In the study of special languages and translation, the legal field is often insulated from other domains. This is primarily due to the extreme system dependence of the terminology of law, which results from a lack of a common legal system of reference throughout the world. The abstract nature of this human-made field and its dynamicity in view of the continuously evolving case law and constant changes in legislation make it difficult to illustrate its complex ontology through traditional terminology management (...) techniques. Therefore, this paper argues for an interdisciplinary approach to constructing the ontology of legal concepts based on structural constituents from frame semantics and comparative law. Frames allowing for the representation of interconnected knowledge segments evoked by legal concepts and the distinction between micro- and macro-dimensions in legal comparison research make it possible to capture the complex ontology of legal terminology evoked in a specific point in time and a determined legal context. The ontological knowledge structure will be exemplified by terms from German social, commercial, employment, and tax law. (shrink)

The primary objective of this study was to propose a functional discrete mathematical model for analyzing folklore fairy tales. Within this model, characters are denoted as vertices, and explicit instances of communication – both verbal and non-verbal – within the text are depicted as edges. Upon examining a corpus of Eastern Slavic fairy tales in comparison to Chukchi fairy tales, unforeseen outcomes emerged. Notably, the constructed models seem to evade establishing certain connections between characters. Consequently, instances where the interactions among (...) fairy tale characters would result in a non-planar graph structure are notably absent. To put it differently, the models refrain from incorporating sub-graphs delineated by the Kuratowski theorem governing planar graphs, specifically the minimal non-planar graphs Κ5 and Κ3,3. Remarkably, even in more extensive texts featuring a larger cast of characters, connections that would yield a non-planar graph pattern are consistently avoided. This leads to the formulation of a hypothesis positing that traditional folk tales adhere to a “planar narrative” design – an identifiable narrative variant characterized by inherent limitations in complexity. This design, in turn, appears deeply entrenched within the societal framework of the cultures that produced these folk narratives. (shrink)

Declaration of independence became a reference point of a new historical epoch - epoch of free, sovereign development of Uzbekistan. Our country from first days of independent development, under direction of President I.A. Karimov, has headed for refusal of a heritage of a command control system, having started to construction of bases of a democratic legal society with the socially-focused market economy. For achievement of these purposes own model of updating and progress which essential features are the selective approach to (...) experience of the developed countries and the account of specificity and features of centuries-oldevolution of national statehood is involved. In Republic of Uzbekistan process of democratization and modernization of a society became stage-by-stage, with a stress on maintenance of deep understanding of an essence of democracy, in view of sociopolitical traditions and features of national mentality. The heritage of sociopolitical culture of our society has acted original “Means”. By means of which modern values and principles of democracy were brought home to people, their perception and understanding was facilitated. Psychological features of national character, such as tolerance, the aggravated feeling of validity, equality before the law, etc. were especially effectively used. It is known, that the basic directions of democratic transformations and formation of a civil society are defined depending on real needs and opportunities of their realization. We have a precise comprehension of that the major condition of formation of a democratic society is strengthening a role and value in a life of a society of not state and public institutes. In Uzbekistan this process goes by practical realization of the concept “From the strong state - to a strong society”. It is a question of stage-by-stage and gradual reduction of a role of the state structures in the decision of social and economic questions and about transfers of these functions to public organizations. Gradually we go to that participation of the state in economic sphere and a field of activity of managing structures, first of all, a private sector - decreases. In parallel the problem of creation of favorable conditions for realization of publiccontrol on the basis of corresponding motivation - public interests is solved. (shrink)

In the paper, the multilevel concept of methodology of science is reviewed. The author distinguishes five levels in the methodology of science. These levels vary in degree of generality and the nature of the relationship with philosophy. The first, most general level of the methodology of ways of learning of the studies on the application of science to philosophical methods such as dialectical and metaphysical. The doctrine of general scientific ways of knowing is the second, less common level of methodology (...) of science. The essence of scientific methods is studied at this level, given their theoretical rationale. There are heuristic dignity, epistemological possibilities, and the boundaries of applicability are identified. The third level of the methodology of science is the study of the system of general scientific ways of learning applied in any basic science. In addition to knowledge of the essence of these methods for the researcher requires knowledge of the basic problems of this science. The fourth level of the methodology of science is the study of the system of general scientific ways of learning and epistemological problems in any basic science. The fifth level of the methodology of science are the problems of narrower plan. This study questions the use of certain, specific methods of scientific learning. Thus, the methodology of science is complex and has a complicated structure. The two most general level the methodology are philosophical, the next two are common to philosophy and science, the fifth level is of a specifically scientific nature. (shrink)

