This is the basis of the first part of the book.

This article discusses the history of the concepts of potential infinity and actual infinity in the context of Christian theology, mathematical thinking and metaphysical reasoning. It shows that the structure of Ancient Greek rationality could not go beyond the concept of potential infinity, which is highlighted in Aristotle's metaphysics. The limitations of the metaphysical mind of ancient Greece were overcome through Christian theology and its concept of the infinite God, as formulated in Gregory of Nyssa's theology. That is how the (...) concept of actual infinity emerged. However, Gregory of Nyssa's understanding of human rationality went still further. He said that access to the infinity of God was to be found only in an asymptotic ascension, as expressed in apophatic theology, and this view endangered the rationality of theology. Deeply influenced by the apophatic tradition, Nicholas of Cusa avoided this danger by showing that infinity could be accessed by symbolic representation and asymptotic mathematical reasoning. Thus, he made an immense contribution in making infinity rationally accessible. This endeavor was finally realized by Georg Cantor. This rational accessibility revealed discernible structures of infinity, such as the continuum hypothesis, and the cardinal numbers. However, the probable logical inconsistency of Georg Cantor's all-encompassing Absolute Infinity points to an intuitive understanding of infinity that goes beyond its rational structures – as in apophatic theology. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 16 This paper deals with an apparent tension in Wittgenstein’s _Philosophical Investigations_: Wittgenstein holds an expressivist position with regard to avowals, but also claims that the _doxastic_ avowal “I believe that p” is a “hesitant assertion” of p. It is argued that the tension is apparent only and that Wittgenstein’s expressivism in fact justifies and explains his views on “I believe”: avowals typically are _explicit expressives_ and usually implicate the corresponding illocutionary acts. The hesitant assertion of (...) p is the result of an implicature of the explicit expressive “I believe that p”. The paper also addresses the ambiguity of avowals and the possibility of thereby undermining the Frege–Geach objection to psychological expressivism. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band enthalt sechs teilweise stark iiberarbeitete Aufsatze, die in der Zeit zwischen der Niederschrift des Buches Theorienstrnkturen und Theoriendynamik, Springer-Verlag 1973, im folgenden mit [Theoriendynamik] bezeichnet, und der Monographie The Strncturalist View of Theories. A Pos­ sible Analogue of the Bourbaki Programme in Physical Science, Springer-Ver­ lag 1979, im folgenden kurz [Strnkturalismus] genannt, entstanden sind. In diesen Abhandlungen werden jeweils gewisse Aspekte des strukturalistischen Theorienkonzeptes behandelt. Am starksten iiberarbeitet wurden die Auf­ satze II, IV, V und VI, die (...) urspriinglich in englischer Sprache erschienen waren. Vier der sechs Arbeiten, namlich I, III, IV und VI, bilden auBerdem erweiterte Fassungen von Vortragen. Obwohl das zweite Buch [Strnkturalismus] durch P. Feyerabends ausftihr­ liche Diskussion der strukturalistischen Auffassung im British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Dezember 1977, angeregt worden ist, stellt es seinem Ansatz und Aufbau nach eher den Versuch einer systematischen Kurzdarstel­ lung des strukturalistischen Vorgehens nach seinem letzten Stande dar. Dem­ gegeniiber entstanden die hier verOffentlichten Artikel stets aus einem ganz be­ stimmten AnlaB. Diese Anlasse konnte man schematisch in drei Klassen unter­ teilen: Entweder ging es darum, eine anschauliche intuitive Ein/iihrnng zu lie­ fern (I und V); oder die Aufgabe bestand darin, die Beziehung zu anderen philosophischen Positionen. wie z. B. derjenigen L. Wittgensteins, H. Putnams, K. Poppers oder T. S. Kuhns. zu analysieren (II. III und IV); oder es sollte zu den wichtigsten und bis dahin verOffentlichten Kritiken Stellung bezogen wer­ den (wie in VI). (shrink)

