Aristotle's Categories can easily seem to be a statement of a naïve, pre-philosophical ontology, centered around ordinary items. Wolfgang-Rainer Mann argues that the treatise, in fact, presents a revolutionary metaphysical picture, one Aristotle arrives at by (implicitly) criticizing Plato and Plato's strange counterparts, the "Late-Learners" of the Sophist. As Mann shows, the Categories reflects Aristotle's discovery that ordinary items are things (objects with properties). Put most starkly, Mann contends that there were no things before Aristotle. (...) The author's argument consists of two main elements. First, a careful investigation of Plato which aims to make sense of the odd-sounding suggestion that things do not show up as things in his ontology. Secondly, an exposition of the theoretical apparatus Aristotle introduces in the Categories--an exposition which shows how Plato's and the Late-Learners' metaphysical pictures cannot help but seem inadequate in light of that apparatus. In doing so, Mann reveals that Aristotle's conception of things--now so engrained in Western thought as to seem a natural expression of common sense--was really a hard-won philosophical achievement. Clear, subtle, and rigorously argued, The Discovery of Things will reshape our understanding of some of Aristotle's--and Plato's--most basic ideas. (shrink)

Originally published as 'Das Problem des Prinzipienforschung und die aristotelische Physik' in Kant-Studien 52 (1960-1), pp. 206-19, the revised text of a lecture given on 28 October 1959 in Hamburg. It presents in summary form the main line of argument developed in the introduction and first two parts of Wieland's book, Die aristotelische Physik (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1962).

Dans l’histoire de la philosophie et des sciences, Aristote a été le premier à élaborer une théorie du temps. Cette théorie, telle qu’elle est présentée en Physique IV 10-14 et VI 2, soulève de nombreuses questions et semble comporter un certain nombre d’énigmes. Toute tentative de lui donner un sens est alourdie par sa complexité et sa présentation souvent cryptique. La plupart des spécialistes modernes pensent que la théorie du temps d’Aristote est imparfaite. Ils se plaignent notamment que cette théorie (...) est incohérente, qu’elle manque d’unité systématique, qu’elle échoue dans sa tentative de déduire les propriétés du temps à partir des propriétés de l’espace et du mouvement, et qu’elle n’explique pas la flèche du temps. Cet article cherche à montrer que ces objections ne sont pas fondées. Selon la nouvelle lecture de Physique IV 10-14 et VI 2 proposée dans l’article qui suit, la théorie du temps d’Aristote est logiquement cohérente, présente une structure logique sophistiquée qui n’est pas strictement déductive, éclaire la flèche du temps et fournit une synthèse du temps dit subjectif et objectif. L’annexe présente une comparaison entre la théorie du temps d’Aristote et la théorie du temps de la physique contemporaine sur la théorie objective du temps et de la psychologie cognitive contemporaine sur la théorie subjective du temps. (shrink)

With the third volume, it is invited to enter the intellectual environment of Aristotle. The most relevant sources are given in full (with English translation), so that the commentary is also a reader documenting the disputationes metaphysicae of the 4th century BC. For the undeniable contradictions in the Metaphysics, a new genetic explanation is offered.

In a notoriously obscure passage in Metaphysics 7.1 Aristotle claims that substance is primary in time. The only concrete literal interpretation suggested so far of this controversial claim is in terms of existing before and after in time. I argue that this interpretation faces serious problems. I then present a novel literal interpretation, in terms of being an appropriate subject of temporal predications, that is immune to these problems and strongly supported by philosophical and contextual considerations.

This chapter contains sections titled: Knowledge and Analysis The Relation Between Prior and Posterior Analytics Syllogistic Interpretations of Aristotle's Syllogistic Logic Knowledge of Facts Aristotelian Causes Demonstration Principles Definitions and Demonstrations Necessity Science and Dialectic Fallibility Applicability Readings of Aristotle's Theory of Science Epistemological Status of the Analytics Bibliography.