This chapter examines Mencius’s views on knowledge and how they might contribute to contemporary debates in epistemology. For this purpose, I focus on three features that I take to be characteristic (although not exhaustive) of Mencian epistemology: first, Mencius’s views on knowing things; second, the role that wisdom or intellectual virtue plays in acquiring knowledge; and third, Mencius’s views on “knowing-to”, a kind of knowledge conceptually distinct from knowing-that and knowing-how. I argue that the views we find in the Mencius (...) on these matters are relevant to contemporary debates on the nature of objectual knowledge, on the role of intellectual virtue in knowing, and on the relation between know-how and intelligent action. (shrink)

Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472 – 1529) is famously associated with the view that knowledge and action are unified (zhī xíng hé yī 知行合一). Call this the Unity Thesis. Given standard assumptions about what it means for a person to know, it may seem that the Unity Thesis is clearly false: I can know that p without currently acting in p-related ways, and I can know how to φ without currently φ-ing. My aims in this paper are, first, to draw on (...) recent work in epistemology to explain and defend the Unity Thesis and, second, to argue that it offers us an attractive conceptual alternative to a standard way of thinking about the nature of intentional action. The first step of my argument draws on the idea that what distinguishes intentional actions from bodily events is the presence of knowing-to – that is, an agent is φ-ing intentionally if and only if she is currently doing something because she knows to do it as a way for her to φ. Such a notion of knowing-to allows us to explain otherwise puzzling features of the Unity Thesis, including the claim that knowing and acting occur simultaneously. In the second step, I argue that the Unity Thesis can help us avoid various long-standing issues in the philosophy of action, including the problem of deviant (formal) causation. (shrink)

I argue that, for Mengzi, the kind of knowledge that features in expressions of the form ‘knowing N’, where N is a noun or a noun phrase, is not a kind of belief but is instead a capacity for intelligently performing relevant actions. My argument proceeds by showing that, first, Mengzi is committed to the view that a person knows N iff she is relevantly capable and, second, that the best explanation for this is that the kind of knowledge involved (...) in knowing N is a capacity. Finally, I motivate such a practicalist interpretation by arguing that it offers us a general but informative explanation of what it is that knowing N makes the knower capable of doing. (shrink)

Many anglophone scholars take the early Confucians to be virtue ethicists of one kind or another. A common virtue ethical reading of one of the most influential early Confucians, namely Mengzi, ascribes to him the view that moral actions are partly (or entirely) moral because of the state from which they are performed, be it the agent’s motives, emotions, or their character traits. I consider whether such a reading of the Mengzi is justified and I argue that it is not. (...) I argue that there is no reason to believe that Mengzi distinguishes the moral value of actions that are performed from virtuous and non-virtuous states. Given this, virtue (as a feature of agents) is normatively posterior to virtuous actions. I conclude, first, that this poses a challenge to a wide range of common interpretations of the Mengzi, be they virtue ethical or otherwise, and second, that there might be conceptual space for an account of virtue ethics that rejects the normative priority of virtue over virtuous actions. (shrink)

This paper raises a new problem for the widely held view that, according to the Confucian philosopher Mencius, being a benevolent person necessarily entails being affectively disposed in morally relevant ways. I argue that ascribing such a view to Mencius generates an inconsistent triad with two of his central philosophical commitments on what it means to be a benevolent ruler. I then consider possible ways of resolving the triad and I argue that the most attractive option is to reject the (...) view that a benevolent person must be affectively disposed in morally relevant ways; instead, being disposed to perform benevolent actions is enough. (shrink)

