philosophische Untersuchungen zur ersten innermarxistischen Grundlagendiskussion W. Schrader. 15. Theorie als Weltentwurf Wir wollen nun in den folgenden Überlegungen das positive Bedeutungsfeld des Ideologiebegriffes abstecken ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"Divine Person" as Analogous NameDylan SchraderThe position of St. Thomas Aquinas and the Thomistic school that human beings cannot name God and creatures univocally is well-known.1 This includes the term "person," which is predicated of the Trinity, of angels, and of human beings truly but analogically. In contrast, it might seem that, when speaking of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in respect of one another, "divine person" must (...) be univocal.2 [End Page 217]The seventeenth-century Discalced Carmelites of Salamanca (the Salmanticenses) thought otherwise. They argued that the ratio3 of "divine person" is common to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit not univocally, but analogically, and that this follows from established Thomistic principles.4 Their position makes for an interesting case study in religious language, as the Salmanticenses apply a highly developed material logic to the central mystery of Christian faith.Words, Concepts, and ThingsIn On Interpretation (Peri hermeneias), Aristotle explains that words immediately signify concepts and, by means of concepts, things.5 This so-called "semantic triangle" makes it easy to misunderstand univocity and analogy if we do not first determine how a particular thinker conceives of the relationship among words, concepts, and things. To discern how the Salmanticenses understood this relationship, it is most helpful to look to their counterparts, the Discalced Carmelites at neighboring Alcalá de Henares outside Madrid, commonly called the Complutenses.6 The Complutenses' Artium cursus [End Page 218] serves as philosophical handmaid to the Salmanticenses' Cursus theologicus, and is therefore essential for correctly interpreting the latter's claims about grammar, logic, and metaphysics.7To begin with the verbal element, this is how the Complutenses, following a fairly typical account, explain the difference between a vocal sound, a name, and a term: A vocal sound (vox) is speech considered simply as an audible phenomenon, the pure sound wave. A name (nomen) is a vocal sound that signifies something. A term (terminus) is a name insofar as it serves as one end of a proposition.8 Terms may be purely mental (as when a proposition is conceived of in the mind alone), or they may be spoken or written.Names and terms are useful precisely because they signify. The Complutenses define "signifying" (significare) as "representing to the knowing power something other than [the signifier] itself."9 A name or term points beyond itself so that something else can become known to the mind through that name or term.When it comes to spoken (or written) terms, a term is "common" (communis) if it signifies more than one thing. Common terms may be "non-transcendent" (non transcendens) or "transcendent" (transcendens). Common terms are non-transcendent if they are predicated of certain things (such as "man" or "animal"). They are transcendent if they are predicated of all things. Six terms are usually acknowledged to be transcendent: "being" (ens); "thing" (res); "true" (verum); "good" (bonum); "something" (aliquid); and "one" (unum).10 [End Page 219]Here it is necessary to distinguish first and second "intention" (intentio).11 The Carmelites take "first intention" properly to be the act whereby the intellect knows things in accord with what is in them as realities.12 This act of the intellect is the "formal first intention," while the thing known is the "objective first intention." A name signifying a thing in this way is a "name of first intention."But the intellect can also attend to those things not in accord with what is in them from their own perspective as realities, but instead with reference to their character as acted upon by the intellect itself. This act is called "second intention."13 An example of first intention is the intellect's knowing that "man is an animal," whereas an example of second intention is its knowing that "'animal' is a genus."The Complutenses stress that first and second intention are, properly speaking, acts of the intellect—distinct ways of attending to what it knows—even though logicians often use "first intention" and "second intention" as shorthand to refer to the objects of these acts.14 In fact, because objective second intentions (the objects of the intellect's second-intentional acts) are beings of reason... (shrink)

Heidegger is noted for his concern with the nothing, das Nichts, and this may be partially due to the way in which his ideas were first introduced. Whereas the positivists regarded his writings as nonsense, employing his references to nothingness to prove them so, other of his interpreters took his thought seriously but regarded it as fundamentally nihilistic. He was pictured as an irrationalist philosopher, preoccupied with death and negativity. It is this representation of Heidegger which still prevails to a (...) large extent among philosophers in this country. Unlike the positivists, they accept what he says as meaningful and important but as having consequences which must be rejected not only as mistaken but, perhaps, as immoral. That this appraisal requires careful examination is indicated by the fact that not a few theologians have borrowed heavily from Heidegger and found in his writings important positive suggestions. The impression that Heidegger is a nihilist or even an irrationalist is mistaken from the ground up; it is difficult to understand how it could be sustained by anyone who had struggled through any one of Heidegger's essays. (shrink)

