The debate on the ethics of terrorism focuses for the most part on the argument that employing violence against innocents or non-combatants is morally wrong. This point is usually made in combination with a so called narrow definition of terrorism , i.e. one that defines terrorism as exclusively targeting innocents . Yet, some scholars prefer a so called wide definition of terrorism, i.e. they hold that it may well be directed against non-innocents. Leaving from the assumption (...) that terrorism can be directed against non-innocents, in this paper I explore the ethical implications of such a wide definition regarding the possible justifiability of terrorism. As terrorism in this wide sense does not infringe the prohibition against killing innocents it seems, at the first glance, that such terrorism is somewhat less reprehensible or even justifiable. I use the term terrorism as describing an indirect strategy of using fear or terror induced by violent attacks or force (or the threat of its use) against one group of people (direct target) or their property as a means to intimidate and coerce another group of people (indirect target) and influence their actions in order to reach further political objectives. Terrorist acts are the violent acts that form part of such a strategy. I will furthermore distinguish between strong and weak terrorism: When the direct targets are so-called innocents it is strong terrorism; in any other case it is weak terrorism. I focus on the question of whether killing in the course of acts of weak terrorism may be justified, and if so, under what conditions. According to my definition, weak terrorism is characterised by violent acts that are not intentionally directed against so called innocents, i.e. people who cannot be held responsible for the problem the terrorists are fighting and are thus immune from attack. (shrink)

Ghana, like many African countries, continues to grapple with domestic violence issues. Ghana's 1992 Constitution mandates provisions that should eradicate the scourge of violence against women and children. In this paper, two main questions are asked. First, will the 1992 Constitution ultimately lead to victories over discrimination and violence against Ghanaian women? Second, has progress been made in eradicating violence against women in Ghana to date? In that regard, have governmental and non-governmental organizations (...) supported Ghanaian women to arrive at relative stability, empowerment and freedom from violence? Progress thus far is encouraging. Presently, there are several holistic or organic approaches being used to combat domestic violence in Ghana. however, an epidemiological examination of custom and a psychosocial approach towards domestic violence may facilitate permanent meaningful solutions. (shrink)

Non-combatant Immunity and Irregular Warfare The Ethical Problem of Human Shields One of the basic principles of the Just War Theory is that of non-combatant immunity. Basically, this principle is about protecting the civilian population against the violence of war. Now, despite the fact that this principle is firmly ingrained in our collective moral conscience and in international humanitarian law, the truth is that the civilian population has never been really insulated from the horrors of war. Quite on (...) the contrary. This seems to be especially the case in so-called irregular warfare. In order to avoid military defeat against a stronger opponent, non-state armed movements very often use tactics that entail important risks for the civilian population. These irregular combatants hide and fight, for instance, among the civilian population or they intentionally blur the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. One of those tactics consists in using non-combatants as human shields. It goes without saying that this tactic presents a complex moral challenge for conventional troops. Should these human shields be treated like any other innocent bystanders, or should they be considered as partial combatants? And can the non-combatant immunity principle be of any moral assistance here? It is the objective of this article to shed more light on this issue. The argument will be developed in four stages. First, we will take a closer look at the principle of non-combatant immunity as it is understood within the Just War Theory. In order to see if and to what extent the principle of non-combatant immunity can be of any assistance in confronting human shields, we will conduct a first case-based analysis. Next, we aim to develop a moral continuum of paradigmatic cases of human shields, the purpose of which is to provide an instrument that will help us to formulate more nuanced moral appreciations. Finally, we will briefly look at the practical relevance of the proposed approach. (shrink)

When one regards the conflicts of the past century, Hegel’s description of history as a “slaughter-bench” seems apt.1 The two world wars the century witnessed were extraordinarily violent. In the First, the combatants were subject to an industrial scale slaughter by being systematically exposed to machine gun fire, artillery bombardments and poison gas. The Second World War added to these horrors with its concept of “total war,” which was defined as a war directed against the totality of the (...) enemy nation: its schools, factories, cities, in short, the entirety of its civilian population. In pursuit of this policy, cities were firebombed, populations were deported or systematically starved, and non-combatants generally were subject to much the same violence as armies in the field. This extension of violence to civilian populations continued in the conflicts that followed. It was particularly marked in the liberation struggles and the civil wars that have extended from the post-war period to this day. While violence between nations has not been lacking, the organized intra-state violence of civil wars and the violence of “failed” states have come to the fore. Again and again, we witness outrages against defenseless populations, their robbing and murder by marauding bands. Such violence seems a continuation of the violence that arises whenever the withdrawal of the forces of civil order occurs. Whether this is occasioned by a natural disaster or by the fall of a dictatorship, looting and gang violence with its settling of scores seems inevitably to errupt. As the example of countries from Somalia to Iraq has shown, such violence only ceases when met by the counter-violence of the forces of public order. (shrink)

In 2002 a significant number of American theologians declared that the ‘war on terror’ was a just war. But the indiscriminate strategies and munitions technologies deployed in the invasion and occupation of Iraq fall short of the just war principles of non-combatant immunity, and proportionate response. The just war tradition is one of Christendom's most enduring legacies to the law of nations. Its practice implies a standard of virtue in war that is undermined by the indiscriminate effects of many modern (...) weapons and by the deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure. The violent power represented by the technology of what the Vatican calls ‘total war’has occasioned a significant shift in Catholic social teaching on just war since the Second World War. Total war generates an asymmetry of weakness in those subjected to these techniques of terror, and this has only strengthened the violence of the Islamist struggle against the West. But those who draw inspiration and legitimacy from this weakness in their struggle with the West also reject virtue in war. In a time of terror the theological vocation is to speak peace and to recall the terms in which the peace of God was achieved by way of the cross. (shrink)

