A treatment of act and being illustrating the general claim that the problems of philosophy can be answered only by a revelational theology. Beginning with a slapdash treatment of transcendental philosophy and its idealistic outgrowths, as well as phenomenological and existential ontologies, supposedly showing the necessary impasses of philosophy when left to its own devices, Bonhoeffer moves to a treatment of the being and act both of God's revelation per se and of the men to whom God is (...) revealed. Man "in Adam" cannot resolve his act and being into unity; man "in Christ" can.--R. C. N. (shrink)

A frequent objection to act-Utilitarianism is that, Because the consequences of acts extend indefinitely into the future, I cannot put the theory into practice, By trying to decide on its basis what it would be right to do in this case. I reinforce this unworkability argument with an argument designed to show that our ignorance of acts' total actual consequences, At least in the case of a great many acts, Stems not merely from remoteness in the causal and/or temporal orders (...) but also from the "kinds" of consequences which go to comprise acts' total actual consequences. (shrink)

Fichte assigns ‘intellectual intuition’ a new meaning after Kant. But in 1799, his doctrine of intellectual intuition is publicly deemed indefensible by Kant and nihilistic by Jacobi. I propose to defend Fichte’s doctrine against these charges, leaving aside whether it captures what he calls the ‘spirit’ of transcendental idealism. I do so by articulating three problems that motivate Fichte’s redirection of intellectual intuition from being to acting: (1) the regress problem, which states that reflecting on empirical facts of consciousness (...) leads only to further facts and so cannot yield a first principle; (2) the rhapsody problem, which states that the categories form a haphazard set and so lack necessity unless they derive from a first principle; and (3) the nihilism problem, which states that a first principle cannot lie outside our cognition of it, lest it be the cause of our cognition and, being first, the cause of all our actions, reducing us to machines. Crucially, Fichte’s three motivating problems are in fact aspects of a single problem. Leaving any aspect unsolved spoils putative solutions to the other two. Consequently, Fichte requires a single unified solution to all three, which his doctrine of intellectual intuition provides. (shrink)

To Be Human presents Krishnamurti's radical vision of life in a new way. At the heart of this extraordinary collection are passages from the great teacher's talks that amplify and clarify the nature of truth and those obstacles that often prevent us from seeing it. Most of these core teachings have not been available in print until now. Besides presenting the core of Krishnamurti's message, the book alerts the reader to his innovative use of language, the ways in which he (...) would use "old words with new interpretations," then gives practical examples, showing that we can clarify our understanding of life itself--and act on this new understanding. The splendid introduction by David Skitt discusses Krishnamurti's philosophy as a guide to knowledge and experience, the roles knowledge and experience should play in our lives, and the times when it is best to cast them aside and "look and act anew." The book's source notes will aid the inquisitive reader who wishes a deeper understanding of this great teacher's message. (shrink)

Richard Cartwright's impact on other philosophers has been as much a product of his own personal contact with students and colleagues as the result of his written work. The essays in this book demonstrate the deep influence he has had, not only by his thinking but equally by his style and manner and, above all, by his clarity and purity of intention. All of the essays are concerned with the questions of logic, language, and metaphysics that have been at the (...) core of Cartwright's own work. The chapters and their authors are: The Consistency of Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic, George Boolos. Russell's "No-Classes" Theory of Classes, Leonard Linsky. Quine's Indeterminacy, Charles S. Chihara. Justifying Symbolizations, Harold Levin. Substitutivity, Scott Soames. Moore-Paradox, Sincerity Conditions, and Epistemic Qualification, Charles E. Caton. Matching Illocutionary Act Types, William P. Alston. Scattered Objects, Roderick M. Chisholm. Parts and Places, Helen Morris Cartwright. Ruminations on an Account of Personal Identity, Judith Jarvis Thomson. G_del's Ontological Proof, Jordan Howard Sobel. "The Concept of the Subject Contains the Concept of the Predicate," David Wiggins. Judith Jarvis Thomson is Professor of Philosophy at MIT. Philosophical Essays, the first collection of Richard Cartwright's work, is being published simultaneously by The MIT Press. (shrink)

