Este trabajo pretende detallar la concepción metafilosófica del socratismo y del aristotelismo precisando la interrelación entre teoría y praxis que ambos proyectos desarrollan. A partir de un diagnóstico común a Michel Foucault y Pierre Hadot, según el cual el saber filosófico era inseparable en la antigüedad de una “existencia filosófica”, se expone cómo concibieron tanto Sócrates como Aristóteles este peculiar “modo de vida”, concluyéndose que las raíces del “biós theoretikós” aristotélico se encuentran en la “vida examinada” defendida (...) por el maestro de Platón. En el transcurso de esta investigación, además, se pone de manifiesto que la dimensión teórica de la filosofía resulta prioritaria en ambos pensadores, si bien el descubrimiento de la verdad, propósito último de la teoría, acarrea consecuencias prácticas imposibles de alcanzar por una vía distinta de la contemplación filosófica. Se resuelve, por tanto, que la tensión entre la filosofía como “ciencia de la verdad” y como “ejercicio de vida” es un rasgo esencial del quehacer filosófico tal y como fue tematizado por estos dos grandes pensadores. (shrink)

Neste artigo procuro mostrar que, embora Sócrates tenha sido um crítico da democracia ateniense, seu pensamento, como conhecido a partir dos primeiros diálogos de Platão, coaduna-se com os valores fundamentais da cultura democrática de Atenas. Para defender essa interpretação, focalizo um dos princípios mais importante da democracia grega: a liberdade de expressão. Primeiro, examino o conceito de liberdade de expressão. Esclareço que, no contexto político democrático, dois termos gregos comunicam dois sentidos conexos mas distintos da liberdade de expressão: isēgoría, que (...) significa a igual oportunidade de todos os cidadãos falarem nas assembleias políticas; e parrhēsía, franqueza, a liberdade para criticar e para uma pessoa dizer a verdade como a ver. Em seguida, trato de três aspectos interligados do pensamento socrático: o método da refutação, a noção de “cuidado de si” e o ideal da vida examinada para evidenciar como eles pressupõem ou se assentam no valor da liberdade de expressão. Destaco que é preciso que a pessoa esteja seriamente comprometida a perseguir e exprimir a verdade para que seja capaz de avaliar suas crenças e livrar-se daquelas que são falsas. Consequentemente, esta pessoa pode prestar conta da própria vida expondo se seu pensamento, discurso e atos estão em acordo, assim como ela é capaz de levar a vida examinada, pondo sob escrutínio a si mesmo e os outros, praticando o pensamento crítico que é essencial para o aperfeiçoamento moral e a formação de um bom cidadão para uma sociedade democrática. Concluo que, na medida em que promove o dizer a verdade, a atitude crítica socrática não é somente coerente com os preceitos básicos do regime democrático, mas também útil à democracia. Palavras-chave : Sócrates. Democracia. Parrhesía. Elenchos. Vida examinada. (shrink)

The article is the result of the research project “Higher Education in Humanistic Perspective: An Approach from Martha Nussbaum”, having Nussbaum’s book Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education as the main referent for the considerations presented. Hermeneutics is used as the philosophical method. One of the purposes of the article is to reveal how higher education courses in human development might be transformed from the perspective of self-examination in Martha Nussbaum’s thought, understanding the latter as one (...) of the three skills required for cultivating humanity. Self-examination is related to Bioethics in two different ways: first, by considering the current scientific context where some relevant issues arise and, second, it is exposed how its practice, by being in close relationship to the ethical and bioethical training of future professionals, is relevant for higher education teaching. Therefore, the consideration here presented is relevant and necessary precisely at a time when science progresses rapidly and not likewise the sense of humanity that should underlie and guide the actions of those involved in scientific progress and Health Care. Three topics are presented in the article: some considerations regarding the importance of bioethical thought, an approach to the particular meaning of Martha Nussbaum’s “self-examination”, and the examination of oneself and human formation related to Bioethics. (shrink)