Any plausible position in the ethics of war and political violence in general will include the requirement of protection of civilians (non-combatants, common citizens) against lethal violence. This requirement is particularly prominent, and particularly strong, in just war theory. Some adherents of the theory see civilian immunity as absolute, not to be overridden in any circumstances whatsoever. Others allow that it may be overridden, but only in extremis. The latter position has been advanced by Michael Walzer (...) under the heading of “supreme emergency.” In this paper, I look into some of the issues of interpretation and application of Walzer’s “supreme emergency” view and some of the criticisms that have been levelled against it. I argue that Walzer’s view is vague and unacceptable as it stands, but that the alternatives proposed by critics such as Brian Orend, C.A.J. Coady, and Stephen Nathanson are also unattractive. I go on to construct a position that is structurally similar to Walzer’s, but more specific and much less permissive, which I term the “moral disaster” view. According to this view, deliberate killing of civilians is almost absolutely wrong. (shrink)

After almost two decades in power, R. T. Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party have established authoritarian and Islamist governance in Turkey, which has adversely affected gender equality and women’s rights. So much so, that in 2009 the European Court of Human Rights acknowledged that there is a climate conducive to domestic violence in Turkey. Despite Erdoğan withdrawing Turkey unconstitutionally from the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, the government cannot (...) withdraw from the state’s duty to protect its citizens from the criminal acts of private individuals. By using international and regional organisations’ approaches to positive obligations and due diligence as a measure, the article addresses whether Turkey is fulfilling its duty of protecting women from the violent conduct of others. It is concluded that the government is failing in its positive obligations and instead, is reinforcing the climate through its discourse and practices that strengthen a national tolerance of violence against women and the national authorities’ reluctance to address it, thus allowing for impunity of its perpetrators. (shrink)

Violence against women is a growing health problem, especially when perpetrated in intimate relationships. Despite increasing attention, there is little comparative evidence on the different types of violence involved and there is a paucity of research on sexual femicides. This study examines cases of violence against women in northern Italy, focusing on sexual and non-sexual femicides and comparing them with rape that does not result in femicides. The sample included 500 women who were victims of (...) sexual and non-sexual femicides, and of rape. Results show sexual femicides mostly involved unknown victims or women who were prostitutes. Sexual femicidal offenders used improper weapons to kill their victims, acted in secluded locations, and fled the crime scene; their crime was more likely the result of predatory intentions, with antisociality and sexual deviance being the most significant factors related to this type of femicide. The criminal and violent pattern that characterized sexual femicides in this study shared significant similarities with the pattern of violence involved in rape. Rape victims were in fact mostly unknown, or involved in a brief relationship with their killer. When the victim was known it was more likely that the abuse occurred at home and in front of the woman’s children. Rapists were often under the effect of alcohol or drugs. Non-sexual femicides mainly involved known victims, and they were more often committed in the context of domestic disputes. It was not seldom that the long relationship between the victim and perpetrator was likely to be characterized by contentiousness, suggesting that the woman was often victim of an oppressive climate of emotional tension and domination. Morbid jealousy contributed to aggravating the tone of a controlling relationship. Non-sexual femicides bore more similarities to cases of rape within the pattern of intimate partner violence. Findings are discussed in terms of their implications for prevention and intervention. (shrink)

Oppressive governments that use violence against citizens, e.g. murder and torture, are usually thought of as liable to armed revolutionary attack by the oppressed population. But oppression may be non-violent. A government may greatly restrict political rights and personal autonomy by using surveillance, propaganda, manipulation, strategic detention and similar techniques without ever resorting to overt violence. Can such regimes be liable to revolutionary attack? A widespread view is that the answer is ‘no’. On this view, unless a (...) government is or is likely to turn violent, revolution against it is disproportional. After all, revolution would involve launching potentially lethal attacks against oppressors who do not threaten the lives and bodily integrity of their subjects but pose only lesser threats. I argue that this claim of disproportionality is false. Armed revolution against Stably Non-violent Oppressive Regimes can be proportional under some circumstances, thus they may be liable to revolutionary attack. My argument relies on the Responsibility-Sensitive Account of Proportionality. This account holds that responsibility for posing threats renders agents liable to greater defensive harms than the harms with which they threaten. Even if non-violent oppressive regimes do not threaten citizens with murder, serious physical injury, or enslavement, their responsibility for creating an environment in which citizens’ political rights and personal autonomy are extremely restricted may loosen the proportionality requirement of inflicting defensive harm and render them liable to revolutionary attack. (shrink)

Twenty years after September 11, the definition of terrorism remains a contentious issue. How to understand or not to understand ‘terrorism’ is by no means a purely academic exercise. The term has a history of being used to denounce certain types of political violence and their perpetrators as being wrongful per se. Like Tony Coady, I believe that it is not just possible but, in fact, crucial to separate the descriptive from the evaluative component if the concept is to (...) be informative at all and if we aspire to an open-ended inquiry into its distinctive wrongness. In The Meaning of Terrorism, Coady revisits and refines the themes of his writing on the topic over the past decades while providing in-depth discussions of many of the key figures in the debate on the ethics of war and terrorism. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: What Is the Second Sexism? The First Sexism Two Kinds of Denialist Forestalling Some Fallacies Structure and Method of the Book.

Medical ethics needs to be on its guard against those in military or political power who would seek to subvert its most basic tenets in order to serve their own endsEmergencies and warlike situations often force medical personnel to follow orders and perform actions or duties pertaining to their field of expertise in flagrant violation of their professional code of ethics. Opposing such orders may be contextually impossible, or elicit unduly high personal costs. Medical ethics, while lamenting these impositions, (...) is often reduced to passive and silent disagreement. In recent years, however, biomedical ethics has become active in accepting and supporting these estrangements from accepted standards and values of the healthcare professions, coming up with justifications of torture; suggesting non-treatment of the wounded, depending on their combatant status; prompting collaboration in the development of biological weapons, and disregarding informed consent.Physicians’ participation in torture has been unanimously condemned and, although acknowledging that such conduct “is the result of the displacement of their medical vocation by the doctrine of ‘national security’”, such an “ideological substrate” has nevertheless been deemed untenable.1 Perpetrators were found to have committed their deeds in an ethical void2; this was recognised, but in no way did it serve to excuse physicians from the duty of opposing induced suffering and assuaging its effects to the best of their abilities.Torture in its “humane” form has been defended on utilitarian grounds,3 using weak arguments that are unable to justify physicians’ active participation in torture. For the most part, professional ethics has remained adamant in its undaunted disapproval of medical non-therapeutic involvement in violent scenarios such as war, terrorism, and even torture. Nobody would have thought, in earlier times, that medical ethics could take any other position than to unrelentingly reject physicians’ participation in torture, …. (shrink)