In her article “Asymmetrical Freedom,” and more recently in her book Freedom Within Reason, Susan Wolf claims to have given us a new theory to account for when we can be held morally responsible for our actions. I believe that she has confused “being morally responsible for an action” with “acting responsibly or irresponsibly.” I will argue that Wolf has given us a nice analysis of the latter concepts, but not of the former one as she intended. I do (...) not believe that she is alone in not appreciating the distinction between these different concepts, but I wiII focus on her work as being a particularly good example of how confusing them can lead to an incorrect account of moral responsibility. (shrink)

In The Kingdom and the Glory, Giorgio Agamben traces a genealogy of the concept of ‘economy’ through the development of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.1 While the more detailed metaphysics of the Trinity—the distinctions between ‘being,’ ‘nature,’ ‘essence,’ and ‘persons’ that drove the debates at Nicea and Chalcedon—were still in the process of development, Agamben argues that the concept of economy formed a kind of ‘placeholder’ for these concepts, holding together the mystery of the Trinity with the seeming (...) ambivalence of the world. Through a series of genealogical twists, this ‘economic’ paradigm in theology turns out to form the basis of modern economic governmentality—the ‘Petersonian’ counterpart to the ‘Schmittian’ shape of modern sovereignty. While Agamben links the language of ‘economy’ in early Trinitarian thought to the problem of the Trinitarian unity, he does so by delinking its use from the economy of salvation. As a result, the later history of the Trinitarian doctrine is characterized (on Agamben’s reading) by an increasing separation of the ‘economy’ and the ‘ontology’ of the Trinity; an inseparable division is opened up in Christian thought between ‘being’ and ‘acting,’ one which haunts Trinitarian doctrine and spills over into the history of Western political, philosophical, and economic thinking. In this paper, I intend to retrace this ‘economic’ lineage, but in order to re-link the questions of the Trinity and salvation; it is clear that the stakes for patristic writers, in working out a Trinitarian theology, were precisely salvation. The lines between heresy and orthodoxy are consistently argued in terms of their relationship to the possibility of salvation—the possibility of a triumph over sin and death. Only once re-situated in this way can the economic ‘theodicy’ of divine administration and the mature formulation of the ‘immanent’ metaphysics of the Trinity be read—as Karl Rahner famously claims—as the same thing. I will proceed first of all by retracing Agamben’s own steps—reconstructing his argument about the centrality of the category of ‘economy’ within Trinitarian theology. Secondly, I will intervene within Agamben’s genealogy at a key juncture, one that is passed over by Agamben’s own text: the Arian controversy. It is with the Arian controversy and the articulation of Nicene Trinitarianism that Agamben locates the break between ‘being’ and ‘activity’ or ‘economy,’ and so it is by re-narrating this controversy that an alternative account of the relationship between these terms in Trinitarian thought can be narrated. Finally, I will draw out a different, intrinsic relationship between Trinitarian ‘being’ and ‘activity’ than the one presumed by Agamben; one in which a relative break is conditioned by a more fundamental soteriological unity. This has, in turn, consequences for how the ‘economic paradigm’—in both its earlier Christian context and in its modern governmental instantiations—operates: the economic-theological paradigm produces the political-theological or ‘ontological’ paradigm of sovereignty to which it is linked. (shrink)

The article is primarily concerned with the ambiguities which surround the concept of the person. According to the philosophical tradition taking its roots from Locke's definition, personhood depends on consciousness. Therefore, “personhood” can be ascribed to different entities, and only these entities acquire a moral standing. This can entail that a human being may or may not be considered as a person, as well as higher animals and even artificial machines. Everything depends on manifest personal characteristics. In order to (...) sort out different meanings ascribed to “person,” I distinguish between being a person and acting as a person. Then, I show that a human being is a paradigm of the person and his being always precedes his acting. (shrink)

Originally published in French in 1982, Schürmann's book is an elegant and provocative answer to the question: "in light of Heidegger's deconstruction of the metaphysical bases for moral and political action, what is to be done?" According to Schürmann, in the era for which metaphysical first principles no longer provide the basis for acting, humanity will be called upon simply to respond appropriately to the ever-shifting play of presencing. Anarchy, then, means absence of rule, not of rules. Those who have (...) asked why Heidegger never came up with an "ethics" fail to understand that ethics, as traditionally understood, is grounded in the metaphysical first principles that Heidegger sought to de-construct. Schürmann argues that "the backbone of metaphysics" involves establishing rules for thinking and doing, founding principles for making the world "intelligible and masterable." "'Anarchy,' on the other hand, designates the withering away of such a rule, the relaxing of its hold". At the end of the book, Schürmann poses and answers a series of objections about the potential dangers of the anarchistic implications of Heidegger's thought, especially in view of the latter's affiliation with National Socialism from 1933 to the mid-1930s. (shrink)