Se trata de analizar el puesto que ocupa El tema de nuestro tiempo en el conjunto de la obra de Ortega, en su camino hacia la llamada “Segunda navegación”, es decir, hacia su filosofía de madurez. Después de contextualizar el libro en la cultura europea de la época, describiendo las novedades que acontecieron en torno a 1921-23 y la situación histórica por la que atravesaba España, en plena crisis del sistema de la Restauración, se entra en el examen de los (...) conceptos nucleares “vida”, “generación”, “racionalismo”, “perspectivismo”, en torno a los cuales Ortega elabora su propuesta filosófica. Las grandes cuestiones de la cultura europea –políticas, morales, el sentido de la Historia– deben ser examinadas a la nueva luz de la razón vital, agotadas las fórmulas de la razón pura. Finalmente, se procede a una evaluación crítica del Tema. Ortega no logra renovar la idea nuclear de “vida humana” por depender aún de un enfoque naturalista y fiar la fundamentación de la razón vital a una ciencia nueva y no a una filosofía primera, como propondrá desde los cursos y textos de los años 30. (shrink)

Siguiendo la trama de la Crisis de la humanidad europea y la fúosofía de E. Husserl, la A. examina primero en su origen y sentido esencial los cooceptos de cultura europa y de"Europa" -que le han valido a Husserl laacusación de "eurocentrismo"- para luego discutir el tema de la crisis europea, entendida como crisis de las ciencias y de la humanidad europea. La noción de cultura europea se esclarece exhaustivamente al destacar la nueva actitud del individuo frente al mundo y (...) la obligación con la idea de verdad que subyace a todo su desarrollo desde su origen griego;además, la ciencia europea revoluciona la cultura y la historicidad humanas coo la idea de infinitud. La crisis mencionada, por su lado,es adjudicable al racionalismo moderno de la ilustración y sus consecuencias objetivistas y naturalistas. El sujeto es ahuyentado del mundo de las relaciooes objetivas y el espíritu humano se vuelve objeto de la psicología naturalista.El cooocimiento del hombre como sujeto y la reversión de la fundamental conversión del sentido del mundo de la vida en las ciencias naturales, a través de su reconstrucción genética,serán las vías examinadas para una salida satisfactoria de la crisis. (shrink)

Neste artigo, proponho-me investigar a sexualidade e a contradição a partir da análise do “início” da história n’A cidade de Deus, XIV, de Agostinho, onde a “vontade”, sob a figura privilegiada da “libido”, é disposta como princípio e fundamento da história por meio da elucidação de vários planos de contradições constitutivas da condição humana. Mais precisamente, se o pecado inaugura um regime de existência humana em ruptura com a essência, trata-se da passagem ou queda do ser humano da natureza para (...) uma condição. A passagem de um estado a outro inaugural da história é examinada por Agostinho a partir do confronto mesmo entre natureza e condição ou entre identidade e contradição. No livro XIV, a análise da sexualidade é o expediente privilegiado por Agostinho para confrontar o que a realidade humana é por essência e o que ela é existencialmente, na medida em que a excitação dos órgãos sexuais é o primeiro efeito da ruptura do homem com a natureza, conforme relato bíblico, e é um dado da condição humana universal e incondicionado de contradição manifesta pela libido. Agostinho, desse modo, não pode por óbvio mobilizar nenhum dado histórico sobre a vida dos homens com a natureza íntegra, de modo que seu único recurso é a revelação, já em relação à condição, o autor mobiliza toda sorte de fatos históricos. Por consequente, o recurso à fé como condição de inteligência do histórico ampara-se numa consideração da contradição e do erro não exclusivamente como um problema de predicação, mas como problemas reais e constitutivos da história. (shrink)

O presente trabalho apresenta a segunda parte do artigo onde a figura de Medéia no canto III das Argonáuticas será examinada. A fim de tornar a leitura mais clara e enriquecedora, fez-se necessário tecer alguns comentários sobre a vida e a obra de Apolônio Ródio, autor da obra aqui estudada.