There seem to be two ways of supposing a proposition: supposing “indicatively” that Shakespeare didn’t write Hamlet, it is likely that someone else did; supposing “subjunctively” that Shakespeare hadn’t written Hamlet, it is likely that nobody would have written the play. Let P be the probability of B on the subjunctive supposition that A. Is P equal to the probability of the corresponding counterfactual, A □→B? I review recent triviality arguments against this hypothesis and argue that they do not succeed. (...) On the other hand, I argue that even if we can equate P with P, we still need an account of how subjunctive conditional probabilities are related to unconditional probabilities. The triviality arguments reveal that the connection is not as straightforward as one might have hoped. (shrink)

Freud’s metapsychology has been interpreted in a number of different ways. Some scholars see him committed to classical scientism, others to genuine hermeneutics. Many Freud philologists suggest that he moved from an early scientism to hermeneutic methods in his later writings, and some think he misunderstood his own angle, thinking himself to be a natural scientist, but actually practising hermeneutics. The article first looks at Freud’s model of the soul and his remarks about psychoanalytic explanations and concludes that there is (...) overwhelming evidence for the contention that he conceived of psychoanalytic explanations in terms of causal explanations and that his metapsychology is, all things considered, scientistic. However, it seems that Freud did not clearly distinguish between causal and rational explanations. The article emphasizes that he could have found this distinction in the writings of Max Weber. In the last two sections, the article turns to a meticulous analysis of two vignettes describing Freud’s own treatment of two cases that he takes to be fine examples of the technique used in psychoanalytic treatment. It turns out that Freud himself looks at these cases and their treatment, throughout, in terms of rationality and irrationality. In particular, he seems to distinguish between an “external” irrationality and an “internal” rationality of neurotic diseases. He also seems to point to functions of neuroses representing certain solutions for mental disturbances. Thus, there is much evidence for assuming that in his psychoanalytic technique, Freud relied on genuine hermeneutic and functional methods; and therefore, Freud’s official metapsychology seems to be methodologically inconsistent with his analytic technique. (shrink)

The article attempts to portray architecture as a spatial medium and to analyse the processing and storage of information, objects and persons. In doing so, architectural space becomes not only the effect of these medial operations, but it also forms and materializes these processes at the same time. Openings are characterized as fundamental elements of architectural media. Also, in this regard, such classic elements as doors and windows in the sense of a room perceived as a perforated membrane, acquire a (...) new medial quality. (shrink)

Das Buch stellt einen Meilenstein in der Aristoteles-Forschung dar, der mit einigen traditionellen Interpretationen der aristotelischen Philosophie radikal bricht. An dem Fundamentalbegriff der Metaphysik, ousia (Sein, Wesen, "Seiendheit"), auf der einen, und dem Fundamentalbegriff der Ethik, eudaimonia (Glück, Glückseligkeit), auf der anderen Seite werden grundlegende Zusammenhänge zwischen der theoretischen und der praktischen Philosophie des Aristoteles dargestellt. Der Autor kommt dabei zu völlig neuen und interessanten Erkenntnissen über die Strukturen des aristotelischen Denkens. Dieses Werk bereichert die Aristoteles-Forschung, die Philosophie des Geistes (...) und die Ethik. (shrink)

The paper analyzes the meaning of color terms within the framework of Kaplan's character theory (which, when generalized to a treatment of hidden indexicality or dependence on the context world, can perfectly accommodate Kripke's notions of apriority and of (metaphysical) necessity). It explains this framework and why it might be fruitfully applied to color terms. Then it defends six theses: that (1) the predicate "is red" and (2) even the relation "appears red to" are hidden indexicals (i.e., have, as used (...) in English, different extensions in different context worlds), that (3) the phenomenal, the comparative, and the epistemic reading of "appears red to" are not three different readings, but reflect the context world dependence of this term, that (4) the statement "x is red iff x would appear red to most English-speaking people under normal conditions" is a priori in English, but analytic only in one reading and not in another, and that these observations account well for the epistemology of color terms and allow us to be metaphysically conservative by claiming that our context world is presumably such that (5) the statement "x appears red to y iff x (appropriately) causes y to be in a certain (disjunctive) neural state N" is necessarily true and (6) the statement "x is red iff the reflectance spectrum of the surface of x is of some (disjunctive) kind R" is necessarily true as well. (shrink)

