이 연구는 간호대학생의 자기인식, 타인인식 및 공감간의 관계를 알아보기 위해 실시하였다. 연구대상은 M군의 소재한 일 대학의 4년제 간호학과에 재학중인 학생 381명(남학생77명, 여학생304명)이었다. 간호대학생의 자기인식, 타인인식 및 공감 간의 관계를 알아보기 위해 SPSS/ PC(win 21.0) 프로그램을 사용하였고, 빈도와 백분율, 그리고 상관관계를 알아보기 위해 Pearson의 적률상관계수, 그리고 공감에 영향을 미치는 변인을 알아보기 위해 중다회귀법을 사용하였다. 연구결과, 간호대학생의 자기인식, 타인인식 및 공감간의 하위요인 모두 유의한 정적 상관이 있는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 자기인식, 타인인식의 점수가 높은 간호학생은 공감수준이 높음을 의미한다. 따라서 간호대학생의 공감수준을 높이기 위해서는 (...) 자기인식과 타인인식을 높일 수 있는 체계적이고도 효율적인 교육과정이 필요하다. (shrink)

Critics of survival research often claim that the survival hypothesis is conceptually problematic at best, and literally incoherent at worst. The guiding intuition behind their skepticism is that there’s an essential link between the concept of a person (or personality or experience) and physical embodiment. Thus (they argue), since by hypothesis postmortem individuals such as ostensible mediumistic communicators have no physical body, there’s something wrong with the very idea of a postmortem person, personality or experience. However, critics can’t simply beg (...) the question and assert that physical embodiment is essential to personhood, personality, or experience, because the evidence suggesting survival is a prima facie challenge to the contrary. On the other hand, defenders of ostensible mediumistic communication need to explain how postmortem awareness and knowledge of the current physical world can occur without a physical body that experiences the world and represents it accurately enough to ground veridical postmortem reports. This paper will fi rst consider why survivalists face potentially serious problems in trying to make sense of apparent postmortem perception. Then it will consider a plausible—and arguably the only—way to deal with the issues. However, that solution turns out to be a double-edged sword. Ironically, the best way to deal with the problem of perspectival postmortem awareness may render the survival hypothesis gratuitous. (shrink)

A proposed empirical criterion for task susceptibility to introspective awareness distinguishes cognitive processes of which one cannot be aware from those of which one can be aware. The empirical criterion for task susceptibility to awareness effects proposes that there are tasks which cannot be affected by awareness of the rules constituting the tasks. These criteria were applied to research programmes in rule-learning in which past studies in the area of learning without awareness were included as well (...) as current research in implicit learning. The principal question addressed in these studies is whether or not rule-learning can occur without awareness. An historical review showed that rule-learning occurred in tasks which were both susceptible and insusceptible to introspective awareness and to awareness effects. Accordingly, it has been proposed that rather than attempt to decide theoretically and empirically between the opposing hypotheses—that of “cognitive learning” on the one hand, which assumes that awareness is a necessary condition for rule-learning, and that of “automatic learning” on the other, which assumes direct, automatic and unconscious processes—efforts should rather be directed toward developing a theoretical approach which is based on both conscious and unconscious processes. However, an approach of this kind encounters severe problems, such as the generation of contradictory predictions, which result from the employment of several incongruent and irreconcilable models of explanation. The criteria for task susceptibility offer a way out of these difficulties. (shrink)

Richard Bradley and others endorse Reverse Bayesianism as the way to model awareness growth. I raise a problem for Reverse Bayesianism—at least for the general version that Bradley endorses—and argue that there is no plausible way to restrict the principle that will give us the right results. To get the right results, we need to pay attention to the attitudes that agents have towards propositions of which they are unaware. This raises more general questions about how awareness growth (...) should be modelled. (shrink)

In The Varieties of Reference (1982), Gareth Evans claims that considerations having to do with certain basic ways we have of gaining knowledge of our own physical states and properties provide "the most powerful antidote to a Cartesian conception of the self" (220). In this chapter, I start with a discussion and evaluation of Evans' own argument, which is, I think, in the end unconvincing. Then I raise the possibility of a more direct application of similar considerations in defence of (...) common sense anti-Cartesianism. Progress in this direction depends upon a far more psychologically informed understanding of normal and abnormal bodily awareness than is generally found in philosophical discussions of these issues. In the context of my attempt at some such understanding, I go on to assess the potential of this more direct line of argument. (shrink)