Many people seem to find it quite impossible to doubt that if a person did not do something freely, then he can be neither praised nor blamed for doing it. This assumption is shared by people with very different views about freedom, determinism and moral responsibility. It is held by most ‘libertarians’, who, to preserve moral responsibility, reject determinism. It is held by ‘hard determinists’, who accept determinism and therefore reject moral responsibility; and it is held by ‘soft determinists’, who (...) accept determinism, but argue that determinism does not exclude any kind of freedom that is relevant to whether a person may be held responsible. (shrink)

A key question has been underexplored in the literature on conscientious objection: if a physician is required to perform ‘medical activities,’ what is a medical activity? This paper explores the question by employing a teleological evaluation of medicine and examining the analogy of military conscripts, commonly cited in the conscientious objection debate. It argues that physicians (and other healthcare professionals) can only be expected to perform and support medical acts – acts directed towards their patients’ health. That is, physicians cannot (...) be forced to provide or support services that are not medical in nature, even if such activities support other socially desirable pursuits. This does not necessarily mean that medical professionals cannot or should not provide non-medical services, but only that they are under no obligation to provide them. (shrink)

Fred Dallmayr explores the benefits of mindfulness in respect to philosophy and theory, practical conduct, language use, art works, historical understanding, and cosmopolitanism. Students of continental, social, and political philosophy will benefit from Dallmayr’s engagement with, among others, Heidegger, Panikkar, Merleau-Ponty, and Derrida.

A theory is agent neutral if it gives every agent the same set of aims and agent relative otherwise. Most philosophers take act-consequentialism to be agent-neutral, but I argue that at the heart of consequentialism is the idea that all acts are morally permissible in virtue of their propensity to promote value and that, given this, it is possible to have a theory that is both agent-relative and act-consequentialist. Furthermore, I demonstrate that agent-relative act-consequentialism can avoid the counterintuitive implications associated (...) with utilitarianism while maintaining the compelling idea that it is never wrong to bring about the best outcome. (shrink)

I argue that an agent can be morally responsible and fully (but not necessarily solely) blameworthy for another agent’s free intentional action, simply by intentionally creating the conditions for the action in a way that causes it. This means, I argue, that she can be morally responsible for the other’s action in the relevantly same way that she is responsible for her own non-basic actions. Furthermore, it means that socially mediated moral responsibility for intentional action does not require an agent (...) to authorize another to act on her behalf, nor does it require her to threaten, coerce, or deceive the other. (shrink)

The dead can be harmed by events that happen after their death, and we survivors often have reason to act so as to enhance their welfare.

"... elegant and provocative... Exhibit[s] a subtle mastery of Heidegger's works." —Review of Metaphysics "... splendidly precise study of Heidegger... to be recommended not only to Heidegger scholars but also to those interested in the question of what philosophical thinking has as its task in the modern technological world." —Religious Studies Review "... indispensable to understanding the later Heidegger." —Choice.

There are various ways in which a person's freedom of action may be diminished or restricted. Instead of acting, he may be acted upon; or he may be unable to help doing what he does. He may suffer from some disability, have a duty imposed on him or do something because he is obliged to do it. In this essay, I wish to examine the notion of being obliged to do something. I shall investigate the differences between ‘being (...) obliged by A to do X’ and ‘being obliged to A for X’; between ‘being obliged to do X’ and ‘having an obligation to do X’; between being physically obliged and being morally, legally and logically obliged; and between saying ‘X is something I am obliged to do’, ‘X is something I choose to do’ and ‘X is something I ought to do’. (shrink)