This paper attempts to develop a projectivistic understanding of chance or objective probability or partial determination. It does so by critically examining David Lewis’ philosophy of probability and his defense of Humean Supervenience, building thereupon the constructive projectivistic alternative, which will basically be a suitable reinterpretation of de Finetti’s position. Any treatment of the topic must show how it extends to natural necessity or deterministic laws or full determination in perfect parallel. The paper indicates at the end how this demand (...) can be met. (shrink)

David Lewis's position, often called analytic functionalism, was inspired by Ryle's analytic behaviorism, which took psychological predicates to express complex sets of behavioral dispositions. In this chapter, the author reviews some tenets of Lewis's philosophy of mind and begins with some comments on the methodology Lewis employed in his analysis of psychological terms, which has become standard in functionalist accounts across philosophy. Then, he discusses the difference between what are often called “realizer functionalism” and “role functionalism,” and argues that Lewis (...) made the wrong choice. In Lewis's argument for the identity theory, the identity of mental states with biological states follows logically from folk‐psychological definitions and broadly physical facts. A central part of folk psychology concerns the interaction of beliefs, desires, and choices. The chapter presents Lewis's often misunderstood account of intentionality. It also presents few pessimistic remarks on the prospect of analyzing phenomenal truths in terms of functional role. (shrink)

Stephan H. Pfürtner (1922-2012) was a Catholic theologian who in the last stage of his academic career taught Social Ethics in the Department of Protestant Theology at Philipps-University in Marburg. The text, originally a lecture in commemoration of Stephan Pfürtner and his work, shows the close connection between biography and theology, between ethical experience and ethical reflection in his case. Empathetic Courage is shown by him in his successful effort to save three young Jewish women from death in the Concentration (...) Camp of Stutthof near Danzig in 1944. Ecumenical Resistance is performed by a group of young Christians around four ministers who became sentenced to death in 1943. A Liberated Conscience is decisive for Pfürtner’s position in a deep conflict with the Roman-Catholic Church on the ethics of human sexuality. Ethics of Reponsibility is the conception that he develops in his Marburg years. Evangelical Catholicity characterizes the spiritual dimension of Stephan Pfürtner’s legacy. (shrink)

Em 1989, a era do realismo político chegou ao fim. &s condições foram modificadas de forma a substituir O modelo hobbesiano de paz pela intimidação que prevalecia até então, por um modelo consideravelmente mais desafiador, o modelo kantiano da paz pelo direito. Se, todavia, o paradigma de Huntington dadas civilizações em conflito estivesse correto, teríamos de esquecer Kant e lembrarmo-nos de Hobbes. A racionalidade pé-no-chão, a desconfiança sadia, a luta pela acumulação do poder e todos os demais instrumentos da caixa (...) realista de ferramentas da prudência política são muito adequados para facilitar a autoafirmação política numa época de culturas violentamente conflitantes. No entanto, um tal desamparo não é bem fundamentado. Considerando-se que, desde seu início, o liberalismo é uma teoria do pluralismo religioso e ético, e que é bem -testada no trato de problemas do multiculturalismo, é ao menos possível argumentar-se em favor de um universalismo liberal fraco que forneça fundamentos normativos para uma ordem global baseada na convivência pacífica. Naturalmente, modéstia conceitual e moral é crucial. Se a doutrina dos direitos humanos deseja defender sua alegação universal em face da diversidade cultural. ela terá de se restringir às condições pré-culturais e meramente naturais do ser humano e da coexistência humana. Essas limitações dão fundamento a sua força normativa. Nem políticas nacionais, nem concepções culturais do que seja a vida próspera e a importância existencial podem ser aceitas se contradizem os imperativos e as condições fundamentais do funcionamento puramente biológico do ser humano. (shrink)