The present "philological commentary" is directed at those who have decided to take time for reading the original text, at least in an English translation. The first volume "Textual Criticism" is intended to meet the difficulties caused by the fact that our text editions are based on manuscripts separated from the original by more than a millennium.

Though since Werner Jaeger's famous Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles of 1912 remarkable observations were made, the topic "Composition of the Metaphysics" almost disappeared from the agenda. As, however, neglect of this philological task results in either selective reading or anachronistic systematization, the author has resumed it, extending it to the internal structure of the singular books.

The question of the relationship between ontology and theology, the main problem of the interpretation in volume 3, is also the guiding question of our last volume. The history of metaphysics is a history of the efforts towards an outlook on the world and life, which are about the meaning and connection of fundamental concepts: being, life, intellect, unity, truth, goodness. From these, the concept of divinity is derived. As in the previous volumes, a rich material of original texts and (...) interpretations is spread out. (shrink)

This book is a critical examination of Michel Foucault's relation to ancient Greek thought, in particular his famous analysis of Greek history of sexuality. Wolfgang Detel offers a new understanding of Foucault's theories of power and knowledge based on modern analytical theories of science and concepts of power. He offers a fresh and complex reading of the texts which Foucault discusses, covering topics such as Aristotle's ethics and theory of sex, Hippocratic diatetics, the earliest treatises on economics, and (...) Plato's theory of love. The result is a philosophically rich and probing critique of Foucault's later writings, and a persuasive account of the relation between ethics, power and knowledge in classical antiquity. His book will have a wide appeal to readers interested in Foucault and in Greek thought and culture. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hobbes and the Katéchon: The Secularization of Sacrificial Christianity Wolfgang Palaver Universität Innsbruck Hobbes and equality: his knowledge of mimetic desire When reading Thomas Hobbes we immediately recognize that he was writing in the early years of our modem age. Hobbes's world is very different from ancient cultures. This is most clearly demonstrated by the importance in his political philosophy of equality and individualism, concepts which cannot be (...) found in ancient political discourse. Hobbes fully rejected Aristotle's view that nature made some human beings commanders and others slaves (1984, 211). According to Hobbes, all human beings are equal. The same applies to individualism. Whereas Aristotle's main concern was the polis, not the individual, Hobbes takes the individual as the starting point of his political philosophy.1 The difference between the two views can be seen as a result of the biblical transformation of the world: the biblical message slowly transformed the ancient world as it increasingly replaced ancient concepts of human nature and social life with those of equality and individualism. The biblical impulse did not, however, result in the creation of a peaceful Kingdom of God on earth. Hobbes 's quite doubtful reputation does not stem from his rejection of Aristotle's philosophy but rather from his insight into the deadly consequences ofequality. According to Hobbes, the natural equality of human beings means that all have the ability to kill one another: On Hobbes and individualism, see Louis Dumont 95-9. 58Wolfgang Palaver Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as t. (shrink)

Truth is one of the most debated topics in philosophy; Wolfgang Kunne presents a comprehensive critical examination of all major theories, from Aristotle to the present day. He argues that it is possible to give a satisfactory 'modest' account of truth without invoking problematic notions like correspondence, fact, or meaning. The clarity of exposition and the wealth of examples will make Conceptions of Truth an invaluable and stimulating guide for advanced students and scholars.

The “official” history of connexive logic was written in 2012 by Storrs McCall who argued that connexive logic was founded by ancient logicians like Aristotle, Chrysippus, and Boethius; that it was further developed by medieval logicians like Abelard, Kilwardby, and Paul of Venice; and that it was rediscovered in the 19th and twentieth century by Lewis Carroll, Hugh MacColl, Frank P. Ramsey, and Everett J. Nelson. From 1960 onwards, connexive logic was finally transformed into non-classical calculi which partly concur (...) with systems of relevance logic and paraconsistent logic. In this paper it will be argued that McCall’s historical analysis is fundamentally mistaken since it doesn’t take into account two versions of connexivism. While “humble” connexivism maintains that connexive properties only apply to “normal” antecedents, “hardcore” connexivism insists that they also hold for “abnormal” propositions. It is shown that the overwhelming majority of the forerunners of connexive logic were only “humble” connexivists. Their ideas concerning connexive implication don’t give rise, however, to anything like a non-classical logic. (shrink)

