Le désir d’une femme d’avoir un enfant la précipite dans un monde conflictuel. Quand elle n’a pas été en mesure de mener à son terme une séparation psychique avec la mère, son identification féminine demeure sous le joug maternel. Les sentiments inconscients de culpabilité, en raison de la volonté de mettre au monde un enfant, se concentrent en premier lieu sur la mère puis s’orientent vers le premier enfant et retentissent le cas échéant sur les relations fraternelles. L’article (...) s’attelle à la compréhension de la position particulière de la fille aînée qui deviendra une femme anxieuse, notamment concernant la gestion de ses relations au sein de la fratrie mais également avec ses parents. Élucider ces mécanismes constitue un moyen de démêler les nœuds émotionnels présents au sein de la fratrie. (shrink)

Dans cet article, l’auteure, psychologue clinicienne, interroge les enjeux intersubjectifs sous-jacents aux expériences de nourrissage. Elle envisage la croissance psychique comme étant fonction de l’instauration d’une relation humaine intime et nourrissante qu’elle nomme une « relation de nourrissage ». À partir d’une séquence détaillée d’observation de bébé à domicile selon la méthode E. Bick, l’auteure considère la relation de nourrissage comme le paradigme de la rencontre intersubjective. Elle souligne l’importance du travail d’accordage dans la mise en forme (...) et l’intégration de l’expérience. Elle montre ensuite que la relation de nourrissage permet, à travers le rétablissement de l’unité symbiotique postnatale ordinaire, l’accès à une reconnaissance intersubjective individuante. Enfin, elle met en lumière le fantasme organisateur de la relation de nourrissage et le rôle central tenu par la fonction paternelle. (shrink)

Masculinity and femininity can both be freely defined through the spectrum of certain characteristics, points of view, features, expectations, and explanations linked to the behavioural traits of masculine and feminine individuals. Those are socially constructed dimensions that explain the male and female status, alongside the position of the sexes within societies. The aim of this study is to re-examine the extent to which culture and cultural context impact the shaping of male and female individuals, as well as the ways through (...) which those influences take place. The relationships between the culturally established set of categories, such as those for gender identification in individuals, are referred to as “human taxonomy”, or “cultural classification”. Hence, the norms, regulations, stances, behaviours, conduct, and, ultimately, the expectations of individuals in a sociocultural environment greatly depend on the relations between mannature-culture. In that context, this paper elaborates on different socio-anthropological theoretic concepts revolving around the creation of masculinity and femininity while emphasizing the historical and contemporary d. (shrink)

Cet article aborde, à partir de la répétition des maltraitances sur enfant dans la relation mère-fille, la fonction du processus de cette répétition selon la théorie freudienne et lacanienne dans un dispositif de soin dans le cadre de la pjj. Une vignette clinique met en évidence que l’insistance de la répétition du fantasme d’infanticide dans la généalogie féminine ne se réduit pas à la narration du traumatisme infantile mais devient une interrogation à l’adresse du Grand Autre pour se (...) définir comme sujet désirant, différent, afin de se soustraire à ce fantasme. Si cette demande sous-jacente à cette répétition n’est pas entendue par les professionnels, les institutions qui sont mis à l’épreuve, dans le transfert et le contretransfert, au profit de la fonction victimaire chez le sujet, les réponses apportées dans la réalité ne pourront que contribuer à assurer la jouissance mortifère de ce dernier dans la transgression, mettant en échec la fonction symbolique de la Loi. Les auteurs montrent, à travers l’efficacité du transfert et de la fonction symbolique de la Loi, que la psychanalyse sans divan peut s’adapter à une clinique du réel, clinique qui peut parfois réinterroger la théorie. (shrink)

In ____Womanizing Nietzsche,__ Kelly Oliver uses an analysis of the position of woman in Nietzsche's texts to open onto the larger question of philosophy's relation to the feminine and the maternal. Offering readings from Nietzsche, Derrida, Irigaray, Kristeva, Freud and Lacan, Oliver builds an innovative foundation for an ontology of intersubjective relationships that suggests a new approach to ethics.

Dans sa lecture de l'Hommage de Lacan à Marguerite Duras pour Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, Erik Porge met en évidence, cinquante ans après, l'actualité de ce texte où Lacan lie la problématique de la sublimation à celle d'une fiction clinique faisant cas. Il montre en effet que la transmission de la clinique de l'analyste participe de la dynamique de la sublimation de celui-ci. La topologie du fantasme, avec laquelle cette folie féminine - qui s'inscrit dans la suite (...) de Marguerite Anzieu (cas Aimée) et des soeurs Papin - est abordée, ouvre le lecteur à une dynamique transférentielle et de sublimation par son articulation à la pulsion. En même temps que Lacan parle de la sublimation, il est ravi par le texte et fait acte de sublimation dans l'écriture de son Hommage, en nouant l'objet de sa propre pulsion au Ravissement de Lol V. Stein et à Marguerite Duras elle-même. Dans un mouvement de retour sur sa lecture de ce texte, Lacan élève la lettre à la dignité de la Chose (définition de la sublimation) ; le style devient condition d'accès au cas et fait lui-même cas. (shrink)

La relation fraternelle est un domaine encore peu étudié et dont on n’épuise pas le sens et la fonction en la pensant comme n’étant qu’une projection sur les pairs d’une problématique qui se jouerait, en fait, avec les ascendants. La séduction fraternelle peut s’analyser à lueur de la problématique parents-enfants ou à celle de l’identification mentale, les deux axes pouvant, pour un même cas, se trouver intriqués de façon complexe. À partir de cas cliniques, nous montrons qu’il convient (...) de différencier ces deux axes pour mieux saisir le sens et la fonction de la séduction fraternelle dans la construction psychique du sujet, dans la naissance des conflits et dans leur résolution. La séduction fraternelle est à mi-chemin de la découverte de la différence des sexes et de la relation incestueuse, à mi-chemin des jeux sexuels infantiles et de la découverte de la sexualité génitale. En ce sens, elle constitue à la fois un miroir, un révélateur et un enjeu dans la construction du sujet en devenir. (shrink)

This volume brings together twenty original essays on the changes and continuities in gender relations and intersecting politics of sexuality, race, class and location. The book is located in debates about contemporary culture at a moment of rapid technological change, global interconnectedness and the growing cultural dominance of neoliberalism and postfeminism. The collection traverses disciplines, spaces and approaches. It is marked by an extraordinarily wide focus, ranging from analyses of celebrity magazines and makeover shows to examinations of the experiences of (...) young female migrants, 'mail order brides' and young women who repudiate feminism. The contributions are united by their attempts to think through the ways in which experiences and representations of femininity are changing in the twenty-first century. Are we seeing new femininities? Are neoliberalism and postfeminism constructing new identities and subjectivities? What kinds of analytic tools and cultural politics are needed to critically engage with the current moment? This book will be of interest to everyone studying gender, media or cultural studies. (shrink)

