibility for being worse off; the fairness of inflicting defensive harm on a person to avert a threat varies with her responsibility for causing or posing the threat; and so on. (shrink)

Subjects experiencing thought insertion disown thoughts they are introspectively aware of. According to what I call “the rationality hypothesis”, thought-insertion reports are not merely intelligible, but also express, or potentially express, fully rational judgments in the light of highly disruptive experience. I argue that the hypothesis is ethically and theoretically motivated, and provides two insights into the philosophical significance of reports by subjects with schizophrenia. First, the reports can be seen as evidence that rational judgments of ownership of a thought (...) prioritize agency awareness over introspective awareness of it. This point fits with an integrative account of thought insertion at the personal and mechanistic levels. Second, rational and competent uses of the first person purely based on introspection do not necessarily involve a full-fledged first-person perspective over one’s thoughts. This suggests that agency awareness, and not introspection as such, is primarily involved in determining the reference of the first person featuring in the judgments. (shrink)

This article explores the moral significance of consent in an unjust world by developing the view that the validity of consent depends on its causes. It defends the view that the causes of consent make it valid or invalid. It then shows how this idea helps us to distinguish different ways in which consent might matter morally where it has problematic causes. Finally, it uses this analysis to explore the moral significance of a range of problematic causes of consent, including (...) objectification, arranged marriage, and third-party threats of violence. (shrink)

The book outlines the contribution of passivity to the constitution of phenomena as diverse as temporal syntheses, perceptual associations, memory fulfillment and cross-cultural communication.

Aristotle not only formulates the problem of intentionality explicitly, he makes a solution to it a requirement for any adequate theory of mind. His own solution, however, is not to be found in his theory of sensation, as Brentano and others have thought. In fact, it is precisely because Aristotle regards this theory as inadequate that he goes on to argue for a distinct new ability he calls "phantasia." The theory of content he develops on this basis (unlike Brentano's) is (...) profoundly naturalistic: it is a representational theory, formulated in terms of the causal powers and physical magnitudes of the body. (shrink)

This paper provides a philosophical analysis of the Price equation and its role in evolutionary theory. Traditional models in population genetics postulate simplifying assumptions in order to make the models mathematically tractable. On the contrary, the Price equation implies a very specific way of theorizing, starting with assumptions that we think are true and then deriving from them the mathematical rules of the system. I argue that the Price equation is a generalization-sketch, whose main purpose is to provide a unifying (...) framework for researchers, helping them to develop specific models. The Price equation plays this role because, like other scientific principles, shows features as abstractness, unification and invariance. By underwriting this special role for the Price equation some recent disputes about it could be diverted. (shrink)

From Fodor and Pylyshyn’s celebrated 1988 systematicity argument in favour of a language of thought , a challenge to connectionist models arises in the form of a dilemma: either these models do not explain systematicity or they are implementations of LOT. From consideration of this challenge and of systematicity in domains other than language, defenders of connectionism have mounted a parallel systematicity argument against LOT which results in a new self-defeating dilemma, what I call here the systematicity challenge challenge : (...) either LOT does not explain nonlinguistic systematicity, or it is in no better position than its rivals to explain any systematicity, even linguistic systematicity. In this paper, first, I critically examine the SCC and some considerations that seem to support it. Second, I offer a response to the SCC by: showing that LOT was never meant to be a cognitive model restricted only to linguistic systematicity, and formulating a new argument in favour of LOT from nonlinguistic systematicity. Third, I argue that there is a central assumption underlying the SCC and maintain that it is mistaken. I conclude that the classical systematicity challenge continues to be fully valid for linguistic and nonlinguistic domains. (shrink)