In this chapter I give an account of the epistemology underlying the concept of “extension” in the Mengzi, an early Confucian text written in the fourth century BCE. Mengzi suggests in a conversation with King Xuan of Qi that a solution to the King’s problem of how one comes to act in a kingly manner is that one engages in “extension”. I argue that a long-standing scholarly debate on the exact nature of Mengzian “extension” can be resolved by closely investigating (...) the epistemological assumptions that must be in place for “extension” to be a viable solution to King Xuan’s problem. More specifically, my argument is that knowledge of a certain kind, namely knowing-to, is both necessary and sufficient for extension to take place. In other words, for a person S to extend X, where X is a capacity for action, S at least needs to have knowing-to. (shrink)

Passages from the recently excavated Guodian manuscripts bear a surprising resemblance to a position ascribed to Gaozi and his followers in the Mengzi at 6A4-5, namely that righteousness is “external.” Although such a resemblance has been noted, the philosophical implications of it for the debate between Gaozi and Mengzi and, by extension, for Mengzian ethics have been largely unexplored. I argue that a Guodian-inspired reading of 6A4-5 is one that takes the debate to be about whether standing in certain family (...) relations makes a difference to whether one’s actions are righteous. Gaozi denies that it does, holding the view that one’s family relations, i.e., relations internal to the household, are irrelevant when it comes to matters of righteousness, while Mengzi disagrees, arguing that all relational properties, including family relations, are just as much reason-giving properties for performing righteous actions as they are in the case of performing benevolent actions. I argue that such a Guodian-based reading provides us a simple, yet explanatorily powerful reading of 6A4-5 that has broader implications for Mengzian ethics and our understanding of the early Chinese intellectual milieu in general. (shrink)

I examine passages from the Zhuangzi that proponents of interpreting Zhuangzian ethics as "patient moral relativism" (PMR) primarily draw on to support their view. I consider whether in these passages Zhuangzi morally evaluates agents or their actions, and if he does, whether his evaluations support ascribing to him PMR. My argument is that Zhuangzi either fails to make the required moral evaluations or he makes moral evaluations that do not accord with PMR. A PMR-friendly reading is possible only if we (...) accept contested interpretative claims about parts of the Zhuangzi that go beyond the primary textual evidence that is frequently cited in support of such a reading. (shrink)

Background and aimsFew Polish hospitals have Hospital Ethics Committee (HECs) and the services are not always adequate. In this situation, the role of HECs, in providing, among others, ethical advice on the discontinuation of persistent therapies, may be taken over by other entities. The aim of our research was to investigate, how often and on what issues hospital chaplains are asked for ethical advice in reaching difficult medical decisions.MethodsA survey of 100 Roman Catholic chaplains was conducted, that is, at least (...) 10% of all chaplains currently working in Polish hospitals.ResultsOf the participants, 29% confirmed receiving requests for advice in making a morally difficult medical decision. Receiving this type of request was not conditional on the place of their service, duration of their pastoral mission or HEC membership. The largest group of chaplains (21%) encounter questions concerning the ethical dilemmas associated with discontinuing persistent therapy. Patients and their families most often raise issues related to the methods of birth control, and the medical staff raise the issue of termination of pregnancy—as reported by 9% and 15% of chaplains, respectively. Most of the chaplains asked for help (79%) experience a deficit of specialist knowledge in the area of medicine or ethics.ConclusionsIn order to improve the quality of ethical consultations in Polish hospitals, in addition to further development of HECs, it is postulated to develop a system for bioethical education of chaplains. (shrink)

In this chapter I give an account of the epistemology underlying the concept of “extension” in the Mengzi, an early Confucian text written in the fourth century BCE. Mengzi suggests in a conversation with King Xuan of Qi that a solution to the King’s problem of how one comes to act in a kingly manner is that one engages in “extension”. I argue that a long-standing scholarly debate on the exact nature of Mengzian “extension” can be resolved by closely investigating (...) the epistemological assumptions that must be in place for “extension” to be a viable solution to King Xuan’s problem. More specifically, my argument is that knowledge of a certain kind, namely knowing-to, is both necessary and sufficient for extension to take place. In other words, for a person S to extend X, where X is a capacity for action, S at least needs to have knowing-to. (shrink)