Recently, philosophers with an interest in consciousness have turned their attention towards “fringe states of consciousness”. Examples include dreams, trances, and meditative states. Teetering between wakefulness and non-consciousness, fringe states illuminate the limits and boundaries of consciousness. This paper aims to give a coherent conceptualisation of deep meditative states, focussing in particular on phenomenal temporality during meditation. Advanced meditators overwhelmingly describe deep states of meditation as atemporal and timeless; however, they also report being continuously alert while meditating. I intend to (...) give a coherent interpretation of this apparent contradiction. After introducing some candidate interpretations, I shall argue that during (deepest) meditation, the subject experiences ‘pure duration’ without temporal structure. This, I argue, explains best why meditators describe deep meditation as ongoing but timeless awareness. A central part of the paper will expand on an account of phenomenal duration without phenomenal succession. The conclusion points towards some further avenues of research. (shrink)

This important book investigates the emergence and development of a distinct concept of self-awareness in post-classical, pre-modern Islamic philosophy. Jari Kaukua presents the first extended analysis of Avicenna's arguments on self-awareness - including the flying man, the argument from the unity of experience, the argument against reflection models of self-awareness and the argument from personal identity - arguing that all these arguments hinge on a clearly definable concept of self-awareness as pure first-personality. He substantiates his interpretation (...) with an analysis of Suhrawardī's use of Avicenna's concept and Mullā Sadrā's revision of the underlying concept of selfhood. The study explores evidence for a sustained, pre-modern and non-Western discussion of selfhood and self-awareness, challenging the idea that these concepts are distinctly modern, European concerns. The book will be of interest to a range of readers in history of philosophy, history of ideas, Islamic studies and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

The authors report "priming" effects for subjects they classify as "inattentionally blind" and interpret this as evidence for unconscious perception--an interpretation consistent with deeply entrenched metatheory. I question that interpretation, however, on methodological grounds. On these assessment procedures, some subjects could be classified as "inattentionally blind" despite representing the critical stimulus in conscious attention. Still others--presenting a more interesting challenge--could be so classified despite representing the stimulus literally in inattentional awareness. The study is illuminated, I believe, by seeing it (...) in metatheoretical and experimental contexts, with its theoretical interpretation contrasted with an alternative. (shrink)

Lawrence's volume provides a detailed discussion and analyses of the moral awareness of major characters in Greek tragedy, focusing particularly on the characters' recognition of moral issues and crises, their ability to reflect on them, and their consciousness of doing so.

Do factive mental states come in degrees? If so, what is their underlying structure, and what is their theoretical significance? Many have observed that ‘knows that’ is not a gradable verb and have taken this to be strong evidence that propositional knowledge does not come in degrees. This paper demonstrates that the adjective ‘aware that’ passes all the standard tests of gradability, and thus strongly motivates the idea that it refers to a factive mental state that comes in degrees. We (...) will explore a range of structural questions that have been overlooked in regard to our awareness of facts, showing that the degreed structure of awareness has significant implications for our understanding of knowledge. (shrink)

Chronic stress impairs working memory, but few studies have explored the protective factors of the impairment. We aimed to investigate the effect of self-awareness on WM processing in people under chronic stress. Participants under chronic stress completed an n-back task after a self-awareness priming paradigm during which electroencephalograms were recorded. The behavioral results showed that participants whose self-awareness was primed reacted faster and more accurately than the controls. Event-related potentials revealed the following P2 was more positive in (...) the self-awareness group than in the controls, indicating that self-awareness enhanced allocation of attention resources at the encoding stage. N2 was attenuated in the self-awareness group compared with the controls, indicating that smaller attention control efforts were required to complete WM tasks adequately after self-awareness priming; and enhanced late positive potential was evoked in the self-awareness group compared with the controls, suggesting self-awareness enabled participants to focus attention resources on the information at the maintenance stage. Critically, mediational analyses showed that LPP mediated the relationship between self-awareness and WM response times. This result suggests that the fact that participants whose self-awareness was primed were able to achieve better behavioral performances may be attributed to their mobilization of sustained attention resources at the maintenance stage. In summary, self-awareness exerted a protective effect on WM in those under chronic stress, which may be due to the enhancements in the allocation and mobilization of attention. These results could be used to develop more specific coping strategies for people under chronic stress. (shrink)