This paper examines the relations between, on the one hand, accounts of the distinction between an agent's identifying with, as opposed to feeling alienated from, their attitudes; and on the other, metaphysical accounts of action. It claims that a commitment to an event-causal conception of agency, which would analyse agency in terms of the causal potency of psychological states and events, appears to render mandatory a particular style of account of identification and alienation – namely, the hierarchical model offered (...) by Harry Frankfurt and Michael Bratman. It is argued that such accounts fall foul of a dilemma: the Authority Problem. The failure of attempts to avoid the Authority Problem is then used to motivate an attractive alternative style of account of the distinction, offered by Richard Moran. However, it is pressed that Moran's account rests on claims about agency which seem incompatible with the event-causal conception of agency. By making the links between the metaphysics of agency and accounts of identification and alienation more explicit, the paper allows us to better comprehend both the apparent need for and characteristic failures of some traditional accounts of identification and alienation, as well as make clear the action-theoretical debt incurred by those who would offer an alternative. (shrink)

Culturally different connotations of basic concepts challenge the comparative study of religion. Do persons in Germany or in the United States refer to the same concepts when talking about ‘spirituality’ and ‘religion’? Does it make a difference how they identify themselves? The Bielefeld-Chattanooga Cross-Cultural Study on ‘Spirituality’ includes a semantic differential approach for the comparison of self-identified “neither religious nor spiritual”, “religious”, and “spiritual” persons regarding semantic attributes attached to the concepts ‘religion’ and ‘spirituality’ in each research context. Results show (...) that ‘spirituality’ is used as a broader concept than ‘religion’. Regarding religion, semantics attributed by self-identified religious persons differ significantly from those of the spiritual persons. The ‘spiritual’ and the ‘religious’ groups agree on semantics attributed to spirituality but differ from the ‘neither spiritual nor religious’ group. Qualifications of differences and agreements become visible from the comparison between the United States and Germany. It is argued for the semantically sensitive study of culturally situated ‘spiritualities’. (shrink)

PurposeContinuous patient-reported outcomes to identify and address patients’ needs represent an important addition to current routine care. The aim of this study was to identify and determine important dimensions of health-related quality of life in routine oncological care.MethodsIn a cross-sectional qualitative study, interviews and focus groups were carried out and recorded. The interviewees were asked for their evaluation on HrQoL in general and specifically regarding cancer treatment. The material was transcribed and analyzed using qualitative content analysis based on Mayring. The (...) results were reviewed in an expert discussion.ResultsInterviews with patients and clinicians, as well as five focus groups with clinicians were conducted. Initially, nine deductive and two inductive categories on HrQoL were built. Four categories were excluded following the qualitative content analysis because they were hardly or not at all mentioned by participants. Following on from the analysis of the expert discussion, one dimension was added, and two further categories were excluded. The resulting system consisted of six dimensions: emotional health, physical ailments, autonomy, social functionality, dignity, and resources.ConclusionThe identified dimensions of HrQoL in routine oncological care were found to differ from those used in existing HrQoL measurements for patients. Further research is needed to test and evaluate the presented structure in a larger sample of cancer patients to further assess its psychometric properties. (shrink)

Identification with and alienation from an attitude appear to be necessarily related, that is, they are not independent phenomena—they exclude one another. This suggests a conceptual relation between them. A simple explanation of their incompatibility is that one is present just when and because the other is not—one is the negation of the other: An attitude is alien just when and because it's not identified‐with, or the other way around. But their incompatibility needn't be explained in this way. (...) Circles and dogs seem to exclude each other, but a circle isn't merely not a dog, rather they are merely different. Similarly, tall and short seem to exclude each other, but these are not merely negations of each other, rather they oppose each other—they are opposites. In this paper, I'll argue that, if we take a certain view of attitudes wherein the attitudes constituting identification and alienation toward the same attitude cannot be had at the same time, then the relation between alienation and identification that most plausibly secures their mutual exclusivity is that of a certain kind of opposition wherein those beings that can identify with and be alienated from attitudes have attitudes they stand in neither relation to. (shrink)

A key question in studying consciousness is how neural operations in the brain can identify streams of sensory input as belonging to distinct modalities, which contributes to the representation of qualitatively different experiences. The basis for identification of modalities is proposed to be constituted by self-organized comparative operations across a network of unimodal and multimodal sensory areas. However, such network interactions alone cannot answer the question how sensory feature detectors collectively account for an integrated, yet phenomenally differentiated experiential content. (...) This problem turns out to be different from, although related to, the binding problem. It is proposed that the neural correlate of an enriched, multimodal experience is constituted by the attractor state of a dynamic associative network. Within this network, unimodal and multimodal sensory maps continuously interact to influence each other’s attractor state, so that a feature change in one modality results in a fast re-coding of feature information in another modality. In this scheme, feature detection is coded by firing-rate, whereas firing phase codes relational aspects. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Anonymous Temporality and Gender:Rereading Merleau-PontyMegan M. BurkeThis Essay Provides a Feminist reading of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of anonymity in order to show that it is a critical resource for a feminist account of gender. For Merleau-Ponty, anonymity is a structure of temporality that is prior to the cogito; it is a time that actualizes the reflective self. It gestures away from ontological commitments rooted in presence and calls attention to (...) how senses inform and actualize one’s reflective experience, which illuminates how it is that certain habits become sedimented or deeply rooted into the structure of one’s lived experience. As such, anonymity provides a useful framework for understanding how and in what ways gender normativity is taken up and resisted in experience. Yet feminist readings of Merleau-Ponty and anonymity are divided. On the one hand, there is a strong criticism of his work in general and anonymity in particular and, on the other hand, there is an effort to recuperate aspects of his project, including anonymity. Four examples can help frame this disparate feminist reception of his work:1. Merleau-Ponty neglects sexual difference. For example, Elizabeth Grosz suggests, “Merleau-Ponty leaves out—indeed, is unable to address—the questions of sexual difference, the question of what kind of human body he is discussing, what kind of perceptual functions, and what kind of sexual desire result from the sexual morphology and particularity of the subject” (Grosz 1994, 10). [End Page 138]2. Anonymity neglects sexual difference. Shannon Sullivan is representative of this point, claiming, “Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the anonymous or impersonal body … leads one to overlook” difference; “Merleau-Ponty fails to realize” difference; “He is wrong” (Sullivan 2001, 71).3. Anonymity illuminates sexual difference. For Silvia Stoller “[W]ith the help of Merleau-Ponty … sexual difference presupposes an anonymous sexuality which underlies gender identifications,” making anonymity important to a phenomenological account of sexual difference (Stoller 2013).4. Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodied subjectivity provides insight into the lived experience of femininity. Feminist analyses of female body comportment, such as those of Iris Marion Young and Sandra Bartky, suggest that gender is a process of sedimentation (Young 1990; Bartky 1990). More specifically, they suggest gender becomes a lived experience through the repetition of particular behaviors and actions such that they become a deeply habituated part of one’s being in the world.While the feminist criticisms of Merleau-Ponty are important insofar as they caution against the acceptance of universal claims about existence, they also overlook anonymity’s relationship to time. Given that Merleau-Ponty’s characterization of anonymity is temporal through and through, this oversight is problematic. Without an account of anonymity as a kind of temporality, we miss the value of anonymity and the further insight that can be drawn from it in relation to gender. In what follows, then, I propose a solution to the disparate reception of his work. I suggest that reading anonymity as a structure of temporality illuminates how gender is taken up in lived experience. And, I suggest that anonymity can provide a strong account of gender normativity when one understands the parallels between sedimentation and anonymity with respect to temporality. By showing the strong connection between sedimentation and anonymous temporality, I suggest that it is ontologically and politically helpful to understand gender as a lived time.In the first section of this paper, I will address the main criticisms of anonymity provided by Shannon Sullivan and Luce Irigaray, while also paying attention to those from Elizabeth Grosz, Judith Butler, and Beata Stawarska. For Sullivan, Grosz, and Butler, Merleau-Ponty’s anonymous body is a neutral body, a body that fails to account for gender differences. Irigaray and Stawarska suggest that anonymity is the mark of patriarchy, making ethical and ontological solipsism fundamental to Merleau-Ponty’s work. In each of these cases, anonymity provides nothing useful for and is, in fact, a detriment to feminist projects.In the second section of this paper, I turn to Stoller’s positive reading of anonymity. For Stoller, anonymity is a political and ethical resource that challenges gender norms because it can allow for transformation in... (shrink)

