Philosophy claims that its goal is to search for truth. The history of philosophy, however, demonstrates that this search for truth has not been free from the power dynamics of respective eras. In this article, I claim that the formation of modern East Asian philosophy is one occasion in which the power structure of the time was visibly reflected. The East–West power imbalance at the beginning of the modern period was both implicitly and explicitly imbedded in the formation of modern (...) Buddhist philosophy in East Asia. To demonstrate this point, I will examine the life and thought of two East Asian Buddhist thinkers, Paek Sŏnguk 白性郁 and Inoue Enryō 井上円了, as paradigmatic examples of... (shrink)

Originally published as 「明治の哲学界：有機体の哲学とその系譜」in 井上克人編『豊饒なる明治』, Kansai Daigaku Shuppannbu, 2012, 3–22. Translated by Morisato Takeshi. German Idealism was introduced to Japanese intellectuals in the middle of Meiji era and was mainly received from a mystical or religious perspective, as we see in Inoue Tetsujirō’s “harmonious existence,” Inoue Enryō’s “unity of mind and body,” and Kiyozawa Manshi’s “existentialism.” Since these theories envisioned true reality as a unified and living whole, I group them under the label “philosophy of organism” and from (...) there argue that their conviction that “all is truth and truth is all” was shaped in large part by the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana. The understanding of Buddhist concepts by Meiji philosophers was philosophical in its content, and those who devoted themselves to the study of Western philosophy were encouraged to describe Eastern thought in Western philosophical terms. As a result, the philosophical world of the Meiji era developed an original standpoint that unified Eastern and Western perspectives by means of a logic of “phenomena-in-reality.”. (shrink)

of (from Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy).

A dialectical contradiction can be appropriately described within the framework of classical formal logic. It is in harmony with the law of noncontradiction. According to our definition, two theories make up a dialectical contradiction if each of them is consistent and their union is inconsistent. It can happen that each of these two theories has an intended model. Plenty of examples are to be found in the history of science.

Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 3, Page 370-394, September 2022.

This theoretical paper develops a conceptual framework that explains how companies can influence consumer behavior in terms of both social and business benefits through their corporate social marketing initiatives. Drawing from the source credibility literature, the article asserts that the effectiveness of CSM depends largely on the corporate credibility of a company in supporting a social cause. Based on this assertion, the framework identifies ten different antecedents of CSM credibility, which are organized into attributes of the company, attributes of the (...) CSM initiative, and attributes of the cause. Furthermore, this framework shows that CSM credibility affects the two examined consequences, intended prosocial behavior and consumer loyalty. Several research and managerial implications are developed based on the propositions specified in the framework. (shrink)