Recent work in "embodied, embedded" cognitive science links mental contents to large-scale distributed effects: dynamic patterns implicating elements of (what are traditionally seen as) sensing, reasoning and acting. Central to this approach is an idea of biological cognition as profoundly "action-oriented" - geared not to the creation of rich, passive inner models of the world, but to the cheap and efficient production of real-world action in real-world context. A case in point is Hurley's (1998) account of the profound role of (...) motor output in fixing the contents of conscious visual awareness - an account that also emphasizes distributed vehicles and long-range dynamical loops. Such stories can seem dramatically opposed to accounts, such as Milner and Goodale (1995), that stress relatively local mechanisms and that posit firm divisions between processes of visual awareness and of visuomotor action. But such accounts, I argue, can be deeply complimentary and together illustrate an important lesson. The lesson is that cognition may be embodied and action-oriented in two distinct - but complimentary - ways. There is a way of being embodied and action-oriented that implies being closely geared to the fine-grained control of low level effectors (hands, arms, legs and so on). And there is a way of being embodied and action-oriented that implies being closely geared to gross motor intentions, current goals, and schematic motor plans. Human cognition, I suggest, is embodied and action-oriented in both these ways. But the neural systems involved, and the size and scope of the key dynamic loops, may be quite different in each case. (shrink)

The concept of “self-awareness” ( svasaṃvedana ) enters Buddhist epistemological discourse in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and - vṛtti by Dignāga (ca. 480–540), the founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition. Though some of the key passages have already been dealt with in various publications, no attempt has been made to comprehensively examine all of them as a whole. A close reading is here proposed to make up for this deficit. In connection with a particularly difficult passage (PS(V) 1.8cd-10) that presents the (...) means of valid cognition and its result ( pramāṇa/pramāṇaphala ), a new interpretation is suggested, inspired by the commentary of Jinendrabuddhi. This interpretation highlights an aspect of selfawareness that has hitherto not been claimed for Dignāga: self-awareness offers essentially subjective access to one’s own mental states and factors. (shrink)

The paper introduces a new kind of models for the logic of proofs LP, the group justification models. While being an elaboration of Fitting models, the group justification models are a special case of the models of general awareness. Soundness and completeness results of LP with respect to the new semantics are established. The paper also offers an interpretation of the group models, which pertains to awareness and group epistemic dynamics.

인도 철학에 나타난 독특한 개념인 비지각(non-perception)은 특정대상의 부재를 알아차리는 인식을 가리킨다. 인도 학파들 간에는 이 비지각적 인식에 대한 다양한 철학적, 개념적 논쟁들이 있어 왔지만, 비지각적 앎이 의식의 진화와 성숙, 최후의 깨어남을 유도하는 중요한 인식 작용이라는 점은 아직 충분히 강조되지 않았다. 인식 주체, 인식 대상, 인식 작용이라는 인식의 3요소가 출현하는 현상 세계에서 인식은 감각 기관을 통한 특정 대상의 형질이나 형체를 알아차리는 감각 인식과 심상들을 상대하는 사유 인식으로 나눌 수 있다. 현상 세계에서 의식은 감각되는 대상들과 그 감각의 주체를 모두 실체인 것으로 본다. (...) 그런데 의식의 궁극적 차원에서는 이 대상 지향적 인식은 착각이라고 할 만한 강력한 의식의 조작이라고 말한다. 즉 인식되므로 당연히 존재한다고 생각되던 개체 의식들, 대상들은 단지 실제로 존재하는 것처럼 경험된다는 것이다. 주체와 대상이라는 존재들은 경험되는 현상, 인식되는 현상 안에서만 그 존재성이 드러난다고 하겠다. 이 사실을 증명하고 확인하는 방법은 대상 없이 일어나는 비지각적 앎을 통해서이다. 주체와 대상들의 비실체성을 완전하게 깨치는 자각 현상이 일어나기 전까지 비지각은 의식의 전환과 성숙을 이끄는 결정적인 앎으로 작용한다. 자각은 의식이 존재와 세계의 실상을 깨닫고, 의식 자체의 본성을 직증하는 현상이다. 이는 곧 궁극의 진리인 불이일원(advaita)을 깨닫는 현상이기도 하다. 우빠니샤드를 비롯한 여러 인도 고대 문헌들에서는 지각과 비지각적 앎을 거쳐 자각에 이르는 과정을 일상에서 경험하는 의식의 상태인 깨어있는 상태, 꿈꾸는 상태, 깊은 잠의 상태의 과정으로 설명하고 있다. 개체 의식내면에서 비지각적 앎이 의식의 실제 경험으로 알려지기 시작할 때, 그 내면 의식의 성숙과 전환이 일어난다. (shrink)

