The introduction of the modern diagnostic and therapeutic procedures to the medical practice provided a new challenge for the medicine. The art of medicine, with its default purpose of acting for the benefit of health, is therefore required to derive from technological progress effectively and rationally. As a result, the medical ethics has been engaged with the rules of economy and management of deficit medical procedures as well as their rational and fair distribution. The above suggests, that medics, given these (...) recourses, should approach each patient with a consideration to their therapeutic rights. However, the physicians cannot just concentrate on the good of one particular patient, but must take into account joint responsibility for the good of a potential patient. This makes medical ethical dilemmas similar to the ethical issues of business. The notion of responsibility is the key for discriminating these two kinds of ethics. (shrink)

Background and aimsFew Polish hospitals have Hospital Ethics Committee (HECs) and the services are not always adequate. In this situation, the role of HECs, in providing, among others, ethical advice on the discontinuation of persistent therapies, may be taken over by other entities. The aim of our research was to investigate, how often and on what issues hospital chaplains are asked for ethical advice in reaching difficult medical decisions.MethodsA survey of 100 Roman Catholic chaplains was conducted, that is, at least (...) 10% of all chaplains currently working in Polish hospitals.ResultsOf the participants, 29% confirmed receiving requests for advice in making a morally difficult medical decision. Receiving this type of request was not conditional on the place of their service, duration of their pastoral mission or HEC membership. The largest group of chaplains (21%) encounter questions concerning the ethical dilemmas associated with discontinuing persistent therapy. Patients and their families most often raise issues related to the methods of birth control, and the medical staff raise the issue of termination of pregnancy—as reported by 9% and 15% of chaplains, respectively. Most of the chaplains asked for help (79%) experience a deficit of specialist knowledge in the area of medicine or ethics.ConclusionsIn order to improve the quality of ethical consultations in Polish hospitals, in addition to further development of HECs, it is postulated to develop a system for bioethical education of chaplains. (shrink)

I argue that, for Mengzi, the kind of knowledge that features in expressions of the form ‘knowing N’, where N is a noun or a noun phrase, is not a kind of belief but is instead a capacity for intelligently performing relevant actions. My argument proceeds by showing that, first, Mengzi is committed to the view that a person knows N iff she is relevantly capable and, second, that the best explanation for this is that the kind of knowledge involved (...) in knowing N is a capacity. Finally, I motivate such a practicalist interpretation by arguing that it offers us a general but informative explanation of what it is that knowing N makes the knower capable of doing. (shrink)

The notion of the common good has been one of the leading themes of Machiavelli scholarship, yet there is no systematic study devoted to it. The aim of this article is to explore Machiavelli's understanding of the common good and to demonstrate how problematic his approach is. First, even in its form as an ideal the notion has an ambiguous meaning that can easily become intrinsically discrepant. Second, political reality makes the ideal practically impossible to embody. Third, as a motivational (...) goal of political activity and patriotic inspiration the common good is blurred by partial and individual interests. Finally, it can be an instrument of deception and exploitation. It seems that these difficulties severely constrained Machiavelli's use of the notion of the common good which for him was probably too obscure to be a principal idea of political thinking. (shrink)

Superficial and systemic diagnosis of family The distinction between two types of diagnosis of family was inspired by the concept of surface and source features of personality by R.B. Cattell. By means of existing psychological questionnaires we can only know the surface of consciously available mental phenomena. The same is true in the diagnosis of family. The McMaster model of family, systemic in its assumptions, developed research tools giving access only to the surface of the phenomena. Although they are divided (...) into certain thematic categories they do not reveal what is really important in the family system. In this article, the author, after a detailed discussion of one of the tests based on the McMaster theoretical model, is attempting to identify the source features of the family, hereinafter called systemic traits. In this research the exploration factor analysis was used. Three perspectives of the opinion of the family were maintained. Factor analysis allowed identification of three factors for each perspective of the family assessment. Confirmative analysis proved a satisfactory match. The accuracy of the identified systemic model was then tested by a confirmation study. The authors also prepared a provisional questionnaire for measuring these systemic traits of the family. The tool proved to be promising and the work worth continuing. Incidentally, it turned out that the characteristics of the family system are relatively independent of personality traits of family members. (shrink)

I examine passages from the Zhuangzi that proponents of interpreting Zhuangzian ethics as "patient moral relativism" (PMR) primarily draw on to support their view. I consider whether in these passages Zhuangzi morally evaluates agents or their actions, and if he does, whether his evaluations support ascribing to him PMR. My argument is that Zhuangzi either fails to make the required moral evaluations or he makes moral evaluations that do not accord with PMR. A PMR-friendly reading is possible only if we (...) accept contested interpretative claims about parts of the Zhuangzi that go beyond the primary textual evidence that is frequently cited in support of such a reading. (shrink)

Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472 – 1529) is famously associated with the view that knowledge and action are unified (zhī xíng hé yī 知行合一). Call this the Unity Thesis. Given standard assumptions about what it means for a person to know, it may seem that the Unity Thesis is clearly false: I can know that p without currently acting in p-related ways, and I can know how to φ without currently φ-ing. My aims in this paper are, first, to draw on (...) recent work in epistemology to explain and defend the Unity Thesis and, second, to argue that it offers us an attractive conceptual alternative to a standard way of thinking about the nature of intentional action. The first step of my argument draws on the idea that what distinguishes intentional actions from bodily events is the presence of knowing-to – that is, an agent is φ-ing intentionally if and only if she is currently doing something because she knows to do it as a way for her to φ. Such a notion of knowing-to allows us to explain otherwise puzzling features of the Unity Thesis, including the claim that knowing and acting occur simultaneously. In the second step, I argue that the Unity Thesis can help us avoid various long-standing issues in the philosophy of action, including the problem of deviant (formal) causation. (shrink)

A book review of Perkins (2022), "Doing what you really want: an introduction to the philosophy of Mengzi", Oxford University Press.