Mueller's gibbons ( Hylobates muelleri ) sing both sex-specific and duet songs. These songs are thought to be involved in territory maintenance, as well as the maintenance of pair or family bonds. However, few observational studies have examined how gibbons interact with their neighbors through song in the wild. We have been conducting field observations of wild gibbon groups in northeast Borneo since 2001. In the Borneo Rainforest Lodge (BRL) and Danum Valley Field Center (DVFC) at the Danum Valley Conservation (...) Area (DVCA), we observed seven episodes of alternating songs between males. Here, we describe the process of song exchange between males. During male interactions, song bouts rarely overlapped and were alternately emitted. Several studies have reported antiphonal vocalizations in New World and Old World primate species, but rarely in apes. Our observations of antiphonal songs in gibbons indicate that gibbons not only unilaterally advertise information, but also interactively communicate with neighbors and family members through songs. Since gibbons are phylogenetically similar to humans, and turn-taking has an important role in human conversation, our research on gibbon communication may provide insight into the evolution of human language. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 29, Number 2, November 2003, pp. 205-221 The Origin of the Indirect Passions in the Treatise: An Analogy between Books 1 and 2 HARUKOINOUE 1. The Analogy Between Book 1 and Book 2 If the central design of the Treatise is to demonstrate that "the subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a complete chain of reasoning by themselves" (T 2; SBN xii), as Hume advertises, (...) it seems unquestionable that his intention lies in the illustration of the human mind as an integrated system dependent upon the cooperation of the understanding and the passions, which are discussed separately in Book 1 and Book 2, respectively.1 What is yet to be determined is whether any internal or systematic connection between these two books was originally intended by the author. Is it too fanciful to agree with John Passmore, and to suggest that some dynamic system of the human mind would emerge when we open the door which stands between the first two books?2 The key for this door seems to be found in Hume's account of personal identity. We may well remember how he distinguished two aspects of our identity, one regarding the understanding and another regarding the passions, and claimed that the latter "serves to corroborate" the former "by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures" (T 1.4.6.19; SBN Haruko Inoue is Professor of Philosophy, Sapporo University 3-7-3-1 Toyohira-ku, Sapporo 062-8520, Japan. e-mail: [email protected] 206 Haruko Inoue 261). It seems reasonable to agree with Jane Mclntyre, who suggests that "Hume recognized questions about personal identity not addressed in Book 1, and that Book 2 makes an important contribution to our understanding of Hume's account of the self and its identity."3 And once we get a good understanding of this integrated mechanism of the human mind operating with both wheels, as it were, of the imagination and the passions, all we have to do is to accept his invitation and enjoy the efficiency of this two-wheeled car, driving through the fields of "Morals, Politics, and Criticism." For, if we take his words in his Advertisement seriously,4 it seems quite likely that the Treatise was published first as a set of Book 1 and Book 2, as Passmore suggests,5 and that Book 3 was written as the demonstration of the consistency of his system through the application of the hypothesis established in the first two books. This paper is a modest attempt to illustrate the intimate connection between Book 1 and Book 2: the latter, planned as a proof and reinforcement of the system Hume had established in Book 1, depends on the former. His basic strategy in the Treatise is to explain both systems of the mind by means of the easy transition of the imagination, which connects different perceptions with each other according to two kinds of principles or "properties of human nature " (T 2.1.4.2; SBN 283), viz. "the association both of impressions and ideas, and the mutual assistance they lend each other" (T 2.1.5.5; SBN 284). In Book 1 Hume establishes the system of the understanding in terms of the first association, viz. the association of ideas, and in Book 2 he proceeds to illustrate the system of passions by involving not only the second association but also the concurrence of both kinds of association which he calls "a double relation of impressions and ideas." His basic strategy is thus to apply the same method of reasoning to the illustration of both systems, assuming that "there is an attraction or association among impressions, as well as among ideas" (T 2.1.4.3; SBN 283). The intimate connection between the two systems of the understanding and the passions is illustrated through the demonstration of the "influence of the imagination upon the passions" (T 2.3.6.1; SBN 424), or in terms of the dependence of the latter on the former. It is owing to the dependence of the association of... (shrink)

Understanding whether the long and elaborate songs of male gibbons have syntax and hierarchical structures is an interesting question in the evolution of language, because gibbons are near humans in the phylogenetic tree and a hierarchically organized syntax is considered to be a basic component of human language. We conducted field research at Danum Valley Conservation Area in northern Borneo to test the hypothesis that gibbon songs have syntax and chunks. We followed one Mueller’s gibbon group for 1 week in (...) the dry and rainy seasons every year from 2001 to 2009, collecting vocal and behavioral data. Results show that songs emitted by the studied male gibbon were governed by combinatory rules. Some context-dependent songs had different combinatory rules, although they overlapped with the songs whose contexts were uncertain. The male Mueller’s songs had characteristics that suggest existence of chunk structure. These results provided an important perspective in the study of language origin. (shrink)

The harshness objection is the most important challenge to luck egalitarianism. Very recently, Andreas Albertsen and Lasse Nielsen provided a scrupulous analysis of the harshness objection and claim that only the inconsistency objection—the objection that luck egalitarianism is incompatible with the ideal of basic moral equality—has real bite. I argue that the relevantly construed incoherence objection is not as strong as Albertsen and Nielsen believe. In doing so, first, I show that the deontological luck egalitarian conception of equal treatment does (...) not endorse harsh policies such as excessive responsibility-sensitive healthcare that would be disrespectful to the imprudent. Second, I demonstrate that deontological luck egalitarianism is not troubled by the case that involves a lack of respect for the prudent, which vexes Anderson’s relational egalitarianism that Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s argument highlights. I thus claim that the harshness objection is not a truly decisive objection against the luck egalitarian project. (shrink)

descent represents a progression in this relationship whereby the Chorus, in finally abandoning their chariot and agreeing to approach Prometheus and listen to him, jeopardize their detachment from him and his fate, offer tentative support, and give him scope to develop his storytelling abilities and apply his persuasive powers. Although this progression does not represent an unequivocal commitment to Prometheus–for the Chorus fluctuate throughout the play between sympathy and reproach for him–it is none the less a crucial step as signalled (...) by the intensity of Prometheus' insistence that they descend and hear his story through to the end. (shrink)