This article discusses the history of the concepts of potential infinity and actual infinity in the context of Christian theology, mathematical thinking and metaphysical reasoning. It shows that the structure of Ancient Greek rationality could not go beyond the concept of potential infinity, which is highlighted in Aristotle's metaphysics. The limitations of the metaphysical mind of ancient Greece were overcome through Christian theology and its concept of the infinite God, as formulated in Gregory of Nyssa's theology. That is how (...) the concept of actual infinity emerged. However, Gregory of Nyssa's understanding of human rationality went still further. He said that access to the infinity of God was to be found only in an asymptotic ascension, as expressed in apophatic theology, and this view endangered the rationality of theology. Deeply influenced by the apophatic tradition, Nicholas of Cusa avoided this danger by showing that infinity could be accessed by symbolic representation and asymptotic mathematical reasoning. Thus, he made an immense contribution in making infinity rationally accessible. This endeavor was finally realized by Georg Cantor. This rational accessibility revealed discernible structures of infinity, such as the continuum hypothesis, and the cardinal numbers. However, the probable logical inconsistency of Georg Cantor's all-encompassing Absolute Infinity points to an intuitive understanding of infinity that goes beyond its rational structures – as in apophatic theology. (shrink)

English summary: The focus by individual ancient (or modern) authors in various fields (law, philosophy, science, theology, literature) on how to use the concept of natural law led to biases that this volume wants to help overcome through a preview of the 'historical depth' of the concept. Its particular charm lies in the fact that its two components (Nature and Law) stand in strong tension with each other, which to the present day does not appear to be fully resolved. While (...) in the classical Greek philosophy of Plato and Aristotle the world is not reduced to an intentional act of creation, the introduction of the concept of natural law by the Stoics and its absorption by Christian writers develops the idea of a divine order underlying natural order. Its challenge by modern science has led to an unresolved uncertainty about ethical and social standards. German text. German description: Die Fokussierung auf die Verwendungsweise des Begriffs des Naturgesetzes bei einzelnen antiken (oder modernen) Autoren auf den unterschiedlichsten Gebieten (Jurisprudenz, Philosophie, Naturwissenschaft, Theologie, Literatur) fuehrte zu Einseitigkeiten, die dieser Band durch einen Ausblick auf die ehistorische Tiefe' des Begriffs ueberwinden hilft. Sein besonderer Reiz liegt darin, dass seine beiden Bestandteile (Natur und Gesetz) in einer starken Spannung zueinander stehen, die bis auf den heutigen Tag nicht voll aufgelost erscheint. Wahrend in der klassischen griechischen Philosophie bei Platon und Aristoteles die Welt nicht auf einen intentionalen Schopfungsakt zurueckgefuehrt wird, entwickelt sich mit der Einfuehrung des Begriffs des Naturgesetzes durch die Stoiker und dessen Ubernahme durch christliche Autoren die Vorstellung einer gottlichem Befehl unterliegenden Naturordnung. Deren Infragestellung durch die moderne Naturwissenschaft hat zu einer nicht aufgelosten Unsicherheit ueber ethische und gesellschaftliche Massstabe gefuehrt. (shrink)