Excerpt: Love – as Ovid pointed out long ago – is an art. It has to be constantly created and requires persistent vigilance, care, and thoughtfulness. This is very clear from a constructivist point of view. The partner is always what we experience of him or her. We have abstracted him or her from our own experiences and therefore he or she is our construction and not, for example, a thing in itself which exists independently from us. And it is (...) this person who has been constructed by us, who has been credited with a past by us, who stirs up expectations in us. If these expectations are not met, we are disappointed and tend to blame the other person. We forget that actually we alone are responsible for how we think of our partner because how she or he acts and speaks can always be interpreted in a variety of different ways. (shrink)

The present study uses event-related potentials to examine subject–verb person agreement in Spanish, with a focus on how markedness with respect to the speech participant status of the subject modulates processing. Morphological theory proposes a markedness distinction between first and second person, on the one hand, and third person on the other. The claim is that both the first and second persons are participants in the speech act, since they play the speaker and addressee roles, respectively. In contrast, third person (...) refers to whomever is neither the speaker nor the addressee (i.e., it is unmarked for person). We manipulated speech participant by probing person agreement with both first-person singular subjects (e.g., yo…lloro “I…cry- 1ST PERSON-SG ”) and third-person singular ones (e.g., la viuda…llora “the widow…cry- 3RD PERSON-SG ”). We also manipulated agreement by crossing first-person singular subjects with third-person singular verbs (e.g., yo… ∗ llora “I…cry- 3RD PERSON-SG ”) and vice versa (e.g., la viuda… ∗ lloro “the widow…cry- 1ST PERSON-SG ”). Results from 28 native speakers of Spanish revealed robust positivities for both types of person violations, relative to their grammatical counterparts between 500 and 1000 ms, an effect that shows a central-posterior distribution, with a right hemisphere bias. This positivity is consistent with the P600, a component associated with a number of morphosyntactic operations (and reanalysis processes more generally). No negativities emerged before the P600 (between 250 and 450 ms), although both error types yielded an anterior negativity in the P600 time window, an effect that has been argued to reflect the memory costs associated with keeping the errors in working memory to provide a sentence-final judgment. Crucially, person violations with a marked subject (e.g., yo… ∗ llora “I…cry- 3RD PERSON-SG ”) yielded a larger P600 than the opposite error type between 700 and 900 ms. This effect is consistent with the possibility that, upon encountering a subject with marked features, feature activation allows the parser to generate a stronger prediction regarding the upcoming verb. The larger P600 for person violations with a marked subject might index the reanalysis process that the parser initiates when there is a conflict between a highly expected verbal form (i.e., more so than in the conditions with an unmarked subject) and the form that is actually encountered. (shrink)

BackgroundEven though virtual reality is more and more considered for its power of distraction in different medical contexts, the optimal conditions for its use still have to be determined in order to design interfaces adapted to therapeutic support in oncology.ObjectiveThe objective of this study was to examine the benefits of VR using two immersion methods and comparing them with each other in a population of women with breast cancer who have undergone breast surgery, during scar massage sessions.MethodsIn a physiotherapy center, (...) each patient participated in four experimental conditions in a random order: two sessions used virtual immersion, one session proposed musical listening and the fourth one was a standard session care. The impact of the level of patient involvement in the virtual world was apprehended through the evaluation of the feeling of presence; the estimation of elapsed time of the physiotherapy sessions and particular attention was paid to the evaluation of patient emotional state.ResultsOur study showed an increase in positive emotions and a decrease in anxiety regardless which support methods were offered. Participatory VR created a feeling of more intense spatial presence.ConclusionOur results highlight the importance of the context in which VR should be offered. The presence of the practitioner and his interactions with the patient can provide a context just as favorable in reducing anxiety as the emotional regulation tools used. The use of technological tools should be favored when the practitioner is unavailable during the treatment phase or, even, in order to reduce the monotonous nature of repetitive therapeutic sessions. (shrink)