Thomas Scanlon buscou desenvolver uma abordagem contratualista da moralidade partindo de argumentos fundados apenas em princípios que ninguém poderia razoavelmente rejeitar. Ele acreditava que a maior parte das teorias contratualistas era fundamentada apenas em acordos realizados por agentes autointeressados e queria apresentar uma versão diferente de contrato social. Ele decidiu, então, chamar contratualismo sua teoria e outras fundamentadas na razoabilidade e contratarianismo aquelas fundadas na racionalidade entendida como busca pelo autointeresse. Essa se tornou uma distinção usual e Hobbes tem sido (...) classificado como contratarianista. A posição ocupada por Hobbes deveria, entretanto, ser examinada em detalhe. A compreensão de Hobbes da racionalidade é diferente do autointeresse. Além disso, ele liga a descoberta das leis de natureza, que comandam a reciprocidade, à razão. No entanto, o interesse na preservação da própria vida é um fim importante na teoria dele. O objetivo do presente artigo é mostrar que a teoria de Hobbes é mais interessante e complexa do que a definição do contratarianismo. (shrink)

Ao analisar parte da tradição filosófica Ocidental e, em particular, contrapor o ensinamento de mestres e gurus do Oriente aos ensinamentos de escolas metafísicas e de ciência política do Ocidente, o presente artigo, poderá ser dito, insere-se na categoria de filosofia das civilizações. Não estando limitada, porém, a nenhuma dessas civilizações, a arte política, enquanto perícia daquele que governa ou leva a vida feliz, pode ser examinada no prolongamento das suas intersecções e enquanto questão filosófica independente. Neste artigo, (...) o autor parte por isso do pressuposto de que a busca do conhecimento do bom governo e vida feliz é comum a ambas as civilizações ou, mais essencialmente, a todo o homem enquanto homem e, observando a ausência de uma correspondência significativa entre ambas no tema da ciência ou arte política, procura examinar possíveis modalidades específicas dessa investigação. Se puder ser dito que, nesse sentido, a filosofia política é uma modalidade mais específica do Ocidente e, do Oriente, a filosofia do sentir intuitivo, o escopo deste artigo é, então, o exame da possibilidade da filosofia do sentir político enquanto questão filosófica independente. (shrink)

O presente artigo se propõe a analisar os desvios de expectativa acerca da transição de gênero realizados por dois autores estadunidenses - Thomas Page McBee e Janet Mock - na feitura de suas autobiografias: "Man alive” (2014) e “Amateur” (2018); “Redefining realness” (2014) e “Surpassing certainty” (2017). Através de análise documental e informado por estudos queer e trans, este trabalho se debruça sobre os empreendimentos levados a cabo pelos autores para estranhar e desafiar o lugar de conquista e estabilidade socialmente (...) atribuídos ao fim de sua transição. Investigo a partir do exame de seus caminhos narrativos os modos distintos como o lugar de chegada atribuído pelo regime discursivo cisnormativo contemporâneo – por exemplo, a assimilação a um pressuposto de permanência identitária e apagamento da trajetória, e a adesão a modelos unívocos de hombridade e mulheridade “de verdade” – é transformado em um dispositivo de desorientação acionado de modo a questionar a própria cisnorma e seus padrões estabelecidos de trajetória de vida. Nessa costura, categorias específicas são examinadas por autôries, e tal exame conduz seu argumento: passabilidade; transição; homem/mulher “de verdade” (e os papeis que cada um deles abrange). (shrink)