One crucial design characteristic of auditory texts embedded in instructional videos is the speaker gender, which has received some attention from empirical researcher in the recent years. Contrary to the theoretical assumption that similarity between the speaker’s and the learner’s gender might positively affect learning outcomes, the findings have often been mixed, showing null to contrary effects. Notwithstanding the effect on the outcomes, a closer look at how the speaker’s gender and speaker–learner similarities further determine cognitive variables, such as different (...) cognitive load types, is overdue. Moreover, on the part of the learner, the role of situational interest in the learning topic that might be gender related has been neglected so far. Therefore, this study explored the role of speaker and learner gender and their interaction regarding learning outcomes. We broaden our perspective by investigating the effects of gender-related differences concerning situational interest in the topic being taught and by determining different types of cognitive load. In a 2 (female/male speaker) × 2 (female/male learner) within- and between-subject design, 95 students learned about female and male human sexual maturity with an instructional video containing auditory explanations. Analysis results indicate that speaker gender and speaker–learner gender similarity had no impact on learning gains, situational interest, and cognitive load types. However, the results demonstrate that learner’s gender, especially for the topic of female sexual maturity, matters the most in line with the assessed variables. Compared with males, females had higher learning gains, reported higher interest in the topic, and invested more germane cognitive resources. Thus, instructional designers may want to consider learner gender-dependent interest and how it can be triggered when creating videos with auditory explanations. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that a theory of the firm that takes profit maximizing to be the essential activity and purpose of the firm is seriously inadequate. I argue that firms in the actual economy neither are nor should be maximizers of profit. I argue instead that firms are and must be satisficers, that they must make enough profit to satisfy the various demands which they encounter in their operation. Yet it should be clear that the notion of satisficing, (...) while it escapes the major problems encountered by maximization, itself lacks much of any very clear content. In the end I claim that the notion of satisficing can best be understood if we abandon the traditional characterization of profits and replace it with a notion of extended profits, which I define as that part of corporate revenue which is available for distribution among stockholders, management, and labor, and for reinvestment in the corporation's business operation. (shrink)

This 1993 book discusses the rise of the marginalist conception of the firm in the context of economic thought over the past two centuries, and explains why economists continue to defend a theory with demonstrable shortcomings. Professor Schrader argues that the marginalist view of the firm retains its support not through any comparative advantage in empirical or predictive power, but by virtue of its being a part of the predominant marginalist economic programme. The clear problems that beset the marginalist (...) approach to the firm signal a general dilemma for economic theory as a whole. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for an account of the evolution of human values according to which it is only through the resolution of local conflicts that broader social values develop. Global issues can only be understood as issues of increasingly broadening our understanding of the local, our understanding of who are the neighbors with whom we must productively and amicably engage. My analysis argues primarily for open dialogue based on listening carefully and maintaining a strong awareness of our own (...) areas of systematic blindness to those with whom we disagree. While my approach offers no recipe here to guarantee successful resolution to value conflict, any other approach is far more likely to lead to failure. (shrink)

In the case of existential philosophy the division is understandable. The existentialist philosophers are clearly engaging in a program which has long been regarded as disreputable by the British. But in the case of phenomenology the divergence is an odd one, indeed. For what is phenomenology if not the "presuppositionless" reflection upon that which is "given" to consciousness? And what is "analysis" if not the unbiased and non speculative examination of experience? If phenomenology is actually "presuppositionless" and, further, if "analysis" (...) is free of doctrinal commitment, how can they be either different or opposed? If there is or has been a difference between them, has it not been of necessity more accidental than essential, more a matter of choice of subject matter than of method or philosophical doctrine? The fact that some British philosophers are now beginning to dip their toes in the waters of French phenomenology, and even to make use of such phenomenological categories as "intentionality," suggests that this is the case. But to the extent that there have been unavowed "presuppositions" in phenomenology and implicit doctrines in "analysis," the differences have been genuine and substantival. They do differ, as a matter of fact, with respect both to what is "given" for analysis and what is involved in analytic reflection itself. (shrink)

Until comparatively recently the complete text of the Opus Postutmum has not been available to students of the Kantian philosophy.Prior to the publication of Adickes’ commentary on this material in 1920, students of Kant were almost wholly dependent upon Reicke's incomplete and markedly inadequate edition of 1882–84. 2 Adickes’ commentary, with its abundance of quoted passages, provided an access to a great deal of material hitherto unavailable. But it was not until the publication of the Academy Edition in 1936 that (...) the complete text became available for independent study. Because of the recent publication of the full text, most accounts of Kant's position in the Opus Postumum have depended upon Reicke's inadequate edition or, as has been more frequently the case, upon Adickes’ commentary. 3 In view of the considerable influence it has had upon Kant interpretation, Adickes’ analysis of the Opus Postumum warrants a careful and critical examination. (shrink)

In this essay we argue for the Janus-faced nature of hope. We show that attempts to sanitise the concept of hope either by separating it conceptually from other phenomena such as wishful thinking, or, more generally, by seeking to minimise the negative aspects of hope, do not help us to understand the nature of hope and its functions as regards religion. Drawing on functional accounts of religion from Clifford Geertz and Tamas Pataki, who both—in their different ways—see the function of (...) religion in terms of its capacity to satisfy deep psychological needs, we demonstrate that religion uniquely positions itself with regard to hope’s two faces, simultaneously exploiting positive and negative aspects of hope. (shrink)

Studien zu einer Comte- und Marx-Kritik W. Schrader. Der ausgesparte Titel Aus der dargelegten Situation aber lassen sich nun ebenfalls jene Sonderbarkeiten erklären, auf die wir für Marx' Aufgreifen eines negativen Ideologiebegriffes ...

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Über den Stand der indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahaviras und Buddhas" verfügbar.