This chapter examines Mencius’s views on knowledge and how they might contribute to contemporary debates in epistemology. For this purpose, I focus on three features that I take to be characteristic (although not exhaustive) of Mencian epistemology: first, Mencius’s views on knowing things; second, the role that wisdom or intellectual virtue plays in acquiring knowledge; and third, Mencius’s views on “knowing-to”, a kind of knowledge conceptually distinct from knowing-that and knowing-how. I argue that the views we find in the Mencius (...) on these matters are relevant to contemporary debates on the nature of objectual knowledge, on the role of intellectual virtue in knowing, and on the relation between know-how and intelligent action. (shrink)

The subject of the following discourse is, as the title itself points out, the anthropology of Heschel. Considering the fact that Heschel is in general unknown in Poland, I shall take the liberty to make known, in short, some pieces of information about him. Heschel was born in Warsaw, Poland on January 11th 1907. After graduating from the Gymnasium in Wilno he started his studies at Friedrich Wilhelm Universität, Berlin. At the Berlin University he studied at the Philosophy Department and, (...) additionally, he took up studies in the sphere of Semitic Philosophy and History of Art. In 1937 Heschel was chosen by Martin Buber as his successor at Mittelstelle für Jüdische Erwachsenen-Bildung in Frankfurt on the Main. In October he was arrested by the Gestapo and deported to Poland together with all the Jews of Polish nationality. After returning to Warsaw he taught philosophy and biblical sciences at the Institute of Jewish Studies. Six weeks before the German aggression against Poland he left for England and then for the United States where he stayed until his death. He was the Professor at the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York. Except for his didactical activity, our philosopher did not neglect creative work. As time went on he was becoming a more and more well-known and appreciated intellectualist and social worker in America. His activity went far beyond the boundaries of the Jewish world. (shrink)

The possibility of the development of comparative thought made the Renaissance an era particularly favorable to the awakening of the scientific understanding of social phenomena. Isolated elements of such an attitude had already appeared, but now their accumulation became of decisive importance.

Among the most prominent supporters of Perdikkas, son of Orontes, were his brother Alketas and Attalos, son of Andromenes, their brother-in-law. That the latter was an unwavering supporter of Perdikkas has not been challenged, nor that his career was advanced by the prestige of the ‘chiliarchos’ at the time of Alexander's death. Crucial to the discussion of the career of Attalos, therefore, is the date of his marriage to Atalante, for which we have only the ambiguous testimony of Diodoros . (...) And, while modern scholars claim that the marriage cannot be dated, they have had a tendency to assume that it was contracted during Alexander's lifetime. There is, however, a case to be made for a later date, one that will give us cause to reconsider Attalos' role in the last years of Alexander's reign and in the struggle for power that followed the King's death. (shrink)

Artykuł krytycznie eksplikuje perspektywę etologiczną i etyczno-empiryczną refleksji nad moralnością, które pojawiają się w ramach szkoły lwowsko-warszawskiej. Poprzez odwołanie się do badań Marii Ossowskiej wyeksponowana zostaje skłonność analiz etologicznych do anihilacji specyfiki normatywności moralnej, jak również niejednoznaczność wniosków samej Marii Ossowskiej i jej predylekcja ku emotywizmowi. Eksploracja myśli Tadeusza Czeżowskiego natomiast odsłania naukowy status norm aksjologicznych i deontycznych, które mogą być uznawane za zdania prawdziwe bądź fałszywe. Finalnie model normatywności Marii Ossowskiej i Tadeusza Czeżowskiego zostaje skonfrontowany z imperatywnością moralną dostępną (...) na poziomie doświadczalnej 'datum morale'. (shrink)

Books 31 to 40 of Livy's history chart Rome's emergence as an imperial nation and the Romans tempestuous involvement with Greece, Macedonia and the near East in the opening decades of the second century BC; they are our most important source for Graeco-Roman relations in that century. Livy's dramatic narrative includes the Roman campaigns in Spain and against the Gallic tribes of Northern Italy; the flight of Hannibal from Carthage and his death in the East; the debate on the Oppian (...) law; and the Bacchanalian Episode. (shrink)

Many anglophone scholars take the early Confucians to be virtue ethicists of one kind or another. A common virtue ethical reading of one of the most influential early Confucians, namely Mengzi, ascribes to him the view that moral actions are partly (or entirely) moral because of the state from which they are performed, be it the agent’s motives, emotions, or their character traits. I consider whether such a reading of the Mengzi is justified and I argue that it is not. (...) I argue that there is no reason to believe that Mengzi distinguishes the moral value of actions that are performed from virtuous and non-virtuous states. Given this, virtue (as a feature of agents) is normatively posterior to virtuous actions. I conclude, first, that this poses a challenge to a wide range of common interpretations of the Mengzi, be they virtue ethical or otherwise, and second, that there might be conceptual space for an account of virtue ethics that rejects the normative priority of virtue over virtuous actions. (shrink)

In this chapter I give an account of the epistemology underlying the concept of “extension” in the Mengzi, an early Confucian text written in the fourth century BCE. Mengzi suggests in a conversation with King Xuan of Qi that a solution to the King’s problem of how one comes to act in a kingly manner is that one engages in “extension”. I argue that a long-standing scholarly debate on the exact nature of Mengzian “extension” can be resolved by closely investigating (...) the epistemological assumptions that must be in place for “extension” to be a viable solution to King Xuan’s problem. More specifically, my argument is that knowledge of a certain kind, namely knowing-to, is both necessary and sufficient for extension to take place. In other words, for a person S to extend X, where X is a capacity for action, S at least needs to have knowing-to. (shrink)