Este artigo homenageia a atualidade do curso A hermenêutica do sujeito, proferido por Foucault no Collège de France em 1982. Sabe-se que o tema central do curso é o cuidado de si como tekhné tou biou, examinado pelo filósofo nos momentos socrático-platônico, helenístico e cristão. Porém, tomaremos a questão da amizade, que atravessa as técnicas de si antigas analisadas por Foucault, para problematizar nosso presente. Após discutir a recepção que fazemos do curso quarenta anos depois, discutimos o atual momento do (...) neoliberalismo e as políticas de inimizade por ele engendradas, de modo a pensar a prática da amizade como contraconduta, como prática de resistência. A amizade anarquista como forma de associação é tomada como máquina de guerra possível contra as atuais políticas de inimizade neoliberais. Palavras-chave: amizade; técnicas de si; ética; política; anarquismo. In defense of friendship: life’s proofs in the subjecvity wars of the contemporary enmity policies Abstract: This article pays homage to the actuality of the course The hermeneutics of the subject, given by Foucault at the Collège de France in 1982. It is known that the central theme of the course is the care of the self as tekhné tou biou, examined by the philosopher in three moments: Socratic-Platonic, Hellenistic, and Christian. However, we will take the question of friendship, which crosses the ancient techniques of the self analyzed by Foucault, to problematize our present. After discussing our reception of the course forty years later, we discuss the current moment of neoliberalism and the enmity policies engendered by it, in order to think about the practice of friendship as a counter-conduct, as a practice of resistance. Anarchist friendship as a form of association is taken as a possible war machine against current neoliberal policies of enmity. Key words: friendship; techniques of the self; ethics; politics; anarchism. En defensa de la amistad: pruebas de vida en las guerras de subjetividad de las políticas de enemistad contemporáneas Resumen: En este artículo prestamos homenaje a la actualidad del curso La hermenéutica del sujeto, presentado por Foucault en 1982 en el Collège de France. Se sabe que el tema que es el centro del curso ha sido la inquietud de sí como tekhné tou biou, examinada por el filósofo en tres momentos de la antigüedad: el socrático-platónico, el helenístico y el cristiano. Aún así, tomamos la cuestión de la amistad, que es transversal a las técnicas de sí antiguas analizadas por Foucault, para problematizar nuestro tiempo presente. Después de discutir la recepción que nosotros hacemos del curso cuarenta años más tarde, ponemos en debate el momento actual del neoliberalismo y sus políticas de enemistad, de manera a pensar la práctica de la amistad como contra conducta, como práctica de resistencia. Tomamos la amistad anarquista como como forma de asociación como posible maquina de guerra contra las políticas de enemistad neoliberales actuales. Palabras clave: amistad; técnicas de sí; ética; política; anarquismo Data de registro: 10/07/2022 Data de aceite: 26/10/2022. (shrink)

Giorgio Levi Della Vida (1886-1967) was not only an eminent Islamologist, belonging to that tradition of Italian Oriental studies that stretches from Ignazio Guidi to Leone Caetani, Carlo Alfonso Nallino and Francesco Gabrieli - he was also a man with solid roots in his own time. He taught in Naples and Rome, then for the ten years 1939-1948 at the University of Pennsylvania. He was one of the few university teachers who, when the oath of loyalty to the Italian (...) fascist regime was introduced, in October 1931, opted not to accept that act of submission. (shrink)

Giorgio Levi Della Vida (1886-1967) was not only an eminent Islamologist, he was also a man with solid roots in his own time. He taught in Naples and Rome, then for the ten years 1939-1948 at the University of Pennsylvania. He was one of the few university teachers who, when the oath of loyalty to the Italian fascist regime was introduced in October 1931, opted not to accept that act of submission. His memoirs, Fantasmi ritrovati, were published in 1966; (...) the book, now out of print, conjures up a tableau vivant of half a century of intellectual encounters in Italy and Europe between the wars. Among the portraits he paints there is the astounding story of those crucial days in June 1924 when the fascist government became a full-blown regime. This article presents extended extracts from that story. (shrink)

Commercial surrogacy arrangements now cross borders; this paper aims to reevaluate the traditional moral concerns regarding the practice against the added ethical dimension of global injustice. I begin by considering the claim that global surrogacy serves to satisfy the positive reproductive rights of infertile first-world women. I then go on to consider three powerful challenges to this claim. The first holds that commercial surrogacy involves the commodification of a good that should not be valued in market terms, the second that (...) it involves the exploitation of the labor of disadvantaged women, and the third that it depends on the illegitimate privileging of positive rights over negative rights. I reject the first of these challenges and argue that global surrogacy arrangements are indeed exploitative on the dual basis of what I call intracontractual injustice and intercontractual coercion. The latter, I contend, depends on a preexisting negative rights violation, which cannot be permitted for the sake of satisfying another's positive reproductive entitlement. I conclude not in favor of a global ban but with suggestions on how developing nations that permit commercial surrogacy might better protect the negative reproductive rights of their female citizens, thereby making them less vulnerable to exploitation. (shrink)

Journal of Global Ethics, Volume 9, Issue 3, Page 329-343, December 2013.

