Protein translocation across biological membranes is of fundamental importance for the biogenesis of organelles and in protein secretion. We will give an overview of the recent achievements in the understanding of protein translocation across mitochondrial membranes(1‐5). In particular we will focus on recently identified components of the mitochondrial import apparatus.

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialtheorie und Philosophie Jahrgang: 3 Heft: 1 Seiten: 108-130.

Willpower has ramifications for autonomy and mental time-travel. Autonomy presupposes mature powers of volition and the capacity to anticipate future events and consequences of one's actions. Ainslie's study is useful to clarify basic autonomy in addiction and dementia. Furthermore, we show how our study on coping with stress can be applied to suppression and resolve.

BackgroundAwareness of aging brings to light one’s own perceived behavioral, physical, and cognitive changes associated with getting older. Personality and physical illness are each related to two components of awareness of aging: attitudes toward own aging, and awareness of age-related changes. Here, we move beyond main effects to examine how personality and arthritis interact with respect to awareness of aging.Materials and Methods296 participants completed online self-report questionnaires of personality, arthritis, ATOA, and AARC gains and losses.ResultsWe ran three hierarchical multiple regression (...) models to test how personality traits and arthritis interacted to predict ATOA, AARC gains, and AARC losses, respectively. Higher extraversion was related to positive ATOA, and higher openness was related to positive ATOA and more AARC gains. Higher neuroticism was related to negative ATOA, more AARC losses, and less AARC gains. We found a main effect for arthritis, where those with arthritis reported more AARC losses. Lastly, we found a significant interaction between arthritis and agreeableness when predicting AARC gains. Among those with low agreeableness, people with arthritis reported significantly more AARC gains compared to those without arthritis.ConclusionPersonality and arthritis are each important for awareness of aging. Overall, our study suggests that for those with arthritis, it is especially important to consider behavioral and cognitive factors related to agreeableness, as they may be important means of promoting positive views on aging. (shrink)

Honeybees display a fascinating social behavior. The structural basis for this behavior, which made the bee a model organism for the study of communication, learning and memory formation, is the tiny insect brain. Neurons of the brain communicate via messenger molecules. Among these molecules, neuropeptides represent the structurally most‐diverse group and occupy a high hierarchic position in the modulation of behavior. A recent analysis of the honeybee genome revealed a considerable number of predicted (200) and confirmed (100) neuropeptides in this (...) insect.1 Is this quantity merely the result of advanced mass spectrometric techniques and bioinformatic tools or does it reflect the expression of more of these important messenger molecules, more than known from other insects studied so far? Our analysis of the data suggests that the social behavior is by no means correlated with a specific increase in the number of neuropeptides. Indeed, the honeybee genome is likely to contain fewer neuropeptide genes, neuropeptide paralogues and neuropeptide receptor genes than the solitary fruitfly Drosophila. BioEssays 29:416–421, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

For the first English edition of his distinguished study, Weisheit und Wissenschaft: Studien zu Pythagoras, Philoloas und Platon, Mr. Burkert has extensively ...

Arguing for controversial readings of many of the canonical figures, the book also focuses on lesser-known writers such as Pierre-Sylvain Regis, Nicolas ...

According to the phenomenal intentionality research program, a state’s intentional content is fixed by its phenomenal character. Defenders of this view have little to say about just how this grounding is accomplished. I argue that without a robust account of representation, the research program promises too little. Unfortunately, most of the well-developed accounts of representation – asymmetric dependence, teleosemantics, and the like – ground representation in external relations such as causation. Such accounts are inconsistent with the core of the phenomenal (...) intentionality program. I argue that, however counter-intuitive it may seem, the best prospect for explaining how phenomenal character represents appeals to resemblance. (shrink)