Methodological strategies for the identification and synthesis of ‘evidence’ to support decision‐making in relation to complex healthcare systems and practices This paper addresses the limitations of current methods supporting ‘evidence‐based health‐care’ in relation to complex aspects of care, including those questions that are best supported by descriptive or non‐empirical evidence. The paper identifies some new methods, which may be useful in aiding the synthesis of data in these areas. The methods detailed are broadly divided into those that (...) facilitate the identification of evidence and those that enable the interpretation of the data retrieved. To illustrate some of the issues involved, reference is made to a multimethod review recently completed by the authors, which aimed to identify factors that promote continuity in the transition from child to adult health and social care. It is argued that as healthcare organisations are becoming increasingly preoccupied with the evidence base of practice, such methods may help ensure that aspects of care and approaches that are outside the dominant pharmaco‐medical domain maintain a prominent position on the healthcare agenda while remaining open to external scrutiny. Healthcare professionals who use such approaches need to know their relative utility and benefits to inform clinical decisions, so as to ensure that best practice is observed. (shrink)

This chapter covers all the main topics of feminist philosophy, from knowledge and being to good life, justice, and power. The relation between hermeneutical and feminist investigations is constructive and deconstructive: on the one hand, feminist scholars have developed hermeneutical methods further and, on the other hand, they have questioned the very foundations of these methods. The first feminist hermeneuticians and historians of philosophy aimed primarily at reconsidering the works of canonical philosophers and at bringing to light the forgotten (...) and neglected works of individual female thinkers. Feminists have started to search for female or feminine traditions, that is, for topics, problems, and/or ways of thinking that are shared by several generations of women philosophers. The primary self‐constitution and self‐identification of philosophers as subjects of language is governed by the hierarchical opposition. (shrink)

Machine Learning (ML) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) are for many the defining features of the early twenty-first century. With such a provocation, this essay considers how one might understand the relational philosophies articulated by Indigenous learning scientists, Indigenous technologists and feminine philosophers of education as co-constitutive of an ensemble mediating or regulating an educative philosophy interfacing with ML/AI. In these mediations, differing vocabularies – kin, the one caring, cooperative – are recognized for their ethical commitments, yet challenging epistemic claims in (...) the contexts of ML. Similarly, ML poses some questions to claims made about relational and Indigenous epistemologies, where the latter is perceived as separated from and unaffected by computation specifically or algorithmic societies generally. This essay seeks to gain several vantage points to explore and complicate how diverse relational philosophies can address ML and perhaps reconsider their own critical practices. (shrink)

L'approche historique des films souffre en France d'une double myopie : soit on sauve selon des critères cinéphiliques hérités de la « politique des auteurs » quelques chefs-d'œuvre qui transcendent leur époque ; soit on évalue les films selon des critères politiques ou idéologiques exogènes, comme « reflets » des débats de l'heure. Nous avons tenté d'élaborer des hypothèses à partir de ce dont parlent la plupart des films de fiction en France : les relations entre les hommes et les (...) fe... (shrink)

The Cramér–Rao bound, satisfied by classical Fisher information, a key quantity in information theory, has been shown in different contexts to give rise to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics. In this paper, we show that the identification of the mean quantum potential, an important notion in Bohmian mechanics, with the Fisher information, leads, through the Cramér–Rao bound, to an uncertainty principle which is stronger, in general, than both Heisenberg and Robertson–Schrödinger uncertainty relations, allowing to experimentally test the (...) validity of such an identification. (shrink)

Toute relation fraternelle dépend de l’organisation de la famille, du mythe et de l’histoire familiale. En situation d’exil, des éléments supplémentaires entrent en jeu. Ces relations sont étroitement liées aux interactions parents/enfants et à l’étape du cycle de vie de la famille lors de l’arrivée de l’enfant. La migration remet en question l’équilibre des places et des rôles des enfants. Quelle va être la fonction de ceux-ci dans un système recomposé? Quelles sont les modalités de leur investissement dans la (...) survie du système familial? La rencontre avec les familles d’origine étrangère, dans un contexte de recherche, permet d’observer que les fratries se structurent autour de la situation d’exil : entre pays/cultures d’origine et d’accueil. Les exemples cliniques visent à mieux saisir les subtils aménagements à l’intérieur de ces fratries qui permettront de dégager des perspectives de soin. (shrink)

Our paper focuses on the philosophical perspective of constructing active caring masculinities agencies in the contemporary feminist discourse. Since contemporary feminisms are not simply anti-essentialist, but more importantly, polyphonic, we believe that it is far more appropriate to talk about ‘masculinities’ as opposed to ‘masculinity’. We are proposing a revised understanding of the self in which the self is not defined primarily in the dichotomous, categorical one-other relationship. We use Paul Ricoeur’s anthropology to describe the self as relational, as well (...) as Joan Tronto’s recent perspective on care which fits well with a Ricoeurian reconstruction of the self. We also engage with Raewyn Connell’s discourse on masculinity and more specifically, hegemonic masculinity. By using ‘caring masculine agencies’ as an alternative to ‘masculinity as reactive anti-femininity’, we are proposing a paradigm shift that hopefully is flexible enough to respect the dynamism inherent to any act of gender-identification. (shrink)

Probing semantic relations Exploration and identification in specialized texts Alain Auger and Caroline Barrière In recent years, several scientific ...