Boredom can motivate us to perform actions that are painful, imprudent, morally objectionable, or unwise in other respects. It can also give rise to forms of akrasia: we may be unwilling to do what we know we must, simply because we will find it boring; when we are racked with boredom—bored stiff, bored to tears—actions that might otherwise never occur to us to do can begin to appear attractive, and sometimes remain attractive against our better judgment. But boredom is also (...) relevant to another set of moral or ethical con- cerns. Alongside questions about what we may do out of boredom, and about whether such actions are morally justifiable, conducive to our well-being, or instrumentally rational, a person’s character can be revealed by how her dispositions of boredom express themselves. And just as our emotional dispositions can be not just criticized, but also improved, so we may think that our dispositions of boredom, too, may be both criticized and improved. From a virtue-theoretical approach to boredom that would encourage this shift of focus from the ethical significance of actions to include assessments of character and motive as well, three questions emerge. What kind of atti- tude is boredom, such that it can motivate (sometimes objectionable) forms of action, while also reflecting or disclosing something about the kind of character one has? What does it disclose or reveal about a person that she is bored by particular things, and not others, and to greater and lesser extents? And is there a virtue that could come to govern our dispositions of boredom, providing an ideal that one might aspire to? (shrink)

Philosophers are now wary of conflating the “fittingness” or accuracy of an emotion with any form of moral assessment of that emotion. Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, who originally cautioned against this “conflation”, also warned philosophers not to infer that an emotion is inaccurate from the fact that feeling it would be morally inappropriate, or that it is accurate from the fact that feeling it would be morally appropriate. Such inferences, they argue, risk committing “the moralistic fallacy”, a mistake they (...) claim is widespread throughout the work of contemporary and historical moral philosophers. I argue that many basic and familiar forms of moral assessment of the emotions are not subject to these arguments. I illustrate this by reconsidering the idea that to assess an emotion as “fitting” is to assess it as what a virtuous person would feel. After showing how assessments akin to this “virtue-theoretical” notion of fit may be prevalent even outside of the Aristotelian tradition, I suggest some more charitable and philosophically productive interpretations of the philosophical views of the emotions that D’Arms and Jacobson criticize, and argue that we cannot coherently theorize about the fittingness conditions of the emotions in a morally neutral way. (shrink)

Scholarship on gender mainstreaming in the European Union consistently highlights the disappointing implementation of gender mainstreaming. This article contributes to that discussion through the analysis of the first policy frame on gender equality in the work programmes of the EU’s Framework Programme for Research and Development, Horizon 2020, from 2014 until 2016. This article analyses how GM as a transformative strategy is contextualised by advisory group experts, and what is being achieved within Horizon 2020 work programmes. In opposition to the (...) Commission’s rhetorical commitment to GM, this article demonstrates that Horizon 2020 work programmes exemplify a failure of implementing GM, further depoliticising gender equality in the Commission’s neoliberal context. (shrink)

People tend to be repulsed by the idea of cash markets in kidneys, but support the trading of kidneys through paired exchanges or chains. We reject anti-commodification accounts of this reaction and offer an egalitarian one. We argue that the morally significant difference between cash markets and kidney chains is that the former allow the wealthy greater access to kidneys, while the latter do not. The only problem with kidney chains is that they do not go far enough in addressing (...) equality concerns, and we show how the introduction of cash payments by the state could remedy this. (shrink)

Participation in healthcare decision-making is considered to be an important right of minors, and is highlighted in both international legislation and public policies. However, despite the legal recognition of children’s rights to participation, and also the benefits that children experience by their involvement, there is evidence that legislation is not always translated into healthcare practice. There are a number of factors that may impact on the ability of the child to be involved in decisions regarding their medical care. Some of (...) these factors relate to the child, including their capacity to be actively involved in these decisions. Others relate to the family situation, sociocultural context, or the underlying beliefs and practices of the healthcare provider involved. In spite of these challenges to including children in decisions regarding their clinical care, we argue that it is an important factor in their treatment. The extent to which children should participate in this process should be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking all of the potential barriers into account. (shrink)