In this paper, we shall give another proof of the faithfulness of Blass translation of the propositional fragment \ of Leśniewski’s ontology in the modal logic \ by means of Hintikka formula. And we extend the result to von Wright-type deontic logics, i.e., ten Smiley-Hanson systems of monadic deontic logic. As a result of observing the proofs we shall give general theorems on the faithfulness of B-translation with respect to normal modal logics complete to certain sets of well-known accessibility relations (...) with a restriction that transitivity and symmetry are not set at the same time. As an application of the theorems, for example, B-translation is faithful for the provability logic \ ), that is, \ \ \ \supset \Box \phi \). The faithfulness also holds for normal modal logics, e.g., \, \, \, \. We shall conclude this paper with the section of some open problems and conjectures. (shrink)

It is often argued that relational egalitarianism has a fundamental problem with intergenerational justice when compared to other theories of justice such as utilitarianism, prioritarianism, and luck egalitarianism. Recently, Timothy Sommers argued that there is no such comparative disadvantage for relational egalitarianism. His argument is quite modest: it merely aims to reject the claim that there could be no way to extend relational egalitarianism to intergenerational justice. This may be called the ‘No Comparative Disadvantage Thesis’. The present article challenges Sommers’s (...) argument in two ways. First, I show that Sommers fails to provide a reasonable constraint on causal efficacy, which is crucial to his argument for our relation (not relationship) to future generations. Second, I show that the chain-relatedness problem casts a shadow over Sommers’s argument for the No Comparative Disadvantage Thesis. More specifically, compared to the other theories of justice, relational egalitarianism (as it stands) can less easily justify that present persons have duties to future others. This is because relational egalitarianism cannot appeal to a specific principle in regard to the duties in question, because its principle is sensitive to current context and practice. I conclude that the No Comparative Disadvantage Thesis does not hold much promise. (shrink)

Centrosomes are the main microtubule organizing centers in animal cells. In particular during embryogenesis, they ensure faithful spindle formation and proper cell divisions. As metazoan centrosomes are eliminated during oogenesis, they have to be reassembled upon fertilization. Most metazoans use the sperm centrioles as templates for new centrosome biogenesis while the egg's cytoplasm re-prepares all components for on-going centrosome duplication in rapidly dividing embryonic cells. We discuss our knowledge and the experimental challenges to analyze zygotic centrosome reformation, which requires genetic (...) experiments to enable scrutinizing respective male and female contributions. Male and female knockout animals and mRNA injection to mimic maternal expression of centrosomal proteins could point a way to the systematic molecular dissection of the process. The most recent data suggest that timely expression of centrosome components in oocytes is the key to zygotic centrosome reformation that uses male sperm as coordinators for de novo centrosome production. Centrosome reformation at fertilization is essential for metazoan development. It requires a complicated interplay of sperm centrioles and the cytoplasm of the oocyte, which has eliminated its centrioles during oogenesis. The male centrioles launch centrosome duplication using female centrosome proteins for the first metazoan cell divisions. (shrink)

In the Shadow of Justice presents a powerful reconstruction of Anglophone political philosophy. Although the central focus of the book is on the origin and influence of John Rawls's theory of justice, it also uncovers the significance of British political theories in ways that contrast them with the Rawlsian liberal egalitarian idea. The book is, thus, a work of intellectual history that engages with the traditions of normative political theories.By referring extensively to the literature of philosophy, political science, economics, sociology, (...) and the archived materials of Rawls, Katrina Forrester puts forward two provocative theses. First is that the core idea of Rawls's... (shrink)

巧緻を極めた完全犯罪の罠ともいうべき言葉の繭を破り「神」と「死」の謎に迫る、躍動感溢れる究極の探究報告。「いま」生きているこの現場の徹底究明。.

