This paper provides a philosophical analysis of the Price equation and its role in evolutionary theory. Traditional models in population genetics postulate simplifying assumptions in order to make the models mathematically tractable. On the contrary, the Price equation implies a very specific way of theorizing, starting with assumptions that we think are true and then deriving from them the mathematical rules of the system. I argue that the Price equation is a generalization-sketch, whose main purpose is to provide a unifying (...) framework for researchers, helping them to develop specific models. The Price equation plays this role because, like other scientific principles, shows features as abstractness, unification and invariance. By underwriting this special role for the Price equation some recent disputes about it could be diverted. (shrink)

This article analyzes the view of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces. The analogy with Newtonian mechanics has been challenged due to the alleged mismatch between drift and the other evolutionary forces. Since genetic drift has no direction several authors tried to protect its status as a force: denying its lack of directionality, extending the notion of force and looking for a force in physics which also lacks of direction. I analyse these approaches, and although this strategy finally succeeds, (...) this discussion overlooks the crucial point on the debate between causalists and statisticalists: the causal status of evolutionary theory. (shrink)

The concept of vulnerability is widely used in bioethics, particularly in research ethics and public health ethics. The traditional approach construes vulnerability as inherent in individuals or the groups to which they belong and views vulnerability as requiring special protections. Florencia Luna and other bioethicists continue to challenge traditional ways of conceptualizing and applying the term. Luna began proposing a layered approach to this concept and recently extended this proposal to offer two new concepts to analyze the concept of vulnerability, (...) namely understanding external conditions that trigger vulnerability and layers of vulnerability with cascading effects. Luna's conception of vulnerability is useful, which we demonstrate by applying her layered view and the new analyses in multiple contexts. We begin by outlining Luna's view and we use vignettes from healthcare involving transgender patients, the care of patients in psychiatric contexts, and research involving prisoners to illustrate how each part of Luna's concept elucidates important moral issues. (shrink)

The essay intends to demonstrate the need to postulate an spiritual reality in the human being as a condition of possibility of the world’s visibility. For that purpose, it employs the phenomenological method. It describes the structure of human sensitive perception. This description firstly presents the world’s structure. Secondly, it manifests the importance of the body as a border element between the soul and the world and as an organ by means of which the soul structures the world. It is (...) the second distance the distance between the body and the world. But, thirdly, the description states that, no matter how intimately the soul interpenetrates the body and requires it to know the world, the soul is not the body. It is the third distance or the primordial distance between the soul and everything else. (shrink)

This second volume completes the biography of the influential philosopher, following Whitehead's move first from Trinity College, Cambridge to London, and then, at the age of 63, to America, where the focus of his work shifted from mathematics to philosophy. Lowe (philosophy emeritus, Johns Hopkins U.) died in 1988 with this biography not quite completed. Vol.2 was edited and seen through publication by J.B. Schneewind, chairman of the Philosophy Department at Johns Hopkins. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

Sometimes Strauss argues as if he thought it possible to understand man without raising questions about his relations to other things, and hence about his place in the whole. But when they are viewed in their broader context, such arguments are seen not to be his final word. Man's humanity cannot be understood in its own terms alone. The human soul differs from everything else in that it is "... open to the whole and therefore more akin to the whole (...) than anything else is." In ordinary usage, "whole" implies completeness and autonomy. But the openness of the soul--i.e., of a part--to the whole can only mean that the whole is open to itself. The whole is, then, not, in the ordinary sense of the term, whole. Nor is the soul which is "open" to it. Stripped of myths, "... the human soul is... more akin to the whole than anything else is" because neither of them is whole. The same conclusion follows when one tries to understand the definition of the philosopher as the man animated by quest for knowledge of the whole. Qua philosopher he knows neither that there is a whole, nor what it might be if there were one. To define the philosopher as the man who knows that he does not know only paraphrases the difficulty. It does not solve it. For "know" is here used equivocally. The same equivocation is at play in the comment "... one cannot know that one does not know without knowing what one does not know". Admittedly "knowledge of ignorance is not ignorance." The philosopher believes and perhaps divines more than he actually knows. All men do. The essential difference between the philosopher and other men may well consist in the fact that the philosopher distinguishes more conscientiously than do others between what he knows and what he believes, and that he strives more single-mindedly than do they to transform as large a share of his beliefs as possible into knowledge. He may conceivably at some point be said to have reached the stage where his aspirations have become reasoned expectations. But that is as far as he can possibly go as long as he remains a philosopher and has not become a wise man or a god. Until and unless the philosopher knows, in the strong sense of the term, he can no more decide whether his aspirations could be fulfilled than he can swim before getting wet. (shrink)

This paper attempts three things. It invites you to engage critically with me in the adjudication of a particular controversy. It attempts to argue for and exemplify important procedures which distinguish good and bad thinking in a critical mode. And it argues the case for the separate teaching of critical thinking (henceforth CT).