This paper begins with a discussion of different definitions of “terrorism” and endorses one version of a tactical definition, so-called because it treats terrorism as involving the use of a quite specific tactic in the pursuit of political ends, namely, violent attacks upon the innocent. This contrasts with a political status definition in which “terrorism” is defined as any form of sub-state political violence against the state. Some consequences of the tactical definition are explored, notably the fact that (...) it allows for the possibility of state terrorism against individuals, sub-state groups and other states. But a major problem for the tactical definition is the account to be given of “the innocent.” In line with justwar thinking, the idea of “the innocent” is unpacked in terms of the concept of non-combatants and this in turn is treated as the category of those who are not prosecuting the harm that allows for a legitimate violent response. Problems with this approach are explored, with particular reference to criticisms made by Gregory Kavka. The recent drive to expand the class of those who may be legitimately attacked is subjected to scrutiny. Particular attention is paid to the role of “collective responsibility” and “deserving your government” in these arguments. (shrink)

This article examines the recent Council of Europe Convention on violence against women through the lens of postcolonial feminist critiques. The article argues that, while there is certainly cause for optimism, the Convention still falls into some of the traps identified by postcolonial feminists. The Convention largely circumvents the stigmatising risks that arise from framing certain VAW forms primarily as a problem of some ‘cultures’. Yet dangers linger in the Convention’s approach to ‘honour’ as an unacceptable justification for (...) VAW. Inherent risks also remain in the vulnerability frame through which the Convention views migrant, refugee, and asylum-seeker women. Applied uncritically, these approaches risk re-inscribing images of inherently powerless women victimised by their non-European ‘cultures,’ reminiscent of colonial times. (shrink)

The principle of non-combatant immunity protects non-combatants against intentional attacks in war. It is the most widely endorsed and deeply held moral constraint on the conduct of war. And yet it is difficult to justify. Recent developments in just war theory have undermined the canonical argument in its favour – Michael Walzer's, in Just and Unjust Wars. Some now deny that non-combatant immunity has principled foundations, arguing instead that it is entirely explained by a different principle: that of (...) necessity. In war, as in ordinary life, harms to others can be justified only if they are necessary. Attacking non-combatants, the argument goes, is never necessary, so never justified. Although often repeated, this argument has never been explored in depth. In this article, I evaluate the necessity-based argument for non-combatant immunity, drawing together theoretical analysis and empirical research on anti-civilian tactics in interstate warfare, counterinsurgency, and terrorism. (shrink)

The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) withits Optional Protocol is the first binding legal act and leading international instrumentregarding the rights of persons with disabilities. One of the principles of CRPDis “respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to makeone’s own choices and independence”, whereby persons with disabilities are recognizedas holders of rights taking into account their specific situation. CRPD recognizes inArticle 6 that “women and girls with disabilities are subject to multiple discrimination”and (...) mandates signatory countries to “take measures to ensure their full and equalenjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.” The research was done inorder to examine the readiness of the state to institutionally cover the awareness of girlsand women with disabilities, their education on the issue of violence, access to servicesand information appropriate to the needs of each category separately, as well as systemicsolutions for their protection from violence. A qualitative research strategy was applied,and the research was conducted with representatives of the Centers for Social Work, representativesfrom the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, professionals who are directproviders of services in the field of non-family protection, as well as the girls and womenwith disabilities themselves. The main conclusions that emerge from the research saythat girls and women with disabilities are more susceptible to violence, especially bytheir partners or family members. More awareness is needed to recognize and encouragereporting of violence. (shrink)

This study examined the relationship between hunting and illegal violence among college males. Although similar on many socio-demographic characteristics such as age and social class , hunters were more likely than non-hunters to be white and Protestant. They also were more likely to have grown up with a family member who hunted. Hunters were about twice as likely to have been violent toward nonhuman animals; however, one type of violence—killing wild or stray animals—accounted for this difference. Regarding (...) class='Hi'>violence toward people, hunters were more than twice as likely to have damaged or destroyed private or public property during their last year in high school but were no more likely during that year to have fought with other persons. Thus, at least for this sample, hunting related to harming animals in the wild and to property damage but not to other forms of animal abuse or violence against humans. This paper discusses possible explanations for this result and limitations of the study. (shrink)

This chapter conceptually analyzes the post-traumatic stress injuries called moral injury, moral fatigue or exhaustion, and broken spirit. It then identifies two puzzles. First, soldiers sometimes sustain moral injury even from doing right actions. Second, they experience moral exhaustion from making decisions even where the morally right choice is so obvious that it shouldn’t be stressful to make it; and even where rightness of decision is so murky that no decision could be morally faulted. The injuries result of mistaken moral (...) self-evaluation. Methods of preventing and treating these injuries are defended, including training in self-forgiveness, moral off-loading of actions and decisions to persons and devices less likely to feel inappropriate guilt, and the use of drugs to prevent such guilt. The foregoing has been about moral injury erroneously resulting from the non-violation of a correct moral code. But the chapter then introduces the concept of moral pseudo-injury—felt moral injury that has in reality resulted from violation of a false moral code, so that no one has really been morally injured. This can be used as a method in warfighting. And since the injuries it produces are illusory, this would be morally superior to physical violence. For it causes less injury to its victims, and should cause less guilt in those who must inflict it. Historical precedents are considered. Finally, our enemies often use moral pseudo-injury against us, in the form of terrorist violence against civilians. Terrorism causes comparatively few harms, yet we mistakenly see it as more morally horrific than conventional combat that causes much worse loss of life among armed forces members. Here we need the nuancing and clarifying power of philosophy to restore a sense of proportion, thence to prevent or therapize the moral pseudo-injury we may experience from these sorts of attacks. (This is a pre-penultimate version of the published version, available from OUP at the external link, which contains minor variances. The paper was earlier known as "PTSD Weaponized: A Theory of Moral Injury"; that now superseded version is archived under "past conferences" on the Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law website.). (shrink)