Contemporary Humeans treat laws of nature as statements of exceptionless regularities that function as the axioms of the best deductive system. Such ‘Best System Accounts’ marry realism about laws with a denial of necessary connections among events. I argue that Hume’s predecessor, George Berkeley, offers a more sophisticated conception of laws, equally consistent with the absence of powers or necessary connections among events in the natural world. On this view, laws are not statements of regularities but the most general rules (...) God follows in producing the world. Pace most commentators, I argue that Berkeley’s view is neither instrumentalist nor reductionist. More important, the Berkeleyan Best System can solve some of the problems afflicting its Humean rivals, including the problems of theory choice and Nancy Cartwright’s ‘facticity’ dilemma. Some of these solutions are available in the contemporary context, without any appeal to God. Berkeley’s account deserves to be taken seriously in its own right. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to connect the Brazilian Paulo Freire’s well known educational thinking with the “philosophy for children” movement. It considers the relationship between the creator of philosophy for children, Matthew Lipman and Freire through different attempts to establish a relationship between these two educators. The paper shows that the relationship between them is not as close as many supporters of P4C have claimed, especially in Latin America. It also considers the context of Educational Policies in our time (...) and why Freire’s understanding of the politics of education makes it impossible to be Freirean and at the same time be neutral or favorable to the actual status quo. Finally, after presenting Lipman’s understanding of the relationship between philosophy, education and democracy and their connection to capitalism, it proposes ways to begin the political path of philosophizing with children inspired by Paulo Freire’s educational thinking. As a result, a more politically committed path to doing philosophy with children is offered. (shrink)

The conception of a ‘law of nature’ is a human product. It was created to play a role in natural philosophy, in the Cartesian tradition. In light of this, philosophers and scientists must sort out what they mean by a law of nature before evaluating rival theories and approaches. If one’s conception of the laws of nature is yoked to metaphysical notions of truth and explanation, that connection must be made explicit and defended. If, on the other hand, one’s aim (...) is to disentangle laws from truth or from explanation, that must be stated and defended as well. If philosophers do not make such assumptions, intuitions, and methodological commitments clear, then it will be impossible to identify the source of disagreement in debates about the laws of nature. Are the conflicts rooted in disagreement about the conclusions reached, or do the background commitments of the combatants block any resolution to the dispute in principle or in practice? (shrink)

It can seem obvious that we live in a world governed by laws of nature, yet it was not until the seventeenth century that the concept of a law came to the fore. Ever since, it has been attended by controversy: what does it mean to say that Boyle's law governs the expansion of a gas, or that the planets obey the law of gravity? Laws are rules that permit calculations and predictions. What does the universe have to be like, (...) if it is to play by them? This book sorts the most prominent answers into three families. Laws first arose in a theological context; they govern events only because God enforces them. Those wishing to reverse the order of explanation, and argue that the powers of objects fix the laws, struggled to claim for themselves the results of new science. The stand-off between these two families bred a third which rejects any kind of enforcer for the laws. On this view, laws summarize events; they do not govern anything. This book traces the fortunes of the three families, from their origins to the present day. It uses objections - and the revisions needed to answer them - to produce the best representative of each. Along the way, it tries to settle the rules of this game, the debate over laws of nature. What should we expect from an account of laws? The book aims to help readers develop their own desiderata and judge the merits of the competing positions. (shrink)

Neuroscientific evidence has educated us in the ways in which the brain mediates our thought and behavior and, therefore, forced us to critically examine how we conceive of free will. This volume, featuring contributions from an international and interdisciplinary group of distinguished researchers and scholars, explores how our increasing knowledge of the brain can elucidate the concept of the will and whether or to what extent it is free. It also examines how brain science can inform our normative judgments of (...) moral and criminal responsibility for our actions. Some chapters point out the different respects in which mental disorders can compromise the will and others show how different forms of neuromodulation can reveal the neural underpinning of the mental capacities associated with the will and can restore or enhance them when they are impaired. (shrink)