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. OSAP is now published twice yearly, in both hardback and paperback.

The beginning of the 21st century witnesses a trend for business and leisure travelers to make accommodation decisions by referring to online reviews of hotel accommodation services and the hotel management’s responses to such reviews. The responses, termed review response genre in this study, have since attracted considerable research attention. The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it aims to identify the moves present in the review response genre; second, it aims to explore how the hotel management attempts to (...) achieve service recovery with the moves of the genre. A total of three obligatory moves are identified: Acknowledging Problem, Expressing Feeling and Thanking Reviewer. The findings will have significant implications for the hospitality and wider service industry practitioners responsible for handling negative online reviews. (shrink)

resumed version of a Philosophycal Anthropology, a PhD Thesis.

Germán Cano Gedisa Barcelona, 2023 149 páginas ISBN: 978-8419406002.

There is now an established literature on the link between later Wittgenstein and enactivist approaches in cognitive science. However, is this link not just a matter for card carrying Wittgensteinians? Can enactivists not manage perfectly well without Wittgenstein? In this paper, I show why some enactivists should care about Wittgenstein. Focusing on the enactivist view, “Sensorimotor Identity”. I argue that proponents of this view can use Wittgensteinian considerations to resolve an issue confronting their view and thereby shore up their proposed (...) dissolution of the explanatory gap. Some enactivists thus have in fact much to gain by engaging with Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Resumo:É pretendido, neste pequeno texto, mostrar como Leibniz se insere de modo bem peculiar na tradicional discussão filosófica acerca da liberdade do agente num mundo governado pelo princípio de razão suficiente. A questão posta por Arnauld, em carta de 13 de março de 1686, além de forçar Leibniz a dar esclarecimentos sobre a solução que adotou, também é importante por carregar certos resquícios do modo pelo qual Aristóteles abordou este tema. Também deve ser notado que, apesar da ruptura que a (...) solução leibniziana faz com a tradição aristotélica, vários outros pontos da filosofia de Aristóteles são aceitos para a construção e resolução do problema. (shrink)

In this book the main emphasis is twofold: on autonomous machine intelligence, and on mind uploading. This chapter shows that, while science fiction (SF) has depicted the extreme embrace of the “prosthetic impulse,” most notoriously in Star Trek's“Borg,” this is used as a warning of the potential Faustian consequences of such tendencies. The Star Trek franchise has also highlighted the converse, the Pinocchio syndrome, a reverse prosthetic impulse, most notably in the android Commander Data. Data is a sentient android and (...) a full member of the Enterprise starship crew in Star Trek: The Next Generation. The inverse of the Pinocchio syndrome, the prosthetic impulse, is arguably exemplified by Star Trek's Borg, who constitute a relentless inhuman tide that threatens to overwhelm every species violently, assimilating all individual beings into the Borg collective, stifling their lan vital and incorporating them as part of a hive mind, with an inexorable “insect mentality”. (shrink)

The word “Hermeneutics” has an exotic aura that may seem uncharacteristic of Locke. It was not one that he employed, nor is it commonly used by his contemporary interpreters, which are reasons enough to require an explanation of its prominence in the title and in the discussion that follows. “Locke’s theory and practice of interpretation” may seem a plainer and more suitable choice of words to characterize the subject of this study, although it is a less convenient alternative, employing several (...) words to express what could be said well enough by one. However, my choice of “hermeneutics” has been prompted by other considerations than the mere economy of words. It is to be preferred, because of its rich associations, which, I believe, direct interpreters to themes in Locke’s philosophy that otherwise might go unnoticed. And this should lead to the discovery of a more fulsome and deeper, although perhaps more problematic wisdom, than is commonly supposed to be found in his writings, and perhaps also to a sense of greater, although here also more problematic, unity among them. The meaning of the word and its cognates afford us a more informative philosophical prospect than the more limited Early Modern, by harking back to Antiquity and pointing forward to Kant and beyond, facilitating the discovery in Locke’s writings of resonances with past tradition and anticipations of philosophical problems and solutions with which it is commonly supposed he had little to do. The aim of this exercise is not to fit Locke into new surroundings, but to consider him anew, hermeneutically, which necessitates that attention be paid to internal contexts of Locke’s several writings, and the “thread and coherence” of his various discourses. A comparison of these internal contexts should make it possible to decide whether there may not be a mode of thinking common to them all that, once identified and clarified, may serve as a trace or connector that unites them into a single expression of thought. (shrink)