The case for toleration as Bayle presents it seems closely tied to the proposition that if we do what we sincerely think right then we do a morally good act, even if that act is actually wrong. The prominence of this proposition in his book would have made it seem unpersuasive to some of the people most important to convince, namely those who followed "the principles of St Augustine". Arnauld, for example, rejects the Jesuits' thesis that an act cannot be (...) morally bad unless we do it in the belief that it is wrong, for reasons that imply rejection of Bayle's thesis that an act must be morally good if we do it in the belief that it is right. In fact, neither proposition is needed as a premiss in Bayle's main argument for toleration, but the difference over this matter is a suitable starting-point for reflection on some of the features of Bayle's moral theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"EVERY MARITAL ACT OUGHT TO BE OPEN TO NEW LIFE'': TOWARD A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING I. INTRODUCTION NE FREQUENTLY encounters misinterpretations of the statement " Every marital act ought to be open to new life " and similar statements in recent Catholic teaching concerning contraception.1 There are two common misinterpretations. One is: No couple may engage in marital intercourse without the intention to procreate. The other is: No couple may (...) engage in marital intercourse at times when they think procreation is impossible. As interpretations of the Church's teaching, these must be mistaken. For the Church teaches that contraception is always wrong and that natural family planning (NFP) is not always wrong. But NFP facilitates intercourse without the intention to procreate at times when procreation is thought to be impossible. Moreover, the Church has never taught that marital intercourse is good only if the couple desires to procreate; indeed, couples known to be sterile have never been forbidden to marry. We think that the only plausible interpretation of "Every marital act ought to be open to new life" is: It is wrong for those who engage in marital intercourse to attempt to impede the transmission of life which they think their act otherwise might bring about. For if they do try to impede that to which their act of itself might lead, they choose to close it to new life. 1 The proposition is formulated somewhat differently by Paul VI, Humanae vitae, 11, AAS 60 (1968), 488 (with references to Gasti connubii and to Pius XII's.Allocution to the Society of Italian Catholic Midwives); and by John Paul II, Familiaris consortia, 29, AAS 74 (1982), 115, following proposition 22 of the 1980 session of the Synod of Bishops. Moreover, the different formulations also are translated diversely. We do not think these differences matter for our present purpose. 365 366 GRISEZ, BOYLE, FINNIS AND MAY Un.derstood in this way, "Every marital act ought to be open to new life" expresses the same proposition as " Contraception is always wrong." Nevertheless, the affirmative formulation helps to clarify what contraception is, for it indicates the precise object of the contraceptive act. "Contraception" signifies only the prevention of conception, but the contraceptive act seeks to impede the beginning of the Zife of a possible person. The distinction is only conceptual, but we think it important, for the explicit reference to new life calls attention to the fact that contraception is a contralife act. The characterization of contraception as a oontralife act is one major element of the unbroken Christian tradition condemning contraception as always wrong. For example, a canon, Si aliquis, concerning contraception was included in the Church's universal law from the thirteenth century until 1917: " I£ anyone for the sake of fulfilling sexual desire or with premediated hatred does something to a man or to a woman, or gives something to drink, so that he cannot generate, or she cannot conceive, or offspring be born, let it be held as homicide." 2 This canon does not say that contraception is homicide ; the tradition made no such mistake. The canon rather says that contraception sihould be regarded as homicide is regarded. To regard contraception as homicide is regarded is not only to make it clear that.contraception is wrong, but also to point to its being contralife as the reason why it is wrong. When contraception is regarded as contralife, it is seen as evil outside marriage as well as within. Historically, contraception probably was more common among the unmarried than the married, and much of the tradition condemned contraception without distinguishing between its uses in and outside mar2 Deoret. Greg. IX, lib. V, tit. 12, cap. v; Oorpus iuris oanonioi, ed. A. L. Richter and A. Friedberg (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1881), 2, 794: "Si aliquis causa explendae libidinis vel odii meditatione homini aut mulieri aliquid fecerit, vel ad potandum dederit, ut non possit generare, aut concipere, vel nasci soboles, ut homicida. tenea.tur." Some transla.te "ca.usa explendae libidinis," which is broad enough to cover all motivation by sexual impulse, "to satisfy lust," which unnecessarily limits the motive to habitual vice. " OPEN TO NEW LIFE " 367 riage. But. Casti oonnubii dealt with contraception... (shrink)

Hylomorphists claim that sensation is a bodily act. In this essay, I attempt to make sense of this notion but conclude that sensation is not a bodily act, but a mental one occurring in an intentional field of awareness.

The dispute resolution mechanism in the Texas Advance Directives Act (TADA) fails to comply with core ethical and legal notions of fundamental fairness. Kapottos and Youngner (2015) acknowledge the...