Contemporary U.S. policy makers often characterize the U.S. counterinsurgency experience in El Salvador as a successful model to be followed in other contexts. This article argues that these characterizations significantly overstate the positive lessons of El Salvador, and ignore important cautionary implications. During the first part of the conflict, neither the Armed Forces of El Salvador nor the U.S. followed the tenets of counterinsurgency doctrine. The FAES killed tens of thousands of non-combatants in 1979 and 1980, before the civil (...) war even began. This repression may have preempted an incipient popular insurrection, but it also locked in a determined social base that enabled the armed left to build a highly effective and sustained insurgency. In 1984, the U.S. had to save the FAES from likely defeat through a major increase in military aid, especially airpower. When the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front switched to a classical guerrilla strategy, the FAES, despite considerable U.S. aid, seldom followed best practices in counterinsurgency. Democratization and redistributional reforms were partial and flawed in implementation. The war settled into a stalemate that would likely have continued indefinitely had it not been for the collapse of the socialist bloc and significant changes in the interests of Salvadoran elites that were largely incidental to U.S. policies.The most important cautionary lesson is that indiscriminate violence against civilians early in a conflict can create dynamics that are very difficult to overcome in subsequent stages. (shrink)

Drug-trafficking in Colombia has been a widely researched phenomenon, especially now, as the country undergoes a transition process with its older guerrilla. Now more than ever it is fundamental to examine how drug-trafficking organizations violent activities affect the consolidation of peace. This article considers different approaches to study violence derived from drug-trafficking, in order to advance towards the objectives of transitional justice. For that matter, this work is based on the idea that drug-trafficking directly generates and reproduces violence (...) which is fueled by the structural violence present in the Colombian context. My thesis is that this phenomenon deters non-repetition guarantees and weakens democracy, which is why there will be three main arguments presented that will revolve around the lack of consensus and the implications of considering drug wars as civil wars, how decisions related to the conceptual apprehension limit the competence of international humanitarian law, and the need for holistic strategies capable of facing drug-trafficking’s political and violent power. Later, alternatives will be explored around the possibilities that each argument offers, as well as which aspects could contribute to a more appropriate approach to combat drug-trafficking. Lastly, I will defend why implementing bottom-up oriented actions can advance towards transitional justice’s intermediate and final objectives, as it is the only alternative that escapes fatalist, utopian or interventionist scenarios. (shrink)

In some cases, the U.S. should adopt a policy of assassinating national leaders. On just war theory, national leaders are sometimes combatants. This is because some leaders are both causal and logical agents of an unjust military campaign. Such leaders occupy this logical role because in some cases their position has an essential link to their nation’s military projects. In addition, such a policy aligns with some of the policies that motivate just war theory in that assassination does not (...) target innocent persons, is connected to self-defense, and does not violate any international agreements. Just war theory should probably be rejected, however, since it rests on dubious claims about the non-contractual essentialist conditions of combatant. On a self-defense theory, some national leaders may be killed because they are threats. They are threats because they originate a causal process that will likely bring about large amounts of unjust harm. In so doing, they forfeit those moral rights that protect them against injurious action and thus remove one of the major constraints against violence and killing. On a consequentialist theory, such a policy would likely bring about the best consequences since it would be a vital tool in the protection against genocide, unjust military aggression, and other horrendous state actions that have characterized the twentieth century. It is unlikely that the harm that would result from such a policy (e.g., its misuse) would outweigh the expected gain from it. (shrink)

A great deal of violence in civil wars is informed by the logic of terrorism: violence tends to be used by political actors against civilians in order to shape their political behavior. I focus on indiscriminate violence in the context of civil war: this is a type of violence that selects its victims on the basis of their membership in some group and irrespective of their individual actions. Extensive empirical evidence suggests that indiscriminate violence (...) in civil war is informed by the logic of terrorism. I argue that under certain conditions, that tend to be quite common, such violence is counter productive. I specify these conditions and address the following paradox: why do we sometimes observe instances of indiscriminate violence evenunder conditions that make this strategy counterproductive? I review four possible reasons: truncated data, ignorance, cost, and institutional constraints. I argue that indiscriminate violence emerges because it is much cheaper than its main alternative – selective violence. It is more likely under a steep imbalance of power between the competing actors, and where and when resources and information are low; however, most political actors eventually switch to selective violence. Thus, given a balance of power between competing actors, indiscriminate violence is more likely at early rather than late stages of the conflict. Overall, the paper suggests that even extreme forms of violence are used strategically. (shrink)

Christian thought on the resolution of conflicts rests on a strong predisposition against violence and a determination to discourage outbreaks of violence, limit the means used, and bring the conflict to as speedy an end as possible. Less attention has been given to the psychological and social roots of violence, the moments of transition from violence to diplomacy and reconciliation, and alternative ways of conflict resolution. These three areas are explored with special reference to the (...) use of sanctions, the WCC’s Programme to Overcome Violence, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, Gandhian Satyagraha, and the Northern Ireland Peace Process. Such measures should be judged against the same criteria as are used in relation to violence and war. (shrink)

The world is littered with wars in which innocent individual human beings, helpless groups of persons and harmless institutions are casualties because they are directly or indirectly targeted and attacked. The nature or composition of such casualties calls for a revision of, or at least leads one to question, the dominant approach to the principle of non-combatant immunity. In the just war theory, moral and political philosophers mostly approach the theorisation about the principle of the immunity of non-combatants from (...) what may be termed the individualist approach. In this approach, combatants and non-combatants are conventionally conceived as individual human beings only, or groups of persons. Consequently, the approach cannot show us how institutions cause or participate in war, and it cannot tell us how institutions should be treated in war, whether they should be treated as combatants or non-combatants, and when they should be treated as combatants or non-combatants. For this reason, the individualist approach is insufficient. However, in what may be referred to as the institutional approach, combatants and non-combatants can also be conceived as institutions rather than individuals or groups of persons. If this is the case, then arguments for and against the immunity of non-combatants can be proffered based on this institutional conception. This article contends that we need to supplement the individualist approach with the institutional approach to be able to: (i) ascertain the causal, constitutive, contributory and participatory roles of certain institutions in a particular war; and (ii) determine whether they are legitimate targets of attack. (shrink)