This article argues that bodily awareness is a basic form of self-consciousness through which perceiving agents are directly conscious of the bodily self. It clarifies the nature of bodily awareness, categorises the different types of body-relative information, and rejects the claim that we can have a sense of ownership of our own bodies. It explores how bodily awareness functions as a form of self-consciousness and highlights the importance of certain forms of bodily awareness that share an (...) important epistemological property with canonical forms of self-consciousness such as introspection. (shrink)

This paper aims to analyze the concepts of phenomenal experiences, subjective standpoints, and self-awareness in light of an enactive approach to mind. In doing so, it assumes that a clear-cut reorganization of those three concepts will help to deal more safely with technological enhancements of sensory modalities, including the hypothetical introspection of a person’s own neural states. It argues in favor of understanding the mental as a subcategory of the physical and of considering measurement scales and mutually complementary perspectives (...) while tackling the mind-body relation. After discussing realistic prospects of sensory enhancement, it explores the overlaps of the notions of phenomenal experiences, subjective standpoints, and self-awareness, concluding for a reorganization that seems convenient to understand new neurotechnologies more effectively. (shrink)

In his book Objectivity, William Earle has attempted to give the phenomenologically intentional aspect of awareness its philosophical due. To sharpen the issues, it may be well to review some of the main points of his treatment. Earle combines a realist view of the object of awareness with a partially Hegelian conception of awareness. Awareness, according to Earle, involves three stages, recognizable as thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The thesis is made up of the subject and object (...) intertwined, and not yet distinguished from each other. The antithesis is constituted by a recoil of the subject from the object back upon itself. Earle terms this recoil a primary reflexivity of the subject, which, though ingredient in awareness, is not yet sufficient to constitute awareness. Whereas for Hegel the reflexive recoil of the subject back upon itself constitutes the object for the subject, for Earle this recoil of the subject in no way creates its object. The reflexive withdrawal of the subject from the object simply separates two metaphysically distinct entities. Hegel's separation of subject and object alienates the subject from himself; Earle's separation of subject and object alienates the subject from the world. But for both Earle and Hegel, knowledge of the object does not take place until a redemptive synthesis of subject and object occurs. In the Hegelian scheme the redemptive synthesis unifies the subject with himself. According to Earle, however, the redemptive synthesis achieves only knowledge of the object as other than the subject; that is, it is the object as distant from, therefore intended by, the subject that is known. The final stage in knowledge is thus constituted by a positive approach of the subject to a metaphysically distinct object. Earle must therefore insist, as he does, that immediate self-awareness is, in principle, impossible. He characterizes his own method as retrospectively reflexive, very different from the primary reflexivity involved in the constitution of awareness. To justify the validity and possibility of this retrospective reflexivity, he argues for the metaphysical identity of a subject forever outside of and beyond its own acts, and, of course, inaccessible to knowledge in a way that the world independent of the subject is not. (shrink)

