Jest to tłumaczenie Zarysów Pyrrońskich Sekstusa Empiryka. W pliku znajduje się początek wstępu oraz I sposób powściągnięcia sądu. This is a complete Polish translation of Sextus Empiricus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism. In the file you may find the beginning of the Preface and the translation of the I mode of suspension of judgment.

Jest to początek Zarysów Pyrrońskich Sekstusa Empiryka, ks. I (1-30) w nowym przekładzie. Całość tekstu ukaże się w Wydawnictwie UMK w połowie roku 2019. -/- This is the opening part of Sextus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism (I 1-30). The translation of the treatise will be published by Wydawnictwo UMK in the 2019.

Critical Pragmatics develops three ideas: language is a way of doing things with words; meanings of phrases and contents of utterances derive ultimately from human intentions; and language combines with other factors to allow humans to achieve communicative goals. In this book, Kepa Korta and John Perry explain why critical pragmatics provides a coherent picture of how parts of language study fit together within the broader picture of human thought and action. They focus on issues about singular reference, that is, (...) talk about particular things, places or people, which have played a central role in the philosophy of language for more than a century. They argue that attention to the 'reflexive' or 'utterance-bound' contents of utterances sheds new light on these old problems. Their important study proposes a new approach to pragmatics and should be of wide interest to philosophers of language and linguists. (shrink)

In this paper, we focus on some misconceptions about Critical Pragmatics, what it is, what it assumes and what it proposes. Doubtless, some of these misconceptions are due to clumsy writing on our part; perhaps others are due to inattentive reading. And some may be due to an effort to shield us from the apparent implausibility of what we said—and in fact meant. It does not matter much. We focus on those misunderstandings that most matter to us, either because, by (...) repetition, they have ended up being annoying, even if they are not, perhaps, that important; or because they are substantial enough to represent a distortion of the basic picture of Critical Pragmatics and its theoretical foundations, namely, Critical Referentialism—also known as the Reflexive-referential Theory—and, more generally, Perry’s fundamental views on meaning and content(s). (shrink)

The treatment of Descartes' philosophy within this book takes it to be a specific instance of rationalism. Descartes gave the human intellect the central role in this system; thus, it is considered a variant of an intellectual rationalism.

This book focuses on the standards of philosophical rationality, corresponding to a philosophy that aspires to be more than the wisdom that stems from and addresses everyday human needs. It is a search for standards that would, as it were, show the way to philosophical wisdom for anyone who is willing and able to assess it. One of the problems is that people have had a different understanding of the basic concept of rationality, which is the rationale. (Series: Development in (...) Humanities - Vol. 1). (shrink)

Does first language (L1) word order affect the processing of non-canonical but grammatical syntactic structures in second language (L2) comprehension? In the present study, we test whether L1-Spanish speakers of L2-Basque process subject–verb–object (SVO) and object–verb–subject (OVS) non-canonical word order sentences of Basque in the same way as Basque native speakers. Crucially, while OVS orders are non-canonical in both Spanish and Basque, SVO is non-canonical in Basque but is the canonical word order in Spanish. Our electrophysiological results showed that the (...) characteristics of L1 affect the processing of the L2 even at highly proficient and early-acquired bilingual populations. Specifically, in the non-native group, we observed a left anterior negativity-like component when comparing S and O at sentence initial position and a P600 when comparing those elements at sentence final position. Those results are similar of those reported by Casado et al. (2005) for native speakers of Spanish indicating that L2-Basque speakers rely in their L1-Spanish when processing SVO–OVS word order sentences. Our results favored the competition model ( MacWhinney, 1997 ). (shrink)

The author aims at evaluating the activities on the Facebook profiles of three regional media editorials – namely the ‘TVP 3 Łódź’ TV channel, the ‘Radio Łódź’ radio channel, and the Express Ilustrowany daily – particularly in terms of including local and regional information in their posts. Another objective was to attempt to quantify and compare these activities. The used research method is the analysis of profile content on Facebook, and the study was conducted within the period of one month.