The introduction of the modern diagnostic and therapeutic procedures to the medical practice provided a new challenge for the medicine. The art of medicine, with its default purpose of acting for the benefit of health, is therefore required to derive from technological progress effectively and rationally. As a result, the medical ethics has been engaged with the rules of economy and management of deficit medical procedures as well as their rational and fair distribution. The above suggests, that medics, given these (...) recourses, should approach each patient with a consideration to their therapeutic rights. However, the physicians cannot just concentrate on the good of one particular patient, but must take into account joint responsibility for the good of a potential patient. This makes medical ethical dilemmas similar to the ethical issues of business. The notion of responsibility is the key for discriminating these two kinds of ethics. (shrink)

The notion of the common good has been one of the leading themes of Machiavelli scholarship, yet there is no systematic study devoted to it. The aim of this article is to explore Machiavelli's understanding of the common good and to demonstrate how problematic his approach is. First, even in its form as an ideal the notion has an ambiguous meaning that can easily become intrinsically discrepant. Second, political reality makes the ideal practically impossible to embody. Third, as a motivational (...) goal of political activity and patriotic inspiration the common good is blurred by partial and individual interests. Finally, it can be an instrument of deception and exploitation. It seems that these difficulties severely constrained Machiavelli's use of the notion of the common good which for him was probably too obscure to be a principal idea of political thinking. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Origines Veliae In Pompeius Trogus, Prologue XVIIIWaldemar HeckelThe so-called “Prologues” (more appropriately “summaries”) of Pompeius Trogus’ Philippic History contain numerous references to people, places, and events not discussed by Justin in his abbreviation of the work. In CP 62 (1969) 162–64, V. Iliescu considered Prol. xviii (origines Phoenicum et Sidonis et Veliae Carthaginisque res gestae in excessu dictae) and argued that Veliae should be “corrected” to read Tyri. 1 (...) O. Seel, in the apparatus to his Teubner edition (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1971), writes “quae urbs contextui male convenire videtur.” But Seel remained unconvinced by Iliescu’s proposal or G. Radke’s more imaginative origines... Didonis vel Elissae.... 2 The latter is, at any rate, doubtful, as Iliescu noted (163), because origines is used in the Prologues of peoples, cities and regions, but not of specific persons (but cf. Justin xi 11.2, where Alexander consults Ammon de origine sua). These emendations are, however, unnecessary. There is good reason to suppose that Pompeius did, in fact, discuss the origins of Velia in southern Italy at precisely this point in his history.Ammianus Marcellinus xv 9.2ff. (= Timagenes, FGrH 88 F2) includes the following observation:A Phocaea vero Asiaticus populus, Harpali [sic] inclementiam vitans, Cyri regis praefecti, Italiam navigio petit. Cuius pars in Lucania Veliam, alia condidit in Viennensi Massiliam: dein secutis aetatibus oppida, aucta virium copia, instituere non pauca.But, in fact, a people of Asia from Phocaea, to avoid the severity of Harpalus [read: “Harpagus”], prefect of king Cyrus, set sail for Italy. A part of them founded Velia in Lucania, the rest, Massilia in the region of Vienne. Then in subsequent ages they established no small number of towns, as their strength and resources increased.”(xv 9.7; tr. J. C. Rolfe)Now we know from Herodotus i 163ff. that, when the Phocaeans fled to the west, some of them settled in Corsica, whither they had sent colonists some twenty years earlier. They maintained themselves through piracy until a naval coalition of Etruscans and Carthaginians met them in the so-called “battle of Alalia” (Hdt. i 166) and made the Phocaean position [End Page 309] in Corsica untenable. According to Herodotus, the Phocaeans sailed to Rhegium, from which they set out to found Elea or Velia (“they founded that city in the land of Oenotria which is now called Hyele”: Hdt. i 167.3; cf. D. Ridgway, CAH iv 2 672).Trogus’ report concerning the origins of the Phocaean colony of Velia was included in his eighteenth book, which, as we can see from Justin’s “Epitome,” dealt with the early history of Carthage from its foundation to the events of the late sixth century (cf. D. Asheri, CAH iv 2 750–52). Since the confrontation at Alalia in c. 535 B.C. formed an important part of the history of Carthaginian expansion in the western Mediterranean, it is most probable that Trogus included an account of the battle and, in the discussion of its aftermath, included a digression on the foundation of Velia. The Phocaeans had, of course, founded Marseille, and their early history will have been well known to Trogus, who discussed the Greeks in Gaul in Book xliii 3ff. The Phocaeans at Velia, however, belonged, historically and geographically, in the context of Carthaginian expansion and in Book xviii. The text of Trogus, Prologue xviii, is thus correct as it stands and requires no emendation.Waldemar HeckelUniversity of CalgaryFootnotes1. Or, less likely, Tyrorum.2. RE viii A2 (1958) col. 2403.Copyright © 1996 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