The dissertation has two parts. In Part I, I argue that the method of question and answer, that is, dialectic, had its origins not, as Plato and Aristotle might lead us to expect, with Zeno or Socrates, but with the Sophists of the fifth century. They were at the vanguard of a new rationalism that made matters which tradition had regarded as settled, subjects for debate and inquiry. They were committed to a self-consciously rationalistic conception of the arts that (...) held that expertise is a matter of rationally grounded knowledge and hence teachable. ;Of particular importance, especially in democracies, and central to their educational program was the art of rhetoric, that is, the art of rational deliberation and argumentation. It is as part of the instruction in this art that dialectic first emerges. Dialectic is a method subject to specific rules , it provides for at least two roles , and provides criteria for judging who has won a question-and-answer exchange. ;In Part II, I examine Plato's Protagoras. I focus on two sorts of passages: those where the participants seem to be engaged in such a question-and-answer exchange, and those where they comment on what they are doing. Examination of the text leads to the conclusion that both Socrates and Protagoras proceed as if this method of argumentation were antecedently familiar, and Socrates and Protagoras both ask and answer questions in accord with its rules. Thus the difference between Socrates and the Sophists cannot consist in their relying on essentially different methods of argumentation . ;I end by suggesting that if there is a difference between Socrates and the Sophists, it consists in Socrates making explicit what the Sophists had been relying on, though only imperfectly: a commitment to the avoidance of contradictions. (shrink)

Straipsnyje parodoma, kad daugelis Viduramžių logikų manė, kad kai kurie „dėsniai“ galioja tik esant tam tikroms sąlygoms. Pavyzdžiui, Aristotelio, Boecijaus ir Abelardo ginti vadinamosios jungčių logikos (connexive logic) baziniai principai galioja tik galimų ar neprieštaringų antecedentų arba nebūtinų ar kontingentiškų konsekventų atžvilgiu. Panašus apribojimas galioja „dėsniui“ (kurį galimai gynė Chrisipas), kad kiekvienas teiginys yra suderinamas su pačiu savimi.

Nature and significance of the ‚final cause’︁ in Aristotle. − 1. In Aristotle's treatment of the tissues and the organs of animal body the search for their final cause is nothing but the search for their function. There are no speculations about the origin of the purposive organisation of biological species, because species are eternal for him. − 2. When Aristotle is describing the production and propagation of an animal as goal‐directed, he does not exclude a causal (...) explanation. He gives causal explanations at great length in De generatione animalium: Against widespread views it is not the future goal that controls the development as a retroactive cause. In animal blood a sort of genetic code is included, which is represented by impulses (which you can imagine as undulatory motions). By these genetic impulses the form of the parent will be transported to the semen (or the menstrual blood in the case of woman) and from the semen to the germ of the offspring. − 3. The biological use of the concept of purpose or goal is quite different from the use in physics and cosmology. In ignorance of the law of inertia Aristotle tries to explain the continuous movement in the world metaphysically, by assuming a tendency of the stars towards the immaterial god. Terminologically he strictly distinguishes this tendency from the ‚final cause’︁ in biology. − 4. In policy man aims at welfare and ‚good life’︁. In history Aristotle denies a goal‐directed progress. (shrink)

It is often assumed that Aristotle, Boethius, Chrysippus, and other ancient logicians advocated a connexive conception of implication according to which no proposition entails, or is entailed by, its own negation. Thus Aristotle claimed that the proposition ‘if B is not great, B itself is great […] is impossible’. Similarly, Boethius maintained that two implications of the type ‘If p then r’ and ‘If p then not-r’ are incompatible. Furthermore, Chrysippus proclaimed a conditional to be ‘sound when the (...) contradictory of its consequent is incompatible with its antecedent’, a view which, in the opinion of S. McCall, entails the aforementioned theses of Aristotle and Boethius. Now a critical examination of the historical sources shows that the ancient logicians most likely meant their theses as applicable only to ‘normal’ conditionals with antecedents which are not self-contradictory. The corresponding restrictions of Aristotle’s and Boethius’ theses to such self-consistent antecedents, however, turn out to be theorems of ordinary modal logic and thus don’t give rise to any non-classical system of genuinely connexive logic,. (shrink)

This article tries to disentangle different perspectives on nature in Aristotle's biological work. In one sense Aristotle speaks of nature as a craft-like factor in the generation of living beings. In another sense 'nature' refers to Aristotle's conception of an unchanging universe, in which the individual living beings are perishable, but reproduce themselves and thus guarantee that the essential blueprints of the different species (eidê) remain the same. In addition, however, Aristotle's zoology acknowledges natural processes that (...) involve greater dynamics and more exceptions, most notably when it comes to the allocation of available matter within the animals of a certain species or to the adaptation to a species' proper environment. In conclusion, it seems fair to say that in Aristotle's zoology different autonomous perspectives overlap, so that it would be inappropriate to reduce all of them to a common denominator. (shrink)