In political philosophy, reflective equilibrium is a standard method used to systematically reconcile intuitive judgments with theoretical principles. In this paper, we propose that survey experiments and a model selection method—i.e., the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)-based model selection method—can be viewed together as a methodological means of satisfying the epistemic desiderata implicit in reflective equilibrium. To show this, we conduct a survey experiment on two theories of distributive justice, prioritarianism and sufficientarianism. Our experimental test case and AIC-based model selection method (...) demonstrate that the refined sufficientarian principle, a widely accepted principle of distributive justice, is no more plausible than the prioritarian principle. This tells us that some changes of certain intuitions revolving around sufficientarianism should be examined (separately) based on the findings of the survey experiment and AIC model selection. This shows the potential of our approach—both practically and methodologically—as a novel way of applying reflective equilibrium in political philosophy. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show the plausibility of John Rawls’s treatment of efficiency within the system of justice. While in political philosophy efficiency is often treated as an independent condition for establishing justice, or more precisely, as a necessary condition for establishing justice, Rawls considers efficiency as a non-negligible factor that has normativity in general circumstances. This is similar to the view that efficiency is a presumptive condition for evaluating social arrangements. However, Rawls’s view is salient in (...) a more substantive way. This paper demonstrates the salience of Rawls’s view of efficiency by responding to G. A. Cohen’s Impure Justice Objection to Rawls’s theory of justice. This shows that there is no impure connection between Rawls’s justice and efficiency. Moreover, the combined thesis of Rawls’s justice and efficiency is superior to Cohen’s pluralist theory of justice, making it a fruitful approach. (shrink)

The trolley problem is a classic thought experiment that evokes an ethical dilemma. Thomson’s “bystander” and “footbridge” versions of the trolley problem induce different intuitive judgments about what to choose in the ethical dilemma. However, we can question how robust these intuitive judgments are. We thus conducted an online survey experiment of Thomson’s versions of the trolley problem which showed that more respondents tended to choose not pulling the lever in the bystander version and pushing a person off the bridge (...) in the footbridge version when they believed they were not being watched. These results illustrate that people’s decisions deviate from the social norms in the absence of the public’s attention. To activate the practice of holding the manufacturers to a normative expectation based on the social norms, we suggest the law must be changed. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Lockean proviso can be utilized as a relevant principle of justice for food security under global climate change. Since reducing GHG emissions is key to enhancing food security, we suggest a global food security scheme that systematically allots, among all people, access to GHG sinks in food systems impacted by global climate change. For consideration of the scheme, it is important to have a principle of justice. Furthermore, it should incorporate the value of fairness. A (...) relevant principle of climate justice for food security should meet the following criteria: (1) the parties concerned under the scheme are states; (2) fairness does not undermine the requirement that the basic needs of all people must be met; (3) when determining fair burdens, a fair distribution of the rights to use GHG sinks should be sensitive both to each state’s responsibility for its GHG emissions and to (4) each state’s effort to reduce such emissions. With them in mind, first, we argue that the Lockean proviso can provide legitimate guidance for each state. Second, the Lockean proviso reasonably enjoins that a state has a right to a food system that secures its citizens’ basic needs, and a duty to meet the basic needs of other people. Third, the Lockean proviso can be deployed as a principle of both global justice and intergenerational justice for food security. Finally, the Lockean proviso enables us to count the reduction of GHG emissions by each state as “the fruits of its labors”. (shrink)

This chapter purports to give empirical feedback on impartial reasoning to justice by using online survey experiments. More precisely, the study focuses on whether and how the different conceptions of the veil of ignorance and John Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium affect real people’s impartial reasoning to justice. The findings show that, while ordinary people support impartial reasoning to the difference principle (maximin), their endorsement of it echoes neither John Harsanyi’s nor Rawls’s reasoning. The results illuminate that findings in human (...) psychology, such as the principles of loss aversion and “perceived luckiness,” cannot be dismissed for denoting the relevant impartial reasoning to justice. (shrink)