The Confucian philosopher Mengzi believes that ‘extending’ one's kindness facilitates one's moral development and that it is intimately tied to performing morally good actions. Most interpreters have taken Mengzian kindness to be an emotional state, with the extension of kindness to centrally involve feeling kindness towards more people or in a greater number of situations. I argue that kindness cannot do all the theoretical work that Mengzi wants it to do if it is interpreted as an emotion. I submit that (...) Mengzi's notion of extending kindness is best understood as the exercise of a capacity for intelligently performing kind actions. (shrink)

The subject of the following discourse is, as the title itself points out, the anthropology of Heschel. Considering the fact that Heschel is in general unknown in Poland, I shall take the liberty to make known, in short, some pieces of information about him. Heschel was born in Warsaw, Poland on January 11th 1907. After graduating from the Gymnasium in Wilno he started his studies at Friedrich Wilhelm Universität, Berlin. At the Berlin University he studied at the Philosophy Department and, (...) additionally, he took up studies in the sphere of Semitic Philosophy and History of Art. In 1937 Heschel was chosen by Martin Buber as his successor at Mittelstelle für Jüdische Erwachsenen-Bildung in Frankfurt on the Main. In October he was arrested by the Gestapo and deported to Poland together with all the Jews of Polish nationality. After returning to Warsaw he taught philosophy and biblical sciences at the Institute of Jewish Studies. Six weeks before the German aggression against Poland he left for England and then for the United States where he stayed until his death. He was the Professor at the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York. Except for his didactical activity, our philosopher did not neglect creative work. As time went on he was becoming a more and more well-known and appreciated intellectualist and social worker in America. His activity went far beyond the boundaries of the Jewish world. (shrink)

The possibility of the development of comparative thought made the Renaissance an era particularly favorable to the awakening of the scientific understanding of social phenomena. Isolated elements of such an attitude had already appeared, but now their accumulation became of decisive importance.

*SufferingWhy so much pain/Why so much hate/When we are brothers/And should offer a hand?/Look at the suffering/Look at the torment/Coming from within/Our land is dying./Look at the suffering/Look at the torment/Coming from within/Our land suffers too much./Look at this mother/She has no more tears/She has nothing left to lament/Our land is dying. /Angola is so great/So rich and so beautiful/Let there be a place for all of us and for those who love it (bis)./Long live Angola/Long live Angola/Long live Angola.

El presente trabajo describe y analiza, desde una perspectiva de género, el escenario laboral de una cárcel de mujeres en Argentina: la Unidad Penitenciaria N° 4 de la ciudad de Santa Fe. Partimos de considerar la articulación entre trabajo y género en la prisión como un dispositivo de gobierno —que funciona de modos tanto represivos como orientados a la producción de determinadas formas de subjetividad— que se constituye, al mismo tiempo, como un sitio potencial para el desarrollo de formas diversas (...) de agenciamiento de las mujeres detenidas. En esta dirección, nos enfocamos, primero, en el modo en que el trabajo vehiculiza imágenes sobre las mujeres detenidas y su “corrección”. En segundo lugar, analizamos los diversos usos y sentidos que las mujeres detenidas hacen del trabajo y de los ingresos allí obtenidos. A partir de ello, mostramos en primer lugar de qué manera el trabajo hace visible el tipo de subjetividad que la institución penitenciaria intenta construir, caracterizada no sólo por exigencias de conformidad a modelos tradicionales de feminidad sino también por el intento de construir subjetividades (micro) emprendedoras y proactivas. Al mismo tiempo, mostramos cómo las mujeres detenidas se valen tanto de la oferta institucional como de una serie de nichos que crean por fuera de esta para construir espacios de agenciamiento que, con ciertos límites, les permiten hacer frente a algunas de las privaciones operadas por la pena privativa de la libertad y por la subordinación de género más en general. (shrink)