This articles exposes the methodological errors involved in attempting to operationalize or value-neutralize the concept of 'terrorism.' It defends, instead, an effects-based approach to the taxonomy of 'terrorism' that builds out from a central conceptual connection between the term's negative connotation and a widely shared moral presumption against the killing of innocent non-combatants. Although this approach to the core meaning of 'terrorism' is far from value-neutral, it has a number of virtues to recommend it. First, it has the (...) political virtue of even-handedness in the way it enables competing appraisals of asymmetric conflicts. Second, it is has the ethical virtue of being flexible enough to accommodate nuanced appraisals of various modes and degrees of terrorist violence. And third, it has the empirical virtue of being useful for purposes of rigorous social scientific research. (shrink)

Terrorist violence is often condemned for targeting innocents or non-combatants. There are two objections to this line of argument. First, one may doubt that terrorism is necessarily directed against innocents or non-combatants. However, I will focus on the second objection, according to which there may be exceptions from the prohibition against killing the innocent. In my article I will elaborate whether lethal terrorism against innocents can be justified in a supreme emergency. Starting from a (...) critique of Michael Walzer’s account of supreme emergency, I will argue that the supreme emergency exemption justifies the resort to terrorism against innocents to avert moral disasters such as genocide and ethnic cleansing, provided that the criteria of last resort, proportionality and public declaration are satisfied. (shrink)

This paper explores the difference it makes to incorporate the multi-focal conception of violence that has emerged in peace studies over recent decades into the discourse of non-violent direct action (Galtung 1969, 1990; Uvin 2003; Springs 2015b). I argue that non-violent action can and should incorporate and deploy the distinctions between direct, cultural, and structural forms of violence. On one hand, these analytical distinctions can facilitate forms of self-reflexive critical analysis that guard against certain violent conceptual and (...) practical implications of non-violence, however inadvertent those may be. At the same time, these lenses help reconceptualise non-violent action in ways that open up an array of strategies and tools not previously prevalent among activists committed to non-violence. Non-violent action may itself be either complicit in, or might be enabled to illuminate and cut against, forms of violence that infuse social, political, and economic structures (i.e. structural violence). Appeals to non-violence and the actions with which they interweave may be complicit in, or might be enabled to illuminate and cut against, religious, ideological, aesthetic, and even scientific understandings and conceptual frames that underpin and support structural violence (i.e. cultural violence). In each case, non- violence must be critically examined with all these possibilities in mind. I first define and contextualize a multidimensional account of violence in terms of direct, structural, and cultural violence. I then consider two examples of how it challenges thinking about non-violence. (shrink)

This paper aims to address the manner in which the protester’s opposition, or what I consider as the protester’s being-there-against, “profiles” itself in the no-man’s-land between non-violence and violence. My focus is therefore to unfold some of its constitutive layers, relying on the conceptual tools prominently provided by Ricoeur’s hermeneutical phenomenology. The first constitutive layer concerns the protester’s bodily presence, seized first of all as a specific “here” and “there,” and then as an expressive body that is (...) communicating through gestures. Within the interpretation of one of these gestures—the fist raised in the air—I highlight the anamnestic nature of the protester’s being-there-against as it appears in the relationship with a state whose legitimacy comes from taking over the monopoly on violence. The second constitutive layer is related to the linguistic dimension of the protester’s presence: here special attention is paid to the way language and violence connect, having as background an analysis devoted to the surplus and the deficit of meaning attached to the slogans chanted by the protesters. (shrink)

A decent education is a basic human right. The provision of free, compulsory education in the US attests to a national commitment to this right. However, thecurrent school system is plagued by inequities, including spending less money on schools serving predominantly poor and non-White populations, subjectingstudents of color to harsher punishments, putting non-White students in special education tracks at higher rates, and neglecting students who are not fluent inEnglish. These inequities are taken for granted within the school system, making the (...) inevitable outcome, achievement gaps between White and non-Whitestudents, seem natural and inevitable. Bourdieu calls this process of making arbitrary differences seem natural “symbolic violence.” Two recent federalinterventions, No Child Left Behind and Race to the Top, have the potential to provide tools for combating this symbolic violence. However, each is designedaround flawed premises which inhibit that potential, which we explore in the context of teacher education. (shrink)

This paper argues for a policy of assassination. Foreign leaders causing unjust wars forfeit their rights against being killed. Killing them also satisfies the conditions on defensive violence that accompany forfeiture (consider, for example, imminence, necessity, and proportionality). Assassination sometimes maximizes the good. In some cases, then, assassination is right and good. A separate issue is whether it is good policy. To the extent that traditional just war theory disallows assassination, it should be revised or rejected.

This article presents research on the scale of the phenomenon of sexual violence against students at selected 33 universities across Poland, the mechanisms used to combat the problem and the awareness of students on the subject. The study focuses on the practical dimension of combating sexual violence against students in the Polish academic environment. It looks at the existence and functioning of both specialised bodies and the procedures used to help the victims and punish the perpetrators. (...) Additionally, the paper describes how the diversity of available legal measures to address the problem by both helping the victims and holding perpetrators accountable creates the issue of the coexistence of two systems—criminal and intra-university. Presenting preliminary results of gathered opinions of universities’ officials regarding functioning of the bodies specialised in combating sexual violence shows not only the most dominant observations and conclusions the professionals have regarding the functions they hold at their home universities, but also main challenges that have to be considered in both creating sufficient policies in order to deal with sexual violence and conducting comprehensive research on said phenomenon. (shrink)