In accordance with the contemporary state of the natural sciences, Wolfgang Sohst here presents an extended ontological model where the process is the first cosmological category, not objects. Her starts with very few primordial categories of becoming that even precede the fundamental concepts of physics and mathematics. Since Democritus, ie. for about 2,400 years, all cultures of European descent rest mainly on the presupposition that substances and their properties provide the inventory of our world. This, however, contradicts the formerly (...) and still today lively intuition (intellectually up to Heraclitus, again in Aristotle and only then resurgent with Hegel) that objects are not the dominating aspect of what we are living in. Rather, the basis of our cosmos is a world process as the result of the complementary relationship of particular objects and their mutual efficiencies. (shrink)

In “Lectio 55” of his Notule libri Priorum, Robert Kilwardby discussed various objections that had been raised against Aristotle’s Theses. The first thesis, AT1, says that no proposition q is implied both by a proposition p and by its negation, ∼p. AT2 says that no proposition p is implied by its own negation. In Prior Analytics, Aristotle had shown that AT2 entails AT1, and he argued that the assumption of a proposition p such that (∼p → p) would (...) be “absurd”. The unrestricted validity of AT1, AT2, however, is at odds with other principles which were widely accepted by medieval logicians, namely the law Ex Impossibili Quodlibet, EIQ, and the rules of disjunction introduction. Since, according to EIQ, the impossible proposition (p ∧ ∼p) implies every proposition, it also implies ∼(p∧∼p), in contradiction to AT2. Furthermore, by way of disjunction introduction, the proposition (p∨∼p) is implied both by p and by ∼p, in contradiction to AT1. Kilwardby tried to defend AT1, AT2 against these objections by claiming that EIQ holds only for accidental but not for natural implications. The second argument, however, cannot be refuted in this way because Kilwardby had to admit that every disjunction (p ∨ q) is naturally implied by its disjuncts. He therefore introduced the further requirement that, in order to constitute a genuine counterexample to AT1, (p → q) and (∼p → q) have to hold “by virtue of the same thing”. In a recently published paper, Spencer Johnston accepted this futile defence of AT1 and developed a formal semantics that would fit Kilwardby’s presumably connexive implication. This procedure, however, is misguided because the remaining considerations of Lesson 55  which were entirely ignored by Johnston  show that Kilwardby eventually recognized that AT2 is bound to fail. After all he concluded: “So it should be granted that from the impossible its opposite follows, and that the necessary follows from its opposite”. (shrink)

Aristotle not only develops for the first time practical philosophy as a independient discipline, but also points out the specific methological problems and bounds of such a discipline, insolar its target is not merely theoretical, but also practical. Such problems are connected basically with the impossibility of reaching the particular as the specific object of action on the level of theoretical reflection. The correa application of universal norms to the particular circumstances of action remains therefore a task to be (...) solved by the personal agent. Phronesis or "prudence" is the faculty that allows to cope with this task adequately, Le. in accordance with the normative standards of virtue. (shrink)

The way Frege presented the Square of Opposition in a reduced form in 1879 and 1910 can be used to develop two distinct versions of the square: The traditional square that displays inferences and a “Table of Oppositions” displaying variations of negation. This Table of Oppositions can be further simplified and thus be made more symmetrical. A brief survey of versions of the square from Aristotle to the present shows how both aspects of the square have coexisted for a (...) very long time without ever being properly distinguished. (shrink)

This book argues that the main focus of the life and work of Aristotle was on the natural sciences. Of central importance are his scientific expeditions, which can be reconstructed from scattered geographical statements. Comparison with modern biology confirms the empirical nature of his biological writings, and the philological approach taken here offers a corrective against premature philosophical systematizing.

