Is practical reason a cognitive faculty? Do practical judgments make claims about a subject matter that are appropriately assessed in terms of their agreement with that subject matter? According to Kantians like Christine Korsgaard, the answer is no. To think otherwise is to conflate the theoretical and the practical, the epistemic and the ethical. I am not convinced. In this paper, I motivate my skepticism through examination of the very figure who inspires Korsgaard’s rejection of cognitivism: Kant. For as I (...) read him, Kant does not construe the distinction between theoretical and practical reason in terms of a distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive faculties but in terms of two distinct applications of a single faculty of reason, which is through-and-through cognitive. Thus, practical, no less than theoretical, reason cognizes a subject matter, and so practical, no less than theoretical, reason is straightforwardly subject to familiar epistemic standards of truth, warrant, and knowledge. Of course, even if I am right about Kant, this does not show that Korsgaard is wrong about reason; and I will offer no direct argument against her position here. Nonetheless, I believe that reflection on Kant’s true view, with its careful treatment of and respect for both the practicality and rationality of reason, should perhaps lead us to rethink what it means to be a rationalist in ethics. (shrink)

According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, rationalistically conceived. Drawing (...) on underappreciated elements of Kant’s moral psychology, I sketch an alternative form of rationalism, according to which moral activity is by nature pleasant because at least some pleasures are by nature rational. (shrink)

One 1120 pages volume, with 4000 entries covering - Western philosophy: authors, schools, concepts and terminology; - religions, cultural anthropology, eastern philosophies; - Psychology and psychoanalysis; - linguistics and semiotics; - sociology and political theory.

I offer a qualified defence of Kant’s natural teleological argument, that is, his inference from the (un)naturalness of an act to its (im)morality. Though I reject many of Kant’s conclusions, I think the form of argument he uses to support these conclusions is not as wrong-headed as it might at first appear. I consider and answer two objections: first, that the argument is inconsistent with Kant’s moral rationalism; and second, that the argument is inconsistent with post-Kantian developments in science. I (...) argue that both objections rest on a common mistake, namely, the assumption that the account of (human) nature on which Kant’s argument relies is theoretical. On the contrary, the relevant account is practical: informed by science, but not determined by it. Once we appreciate the practical character of Kant’s naturalism, we can see not only that Kant can be a naturalist and a rationalist, but contemporary Kantians can be as well. (shrink)

Traditionally, Kantian ethics has been thought hostile to agents' well-being. Recent commentators have rightly called this view into question, but they do not push their challenge far enough. For they leave in place a fundamental assumption on which the traditional view rests, viz., that happiness is all there is to well-being. This assumption is important, since, combined with Kant’s rationalism about morality and empiricism about happiness, it implies that morality and well-being are at best extrinsically related. Since morality can only (...) make our lives go well by making us happy, and since morality can only make us happy by influencing our sensibility, morality is not its own reward--not really. It is simply the condition for some separate benefit. Drawing on Kant’s underappreciated discussion of self-contentment, an intellectual analog of happiness, I reconstruct an alternative account of morality’s relation to well-being. Morality does make our lives go well--and so is its own reward--not because it makes us happy but because it makes us self-contented. (shrink)

This paper presents a roadmap of Finnish companies adopting and managing corporate social responsibility (CSR). It discusses the companies' views on CSR and highlights the practices that Finnish companies have adopted or are currently adopting. It also presents a framework that outlines the CSR processes and management prospects. Results showed that Finnish companies are progressively managing CSR. This newly revived thinking about social responsibility is viewed as an issue traced back from Finland's history of industrial development. There is no general (...) definition of CSR; however, various concepts are connoted into it. Driven by several factors, CSR is developing gradually as indicated by the positive responses and initiatives of the companies. CSR management and practices towards employees, suppliers, community and customers are well defined locally based generally on established socially responsible behavior which could be articulated by laws and regulations, corporate values and business ethics. However, managing CSR with a global scope, problems such as; lack of information and structured management system, different views and interpretations, supply chain complexities, overlap with environmental issues, etc. often lead some companies to manage CSR haphazardly. Views and management of CSR are also influenced by some distinct Finnish cultural attributes. An initial conceptual framework for CSR is drawn reflecting the current practices and prospects for management strategies. Such framework can be used in organizing and streamlining CSR elements for effective management approaches and measuring of performance. It could be expected that in due time, the efforts of the companies will become more evident, organized and systematically managed. (shrink)