Section 1. Introduction. The prophet of non-violence -- section 2. Women in Islam. Women in the light of hadith -- Violence against women and religion -- section 3. War and peace in Islam. Theory of war and peace in Islam -- Centrality of jihad in post Qurʼanic period -- Jihad? But what about other verses in the Qurʼan? -- Islam, democracy and violence -- A critical look at Qurʼanic verses on war and violence -- section (...) 4. Justice and compassion in Islam. Concept of justice in Islam -- Love in Sufi poetry: Maulana Rum, the poet of love -- Compassion in Islam: theology and history -- Islam and compassion: scriptural, historical and contemporary perspective -- section 5. Social issues. Science, West and Islamic origin of science -- Opening chapter of the Qurʼan and its ecological interpretation -- Islam and contemporary issues -- Religion or secularism? -- Modernity, discontent and religion -- Hindu-Muslim unity through religion? -- Religion and conflict. (shrink)

Gender discrimination and sexual harassment of female police officers by their male counterparts remain areas of liability where police departments appeared to have failed to effectively confront the nagging issues. However, the appreciable level of research conducted on these issues in the global North has not been matched by the South, where issues bordering on sexual violence have cultural underpinnings. Drawing from the case of the Nigeria Police Force, feminist analysis was used to explore the lived reality of 43 (...) female officers in a qualitative study. Participants expressed distress in abiding by structural discriminatory regulations against female officers which include non-admittance of married women into the force, forbidding unmarried officers from getting pregnant, and a stipulated minimum of three-year work period before a female officer can marry. Findings also indicated that participants suffer a variety of sexual harassment, intimidation, and, violence from their male colleagues, while they feel constrained in reporting their victimization. Important policy and practical implications requiring the Nigerian police to address hegemonic masculinity and promote gender equality were provided. (shrink)

Martin Luther King Jr. cannot be said to have addressed the problem of terrorism in general because he proposed his philosophy of non-violence resistance within the context of the oppression, injustice, segregation, violence and discrimination suffered by the African Americans. Nevertheless, his philosophy captured ways by which we can fittingly address the problem of terrorism. Many of the methods of non-violence given by Martin Luther King Jr. are of paramount importance in the face of terrorism. His philosophy (...) is basically important today in Nigeria owing to the fact that our unity as a country is threatened by the recurring activities of terrorism and as such we are at a cross road in the history of our country, where drastic decisions have to be taken to address this perilous trend. The philosophy of non-violent resistance as proposed by Martin Luther King Jr. is a veritable step towards a working solution, as it is not only an outcry against terrorism of any sort, but also an ideology that frowns against any form of action that results in the taking of human life or the carnage that comes with violence. His non-violent resistance theory which he developed after a deep study of Mahatma Gandhi’s theory of non-violence, is a radical approach towards the fight against violence of any sort inflicted on the African Americans of his time, an action borne of a passionate fight against racism. So, to aptly address the problem of terrorism in Nigeria, it is necessary we consult and apply some principles of the philosophy of non-violence resistance as postulated by Martin Luther King Jr. (shrink)

Since the end of the 19th century, three combat sports – Boxing, Muay Thai, and Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) – while different from the point of view of their respective regulatory frameworks and of their technical specificities, have alternately become the target of analogous waves of criticisms, even of “moral crusades.” These are a product of converging discourses of stigmatization coming from policy-makers, from sport managers, as well as from journalists. In a recurrent way, these activities have been accused of (...) being extremely brutal and contrary to the values of sport, and, more so, of degrading human dignity. Formerly deemed to be illegitimate and immoral, Boxing and Thai boxing have been, however, each in its turn, progressively accepted in society, recognized as sports disciplines, and considered as having educational potential. Nowadays, the diatribes mainly focus on MMA. The objectives of this contribution consisted of specifying the socio-historical circumstances of these denigration campaigns against combat sports, between permanence of criticism and periodic reconfigurations of the targets, as well as understanding the social factors underpinning this. In this respect, we formulated the hypothesis that the successive focus of condemnations on these three disciplines could be understood at the interface of an effect of social stigmatization of their participants coming from the most marginalized social backgrounds and of the necessity to define, in a context of axiological crisis, a consensual standard of moral monstrosity. (shrink)

This article presents and reflects upon the results of a survey involving a sample of women who have experienced gender-based violence and who have turned to an institutional centre to tackle their situation. In aiming to move beyond a descriptive treatment, we consider the plurality of user types and their remote use patterns in relation to the resources offered by virtual feminist communities designed to promote increased sociopolitical mobilisation in the fight against violence against women. We (...) will observe the progressive emergence of protest actions organised by Spanish virtual feminist communities, which make use of new technologies to contribute productively to the debate and to political action in innovative organisations and formats. The article discusses how feminist virtual communities are using digital spaces for their work combatting violence against women, and whether this work is apparent to those who experience this violence. Finally, we tackle the implications of this work for online feminist activism in terms of a more interactive and social constructivist model of activism, as well as considering its relationship to institutional-legal discourse and public policies that require women to recognise themselves as victims. (shrink)

The phenomenon of domestic violence is as old as humanity itself, but legal protection against violence both internationally and nationally begins to be provided very late. In the Republic of North Macedonia, until 2004, there was no legal protection of victims of domestic violence, nor was adequate sanctioning of perpetrators. Only since 2004, with the amendments and additions to the Criminal Code in the criminal sphere, and the Law on the Family in the civil sphere, the (...) phenomenon of domestic violence began to receive due legal attention, with the application of provisions for the sanctioning of perpetrators and temporary measures protection for victims. The adoption of the Istanbul Convention (The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence) and its ratification in 2018 undoubtedly contributed to the Republic of North Macedonia undertaking a series of reforms in the field of domestic violence. So initially, in 2021, the new Law on domestic violence was adopted in harmony with the principles of the Istanbul Convention, whereas in 2023 the Law on the amendment of the Criminal Code was adopted. This law focused on changes in criminal offenses related to domestic violence and gender-based violation, as well as the incorporation of new criminal offenses in this regard. These legislative reforms, especially the amendments approved in February 2023 which are of particular importance in the prevention and fight against domestic violence and violence against women in the Republic of North Macedonia are the focus of this research. Here we have analyzed and commented the approved changes to the Criminal Code of RNM. (shrink)