This paper makes some additional points about matters discussed in my book „Aristoteles als Naturwissenschaftler“ (Aristotle as a Natural Scientist), Berlin 2014. Findings by the biologist A. M. Leroi, who published a book on Aristotle with a similar subject that same year („The Lagoon. How Aristotle invented science“), will be considered. It will be argued that the mayflies discovered by Aristotle in the Kuban River belong to the species Palingenia fuliginosa. Aristotle is more likely to (...) have observed the life-history of the catfish in the river Strymon in Northern Greece than in the Achelous river basin in Acarnania. He probably never set eyes on the catfish Silurus aristotelis, which is endemic to Acarnania and was discovered by Agassiz in 1857. (shrink)

Does Aristotle's terminology provide some guidance when we inquire into the origins of the notion of thing? Naturally, one might think of Aristotle's notion of being, which is meant to capture everything that is. However, ‘being’ in Aristotle seems to be significantly broader than what we take to be a ‘thing’. I will take up a thesis introduced and defended by Rainer-Wolfgang Mann, namely that Aristotle is actually the inventor of the notion of thing in (...) that his Categories conceptualized the distinction between properties on the one hand and their bearers, individual substances, on the other. It will be argued though that Aristotle, when conceptualizing things as bearers of properties, depicts a notion that is actually stronger than what we usually mean by ‘thing’. (shrink)

With contributions by John J. Cleary, Gregor Damschen, Rainer Enskat, Francisco J. Gonzalez, Jürgen Mittelstraß and Carlo Natali (all on Plato) as well as by Enrico Berti, Nicolas Braun, Graciela M. Chichi, Wolfgang Kullmann, Helmut Mai, Alejandro G. Vigo, Franco Volpi and Hermann Weidemann (all on Aristotle).

This study draws attention to the ordering of matter and form argued for in Aristotle’s Physics II, 8 (199a30–32). This argument for hylomorphic teleology relies on the presentation of nature earlier in Physics II, 1. In this way, it highlights the connections between chapter one’s account of nature as matter and form and chapter eight’s defense of final causality. Grounding final causality in the principles of nature reveals its central importance for Aristotle’s view of nature. To clarify the (...) meaning of hylomorphic teleology I contrast my interpretation of Aristotle with that of Wolfgang Wieland regarding the scope and foundation of the final cause, countering his claim that chance and universal final causality are mutually exclusive. I contend that the presentation of teleology in chapter eight supports a diverse interpretation of the final cause, one that admits chance events while not sacrificing the intrinsic ordering of matter to form. (shrink)

The problems involved in understanding the Aristotelian notion of an ἀρχή arise from the widely accepted view that Aristotle’s theory of knowledge is torn between irreconcilable empiricist and rationalist tendencies. I argue that several puzzling features of the Aristotelian ἀρχή are clarified when it is understood as akin to the Urphänomen, which plays a central role in the scientific thought of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. More broadly, I argue that the apparent conflict in Aristotle’s theory of knowledge (...) is resolved by seeing that Aristotle is neither an empiricist, nor a rationalist, but a “rational empiricist” akin to Goethe. (shrink)

Section 1 contains a Kripke-style completeness theorem for arbitrary intermediate consequences. In Section 2 we apply weak Kripke semantics to splittings in order to obtain generalized axiomatization criteria of the Jankov-type. Section 3 presents new and short proofs of recent results on implicationless intermediate consequences. In Section 4 we prove that these consequences admit no deduction theorem. In Section 5 all maximal logics in the 3 rd counterslice are determined. On these results we reported at the 1980 meeting on Mathematical (...) Logic at Oberwolfach. This paper concerns propositional logic only. (shrink)

Signal-detection methodology may be used to disentangle sensory from judgmental effects when analyzing sex differences in pain. An illustrative example is given by reanalyzing a published category-scaling experiment in terms of detection-theory indices. As a result, the apparent sex difference is recast in terms of a judgmental bias. [berkley].