continent. 1.1 (2011): 27-32. “My”—what does this word designate? Not what belongs to me, but what I belong to,what contains my whole being, which is mine insofar as I belong to it. Søren Kierkegaard. The Seducer’s Diary . I can’t sleep till I devour you / And I’ll love you, if you let me… Marilyn Manson “Devour” The role of poetry in the relationalities between people has a long history—from epic poetry recounting tales of yore; to emotive lyric poetry; to (...) rude, irreverent limericks; to Hallmark cards which have ditties that allow one to cringe, and somehow fall in love at the same moment. Without going into a notion of aesthetics, or attempting to choose which form of poetry is superior, we might want to consider why the form of poetry itself has long been a part of relationality. And whilst doing so, we might always keep in mind that poetry—especially poetry that moves, transports us—is the form that Plato has been warning us about, particularly if we want to become good citizens.As Avital Ronell teaches us in Stupidity : the poet, irremediably split between exaltation and vulgarity, between the autonomy that produces the concept within intuition and the foolish earthly being, functions as a contaminant for philosophy—a being who at least since Plato, has been trying to read and master an eviction notice served by philosophy. The poet as genius continues to threaten and fascinate, menacing the philosopher with the beyond of knowledge. Philosophy cringes (287). And considering that the philosopher is the lover of wisdom, we might begin to ask ourselves why one lover is warning against another—if the philosopher is in love with wisdom, then is the poet perhaps his rival, his challenger, for that very love? For, one must also remember that Plato—through Socrates—mentions constantly that Homer is his favourite. Moreover, by adopting both his own voice, whilst mixing it with Socrates’, Plato is adopting the form of poetry that he warns most about—the warning almost serves more as a homage to poetry than anything else. Here, we might open the register that one of the main reasons that he ejects a particular kind of poet is on the grounds of effecting effeminacy on the populace—good poetry moves you, affects you, transports you, shifts you beyond reason, puts you “out of your mind.” However, Plato also teaches us that rhetoric in its highest form requires divine inspiration by way of the daemon, or the muse. This moment of divine intervention is one that seizes—perhaps even ceases—you; putting you “beyond yourself.” In other words, a good rhetorician must always already be open to the possibility of otherness—the same otherness that possibly resides in the feminine. One could also trace this back to the poet that he both loved, and feared, most—Homer. Perhaps the effect of effeminacy that Homer's poetry opened is precisely the source of its power: through listening to Homer, one's body, one’s habitus is opened to the possibility of the feminine. And here, one must remember that the source of all learning—and all teaching—also lies in mimesis, in repetition, in habit. Once the habitus is opened to the possibility of invasion, of intervention, of otherness, there is quite possibly no possibility of distinguishing whether the mimesis is that of reproduction, or if there is always already a productive aspect to it. And by extension, if learning cannot be controlled, the very notion of teaching itself is shifted from a master-student relationality to one where the master is potentially changed as well—the relationality between the master and the student is not only inter-changing, but one cannot even know who is teaching, or learning, at any point. All that can be said is that they are in a relationality; which means that one is ultimately unable to locate the locus of knowledge, of wisdom—the site of which Plato is attempting to convince us is the sole domain of the philosopher. And it is this that philosophy is cringing from. To compound matters, philosophy is striving for wisdom; which can only come from the Gods. In other words, this is a gift that has to be bestowed on them—and more than that, wisdom is always already exterior to one’s control and knowledge. At best, it is the role of one to recognise the gift, to answer the call as it were. Here, if we listen carefully, we can hear the echo of Alexander Graham Bell, and the telephone. And as we are attempting to respond to the call of wisdom—the call that both poetry and philosophy are listening out for—it might be helpful to recall the agreement between Alexander Graham Bell and his brother Melville. In the biography, Alexander Graham Bell and the Conquest of Solitude , Robert V. Bruce notes that Aleck and Melly made a “solemn compact that whichever of us should die first would endeavour to communication with the other if it were possible to do so” (63). Since Melville was the one who passed on first, this pact put the onus on Aleck to receive the call of his brother. If you take into consideration the fact that until Melville’s death, both brothers had been working on an early prototype of the telephone, the instrument of distant sound can be read as an attempt by Aleck to maintain the possibility of keeping in touch with Melly, of hearing the voice from beyond. However, this was a connection that was not premised on any knowing, reason, or rationality; it was rather, one that was based on hope, and born out of love. And here, if we eves-drop on a cross-line with The Telephone Book , we can pick up the voice of Avital Ronell once again and hear, “the connection to the other is a reading—not an interpretation, assimilation, or even a hermeneutic understanding, but a reading” (380). In other words, the telephone can be read as the openness to the possibility of responding to the other; one that might always remain unknown. Even in this day of caller-identification, we can never know for sure who the other person on the line is until we pick up: hence, the only decision we can make—the effects of which we remain blind to until it affects us—is to either pick up or not, to either respond or not. And it is not as if the decision to pick up comes without risks: each time we answer a call, we run the risk of it ruining our day. Even when we don’t know who the caller is, perhaps especially when we don’t know who the person on the other end of the line is—and here one only has to think of prank calls—we are leaving ourselves completely open to being affected by another. Thus, philosophy finds itself in the position of Vladimir and Estragon. Since they have no idea who Godot is, they can never know if or when he shows up—thus, if he (and we are taking his gender on the word of the boy, some boy—we don’t even know if it is the same boy—who comes round in the evening) has already come, they would not be in the position to know it. And even if someone comes to them and announces that “I am Godot,” the wait would not be over—without referentiality to the name, they would have to take on faith that that person is indeed Godot. Hence, all they can know is that they are waiting for Godot; and Godot is the name of that waiting itself. All philosophy can know is that it is waiting; and wisdom is the name of that waiting itself. Which brings us to Tina Turner’s eternal question, “what’s love got to do, got to do with it?” In order to begin to consider that, we have to first attempt to examine the notion of love itself. Perhaps we might begin to consider what the difficulty of the statement “I love you.” For, if love is a relationality between two persons—both of whom remain singular, and are attempting to respond to each other—this suggests that neither of them subsume the other under themselves. In other words, the other remains wholly other. If this is so, then the “you” in the statement always remains shrouded in mystery. And even if the “you” was replaced with the name of the person, the veiling remains: for, names refer both to the singularity that is the person, and also every other person bearing that name, at exactly the same time. To compound matters, the only time one has to utter a persons name is in their absence—thus, the correspondence of a name to that particular person is at best an affect of memory. And if we consider the notion of memory, we have to also open the register of forgetting—bringing along with it the problem that there is no object to forgetting. For instance, when one utters “I forgot,” all one is uttering is the fact that one has forgotten, and nothing more—the moment there is an object to the statement, one has strictly speaking remembered what one has forgotten. Moreover, we have no control over when forgetting happens to us. And since it is always already exterior to us, affects us, and has no necessary object, there is no reason to believe that every moment of memory might not bring with it a moment of forgetting. Hence, whenever we utter a name—even if we accept the correspondence between the utterance and the person in front of us—all we are doing is uttering the fact that we are naming. Thus, it is not so much that ‘a rose by any other name would smell as sweet’ but more appropriately, ‘a rose is a rose is a rose’—the relationality between its name and the phenomenon of its sweet smell can only be established after that moment of naming, that instance of catachresis. So, whenever one utters “I love you,” not only is it a performative statement, it is the very naming of that love—all you are doing is establishing a relationality between you and the other. And since there is no necessary referent—one is naming that referentiality as one utters it—this suggests that it is always already a symbolic statement; without which the mystery of the other cannot me maintained. In other words, one cannot love the other without maintaining this symbolic distance—through a ritual; in this case the utterance “I love you.” This might be why Valentine’s Day seems to provoke such a massive reaction: the most common one from people (besides florists) being, Valentine’s Day is mere commercialism. Those among the nay-sayers who maintain a soft spot for Karl Marx would proceed to call it the commodification of relationships; those who prefer the Gods would claim that the sanctity of relationships has been profaned; the gender theorists would note how the fact that males buy the gifts only serves to highlight the unequal power-relation between the genders. Whichever side and variation of the arguments they choose boils down to this: the discomfort lies in the fact that they are confronted with the notion of relationships moving into a mediated sphere. The underlying logic is that love is between two persons only; it should not only remain between them, but more pertinently, be an unmediated experience between two persons. Which of course completely misses the point. For, if we reopen the register that relationships are the result of a negotiation between two persons, there must then be a space between them for this very negotiation to occur. Otherwise, all that is happening is, one person is subsuming the other within their own sphere of understanding; effectively