Throughout the years, Sosa has taken different views on the safety condition on knowledge. In his early work, he endorsed the safety condition, but later retracted this view when first developing his much discussed virtue epistemology. Recently, Sosa has further developed his virtue theory with the notion of competence and has developed an accompanying, modified safety condition that he maintains is entailed by that theory: the SSS-safety condition. Sosa's view is that this condition holds on both knowledge and action, because (...) both knowledge and action are the manifestations of competence. The SSS-safety condition, roughly, says that if S were to make an attempt at φ-ing under certain specified shape-situation pairs, holding fixed their seat, then S would φ. The argument of this paper is that this new SSS-safety condition does not hold on either knowledge or action. We argue for this conclusion by providing a principled way to generate counter-examples to the condition for both knowledge and action. The reasoning is that there can exist a non-empty symmetric difference between the sets of shape-situation pairs under which distinct agents can manifest their epistemic and pragmatic competences, and if there can exist such a symmetric difference then the SSS-safety condition fails to hold. (shrink)

The evidence of human wickedness in the world is so transparent that no rational person can dispute its reality. This paper approaches the question of the human person from an African philosophical perspective and explores the relation between the apparently free-acting human being and God conceived as the creator of the world and the ultimate cause of the human being. The paper will proffer answers to the following question: to what extent can the human being be absolved (...) of blame for the evil they perpetrate in a world conceived in African traditional religion and thought as the creation of a high deity who could have foreseen the negative bent of human nature and should have made human nature inclined to goodness all of the time? The paper will make novel contributions to the debate about human nature in African philosophical discourse by recasting the human being as a homo melancholicus, or melancholy being, whose evil inclination in the world can best be understood in the context of a tragic vision of reality. (shrink)

How is what we believe related to how we act? That depends on what we mean by ‘believe’. On the one hand, there is what we're sure of: what our names are, where we were born, whether we are sitting in front of a screen. Surety, in this sense, is not uncommon — it does not imply Cartesian absolute certainty, from which no possible course of experience could dislodge us. But there are many things that we think that we are (...) not sure of. For example, you might think that it will rain sometime this month, but not be sure that it will. Both what we're sure of and what we think have important normative connections to action. But the connections are quite different. This paper explores these issues with respect to assertion, inquiry, and decision making. We conclude by arguing that there is no theoretically significant notion of ‘full belief’ intermediate in strength between thinking and being sure. (shrink)

Despite decades of struggle against the industrial food system, academics still question the impact of the alternative food movement. We consider what food movement leaders themselves say about their motivation to act and their capacity to scale up their impact. Based on semi-structured interviews with 27 food movement leaders in Michigan, our findings complicate the established academic narratives that revolve around notions of prefigurative and oppositional politics, and suggest pragmatic strategies that could scale up the pace and scope of food (...) movement impacts. In contrast to the apolitical perspective some scholars see guiding alternative food movements, local leaders we interviewed see the food system from a structural-political lens. Though some see strength in fragmentation, most are not under the illusion that they can work alone and aspire to build their collective strength further. Concerns about organizational survival and conflicting views about the goals of the food movement, however, present ongoing challenges. Ultimately, we argue that there is a middle ground food movement leaders can walk between prefigurative and oppositional politics, one that still attempts to intentionally change the state, while also maintaining the inventiveness that can come from autonomous, grassroots initiatives. Specifically, interviewees suggested that increased strategic capacity around policy advocacy, critical food systems education, and negotiation could help them extend cross-movement networks and mainstream more equitable food policies, while continuing to experiment with customized solutions. (shrink)

For over 2000 years, philosophy has been our best guide to the experience of being human, and the true nature of reality. From Aristotle, Plato, Epicurus, Confucius, Cicero and Heraclitus in ancient times to 17th century rationalists Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza, from 20th-century greats Jean-Paul Sartre, Jean Baudrillard and Simone de Beauvoir to contemporary thinkers Michael Sandel, Peter Singer and Slavoj Zizek, 50 Philosophy Classics explores key writings that have shaped the discipline and had an impact on the real (...) world. Philosophy can no longer be confined to academia, and 50 Philosophy Classics shows how powerful it can be as a tool for opening our minds and helping us think. Whether you are fascinated or daunted by the big questions of how to think, how to be, how to act and how to see, this is the perfect introduction to some of humanity's greatest minds and their landmark books. (shrink)