Dieser Band thematisiert Heideggers Verständnis der technischen Welt und deren Verhältnis zu Kunst, Politik und Sprache. Diskutiert wird dabei auch, wie Heideggers Denken der Technik von Philosophen der Gegenwart aufgegriffen und weiter entwickelt wird und wie es dabei helfen kann, Globalisierung, Digitalisierung und die Entwicklung in den Biotechnologien philosophisch zu verstehen. Im Dokumententeil wird die Urfassung von Die Zeit des Weltbildes veröffentlicht.

En el presente trabajo se propone analizar la apropiación que hace Walter Benjamin del criticismo kantiano para la construcción de una filosofía contemporánea venidera. En función de ello, mediante una vía de interpretación expositiva, abordaremos cómo se articula en “Sobre el programa de la filosofía venidera” el pasaje de la crítica a la metafísica hacia una crítica de tipo retórico, considerando los momentos siguientes: la doble articulación del significante Lehre (entendido en su acepción teorético-doctrinal —tal como funciona en el discurso (...) de las filosofías de sistema— o en su fundamento retórico —Lehre como enseñanza, transmisión o comunicación indirecta—), la ampliación del campo de la experiencia concebido en el ámbito de die Sprache y la interpretación de la metafísica crítica en cuanto mitología moderna. A partir de la exposición de estos momentos, arribaremos a las consideraciones finales de que la apropiación de Benjamin del criticismo como punto de partida para la constitución de una filosofía contemporánea venidera, en contraposición con el ideal epistémico de la Lehre entendida bajo una interpretación teórico-doctrinal, resulta inseparable de una crítica radical al estatuto del discurso filosófico sistemático y a su fundamento de determinación idealista. (shrink)

RESUMEN En este artículo se presenta una reflexión crítica de la propuesta ética liberal de Charles Taylor y su viabilidad en el contexto político de las sociedades liberales actuales. Una conformación social y política liberal se entiende como aquella donde se promueven y se defiende mayores libertades en esquemas de derechos individuales junto con la exigencia del respeto a esas garantías individuales. Sin embargo, el contexto político liberal, siendo el más idóneo en las sociedades actuales, presenta varios problemas éticos que (...) Taylor ya ha identificado como malestares de la modernidad, tales como el exceso de individualismo, la primacía de la razón instrumental y la fragmentación y polarización de la sociedad. Ante estos retos y conflictos que surgen por el propio liberalismo, la ética de Taylor es una alternativa posible para comprenderlos y gestionarlos desde un civismo ético y la promoción de metas comunes. ABSTRACT This article presents a critical reflection on the liberal ethical proposal of Charles Taylor and its viability in the political context of current liberal societies. A liberal social and political configuration is understood as one in which greater liberties are promoted and defended in individual rights schemes together with the requirement of respect for those individual guarantees. However, the liberal political context although the most suitable in current societies, presents several ethical problems that Taylor has already identified as the malaise of modernity: excess of individualism, primacy of instrumental reason and fragmentation and polarization of the society. Faced with these challenges and conflicts arising from the liberalism itself, Taylor's ethics is a possible alternative to understand and manage them from an ethical civility and the promotion of common goals. (shrink)