This chapter proceeds in two ways. First, I argue that Fanon’s structural witnessing of racism yields important insights about the nature of violence that challenges the settler colonial concept of violence as the extra-legal use of force. Second, I argue that his analysis of violence is insufficient for combating colonial racism and violence because, using the terms of his own analysis, it leaves intact logics and mechanisms that allow racism to structurally renew itself in perpetuity: (...) class='Hi'>violence against women. Without a critical feminism that tracks the alterities of structural violence against women, and women of color in particular, Fanonianism is just another lifeline of colonialism. I thus caution against uncritical uses of Fanon’s structural account of violence for any emancipatory social theory that fails to acknowledge the attendant alterities, asymmetries, and axes of coordinated subordination involved in racialized violence against women. (shrink)

This article addresses relations between concepts of ‘self’, ‘other(s)’ and ‘othering’ through a reading of the revolutionary psychiatrist Frantz Fanon’s psychoaffective phenomenological and pedagogical narrative approach, reading his work as phenomenological and educational as well as critiquing phenomenology, psychology, education and (of course) psychiatry. While most—especially educational—commentators base their engagement with Fanon’s revolutionary materialist phenomenology of racialised embodiment and consciousness on his first book, Black Skin White Masks and attend to his final book, Wretched of the Earth as expressing his (...) core political and philosophical analyses, this article focuses in particular on Fanon’s second and middle book, A Dying Colonialism, evaluating the political possibilities of the specific narrative temporalities elaborated there. Notwithstanding its rather dismissive reception, it is argued that this, middle, book—written during, and as a document of, the Algerian liberation struggle—expresses and develops Fanon’s psychopolitical and performative philosophy of subjective and objective transformation from alienation to emancipation. This philosophy works pedagogically, in imagining the transformation of relations between others, as well as between self and others, including relations between coloniser and colonized, as also between and within selves. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Commandment against the Law Writing and Divine Justice in Walter Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence”Tracy McNulty (bio)Pierre Legendre has shown that the Romano-canonical legal traditions that form the foundations of Western jurisprudence “are founded in a discourse which denies the essential quality of the relation of the body to writing” [“Masters of Law” 110]. It emerges historically as a repudiation of Jewish legalism and Talmud law, where (...) the rite of circumcision encodes the subject’s entry into law as an “allegiance to the absolute Writing,” or the “relationship between the human subject and the logical place of the Other” [110–11; see also “les juifs”]. In this shift, one understanding of writing is displaced by another: the material inscription of the letter, as an incommunicable limit or cut, is supplanted by the fantasy of what Legendre calls a “living writing,” a writing “in the heart” that promotes an ideal of perfect communication in which nothing is lost, in which meaning is lodged in an absolute Other who guarantees all knowledge. In his words, “we belong to a culture in which a mystically alienated human body stands in the place of the absolute book. The state has emerged from this structure.... Its basic characteristics can be set out by means of a fundamental Romano-pontifical maxim: the Emperor carries all the archives in his breast (omnia scrinia habet in pectore suo)” [“Masters of Law” 109].The ultimate theological source of this Roman maxim is Paul’s polemic against the Jewish law in the Epistle to the Romans. Paul’s polemic is structured by a distinction between two orders of law: the “law of God” and the “law of sin.” The first is associated with the intelligible “spirit” of the law, which is “written in the heart,” the second with the prescriptive “letter” of the Jewish law, which compromises or corrupts the first by binding it to a particular representation and consigning it to written form. Paul’s solution is to bypass the law, to bypass representation, and perhaps even language itself. The prescriptive “letter” of the Jewish law must be sublated by the law of the spirit, such that “we serve not under the old written code but in the new life of the Spirit” [Romans 7: 6]. Christ, as the living embodiment of the law of God, upholds the spirit of the law by “fulfilling”––and so rendering obsolete–its written form.The doctrine of Christ as the “living law” sustains what Legendre describes as a “banalisation of writing” [“Masters of Law” 111], a disregard for its material inscription that holds the letter to be nothing more than a placeholder, a flawed or incomplete representation of a meaning or truth that is itself beyond words. At the same time, it makes possible the legal and political fantasy of a living writing, located in a single body understood as the site of interpretive authority. The extraction of a meaning or truth from the intractable letter becomes the ultimate aim of the legal order and the most lofty task of its sovereign interpreter, uniquely charged with animating the dead letter. This notion permeates what Peter Goodrich describes as “the most standard protocols of legal reading,” according to [End Page 34] which “it is not the letter but the spirit that determines the meaning of the law”:The text is composed of dead letters (litera mortua); the rule is no more than a “mute judge,” a sleeping form, requiring the interposition, anima legis, of jurist or judge.... [T]he meaning of the law is internal to its living body, viva vox iuris or lex loquens, its image, interpreter, or legislator. In classical terms it is spelled out by reference to something beyond words: “to know the law is not to know the words of the law, but its force and power.” In a renaissance formulation we are similarly told that “no words, forms, niceties, or propriety of language is of any regard in the Civil Law, in comparison to truth, faithfulness and integrity. For verba menti, non verbis servire debet; words, are made as instruments to serve and express the mind, and not to command it.”[229–30]1... (shrink)

Hannah Arendt reproaches our tradition of political philosophy for reducing politics to domination, and for so concealing the central political phenomenon, i.e., power. Since Arendt’s own concept of power is an extension of her concept of action, she understands power in a both non-hierarchical and non-instrumental way, as much distinct from domination as from violence. Furthermore, by stressing the essential relational and potential character of power, she shows the impossibility of human omnipotence. Section three sketches Arendt’s analysis of violent (...) action as an instrumental, mute and solitary activity, which can destroy, but never generate power, and which, therefore, can never be more than a poor substitute for acting together. However, the priority of power over violence is not absolute: sometimes power needs violence to maintain itself. Arendt seems to recognize this, but nowhere elaborates it. (shrink)