effacing the other. If that were the case, there would no longer be any relationality; all negotiation is gone and the other person is a mere extension of the self—one is in a masturbatory relationality with one’s imaginary. Hence, any relationship must always already carry with it the unknown, and possibly always unknowable. The other person is an enigma, remains—must remain—enigmatic to you. This is the only way in which the proclamation “I love you” remains singular, remains a love that is about the person as a singular person—and not merely about the qualities of the person, what the person is. For, if the mystery of the other is unveiled, then the love for the other person is also a completely transparent love: one that you can know thoroughly, calculate; a check-list. And if they are knowable, this suggests that they can also be negated, and hence, the love can also go away. Only when the love for the other person is an enigmatic one, one that cannot be understood, can that love potentially be an event—and if it is an event, then strictly speaking, it cannot be known before it happens; at best, it can be glimpsed as it is happening, or perhaps even only realised retrospectively. At the point in which it happens, it is a love that comes from elsewhere: this strange phenomenon is best captured in the colloquial phrase, I was struck by love;” or even more so by, “I was blinded by love.” This is a blinding to not only the subject of the encounter—the self—but also of the very object of that encounter, the “you”—all that can be said is that there is an encounter. And it is for this reason Cupid is blind: not just because love is random (and can happen to anyone at any time), but more importantly because even after it happens, both the reason you are in love, and the person you are in love with, remain blind to you. Since there is an unknowable relationality with the other person, the only way you can approach it is through a ritual. This is the lesson that religions have taught us: since one is never able to phenomenally experience the God(s), one has no choice but to approach them symbolically. These rituals are strictly speaking meaningless—the actual content is interchangeable—as it is the form that is important. Rituals allow us momentary glimpses at secrets; and secrets are never about their content(s). Rather, secrets entail the recognition that they are secrets; the secret lies in their form as secret. This can be seen when we consider how group secrets work: since the entire group knows the secret, clearly the content of the secret is not as important as the fact that only members within the group are privy to this secret. Occasionally the actual content can be so trivial that even other people outside the group might know the information; they just do not realize its significance. For instance, if I used my date of birth as my bank-account password, merely knowing when I was born would not instantly give you the key to my life savings. In order for that to happen, you would have had to recognise the significance of the knowledge of my birthday. This means that you have to know that you know something. Since the God(s) are, strictly speaking, unknowable, this suggests that rituals put one in a position to potentially experience the God(s). The meaningless gestures on Valentine’s Day play precisely this ritualised role. It is not so much what you give the other person, but the fact that you give it to them. The gift in this sense is very much akin to an offering; the gift opens the possibility of an exchange. Gift-giving does not guarantee that you will like what is returned; there is always a reciprocation of the gift, but what is returned to you is never known in advance, until the moment it is received. This means that the worst thing that one can do is not give the gift: that would be akin to a cutting off of all possibilities, a complete closing of all communication with the other person. This at the same time also means that you cannot wait for the other person to give you something before you get them their gift: if that were the scenario, the reciprocal gift would be nothing more than a calculated return. The only manner in which both persons can give true gifts is to offer them independently of the other person, whilst keeping them in mind. In this way, the two gifts are always already both uncalculated (in the sense of not knowing what the return is) and also a reciprocation for the other (without knowing whether the other person actually has a gift in the first place). Naturally, this would seem like an irrational, even stupid, way of buying gifts. But it is precisely the stupidity involved that saves the relationship from being banal—more importantly, stupidity prevents it from entering the mere profane. This is not to say that an enigmatic love cannot end—of course it can. However, the difference lies in the fact that if the relationality is wholly transparent, it is subsumed under reason—completely predictable, within the self, and thus never open to the possibility of otherness, exteriority, musing. A love that is an event is one that is also open to the possibility of the divine, the sacred—always already closer to the possibility of wisdom. If we establish that both love and wisdom are exterior, to our knowledge, and the finitude to our selves, this suggests that both are names for the possibility of openness to otherness. In other words, and what choice do we have here but to use the words of the other, the philosopher—the lover of wisdom—is a name for one who is waiting, and nothing more. But that still leaves us with the question of this uncomfortable relationality between philosophy and poetry. But before we address that question, we have to take a momentary detour, and consider the whether it is possible to call one a poet. For, if we take the notion of a poet to be one who reaches the highest levels of rhetoric (beyond the lawyer, and the orator, who only aim to either please the crowds, or convince by way of sophistry), then we must also acknowledge that one can only become a poet at the moment of seizing, the point of inspiration, by the muses. Without this divine moment, all (s)he can do is practice her craft. As no one can control when the muses make their appearance, one could always be practising in vain—in some way, one is always already practising to be least in the way when the muse whispers into one’s ear; one is practising so as not to be vain. And since one cannot know when the muse will appear, there is no time frame to the practising—unlike the lawyer who speaks against a clock, poetry knows no time; the only time that matters is the time appropriate to poetry itself. Thus, all the poet (if one can use this term) is practising for the possibility of effacing her/him self—and waiting. Thus, in order for poetry to occur, in order to be seized, the poet—along with all her concerns—must cease. In other words, there is no poet; there is only the possibility of poetry. However, even as there is no time frame to this waiting, even as all we can say is that poetry is a name for waiting, the one who is practising is always already also in time. And since (s)he is in a symbolic relationality with the possibility of poetry, this suggests that the practising is her sacrifice, and time is precisely what she is sacrificing. Here, it might be helpful to turn to a strange source when it comes to poetry—Georges Bataille—and consider his teachings in the first volume of The Accursed Share where he reminds us that, the “essence [of sacrifice] is to consume profitlessly .” This is where each exchange is beyond rationality, beyond calculability, beyond reason itself, “unsubordinated to the ‘real’ order and occupied only with the present.” He continues: Sacrifice destroys that which it consecrates. It does not have to destroy as fire does; only the tie that connected the offering to the world of profitable activity is severed, but this separation has the sense of a definitive consumption; the consecrated offering cannot be restored to the real order.” (58) Since there is no need for a physical change in the object of sacrifice—“it does not have to destroy as fire does”—this suggests that the tie is severed symbolically. Hence, there is an aspect of trans-substantiation in this sacrifice: the form remains the same; in fact there is no perceivable change—this is the point at which all phenomenology fails—but there is always already a difference, an absolute separation from the “real order,” from logic, calculability, reason. The object of sacrifice, the victim [,] is a surplus taken from the mass of useful wealth…Once chosen, he is the accursed share , destined for violent consumption. But the curse tears him away from the order of things…” (59). And it is this tearing away from the order of things—the order of rationality—that “restores to the sacred world that which servile use has degraded, rendered profane” (55). For, only when it is no longer useful, when it is no longer abstracted—subjected, subsumed under—merely a use-value, can the object be an object as such, can a subject be a subject as such; be a singularity. Thus, it is never so much who or what is sacrificed, but the fact that there is a sacrifice. So even as (s)he is sacrificing her time to poetry, it is always already beyond her knowledge whether what (s)he is doing is actually preparing her for poetry or not—all (s)he can know is that she is sacrificing and nothing more. Hence, all (s)he can do is to open her self to the possibility of this relationality—all (s)he can do is be in love with poetry. At the moment the muse whispers into her ear, (s)he ceases to be, and becomes a medium for poetry—and since this possession is always already beyond our cognitive knowledge, this is also a moment of divine wisdom. In other words, there is no difference between poetry and wisdom—the moment of poetry is the moment of wisdom. And this might be the very reason for the philosopher’s aversion to poets. Not so much because they may corrupt the youth (this is after all the aim of all thinking, all philosophy), but precisely because in order to do so, the philosopher must wait for a moment of possession, for divine musing, for poetry. Hence, all thought, all thinking, all philosophy, is nothing but the waiting for the possibility of poetry itself. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that Nietzsche collapses the rigid dichotomy between nature and culture, as well as body and mind, by insisting on their mutually constitutive nature. This forces him to reconceptualize the role of women, who had traditionally been considered to be wedded to both the natural realm and the body. Nietzsche hails women for their insight that culture can never capture nature, and for being attuned to the interplay between the two realms. He attributes an enormous power (...) to the maternal figure who becomes a symbol for life as a whole. Her power arouses his own resentment, and he redoubles his efforts to exclude her, once again driving a wedge between nature and culture. Key Words: feminism • Nietzsche • subjectivity • Zarathustra. (shrink)