My aim in this essay is to reorient our understanding of the Kantian ethical project, especially in relation to its assumed rivals. I do this by considering Kant's relation to eudaimonism, especially in its Aristotelian form. I argue for two points. First, once we understand what Kant and Aristotle mean by happiness, we can see that not only is it the case that, by Kant's lights, Aristotle is not a eudaimonist. We can also see that, by Aristotle's lights, Kant is (...) a eudaimonist. Second, we can see that this agreement on eudaimonism actually reflects a deeper, more fundamental agreement on the nature of ethics as a distinctively practical philosophy. This is an important result, not just for the history of moral philosophy but for moral philosophy as well. For it suggests that both Kantians and Aristotelians may well have more argumentative resources available to them than is commonly thought. (shrink)

Ask most philosophers for an example of a moral rationalist, and they will probably answer “Kant.” And no wonder. Kant’s first great work of moral philosophy, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, opens with a clarion call for rationalism, proclaiming the need to work out for once a pure moral philosophy, a metaphysics of morals. That this metaphysics includes the first principle of ethics, the moral law, is obvious. But what about the second principles, particular moral laws, such as duties (...) of truthfulness, beneficence, etc.? Are these principles metaphysical too? Many have thought not, since they make essential use of empirical and anthropological considerations. I argue otherwise; the second principles are metaphysical and this matters. I do this by taking seriously the metaphysics of the metaphysics of morals—more specifically, by understanding the metaphysics of morals alongside the metaphysics of nature. For, qua metaphysics, both employ a common two-stage methodology, the first stage of which is wholly a priori but the second stage of which is partly empirical. As I explain, appreciating this common methodology sheds new light on how the second principles are to be established, as well as on the reach of Kant’s rationalism. (shrink)

According to many of its advocates, one of the main attractions of Kantian moral philosophy is its metaethical innocence. The most interesting argument for such innocence appeals to Kantians' rationalism. Roughly, if moral action is simply rational action, then we do not need to appeal to anything beyond rationality to certify moral judgment. I assess this argument by reflecting on (dis)analogies between moral and logical forms of rationalism. I conclude that the Kantian claim to metaethical innocence is overstated. Kantians cannot (...) avoid substantial metaethical commitments. Or if they can, it is not their rationalism that explains why this is so. (shrink)

This essay discusses the aesthetic potential within Bernard Stiegler’s concept of technics, particularly its nascent or preactual form of realism. This realism fosters a sense of spontaneity, crucial to a modal engagement with time, being, and history in the face of contemporary planetary enframing. By critically appraising Stiegler’s framework, the essay proposes an aesthetics of care that aligns with restoring art’s primordial inhumanism. This stands in stark contrast to the inhumanism inherent in technological modernity. Reviving this aesthetics, a global challenge (...) that traverses East and West, might appear anachronistic. It proposes a return to the primordial integration of the human and inhuman, initially enshrined in art as technics (evident as far back as the Upper Paleolithic). Modern technology, however, severs the organological function of art from its foundational relation with humanity. In this dismemberment, a singular, immanent humanism emerges as the defining characteristic of modernity. This human becomes wholly accessible and subservient to technology, thus negating the reciprocal tension that defines their elemental and productive relationship, their original organology or how life at the time was intensively organized by this so-called tension. In conclusion, the essay advocates restoring this lost inhuman essence through a revitalized aesthetic sensibility that embraces an integral ecology as a countermeasure to stagnation and despair engendered by excessive human-centric enframing. (shrink)

True enough, not many of the human lot we know, not least of all thosewe may chance upon in life in an intricate tangle of modern socialformations where individuals get to interface rather unreflectively mostof the time, would be so generous as to bestow a casual interest in philosophy. Two thousand years ago, this kind of antipathy toward philosophy made its point well when a man named Socrates was condemned to death, proof rather of the unchanging isometrics of equivocation in (...) the face of the compelling demands of justice and truth that Socrates exposed to be the skeleton in the cupboard of power, hiding under the façade of indestructibility. This pervasive practice would have by now covered an entire époque of Western intellectualtradition from the death of Socrates to the contemporary, disguised asunwavering love of everything that abounds in beauty and vitality, adetermined search for the fundament that holds everything together under the condition that Man is free and that Life is precious as too rich and valuable for the taking. (shrink)