(1) A to produce a particular response r (2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1) (3) A to fulfill (1) on the basis of his fulfillment of (2).” Grice (1969, 1989), p. 92.

There is not much disagreement that the recent spectacular establishment of parliamentary democracies and market economies in Eastern Europe and the even more breathtaking events in most Soviet republics – which should culminate in the reemergence of the Baltic nations as independent states – may be convincingly conceived of as the triumph of civil society over the Marxist-Leninist system. Both the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist system and the reemergence of civil society may be discussed in terms of theories which deal (...) with the relationship between human nature and sociopolitical systems. (shrink)

Classical Gricean pragmatics is usually conceived as dealing with far-side pragmatics, aimed at computing implicatures. It involves reasoning about why what was said, was said. Near-side pragmatics, on the other hand, is pragmatics in the service of determining, together with the semantical properties of the words used, what was said. But this raises the specter of ‘the pragmatic circle.’ If Gricean pragmatics seeks explanations for why someone said what they did, how can there be Gricean pragmatics on the near-side? Gricean (...) reasoning seems to require what is said to get started. But then if Gricean reasoning is needed to get to what is said, we have a circle. (shrink)

Gricean pragmatics seems to pose a dilemma. If semantics is limited to the conventional meanings of types of expressions, then the semantics of an utterance does not determine what is said. If all that figures in the determination of what is said counts as semantics, then pragmatic reasoning about the specific intentions of a speaker intrudes on semantics. The dilemma is false. Key points: Semantics need not determine what is said, and the description, with which the hearer begins, need not (...) provide the hearer with knowledge of what was said, or the ability to express what was said, from the hearer's context. (shrink)

In “Unarticulated Comparison Classes” 2018 [2009], Richard Vallée adopts John Perry’s (2012 [2001]) reflexive-referential theory of meaning and content as well as his concept of unarticulated constituents (Perry 1986) to deal with certain context-sensitive elements of the truth-conditions of statements containing relative gradable predicates. I am sympathetic both with the general framework and with the assumption that unarticulated constituents are involved in the truth-conditions of bare positives such as “Monica is tall.” I do not share, however, Vallée’s main conclusions on (...) the examples he provides as pre-theoretical evidence. This leads me to disagree with some details of his proposal for the semantics and pragmatics of relative gradable adjectives. (shrink)

Brzezinski predicts that the interface between ethics and science will be the new frontier of politics, and it will place on the shoulders of democratic leaders and those concerned with human rights, the obligation to be at least part-time scientists and philosophers.

‘Zu’, zeure pozak eta zeure penak, zeure oroitzapen eta anbizioak, zeure identitate pertsonala eta nahimenaskatasunaren zentzua, izan ere, ez zara/dira nerbio zelula talde ikaragarri haundi bat eta asoziatutako molekulak besterik.

Certain aspects of time physics were considered within the framework of quantum cosmology of the closed universe. Based on the general relativity we know that total energy of the closed universe is precisely equal to zero. This fact allows interpreting the creation of the closed universe as a spontaneous, causeless occurrence of respective quantum fluctuation, without any energy input. However, in such a universe the unitary evolution is “frozen”—no changes may occur, i.e. the universal cosmic time, which numbers the changes (...) in the state of the universe, cannot exist. This conclusion is obviously contrary to the experiment. For this reason the changes observed in the closed universe may be generated solely by non-unitary, irreversible and jumpwise evolution, associated with quantum measurement, which cannot be caused by any element of reality liable to linear laws of quantum theory. Therefore, quantum cosmology does not generate a closed thinking system. In consequence, this leads to an ontology called objective idealism. (shrink)