Cet article propose une approche de la société traditionnelle corse à travers la représentation qu’en délivre un de ses membres féminins. Nous privilégions, pour se faire, la correspondance échangée, autour de 1900, entre une soeur, restée au village (Sarrola-Carcopino, Corse du Sud) et son frère, soldat colonial en campagne à Madagascar. Nous y voyons apparaître les aspects de son rôle d’informatrice privilégiée et l’existence d’une division sexuelle des tâches d’information (regroupant les distinctions privé/public, affect/social, maison/patrimoine...). Cet échange ouvre tant du (...) côté d’une histoire du quotidien que de celui d’une ethnologie des relations groupales et des distinctions sexuelles, faisant de l’analyse des pratiques épistolaires un guide efficace des mouvements et des rythmes de la vie villageoise corse autour de 1900 et de la lente intégration de l’île à l’ensemble national. (shrink)

Résumé Cet article met en évidence la complexité des enjeux psychiques familiaux et individuels dans différentes cultures. La variabilité de la notion de famille et de celle de parenté fondée sur le tabou de l’inceste consanguin et symbolique introduit ces enjeux complexes. Les enjeux familiaux sont aussi différents selon le rang de l’enfant dans la fratrie, la différence des sexes ne manquant pas d’influer sur les relations fraternelles et les enjeux psychiques individuels.

Christophe Gripon | : La figure biblique érotisée de la Sagesse Éternelle et son lien avec Christ a amené certains hommes à percevoir Christ dans son reflet féminin et à vivre une relation érotique avec Lui/Elle. La dualité entre deux pôles antinomiques de Christ, l’un pleinement masculin et l’autre pleinement féminin, pourrait être abordée dans une approche apophatique de la tension entre deux pôles opposés, aux antipodes d’une asexualisation de Christ. Reconnaître ainsi le reflet féminin de Christ pourrait contribuer (...) à Le/La rendre plus « aimable » pour les hommes et participer au débat concernant une théologie spirituelle qui tienne compte de l’importance du désir érotique dans la relation à Christ. | : The eroticized biblical figure of Eternal Wisdom and its link with Christ has led some men to perceive Christ in his female reflection and to live an erotic relation with He/She. The duality between two paradoxical poles of Christ, one fully male and the other fully female, could be addressed in an apophatic approach of the tension between two opposite poles, the antipodes of an asexualisation of Christ. Thus recognizing the female reflection of Christ could contribute to make Him/Her more “attractive” for men and to take part in the debate about a spiritual theology which takes into account the importance of sensual attraction in the relationship with Christ. (shrink)

This article reports on an EU-funded project conducted in Greece, Portugal, England and Wales. Data were collected from male and female student teachers using surveys, interviews and focus groups. The project investigated their understanding of citizenship and the role of men and women in public and private life. Pateman's concept of a sexual contractwas used to discover how student teachers understood changing relations between men and women. Young professionals in each country had relatively similar representations of the public sphere, which (...) was seen as a distant sphere in which masculine power was unchallenged. The tension between power and femininity was articulated differently by men and women. Cross-national comparisons revealed how women in different European countries struggle over gender relations in family life and in everyday social contexts. Although gender relations are changing, the primary context for female citizenship is still predominantly the family. The sexual contract remains therefore a key theme to be considered in relation to the education of citizens. (shrink)

If, as Anthony Elliot argues, `the [symbolic] law of the father triumphs over the loss of the maternal body' in the making of men, how is the masculine body possible? The answer would appear to be, on condition that it becomes implacably hard, disciplined, an object of work. On the other hand, excessive interest in the body, as in the case of bodybuilding, would appear also to betoken narcissism and femininity. Drawing on the notions of the `hard man', the significance (...) of muscle, bodybuilding and the case of `Iron' Mike Tyson, this article attempts to come to grips with the complex and contradictory relations among desire, anxiety and the embodiment of masculinity. Specifically, this entails focusing on the deconstruction of discourses relating to muscle and `hardness', and on how identifications with such discourses are made and sustained. (shrink)

Este texto assinala características e implicações teóricas presentes na referência crítica que faz Winnicott às interpretações psicanalíticas da obra e da vida de Leonardo da Vinci em termos de pulsão sexual, complexo de Édipo e sublimação. Tal referência supõe, ao contrário, o papel fundamental que desempenha para o autor, na compreensão da experiência de arte, a noção de elemento feminino puro que, anterior à constituição de uma área de jogo, encontra-se primariamente relacionado ao impulso criativo, ao olhar da mãe e (...) ao sentimento de continuidade de ser, base para que se instaure uma identidade outra, capaz tanto de integrar processos de identificação como de retornar a estados informes.This text points to theoretical characteristics and implications present in the critical references that Winnicott makes to psychoanalytic interpretations of the work and life of Leonardo da Vinci in terms of sexual impulses, Oedipal Complex and sublimation. Such references suppose, on the contrary, the fundamental role that the author plays in the understanding of the experience of art, the notion of the pure feminine element that, before the constitution of an area of play, finds itself primarily related to the creative impulse, in the gaze of the mother and in the feeling of continuity of being, the basis for that which installs the identity of the other and is capable of integrating processes of identification and the return to unformed states. (shrink)

Differing from the Freudian position, this paper takes the view that a girl's early closeness to her mother gives her an initial advantage in forming sex identification. This is soon overcome, however, by the many cultural privileges and the prestige offered males. Boys must shift from an initial identification with mother, but get cultural rewards for the new role. 4 hypotheses generated from this position tended to be supported by the research findings reviewed.