The guise of the good thesis can be understood as an attempt to distinguish between human motivations that are intelligible as desires and those that are not. I propose, first, that we understand the intelligibility at stake here as the kind necessary for the experience of reactive attitudes, both negative and positive, to the behavior and motivations of an agent. Given this, I argue that the thesis must be understood as proposing substantive content restrictions on how human agents perceive objects (...) of their desires; it cannot be a purely formal constraint. Moreover, while proponents of the guise of the good thesis who posit substantive content restrictions on human desire are right to do so, they are mistaken to claim that we always desire the apparently good. Instead, I propose a different limit: the naturally attractive. This alternative to the guise of the good thesis nonetheless captures the compelling idea that human desires are intelligent, quasi-perceptual responses to the world. (shrink)

Anti-commodification theorists condemn liberal political philosophers for not being able to justify restricting a market transaction on the basis of what is sold, but only on the basis of how it is sold. The anti-commodification theorist is correct that if this were all the liberal had to say in the face of noxious markets, it would be inadequate: even if everyone has equal bargaining power and no one is misled, there are some goods that should not go to the highest (...) bidder. In this paper, I respond to the anti-commodification critique of liberalism by arguing that the political liberal has the wherewithal to account not only for the conditions under which goods should not be sold, but also for what kinds of goods should not be for sale in a market economy. The political liberal can appeal to a principle of equal basic rights, and to one of sufficiency in basic needs and the social bases of self-respect, I argue, to account for what’s problematic about markets in civic goods, necessary goods, and physical goods including body parts and intimate services. (shrink)

According to an attractive conception of love as attention, discussed by Iris Murdoch, one strives to see one’s beloved accurately and justly. A puzzle for understanding how to love another in this way emerges in cases where more accurate and just perception of the beloved only reveals his flaws and vices, and where the beloved, in awareness of this, strives to escape the gaze of others - including, or perhaps especially, of his loved ones. Though less attentive forms of love (...) may be able to render one’s continued love coherent and justifiable in these cases, they risk further alienating the beloved precisely because they are less attentive and because of the operations of the beloved’s shame. I argue that attentive love is well-suited to alleviate this problem of alienation, but that in order to do so, it must be supplemented with grace. I propose a conception of gracious love as an affectionate love for the qualities of human nature, distinguishing this from a love of humanity, and show how this complex emotion, in being responsive to the complexities of shame, is able to alleviate the problem of alienation. (shrink)

Consensus is lacking among research ethicists on the question of how broadly to understand the requirements of non-exploitation in international clinical research. Two types of principles have been proposed, minimalist and non-minimalist, grounded in two opposing conceptions of exploitation, transactional and systemic. Transactionalists have offered principles, which, it has been argued, are satisfied by minimal gains to vulnerable subjects measured against an unjust status quo. Systemicists have advanced principles with decidedly non-minimal mandates but only by conflating the obligations of clinical (...) research with those of First World citizenship. My aim here is to break this deadlock by offering grounds for a non-minimal requirement of international research ethics grounded in a transactional conception of exploitation. I do this by arguing that a subject's gains must be measured not only within the transaction, relative to her own starting point and to the share of gains enjoyed by her co-transactor, but also across transactions, so as to ensure parity of benefit to trial participants whenever, and wherever, parity of burden is assumed. (shrink)

In this paper, I situate Hans Blumenberg historically and conceptually in relation to a subtheme in the famous debate between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer at Davos, Switzerland in 1929. The subtheme concerns Heidegger’s and Cassirer’s divergent attitudes toward philosophical anthropology as it relates to the starting points and goals of philosophy. I then reconstruct Blumenberg’s anthropology, which involves reconceptualizing Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms in relation to Heidegger’s objections to the philosophical anthropology of his day (e.g., Max Scheler, Helmuth (...) Plessner, and Arnold Gehlen) as unduly anthropocentric. Blumenberg builds on anthropologist Gehlen’s assumption that human beings are biologically underdetermined and therefore world-open. With this starting point, symbolic forms, such as myth and language, make up a compensatory life-world that supports human existence. Action, or self-assertion, which is necessary given the lack of a seamless fit between human beings and the environment, is thus circumscribed and shaped by the historied, cultural constructs that constitute a life-world. Human beings can thus be characterized as a species that continually renegotiates the shape of its existence through its relation to biological limits on the one hand and cultural constants on the other. Because Blumenberg and philosophical anthropology are relatively unexplored by Anglophone philosophers, and because philosophical anthropology is central to Blumenberg’s methodology generally, this study provides an introduction to both. (shrink)