Can there be phenomenal consciousness without self-consciousness? Strong intuitions and prominent theories of consciousness say “no”: experience requires minimal self-awareness, or “subjectivity”. This “subjectivity principle” faces apparent counterexamples in the form of anomalous mental states claimed to lack self-consciousness entirely, such as “inserted thoughts” in schizophrenia and certain mental states in depersonalization disorder. However, Billon & Kriegel have defended SP by arguing that while some of these mental states may be totally selfless, those states are not phenomenally conscious and thus (...) do not constitute genuine counterexamples to SP. I argue that this defence cannot work in relation to certain experiences of ego dissolution induced by potent fast-acting serotonergic psychedelics. These mental states jointly instantiate the two features whose co-instantiation by a single mental state SP prohibits: phenomenal consciousness and total lack of self-consciousness. One possible objection is that these mental states may lack “me-ness” and “mineness” but cannot lack “for-me-ness”, a special inner awareness of mental states by the self. In response I propose a dilemma. For-me-ness can be defined either as containing a genuinely experiential component or as not. On the first horn, for-me-ness is clearly absent from my counterexamples. On the second horn, for-me-ness has been defined in a way that conflicts with the claims and methods of its proponents, and the claim that phenomenally conscious mental states can totally lack self-consciousness has been conceded. I conclude with some reflections on the intuitive plausibility of SP in light of evidence from altered states. (shrink)

Actions for which we are responsible constitute our engagement with the world as rational agents. What is the relationship between such actions and our capacities for rational agency? I take this to be a question about responsibility in a particular use of that term, which I shall call ‘responsibility2’. We are not responsible2 for all our intentional actions (actions under hypnosis, for example), but we can nevertheless be responsible2 for actions we do not adequately control, for negligent actions, and for (...) non-intentional omissions. Appreciating this helps show that familiar principles of responsibility are false: those which delimit responsibility to intentional actions or to actions and outcomes under our control. In the attempt to fashion an alternative principle, cases of negligence prove pivotal. We hold ourselves and others responsible2 for conduct within our respective ‘domains of secure competence’, (i.e. that within which we are confident of doing what we set ourselves to do, barring events which defeat our competence), even when actions within that domain fail. The significance of this practice of holding ourselves and others responsible2 lies in the way it maintains our sense of who we are and of how we are related to the world in which we act.1. (shrink)

What are we moved to when we are moved by something? Sometimes to tears; other times to action; and, on other occasions, to quiet contemplation. When a member of the Sierra Club is moved by something, he or she may be moved to tears or to political activism; but ‘being moved by’ in such circumstances just might consist in feelings of awe. ‘Moved by’ carries an obvious suggestion of causality on its semantic face. What I am moved by is (...) what brings it about that I feel or act the way I do. To be ‘unmoved’ is to be unresponsive; or, at times, to lack compassion. To be moved by something or someone often involves having care or concern for that which is found moving. A variety of this sort of concern just could be an essential ingredient in the stance of the environmental preservationist. (shrink)

This article discusses the theory of perception of Peter Auriol. Arguing for the active nature of the senses in perception, Auriol applies the Scotistic doctrine of objective being to the theory of perception. Nevertheless, he still accepts some parts of the theory of species. The paper introduces Auriol's view on the mechanism of perception and his account of illusions. I argue for a direct realist reading of Auriol's theory of perception and propose that his position becomes clearer if we (...) use the distinction between the first- and third-person perspectives which he seems to presuppose. (shrink)