In this article, I take up Marcella Althaus-Reid’s queer strategy that pairs disaffiliation with intimate identification in order to draw out the possibilities and limits of queer strategies of resignification and denaturalization. I will use David M. Halperin’s work on gay femininity, abjection, and camp as the primary site to investigate these queer strategies. This article’s considerations have implications for recent directions taken in contemporary queer theology by challenging projects that presume a certain limitless capacity for queering or that (...) seek to appropriate almost anything – marriage, celibacy, or orthodoxy – as queer. Rather than seeking to mitigate complicity in misogyny or trying to recuperate misogynist theological positions by highlighting their subversive queerness, Althaus-Reid’s demands from queer theologians a prophetic, denunciatory posture that turns away from the imperial theological highways towards the queer ways of knowing and relating to the God at the margins of T-theology. (shrink)

Vertigo, Masculine Phantasy, Feminine Mask. Vertigo allows us to shed light on how an obsessive symptom is articulated with a typical masculine phantasy and how it unravels itself during the crossing of this phantasy. On the feminine side, it teaches us in what respect can it be onerous to wear the mask of the object of the masculine phantasy.

L’auteure rend compte de son expérience auprès de collégiens et lycéens, dans le cadre des interventions d’« éducation à la vie affective, relationnelle et sexuelle », sur l’abord avec eux de la thématique de l’identité de genre. Elle essaie de sensibiliser les adolescents au processus de construction progressive de cette identité à partir des éléments corporels, psychiques et sociaux, en introduisant la notion d’identification aux figures masculines et féminines investies affectivement dans leur environnement. Il lui paraît important, par ailleurs, (...) de faire entrevoir ce processus d’identification comme un jeu au sens winnicottien du terme, pouvant contenir une dimension de plaisir. Cet apprivoisement de leur identité de genre par la pensée et l’échange avec d’autres, parce qu’il peut avoir une dimension angoissante à un moment donné, a tout à gagner à être proposé aux élèves tout au long de leur scolarité, comme le prévoit la loi, pour prendre en compte l’évolution de leur maturité psychique. (shrink)

Dans les prises en charge éducatives d’adultes handicapés, il arrive que des parents imposent leur directive. L’auteur repère et analyse ce mode singulier du lien d’emprise en proposant la notion de fratrie imaginaire pour caractériser la relation dans laquelle sont pris ces professionnels auprès des parents. Dans une lutte d’appropriation du sujet, ils sont alors minorisés à hauteur des craintes qu’ils suscitent et de l’ampleur de la minorisation que les parents ont eux-mêmes subies auprès d’autres professionnels du secteur médico-social. (...) Une extension de l’enveloppe familiale peut être le fruit des parents comme de la fratrie réelle. Ceci étant, une fois l’éclairage intersubjectif réalisé, il va s’agir de trouver des moyens institutionnels pour restaurer un dialogue basé sur un fondement stable repositionnant les acteurs de l’institution sur un terrain professionnel. (shrink)

Parmi les déesses du monde mésopotamien, deux figures féminines se dégagent : les soeurs Ištar et Ereškigal. Ištar agit dans la sphère des relations amoureuses, et surtout de la bataille. Elle joue dans la guerre comme elle le ferait « avec une corde à sauter ». Ereškigal règne sur le monde des morts : elle est celle « qui n’a pas connu le jeu des jeunes filles ». Cette contribution s’appuie sur les documents écrits (hymnes, narrations mythologiques) en cunéiformes (sumérien (...) – akkadien et textes bilingues) des iie et ier millénaire av. n. è. Elle prend pour angle d’approche les relations conflictuelles entre ces grandes déesses pour mieux saisir leurs rapports respectifs au jeu : où et quand jouent-elles? À quoi et avec qui jouent-elles? Quelles sont les informations que l’on peut en tirer pour les femmes et jeunes filles humaines? Diverses problématiques sont abordées à la lumière des études de genre : celles des rapports intergénérationnels et interfamiliaux, de la définition des espaces privé-public, de la séduction et de l’érotisme. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:preface “Africa Reconfigured,” the cluster in this issue on recent scholarly and creative work on Africa, displays a variety of cultural, artistic, and linguistic approaches to decolonizing gender. Originating in disparate fields, each article in this cluster presents examples of how new meanings of gender are produced that defy dominant definitions. Xavier Livermon examines the cultural and political context of postapartheid South Africa, arguing that redefinitions of “tradition”—not just (...) legal rights—have led Black South Africans to “queer” marriage practices. Busi Makoni pushes the boundaries of feminist linguistics to consider how young women creatively relate to the prevailing lexicon of body parts in southern African languages and, in doing so, how they challenge normative gender identities. Cheryl Toman offers an account of writer, playwright, and performer Werewere Liking’s distinctive lifelong fusing of performance art and social activism in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali and how Liking’s plays, prose, and poetry enact decolonization in unique ways. Nigerian artist Peju Alatise, whose work is featured in our art spread, presents an array of ideas, materials, and genealogies that deeply question European and US aesthetics, as the art essay by Moyo Okediji explains. Concluding “Africa Reconfigured” are critical perspectives on Euro-American gender orders found in Olumide Popoola’s except from a novel and the poems by Gabeba Baderoon. Two articles in the second half of this issue reconsider a specific moment of US women’s history: women’s liberation in the 1960s and early 1970s. Sara M. Evans challenges the stereotyping of the women’s liberation movement as white, middle class, and antisex, arguing that this is a myth fostered by academic theory, the movement’s opponents, and the mistaken notion that women ’s liberation rejected its New Left roots. Complementing Evans’s argument, Agatha Beins addresses the issue of racism in that same historical moment of women’s liberation in the United States by revisiting images 8Preface of revolutionary women of color in US feminist periodicals of the time, arguing that we have to understand the use of these images in the context of mainstream and New Left portrayals that demeaned feminism as being not serious about politics. Also in this issue is Mark Schuller ’s analysis of gender-based violence in Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake of 2010, in which he examines how international humanitarian organizations are not always fully aware of how structural violence operates in the country. In our forum “Teaching about Ferguson,” Feminist Studies offers our readers reflections on the pedagogical challenges and opportunities in taking up the issue of state-sanctioned violence against people of color in the United States. All the articles and essays in this issue emphasize that the specificities of transnational, historical, and political contexts—rather than abstract invocations of globalization —are essential for understanding the changing meanings of gender identities and hierarchies as well as the political goals of women ’s organizations. The first article in our cluster on “Africa Reconfigured” takes on a popular Western assumption about South Africa, which is that the constitutional changes that acknowledged and legalized same-sex partnerships replaced intolerant “traditional” practices among Black South Africans. Xavier Livermon challenges this assumption by demonstrating how Black South Africans engage tradition in creative nonheteronormative ways. He closely follows how Black South Africans redefine autochthonous cultural practices in order to create new meanings and practices for marriage. Just as the very definitions of gender have been continuously in flux, so have the definitions of marriage, and Livermon demonstrates how marriage and long-standing coupling practices have become queered and reconstituted in contemporary Black South Africa. In line with Livermon’s interest in redefinitions of sexuality and gender in a postapartheid context, Busi Makoni explores the relationship between the naming of genitalia and gender positionings. Studying both men’s and women’s uses of the lexicon for body parts in multiple Southern African languages, Makoni concludes that women engage in a process of dis-identification with, and reappropriation of, socially inscribed language for their bodies. Women use the same name labels, but assign them completely different meanings, thereby creating counternarratives of feminine identity. Preface 9 The ability to create new meanings permeates the art... (shrink)

