Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Über den Stand der indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahaviras und Buddhas" verfügbar.

The purpose of Wissenschaft und Weltanschaunng , 1 by Aloys Wenzl, is to provide a rational explanation of the world which shall give us greater insight into its nature than either common sense or the natural sciences can give us. Philosophy, Professor Wenzl says in his introduction, springs from the desire for a weltanschaunng , for insight into the significance of life. But it also springs from a desire for rational explanation , and aims at objective validity. It proposes to (...) give a truer, more complete, and more intelligible account of reality than appearances provide. This idea of a more intelligible explanation underlies the whole of Professor Wenzl's book. We want more than knowledge of empirical facts, we want knowledge of reasons , or, as he often puts it, insight . We want to see that though things seem to be contingent, they are really necessary. (shrink)

In the case of existential philosophy the division is understandable. The existentialist philosophers are clearly engaging in a program which has long been regarded as disreputable by the British. But in the case of phenomenology the divergence is an odd one, indeed. For what is phenomenology if not the "presuppositionless" reflection upon that which is "given" to consciousness? And what is "analysis" if not the unbiased and non speculative examination of experience? If phenomenology is actually "presuppositionless" and, further, if "analysis" (...) is free of doctrinal commitment, how can they be either different or opposed? If there is or has been a difference between them, has it not been of necessity more accidental than essential, more a matter of choice of subject matter than of method or philosophical doctrine? The fact that some British philosophers are now beginning to dip their toes in the waters of French phenomenology, and even to make use of such phenomenological categories as "intentionality," suggests that this is the case. But to the extent that there have been unavowed "presuppositions" in phenomenology and implicit doctrines in "analysis," the differences have been genuine and substantival. They do differ, as a matter of fact, with respect both to what is "given" for analysis and what is involved in analytic reflection itself. (shrink)

Studien zu einer Comte- und Marx-Kritik W. Schrader. Der ausgesparte Titel Aus der dargelegten Situation aber lassen sich nun ebenfalls jene Sonderbarkeiten erklären, auf die wir für Marx' Aufgreifen eines negativen Ideologiebegriffes ...

So far as his critical employment of the concept is concerned, the thing in itself is not a second object. The thing in itself is given in its appearances; it is the object which appears. In other words, the object is taken in a twofold sense. There is no contradiction, Kant maintained, in supposing that one and the same will is, as an appearance, determined by the laws of nature and yet, as a thing in itself, is free. He never (...) meant to hold that the self of the theoretical reason and the self of the practical reason are two separate and distinct entities. It is one and the same object considered from two perspectives. In this sense the thing in itself is purely a limiting concept. So far as the critical method is concerned, objects are always considered from a particular and limited perspective, e.g. science, morality, art, et cetera. This is the central meaning of his theory of appearances. In this employment of the concept it is completely meaningless to speak of the thing in itself as a cause of appearances. The critical distinction between appearances and things in themselves is not intended to be a distinction between subjective sense data and public objects, but between public objects as given according to two or more modes. This involves no extension of the category of causality beyond appearances. Moreover, it is not open to the charge that an unknown object is given the attribute of existence. The thing in itself is known as an appearance. By definition that is the only way that it could be known. To say that we know only appearances and not things in themselves is to state an obvious tautology, namely that objects are known only as they are known. (shrink)

philosophische Untersuchungen zur ersten innermarxistischen Grundlagendiskussion W. Schrader. 15. Theorie als Weltentwurf Wir wollen nun in den folgenden Überlegungen das positive Bedeutungsfeld des Ideologiebegriffes abstecken ...

This 1993 book discusses the rise of the marginalist conception of the firm in the context of economic thought over the past two centuries, and explains why economists continue to defend a theory with demonstrable shortcomings. Professor Schrader argues that the marginalist view of the firm retains its support not through any comparative advantage in empirical or predictive power, but by virtue of its being a part of the predominant marginalist economic programme. The clear problems that beset the marginalist (...) approach to the firm signal a general dilemma for economic theory as a whole. (shrink)

Analogical thinking, relations between microcosm and macrocosm, polarity and intensification, inspiration, magical, alchemistic, and magnetic/sympathetic concepts: key terms like these indicate the importance of the traditions of pansophist and holistic interpretation of the world in Goethe's literary and scientific works. Of equal significance is his engagement with 'universal wisdom' (Weltweisheit), as embodied in the philosophical and scientific tendencies of the age he lived in. The Geneva conference of the Swiss Goethe Society documented here casts light on Goethe's position in the (...) rivalries tensions between old and new in his day. (shrink)