Marr’s celebrated contribution to cognitive science (Marr 1982, chap. 1) was the introduction of (at least) three levels of description/explanation. However, most contemporary research has relegated the distinction between levels to a rather dispensable remark. Ignoring such an important contribution comes at a price, or so we shall argue. In the present paper, first we review Marr’s main points and motivations regarding levels of explanation. Second, we examine two cases in which the distinction between levels has been neglected when considering (...) the structure of mental representations: Cummins et al.’s distinction between structural representation and encodings (Cummins in Journal of Philosophy, 93(12):591–614, 1996; Cummins et al. in Journal of Philosophical Research, 30:405–408, 2001) and Fodor’s account of iconic representation (Fodor 2008). These two cases illustrate the kind of problems in which researchers can find themselves if they overlook distinctions between levels and how easily these problems can be solved when levels are carefully examined. The analysis of these cases allows us to conclude that researchers in the cognitive sciences are well advised to avoid risks of confusion by respecting Marr’s old lesson. (shrink)

While it is known that Euclid’s five axioms include a proposition that a line consists at least of two points, modern geometry avoid consistently any discussion on the precise definition of point, line, etc. It is our aim to clarify one of notorious question in Euclidean geometry: how many points are there in a line segment? – from discrete-cellular space (DCS) viewpoint. In retrospect, it may offer an alternative of quantum gravity, i.e. by exploring discrete gravitational theories. To elucidate our (...) propositions, in the last section we will discuss some implications of discrete cellular-space model in several areas of interest: (a) cell biology, (b) cellular computing, (c) Maxwell equations, (d) low energy fusion, and (e) cosmology modelling. (shrink)

It has been known for long time that most of the existing cosmology models have singularity problem. Cosmological singularity has been a consequence of excessive symmetry of flow, such as “Hubble’s law”. More realistic one is suggested, based on Newtonian cosmology model but here we include the vertical-rotational effect of the whole Universe. We review a Riccati-type equation obtained by Nurgaliev, and solve the equation numerically with Mathematica. It is our hope that the new proposed method can be verified with (...) observation data. (shrink)

Inspired by “One Note Samba,” a standard jazz repertoire, we present an outline of Bose-Einstein Condensate Cosmology (BECC). Although this approach seems awkward and a bit off the wall at first glance, it is not impossible to connect altogether BEC, Scalar Field Cosmology and Feshbach Resonance with Ermakov-Pinney equation. We also discuss shortly possible link with our previous paper, where we describe Newtonian Universe with Vortex in terms of Ermakov equation.

In "De anima" 3.5, Aristotle argues for the existence of a second intellect, the so-called "Agent Intellect." The logical structure of his argument turns on a distinction between different types of soul, rather than different faculties within a given soul; and the attributes he assigns to the second species make it clear that his concern here -- as at the climax of his other great works, such as the "Metaphysics," the "Nicomachean" and the "Eudemian Ethics" -- is the difference between (...) the human and the divine. If this is right, we needn't go on a wild goose chase trying to invent a role for the so-called Agent Intellect to play. God moves our intellects as he moves the heavenly spheres, "as a beloved": he constitutes the complete actualization towards which all of our intellectual striving is directed. Aristotle regards such final causation as an efficient cause, but not in a way that would make it part of what we would call the causal processes or mechanisms of human psychology. But, he would insist, it is essential for appreciating who we are and what our place is in the world. (shrink)

This article explores the extent to which the magnitude of harm that a person is liable to suffer to avert a threat depends on the magnitude of her causal contribution to the threat. Several different versions of this view are considered. The conclusions are mostly skeptical—facts that may determine how large of a causal contribution a person makes to a threat are not morally significant, or not sufficiently significant to make an important difference to liability. However, understanding ways in which (...) causation may be scalar helps to deepen our understanding of other morally significant facts, such as responsibility. (shrink)

In his recent book, Killing in War, Jeff McMahan sets out a number of conditions for a person to be liable to attack, provided the attack is used to avert an objectively unjust threat: (1) The threat, if realized, will wrongfully harm another; (2) the person is responsible for creating the threat; (3) killing the person is necessary to avert the threat, and (4) killing the person is a proportionate response to the threat. The present article focuses on McMahan's second (...) condition, which links liability with responsibility. McMahan's use of the responsibility criterion, the article contends, is too restrictive as an account of liability in general and an account of liability to be killed in particular. In order to defend this claim, the article disambiguates the concept of liability and explores its role in the philosophical analysis of the permission to cause harm to others. (shrink)