Стовпець О. В. Інститут інтелектуальної власності в епоху інформації й постмодерну: соціально-філософський ракурс : [монографія] / О. В. Стовпець. - Одеса : Державний заклад "Південноукраїнський національний педагогічний університет ім. К. Д. Ушинського", 2016.

This paper continues the investigations begun in [6] and continued in [7] about quantifier-free axiomatizations of plane Euclidean geometry using ternary operations. We show that plane Euclidean geometry over Archimedean ordered Euclidean fields can be axiomatized using only two ternary operations if one allows axioms that are not first-order but universal Lw1,w sentences. The operations are: the transport of a segment on a halfline that starts at one of the endpoints of the given segment, and the operation which produces one (...) of the intersection points of a perpendicular on a diameter of a circle with that circle. MSC: 03F65, 51M05, 51M15. (shrink)

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. OSAP is now published twice yearly, in both hardback and paperback.

This study measures the importance of finalizing university higher education in the income of Peruvian workers. Thus, information from the National Household Survey of Peru is analyzed, estimating three regression models based on who finished university studies and who did not. Our results show that completing university presents higher private returns than not doing it, and that the gap in returns by sex is shortened in those who finish their studies. In addition, there are higher returns in urban areas, capital (...) cities, quality universities, and in those who do not study an education career. (shrink)

This article examines the possibility of establishing a Department of Peace (DOP) as a Department of the Government of Canada. The topic has been introduced in Parliament twice, as Bill C-447 in 2009 and as Bill C-373 in 2011, without any further actions beyond the formal First Reading. The introduction of the bills could only happen on the basis of significant support among Canadians. At present efforts to introduce the DOP continue, although in somewhat muted form. Based largely on oral (...) interviews, this article assesses the potential for establishing a DOP in the context of the Canadian peace tradition as well as global developments. It concludes that a DOP has great potential to move the peace agenda forward but that, in view of the priorities of the current government and the general mood in Canadian society, it is not realistic to expect a DOP to be implemented at present. (shrink)

O presente artigo é uma discussão sobre a noção heideggeriana de Überwindung. Seu objetivo é duplo: por um lado, [1] mostrar a perspectiva que tal termo deve ser compreendido; por outro, [2] aprofundar esta perspectiva à luz de comentários ao aforismo I do texto Überwindung der Metaphysik. Para tanto, duas questões são postas: em que perspectiva e que questões estão implícitas quando Heidegger propõe o projeto da Überwindung der Metaphysik?; e por que uma Überwindung contém em si tantos problemas? De (...) modo a discutir e comentar tais questões, o artigo percorre dois caminhos: [1] faz-se uma análise da própria indicação heideggeriana da perspectiva de compreensão da Überwindung der Metaphysik, qual seja, revisitar, a partir de um olhar determinado, a construção da noção de história do ser. Esta, por sua vez, tem sua gênese antes mesmo da própria Kehre. Mais especificadamente, na reinterpretação que o próprio Heidegger faz de seu texto Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. A partir desta reconsideração feita por Heidegger e inserida em seu próprio texto, é possível detectar quatro teses fulcrais que traçam essencialmente a metafísica e que justificam a sua superação. São elas: [a] o fato de o ser, originariamente, se velar e provocar, historialmente, o seu esquecimento; [b] a relação entre a verdade do ser e a história, que se desenvolve como história do ser; [c] a ideia de que pertence ao ser um caráter originário de retração de si mesmo e que essa retração é um destino que pertence à história do pensamento metafísico e se configura na própria essência da metafísica; [d] afirmar que a certeza da manifestação da essência coincide com o seu fim. [2] Adentra-se, mediante uma aproximação pari passu, no aforismo I do texto Überwindung der Metaphysik, com intuito de comentar a problematicidade do termo Überwindung quando usado para repensar a metafísica à luz da perspectiva da história do ser. (shrink)