Rethinking the Relation between Women and Psychoanalysis interrogates core psychoanalytical theoretical concepts concerning loss and femininity. Contributors apply different psychoanalytic perspectives to loss and femininity, focusing on the intersection of psychoanalysis, culture, and clinical work.

Les historiens qui se sont intéressés à la sexualité au xviie siècle ont souvent noté qu’il était rare d’accéder à une parole féminine. Quelques bribes en subsistent pourtant, que délivrent les biographies et autobiographies spirituelles de femmes dévotes et les archives des tribunaux d’Église (Officialités). À partir de cette parole enchâssée dans d’autres discours – ceux des hommes et femmes d’Église qui les recueillent, ceux des juges qui les enregistrent –, opacifiée par des visées particulières – hagiographique ou judiciaire (...) –, censurée parfois, on ne peut espérer atteindre la réalité des pratiques sexuelles. En revanche, les silences qui la ponctuent donnent à voir l’importance de l’ignorance, de l’innocence et de la feinte dans l’expérience féminine de la sexualité depuis les fantasmes et les découvertes de l’enfance jusqu’aux premiers temps du mariage. (shrink)

Purpose of the article is to highlight the peculiarities of the androgyny presentation in current visual culture, in particular in fashion and its philosophical and culturological comprehension. Determination of the leading trends associated with the offset of gender stereotypes and denial of the established separation into the feminine and masculine beginnings is due to the attention to the latest theories, such as transfeminism. Theoretical basis is the works of contemporary authors who develop such concepts as "gender", "gender identity", "androgyne" and (...) move within the limits of the theories of transfeminism and transgenderism. The leading French thinker J. Baudrillard outlines philosophical measurements related to the justification of fashion. The interaction issues of the feminist theory, aesthetics of gender and androgyny, which are manifested in visual images, are presented in the writings of P. Auslander, R. Crepax. Transformation of the androgyny idea is considered in the works of B. Řiháková, F. J. Galarte. S. Stryker, T. Bettcher and J. Halberstam also address the problem of transgenderism and transfeminism in their writings. Originality is to highlight the main aspects associated with actualization of androgyny, its visual presentations in fashion, and the connections with contemporary theoretical discourse. A number of concepts related to the transformation of gender stereotypes have been identified. It was revealed that the logical continuation of changes in society, science and technical development is the actualization of androgyny as an individual’s freedom in self-presentation and self-identification. It was emphasized that during the last century androgyny also serves as the basis for forming new trends in theoretical discourse, in particular, transfeminism, as well as it finds many visual manifestations in fashion and fashion industry. Conclusions contain the results of the study that describes the role of androgyny in the context of today’s culture as a measurement of personal freedom, aimed at avoiding gender stereotypes and the usual dichotomy of masculinity and femininity, which manifests itself in contemporary visual practices. (shrink)

Purpose. The signification of the theoretical grounds for the conceptual reconstruction of the dichotomy "spirit-body" in the field of postmodern notions in philosophy and culture, the identification of the location of the given dichotomy in the processes of the transition of philosophy from being classical to the postclassical one, simultaneously, culture – to the cultural forms of postmodernity. Theoretical basis. The changing systems of post paradigm relations, radically transforming human life in the postmodern world, represent the obvious transformations of (...) the fundamental conceptual schemes. For postmodern philosophers, the dichotomy "spirit-body" does not mean better interpretation of separate substances any more, but the development of the relationship between mental and physical properties. Feminist philosophers assert that the "spirit-body" opposition occupies the special place among classical dichotomies, as it acquires the key meaning in the patriarchal concepts of masculinity and femininity. In the post modernity, the body and corporality become dominant themes not only in the philosophy and "high" culture, but also in mass culture; at the same time, the emphasis on their common narratives and intertexts testifies to the fundamental transformations that reflect the "condition" of postmodernity. Originality of this research lies in the expose of the specific transformation features of the dichotomy "spirit-body" as a philosophic opposition closely connected with postmodernism and realized in the practices of mass culture. This research is reflectedof the idea of the absoluteness and invariabilityof this duality as thebasicdichotomy of the classical philosophy in its correlation with cultural logic of the postmodernity at the end of the 20 – the beginning of the 21st centuries. Conclusions. With the reinterpretation of the "spirit-body" dichotomy, the body is theorized as a cognitive agent with desires independent of the mind. In postmodernism, the body is the source of charm, and aversion and destruction, and restoration. At the same time, with the growth of the visualization factor and the change in the status of "high" culture, the "turn" in the status of mass culture is created: today both the former and the letter have many common discourses, narratives and intertexts. (shrink)

This article addresses the issue of femme gaze and desire in relation to a range of heterosexual fashion advertisements from the British edition of the mainstream fashion magazine Vogue. It considers the lasting legacy of heterosexual feminist and lesbian feminist constructions of the gazing subject, particularly in terms of masculinity, trans-sex identification and masquerading. Both of these fields of knowledge have failed to recognize feminine and femme-inine viewing subjects and to include them in the field of visibility independently, (...) without recourse to masculinity. The article considers possibilities for resistant femme visibility, identification, and desire. It argues through the analysis of fashion images that the concepts of femme-nity and femme-nine are useful in criticizing prevailing regulatory norms of perception and normative expectations on gender, as well as in denaturalizing the assumed relationship between the gaze, gender, sexuality, and desire. (shrink)

L’article se propose de retracer brièvement l’itinéraire et le fondement théorique (du marxisme au poststructuralisme) des termes « condition féminine », « rapports sociaux de sexe » et « genre » dans différentes disciplines (sociologie, histoire et science politique) en précisant la chronologie différenciée de leur usage en France et dans le monde anglophone.