John Locke’s claims about relations (such as cause and effect) and mixed modes (such as beauty and murder) have been controversial since the publication of the Essay. His earliest critics read him as a thoroughgoing anti-realist who denies that such things exist. More charitable readers have sought to read Locke’s claims away. Against both, I argue that Locke is making ontological claims, but that his views do not have the absurd consequences his defenders fear. By examining Locke’s texts, as well (...) as the intellectual context in which they were written, I show that Locke’s position is at once radical and thoroughly traditional. (shrink)

Diese Hardcover-Ausgabe ist Teil der TREDITION CLASSICS. Der Verlag tredition aus Hamburg veroffentlicht in der Buchreihe TREDITION CLASSICS Werke aus mehr als zwei Jahrtausenden. Diese waren zu einem Grossteil vergriffen oder nur noch antiquarisch erhaltlich. Mit TREDITION CLASSICS verfolgt tredition das Ziel, tausende Klassiker der Weltliteratur verschiedener Sprachen wieder als gedruckte Bucher zu verlegen - und das weltweit! Die Buchreihe dient zur Bewahrung der Literatur und Forderung der Kultur. Sie tragt so dazu bei, dass viele tausend Werke nicht in Vergessenheit (...) geraten. (shrink)

This book explores the idea of a childlike education and offers critical tools to question traditional forms of education, and alternative ways to understand and practice the relationship between education and childhood. Engaging with the work of Michel Foucault, Jacques Rancière, Giorgio Agamben and Simón Rodríguez, it contributes to the development of a philosophical framework for the pedagogical idea at the core of the book, that of a childlike education.Divided into two parts, the book introduces innovative ideas through philosophical argument (...) and discussion, challenging existing understandings of what it means to teach or to form a child, and putting into question the idea of education as a process of formation. The first part of the book consists of a dialogue with a number of interlocutors in order to develop an original conception of education. The second part presents the idea of a childlike education, beginning with a discussion of the relationships between childhood and philosophy, and followed by a critique of the place of philosophical experience in a childhood of education. Instead of asking how philosophy might educate childhood, this book raises the question of how childhood might educate philosophy. It will be of key value to researchers, educators and postgraduate students in the fields of education and the human sciences. (shrink)

I claim that Berkeley's main argument against abstraction comes into focus only when we see Descartes as one of its targets. Berkeley does not deploy Winkler's impossibility argument but instead argues that what is impossible is inconceivable. Since Descartes conceives of extension as a determinable, and since determinables cannot exist as such, he falls within the scope of Berkeley's argument.

This book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the notion of childhood and its place in philosophical education. Childhood is not seen as a developmental state that needs to be overcome, but rather an existential state that constitutes a significant part of being human as well as the (forgotten) dimension of the world itself.

The Architectonics of Meaning is a lucid demonstration of the purposes, methods, and implications of philosophical semantics that both supports and builds on Richard McKeon's and other noted pluralists' convictions that multiple philosophical approaches are viable. Watson ingeniously explores ways to systematize these approaches, and the result is a well-structured instrument for understanding texts. This book exemplifies both general and particular aspects of systematic pluralism, reorienting our understanding of the realms of knowing, doing, and making.

The popular Cartesian reading of George Berkeley's philosophy of mind mischaracterizes his views on the relations between substance and essence and between an idea and the act of thought in which it figures. I argue that Berkeley rejects Descartes's tripartite taxonomy of distinctions and makes use of a fourth kind of distinction. In addition to illuminating Berkeley's ontology of mind, this fourth distinction allows us to dissolve an important dilemma raised by Kenneth Winkler.

Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit have defended a non-reductive account of causal relevance known as the ‘program explanation account’. Allegedly, irreducible mental properties can be causally relevant in virtue of figuring in non-redundant program explanations which convey information not conveyed by explanations in terms of the physical properties that actually do the ‘causal work’. I argue that none of the possible ways to spell out the intuitively plausible idea of a program explanation serves its purpose, viz., defends non-reductive physicalism against (...) Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Exclusion Argument according to which non-reductive physicalism is committed to epiphenomenalism because irreducible mental properties are ‘screened off’ from causal relevance by their physical realizers. Jackson and Pettit’s most promising explication of a program explanation appeals to the idea of invariance of effect under variation of realization , but I show that invariance of effect under variation of realization is neither necessary nor sufficient for causal relevance. (shrink)

Despite their influence on later philosophers such as Hume, Malebranche's central arguments for occasionalism remain deeply puzzling. Both the famous ‘no necessary connection’ argument and what I call the epistemic argument include assumptions – e.g., that a true cause is logically necessarily connected to its effect – that seem unmotivated, even in their context. I argue that a proper understanding of late scholastic views lets us see why Malebranche would make this assumption. Both arguments turn on the claim that a (...) volition is the only candidate for a cause, because only a volition can include an effect as its intentional content. (shrink)

uber das Programm der kommenden Philosophie. ZUr Kritik der Gewalt. SChicksal und Charakter. GEschichtsphilosophische Thesen. THeologisch-politisches Fragment.

This article canvases the main areas of controversy: the nature of Lockean signification and his position on propositions and particles.

Rawls’s theory of justice has been criticized for allowing individuals by their own voluntary choice to make themselves members of the ‘least advantaged’ class and thereby eligible, albeit undeservedly, for the benefits mandated by the Difference Principle. I argue, first, that this criticism overlooks the fact that the Difference Principle applies only to the lifetime expectations of representative persons and, second, that it is possible to implement the Difference Principle (and the social minimum) through policies that do not create work (...) disincentives or require making objectionable moral judgments about who is and who is not deserving of assistance. (shrink)

It is commonly held that the natural numbers sequence 0, 1, 2,... possesses a unique structure. Yet by a well known model theoretic argument, there exist non-standard models of the formal theory which is generally taken to axiomatize all of our practices and intentions pertaining to use of the term “natural number.” Despite the structural similarity of this argument to the influential set theoretic indeterminacy argument based on the downward L ̈owenheim-Skolem theorem, most theorists agree that the number theoretic version (...) does not have skeptical consequences about the reference of “natural number” analogous to the ‘relativity’ Skolem claimed pertains to notions such as “uncountable” and “cardinal.” In this paper I argue that recent proposals by Shapiro, Lavine, McGee and Field which aim to distinguish the number and set theoretic indeterminacy arguments by locating extra-mathematical constraints on the interpretation of our number theoretic vocabulary are inadequate. I then suggest that if we consider the manner in which the natural numbers figure in our computational practices – e.g. in characterizing how we compute sums and products or determine prime factorizations – it follows that our application of computational terms such as “computable function” and “tractable computational problem” indirectly uniquely determines their structure. (shrink)

Unlike many of Descartes’s other followers, Pierre-Sylvain Re´gis resists the temptations of occasionalism. By marrying the ontology of mechanism with the causal structure of concurrentism, Re´gis arrives at a novel view that both acknowledges God’s role in natural events and preserves the causal powers of bodies. I set out Re´gis’s position, focusing on his arguments against occasionalism and his responses to Malebranche’s ‘no necessary connection’ and divine concursus arguments.

In Human Nature, Hobbes argues for what I call the ‘Great Deception Thesis’: “whatsoever accidents or qualities our senses make us think there be in the world, they are not there, but are seemings and apparitions only.” I argue that both the thesis and Hobbes’ arguments for it have been misunderstood. Rather than arguing for indirect realism or a primary/secondary quality distinction, Hobbes claims that no sensory experience resembles its object. I conclude by showing how Hobbes can account for the (...) usefulness of images even in the absence of any resemblance between those images and the objects that cause them. If I am right, Hobbes presents a distinctive and intriguing theory of perception, one that emphasizes the dynamic nature of experience. (shrink)