Singular terms without referents are called empty or vacuous terms. But not all of them are equally empty. In particular, not all proper names that fail to name an existing object fail in the same way: although they are all empty, they are not all equally vacuous. “Vulcan,” “Jacob Horn,” “Odysseus,” and “Sherlock Holmes,” for instance, are all empty. They have no referents. But they are not entirely vacuous or useless. Sometimes they are used in statements that are true or (...) false. We are basically referentialists about proper names. The ordinary semantic function of a proper name is to refer to an object, and to do it directly, that is, without semantically providing any identifying condition that the object should meet to be the referent. To put it differently, we agree that statements containing proper names express singular propositions, i.e., that their truth-conditions involve the referent of the proper name, if it exists, and not any identifying condition of it. Now, since empty names lack a referent, and therefore would not express such a singular proposition, how do we explain that many, if not all, statements containing them have a truth-value? Answering this question for the case of fictional names, in particular, is the aim of this paper. (shrink)

This is a reprint of the chapter “Prelude: Antitrinitarianism in Poland before Socinus” by Zbigniew Ogonowski in his "Socinianism: History, Views, Legacy" (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2021), 3–56. Reprinted with the permission of Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura. We are grateful to Valentina Saraceni for her permission to reprint this material in the present volume. The paper takes an in-depth look at an early, pre-Socinian stage of Polish antitrinitarianism. First, it outlines the historical reasons for the emergence (...) of antitrinitarianism in Poland. Second, it explains how the early Polish antitrinitarians were able to develop a view substantial enough to provide a basis for Socinianism, a philosophical and religious movement with a pan-European reach. Third, it discusses similarities and differences between the two stages of Polish "Arianism", pre-Socinian and Socinian. (shrink)

[EN] In this paper, I offer a content–pluralistic account of the meaning of the first–person plural pronoun «we», building upon John Perry’s view on indexicals and demonstratives. I argue that unlike «I», «we» is not a pure or automatic indexical: i.e., it is an indexical whose referents are partly determined by the speaker’s intention; and that it’s not wholly discretionary either, since its character or meaning does require that the speaker be part of its referent. In this sense, «we» is (...) not just the plural counterpart of «I», but is closer to «now» and «here». I consider an alternative approach defended by Vallée that takes the meaning of «we» as reducible to the meaning of «I» plus the different combinations of «you» singular, «he/she», «you» plural, and «they». I argue that, other things being equal, a basic economy principle of meaning favors my approach, and that the cases of co–reference and anaphora posed by Vallée himself and Nunberg are better explained by it. Besides, I discuss seemingly non referential uses of «we», as in Nunberg’s cases of «we [the condemned prisoners]», in which besides referring to herself the speaker does not seem to have any other particular individual in mind to whom she intends to refer. I contend that my approach provides a natural account of these cases. [ES] En este trabajo, presento una teoría del significado del pronombre de primera persona del plural, «nosotros», inspirada en la concepción sobre los indéxicos y demostrativos de John Perry. Defiendo que a diferencia de «yo», «nosotros» no es un indéxico puro o automático, puesto que su referencia se determina en parte mediante la intención de la hablante; y no es enteramente discrecional, ya que su carácter o significado requiere que la hablante sea parte de su referencia. En este sentido, “nosotros” no constituye la mera contrapartida plural de «yo», y está más cercano a «aquí» y «ahora». Además, discuto una teoría alternativa propuesta por Vallée, que reduce el significado de «nosotros» al de «yo» más las distintas combinaciones de «tú», «ella», «él», «vosotras/vosotros» y «ellas/ellos», para concluir que principios básicos de economía y simplicidad teórica hablan a favor de mi propuesta, y que los casos de co-referencia y anáfora aducidos por el propio Vallée y Nunberg también se explican mejor mediante ella. Finalmente, considero supuestos casos de usos no referenciales de «nosotros», como los que presenta Nunberg, en los que la hablante no parece tener la intención de referirse a ningún individuo en particular aparte de sí misma. Sostengo que mi propuesta ofrece una explicación clara y natural de tales casos. (shrink)