It is estimated that one in three women experience intimate partner violence (IPV) across the course of their life. The popular uptake of “smart speakers” powered by sophisticated AI means that surveillance of the domestic environment is increasingly possible. Correspondingly, there are various proposals to use smart speakers to detect or report IPV. In this paper, we clarify what might be possible when it comes to combatting IPV using existing or near-term technology and also begin the project of evaluating (...) this project both ethically and politically. We argue that the ethical landscape looks different depending on whether one is considering the decision to develop the technology or the decision to use it once it has been developed. If activists and governments wish to avoid the privatisation of responses to IPV, ubiquitous surveillance of domestic spaces, increasing the risk posed to members of minority communities by police responses to IPV, and the danger that more powerful smart speakers will be co-opted by men to control and abuse women, then they should resist the development of this technology rather than wait until these systems are developed. If it is judged that the moral urgency of IPV justifies exploring what might be possible by developing this technology, even in the face of these risks, then it will be imperative that victim-survivors from a range of demographics, as well as government and non-government stakeholders, are engaged in shaping this technology and the legislation and policies needed to regulate it. (shrink)

What do we mean when affirming ‘the powerful return of the state’? Do we have in mind the jus ad bellum employed by aggressive states, or are we thinking of the duties that a state has towards its citizens? Starting from these questions, this article aims to reconceptualize the issue of the political legitimacy of a state by reconsidering the relationship between power and violence. Among other forms of emergencies and violence, then, a legitimate state needs to be (...) capable of responding to gender-based (sexual and domestic) violence. To reinforce my suggestion, I will reinterpret some Greek and Roman myths related to the founding of cities (Thebes, Athens and Rome). Through these myths, we will be able to illustrate, in particular, the necessity for a state to be capable of combating both public and private violence, reframing the notion of nemesis (as a fate that can be changed by descendants) and fear (as a status that can be stopped in the present). (shrink)

In opposition to the absolutist ethics of non-violence, the author argues that in response to aggression and violence one has to use every means possible to prevent them. To resist violence is a moral duty of the individual. It would be desirable for violence to be prevented by strength of mind, but if strength of mind is not enough or the aggressor is insensitive to intellectual, spiritual and psychological impacts, one has to employ by accretion all (...) necessary means. Ethics is called upon to set limits to the employment of the means of countering violence. (shrink)

This essay addresses structural violence against Latinas by looking at the existential toll different forms of cultural violence take on us. In particular, it looks at linguistic violence and the role lesser-known violences play in the intergenerational continuation of colonial violence, such as hermeneutic violence. Defined as violence done to systems of meaning and interpretation, hermeneutic violence is discussed at length in relation to the experience of harm and injury. The essay further (...) explores some resistant epistemic practices Latina feminists have generated to address systemic violence. The work of Gloria Anzaldúa is elaborated as an example of resistant epistemic practices. (shrink)

L’interprétation d’un acte de violence de masse est toujours délicate puisqu’elle confère un certain statut au groupe visé. Ce statut peut devenir un facteur important dans la décision de la communauté internationale de reconnaître ou non l’indépendance d’un groupe et de son territoire. Cet article examine le cas de la reconnaissance du Kosovo par la communauté internationale, en février 2008, et soutient que cette reconnaissance a été rendue possible par l’utilisation d’arguments basés sur le statut collectif de victime de (...) nettoyage ethnique détenu par la population albanaise du Kosovo. L’article comble le fossé entre, d’un côté, la théorie de la sécession comme réparation, et de l’autre, les travaux sur la violence de masse contre les groupes ethnonationaux. L’analyse montre que la pratique de la reconnaissance étatique a été réorientée vers un critère restrictif lié au type de violence subie par le groupe réclamant l’indépendance. Dans cette optique, le territoire devient une forme tangible de compensation pour les injustices subies, ce qui tranche par rapport à la pratique antérieure de la reconnaissance étatique dans l’ex-Yougoslavie et ailleurs.The interpretation of an act of mass violence is always a contentious issue since it confers a certain status to the targeted group. This status may become an important factor in the international community’s decision to recognize or not the independence of a group and its territory. This article examines the case of Kosovo’s February 2008 recognition by the international community and argues that this recognition was made possible by the summoning of arguments based on Kosovo Albanians’ collective status as victims of ethnic cleansing. The article bridges the gap between on the one hand the Remedial Right theory of secession, and on the other hand, works on mass violence against ethnonational groups. The article shows that the practice of state recognition was reoriented towards a restrictive criterion linked to the type of violence sustained by the group claiming independence. Under this interpretation, territory becomes a tangible form of compensation for suffered injustices, which contrasts with earlier practice of state recognition in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. (shrink)

Jainism is a religio-philosophical school of India which reacted against the Brahmanic/Vedic tradition and established as a school of thought. As a way of life it started as a Sramanic movement (the non-Brahmanic ascetic tradition) to attain the truth. Jains metaphysics and epistemology are purely logical and conducive for all. Jainism always is against the physical and psychological violence, and believes that it is the Ekanta (one sided view of reality) philosophy, which leads to violence. According (...) to the Jains, Ekantavada is a very rigid view, thus partial in nature. Any school asserting this claim for the absolute truth logically thus rejecting all the other views that basically leads towards dogmatism and in toleration; which further aggravated and leads toward violence. Mahavira as a champion of Ahimsa (nonviolence) carried out this concept from the domain of practical behaviour to the domain of intellectual and philosophical discussion. The Jaina principle of respect for the other life gave rise to the principle of respect for the views of others; thus they advocates Anekāntavāda. According to them, non-violence is the goal and Anekāntavāda becomes the tool. Its Syadvada is basically a logical inclusivity which accepts diversified aspects of truth. Consequently, it tells that a complete understanding of any truth requires the consideration and acceptance of a variety of viewpoints. This pluralistic view of the Jains is to be effective well to combat social violence and evils too. The world is in the pyramid of violence that can only entail massive destruction of this phenomenal world in any moment. I think, this pluralistic approach of Anekāntavāda is to be considered as the panacea to overcome all types of rigidities and bigotries of the present society as well. Philosophy and Progress, Vol#67-68; No#1-2; Jan-Dec 2020 P 15-31. (shrink)