Abstract:What is Hume’s hypothesis of the double relation of impressions and ideas from which a passion arises? How does it operate in structuring his system? These are primary questions that need to be answered in order to understand Hume’s intention in the Treatise. Yet, there exists no reasonable answers, nor serious attempts to answer them, probably because this hypothesis is considered as a limited issue, relevant only to the indirect passions, or because it is too mechanical and unsophisticated to excite (...) critics’ curiosities. My present aim is to show that Hume’s double relation of impressions and ideas operating in the production of indirect passions is integral to his entire system not only in that it serves as a powerful weapon to advocate his naturalistic position, but also in that it is a highly sophisticated psychological mechanism that functions as a schema for the cooperation of the imagination and the passions. (shrink)

In contemporary political philosophy, reflections on poverty demand careful treatment in the light of key ethical concepts—especially autonomy. While the negative effects of poverty on autonomy are acknowledged, the welfare dependency of the poor is seen as an autonomy-undermining factor, which I call the “autonomy–poverty dilemma.” This chapter discusses contemporary political theories about autonomy and poverty in terms of how they relate to this dilemma. The features and problems of three pertinent theories are addressed in such a way as to (...) resolve the autonomy–poverty dilemma. The first is luck egalitarianism, which weighs individual responsibility in defining just distributions, but may leave some of the incapacitated unattended in order not to annul their personal responsibility and may stigmatize those who are dependent (such as people with mental disabilities) who are not personally responsible. Such stigmatization is also a problem with relational egalitarianism, which bases egalitarian justice on the equal standing of individuals, in that the ideal of socially embedded autonomous agents could be degrading to the dependent. While the capability approach overcomes that problem by providing a powerful buttress for the dependent and allowing them to emerge from poverty, it runs the risk of a paternalistic, perfectionist idealism. In closing, this chapter proposes an alternative view, which I call the “radical pluralist view of egalitarian justice,” based on a consideration of the features and problems of these three key theories. (shrink)

First, the author argues that Daniels and Sabin’s way of setting priorities in healthcare is implausible. Daniels and Sanin think there is a lack of consensus on comprehensive principle(s) of justice that can resolve the issue of priority-setting in healthcare. Nevertheless, their argument appeals to the deliberative democracy-based idea of accountability for reasonableness that involve the conception of justice construed naturally as comprehensive. The author then proposes a comprehensive conception of justice, an equal opportunity-based principle of justice, with which the (...) issue of priority-setting can be resolved. Although Daniels addresses two critical issues on the equal opportunity-based principle of justice, the author contends that it can be defended in ways that overcome these issues while being applicable to priority-setting conditions. (shrink)

This article aims to defend responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism by arguing for the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility as a plausible conception of an agent's responsibility for inequalities caused by his or her choice in responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. I show that the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility is not only philosophically defensible as a conception of genuine choice, but also promising enough to ward off two common worries which cast doubt on responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism (qua luck egalitarianism): first, the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility (...) allows the assignment of differential degrees of responsibility to rational agents in proportional terms, which may make it echo the adverse effects of their childhood environments. Second, its proportional construal essentially allows that nobody possesses a full degree of rational capacities. This enables responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism to refute the harshness objection. (shrink)

In recent years many essays have been made public and various opinions have been advanced on youth. I would like to conceive one of the salient characteristics in the consciousness and the behavior pattern of today's youth as “play-orientedness” and center my discussion on that particular inclination. “Play-orientedness” here is not intended to mean merely “activeness in sports and hobbies,” nor is it synonymous with “pleasure-orientedness.” It is a broader term and is rather close in meaning to what is commonly (...) called “the spirit of play.” We might perhaps define it as “play as a way of life,” or an inclination to introduce elements of “play” into one's daily life and make his actual life “play-like.”. (shrink)

This paper offers a new insight on the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) in the theory of epistemic democracy. This theorem states that democratic decision-making leads us to correct outcomes under certain assumptions. One key assumption is the ‘independence condition’, which requires that voters form their beliefs independently when they vote. This paper examines the role of an opinion leader as an informational source, which potentially violates independence. We demonstrate that voters’ beliefs may be correlated in the presence of the leader, (...) and that the CJT can fail if the leader’s opinions are reliable. This leads us to the following paradoxical observation: for epistemic democracy, good leaders may be bad, while bad leaders may be good. (shrink)