It has been claimed in the literature that collective intentionality and group attitudes presuppose some “sense of ‘us’” among the participants (other labels sometimes used are “sense of community,” “communal awareness,” “shared point of view,” or “we-perspective”). While this seems plausible enough on an intuitive level, little attention has been paid so far to the question of what the nature and role of this mysterious “sense of ‘us’” might be. This paper states (and argues for) the following five claims: (...) (1) it is neither the case that the sense in question has the community (or “us”) in its content or as its object nor does the attitude in question presuppose a preexistent community (or “us”) as its subject. (2) The “sense of ‘us’” is plural pre-reflective self-awareness. (3) Plural pre-reflective self-awareness plays the same role in the constitution of a common mind that singular pre-reflective self-awareness plays in the individual mind. (4) The most important conceptions of plural subjects, collective persons, or group agents in the current literature fail to recognize the nature and role of plural self-awareness, and therefore fall short in important respects. (5) In spite of the striking similarities between the plural and the singular mind, there are important differences to consider. The authority of the singular first person point of view has no equivalent in the plural case. (shrink)

According to the decomposition thesis, perceptual experiences resolve without remainder into their different modality-specific components. Contrary to this view, I argue that certain cases of multisensory integration give rise to experiences representing features of a novel type. Through the coordinated use of bodily awareness—understood here as encompassing both proprioception and kinaesthesis—and the exteroceptive sensory modalities, one becomes perceptually responsive to spatial features whose instances couldn’t be represented by any of the contributing modalities functioning in isolation. I develop an argument (...) for this conclusion focusing on two cases: 3D shape perception in haptic touch and experiencing an object’s egocentric location in crossmodally accessible, environmental space. (shrink)

It has been shown that visual awareness in the blind hemifield of hemianopic cats that have undergone unilateral ablations of visual cortex can be restored by sectioning the commissure of the superior colliculus or by destroying a portion of the substantia nigra contralateral to the cortical lesion (the Sprague effect). We propose that the visual awareness that is recovered is due to synchronized oscillatory activities in the superior colliculus ipsilateral to the cortical lesion. These oscillatory activities are normally (...) partially suppressed by the inhibitory, GABAergic contralateral nigrotectal projection, and the destruction of the substantia nigra, or the sectioning of the collicular commissure, disinhibits the collicular neurons, causing an increase in the extent of oscillatory activity and/or synchronization between activities at different sites. This increase in the oscillatory and synchronized character is sufficient for the activities to give rise to visual awareness. We argue that in rodents and lower vertebrates, normal visual awareness is partly due to synchronized oscillatory activities in the optic tectum and partly due to similar activities in visual cortex. It is only in carnivores and primates that visual awareness is wholly due to cortical activities. Based on von Baerian recapitulation theory, we propose that, even in humans, there is a period in early infancy when visual awareness is partially due to activities in the superior colliculus, but that this awareness gradually disappears as the nigrotectal projection matures. (shrink)

Advances in neurobiological knowledge and neuroimaging technology have contributed greatly to our investigations into the nature of self-awareness.

The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described as conservative change from one probabilistic belief or credence function to another in response to newinformation. Roughly: ‘Hold fixed any credences that are not directly affected by the learning experience.’ This is precisely articulated for the case when we learn that some proposition that we had previously entertained is indeed true (the rule of conditionalisation). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or (...) concepts of which one was previously unaware? The economists Karni and Vierø (2013, 2015) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling, but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples. And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion of conservative change in this setting. (shrink)

I am aware of the red and orange autumn leaves. Am I aware of my awareness of the leaves? Not so according to many philosophers. By contrast, many meditative traditions report an experience of awareness itself. I argue that such a pure awareness experience must have a non-sensory phenomenal character. I use Douglas Harding’s first-person experiments for assisting in recognising pure awareness. In particular, I investigate the gap where one cannot see one’s head. This is not (...) a mere gap because I seem to be looking from here. Critically, I claim, the experience of looking from here has a non-sensory phenomenal character. I argue that this sense of being aware cannot be reduced to egocentric visual-spatial relations nor the viewpoint because it continues when I close my eyes. Neither is a multisensory origin sufficient to explain why I seem to be at this central point rather than elsewhere. Traditionally, claims of a pure awareness experience have been restricted to highly trained individuals in very restricted circumstances. The innovation of Harding’s approach is that it reliably isolates a candidate for pure awareness using methods which can be replicated at any time. (shrink)