The present work proposes to analyze the dialectic between allegory and symbol elaborated from Walter Benjamin's rhetorical-aesthetic reading of the artistic form of the German Trauerspiel. Based on this, through a way of expository interpretation, we will address how the following three key moments are articulated in the book on the German Trauerspiel: the link between the Trauerspiel and the profane scene of reading, the particularity of allegorical signification, and the inseparability of allegory and mourning. From the exposition of these (...) moments, we will arrive at some final considerations: within the field of the philosophy of art, the dialectic between allegory and symbol constitutes a rhetorical-aesthetic conception of meaning (Bedeutens), thought through a double characterisation that Benjamin finds in die Sprache. (shrink)

In this paper we articulate, partially and from a rhetorical analysis approach, the crucial moments in which reading appears linked to die Sprache in Walter Benjamin's writings. Both reading and die Sprache operate in Benjamin's discourses as a point of synecdochic crystallization for the elaboration of his rhetorical critique, already outlined in his posthumous writings of youth and brought into play in his early and late essays on art criticism. Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator.

El análisis historiográfico sobre la ciudad de ‛Umar b. Ḥafṣūn, Bobastro va a permitir la caracterización de este enclave como uno de los más complejos de al-Andalus. No existe, según la documentación que poseemos, ningún otro asentamiento en época emiral que reciba un número tan elevado de aplicaciones terminológicas, indicio bastante elocuente de una realidad topográfica muy compleja. Con todo, pocos de estos calificativos tienen un perfil conceptual plenamente delimitado. Con el triunfo del Estado islámico encarnado en el Califato de (...) Córdoba, la situación del lugar de Bobastro va a cambiar radicalmente y la que fuera sede de los ḥafṣūnies se convertirá en refugio circunstancial de algunos gobernantes malagueños. (shrink)

The 'Enciclopedia Filosofica' is an encyclopaedia of philosophical topics promoted by the Centre for Philosophical Studies of Gallarate and published, in its third and last edition in 2006, by the Bompiani publishing house in Milan. The first edition of the 'Enciclopedia Filosofica' was promoted by the Centre for Philosophical Studies of Gallarate in the 1950s, seeing the light in 1957-58. A second edition, published by the Sansoni publishing house in Florence, was published in 1968-69 and reprinted in 1979. The third (...) and last edition, published by Bompiani in 2006, is intended to cover the whole of philosophical knowledge and related disciplines with over ten thousand entries edited by about a thousand academics, both Italian and non-Italian, and distributed in twelve volumes for a total of 12,496 pages. (shrink)

The parable of modern thought, aiming to delineate the beginning and the foundation of knowledge, in the end has to resolve into the blending of a double primitiveness: on one side the methodological primitiveness of cogito, on the other and together the metaphysical a priori, always functioning, of an unconditional, of an infinite principle, what constitutes the foundation and the rule of the cogito. The reality and transcendence of this principle can be clarified starting from an attentive phenomenology of the (...) existing: 1. Starting from the negative character of every ontology (determinatio est negatio) one has to access a constitutive relationality of being. In this sense one has to reprise Hegel’s formula according to which every reality is for itself in that it is for another and is for another in that it is for-itself. Besides, relationality that safeguards the reciprocal connection and the difference between entity and entity cannot be conceived without supposing an identity of being, always subtended and always functioning: an original and originating immanence, a radical logos that constitutes and goes beyond the interlacement of entities, without resolving into the sum of their beings. 2. The question then arises of whether this immanence that is always other than the entity has to be seen as an absolutely immanent transcendence or as a metaphysical transcendence. A correct phenomenological analysis of the existing leads us to reflect on the datum of a recurrent irrationality in human experience (error, evil): an irrationality which, excepting contradiction, is not referable to the logos first affirmed. In this perspective one has to deduce the assertion of a metaphysical transcendence, of a constitutive difference of the entity with respect to being.3. A conclusive section of the essay aims to delineate the conciliation of this difference, which on one side can be found along the pathway of ethical exercise and on the other side can be prophesied through poetic prefiguration. (shrink)