First he shows how Thomas's conception of the act of existence is dynamic and expansive, not only present in itself as "first act," but naturally pouring over in a "second act" to give itself to others in self-expression and self-communication through action. This highlights the relational aspect of being, so that to be is to be oriented toward relations and ultimately toward community. When this notion is applied to person, the highest perfection and most intense expression of existential (...) class='Hi'>being, the person is seen as naturally exercising expansive, self-communicating act, now raised to the order of self-consciousness and freedom. To be a person is to be with, in sharing, receiving, and loving. This relational aspect of the human person reflects the personal nature of God as revealed in the doctrine of the Trinity. "To be fully a person," he writes, "consists in living out to the full the alternating rhythm of self-possession and openness to others", and he argues that such a concept of the person sums up and completes the intrinsic thrust of Aquinas's metaphysics. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that it counts against one morally if one is close and good friends with a bad person. Some argue that one acts badly by counting a bad person as a good friend, because such friendships carry significant moral risks. Others locate the moral badness in one’s moral psychology, suggesting that one becomes objectionably complacent by being good friends with a bad person. In this paper, I argue that none of these accounts are plausible. In fact, I (...) propose that the starting intuition, that there is something pro tanto morally bad in being close and good friends with a bad person, does not track ethical reality. A person’s friend list isn’t at all in-principle informative of a person’s moral character. I also diagnose why we nonetheless have this mistaken intuition. I propose that friendships are fragmented in two crucial aspects. Once we observe these fragmentations, our initially mistaken intuition completely goes away. (shrink)

A type of transcendental argument for libertarian free will maintains that if acting freely requires the availability of alternative possibilities, and determinism holds, then one is not justified in asserting that there is no free will. More precisely: if an agent A is to be justified in asserting a proposition P (e.g. "there is no free will"), then A must also be able to assert not-P. Thus, if A is unable to assert not-P, due to determinism, then A is not (...) justified in asserting P. While such arguments often appeal to principles with wide appeal, such as the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, they also require a commitment to principles that seem far less compelling, e.g. the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘able not to’ or the principle that having an obligation entails being responsible. It is argued here that these further principles are dubious, and that it will be difficult to construct a valid transcendental argument without them. (shrink)

The current political debates in England highlight the role of language in citizenship, social exclusion, and discrimination. Similar debates can also be found around the world. Correspondingly, research addressing different language communities is burgeoning. Service providers and academics are increasingly employing bilingual community researchers or interpreters to carry out research. However, there is very little written about the effect of working with bilingual researchers. What it means to be bilingual is often essentialised and rarely problematised. Bilingual researchers are seen as (...) unproblematically acting as bridges between communities just because they are bilingual. Their ties to communities, their use of language, and their perspectives on the research are rarely investigated. Language is tied in an unproblematic way to meaning, values, and beliefs. In this article, I use examples from my own research to question what it means to be bilingual and to do cross-language research. I argue that there is no straightforward way in which meanings can be read off from researchers' ties to language and that being bilingual is not the same for everyone. (shrink)

This paper is an empirical study of what solidarity in a Western European healthcare system means today. Drawing upon empirical research on the 2015 refugee cohort's health needs and their health-seeking behaviour, it unites claims from the literature on solidarity in the fields of migration and healthcare. I argue that the Austrian healthcare system not only is an example of ‘civic solidarity’ in the form of institutionalised obligations to citizens but that it also enacts political forms of solidarity and produces (...) political inclusion for marginalised groups such as refugees. My findings show that being entitled to and accessing services in the healthcare system holds meaning beyond the provision of care: It enables to act autonomously, to build familiar relationships with Austrian institutions, inclusion via the personal electronic health card and to support others in the same solidaristic system. These insights can be used to raise awareness about the inclusional function of healthcare services among practitioners. They also show how solidarity-based healthcare systems can be a motor for shaping positive relationships between immigrants and the host country, and point to additional modes of solidarity in the context of forced migration next to civil society and nonstate support structures. This paper builds upon ethnographic data that were collected between 2018 and 2020 in Vienna, Austria (observational notes before, during and after medical consultations with refugees; interviews with them; interviews with healthcare practitioners and other care providers). (shrink)

This paper provides an account of what it is to have faith in a proposition p, in both religious and mundane contexts. It is argued that faith in p doesn’t require adopting a degree of belief that isn’t supported by one’s evidence but rather it requires terminating one’s search for further evidence and acting on the supposition that p. It is then shown, by responding to a formal result due to I.J. Good, that doing so can be rational in a (...) number of circumstances. If expected utility theory is the correct account of practical rationality, then having faith can be both epistemically and practically rational if the costs associated with gathering further evidence or postponing the decision are high. If a more permissive framework is adopted, then having faith can be rational even when there are no costs associated with gathering further evidence. (shrink)