This paper aims to present possible approaches, resources and programmes to introduce the topic of biosecurity to life scientists and engineers at the higher education level. Firstly, we summarise key findings from a number of international surveys on biosecurity education that have been carried out in the United States, Europe, Israel and the Asia–Pacific region. Secondly, we describe the development of our openly-accessible education resource, illustrating the scope and content of these materials. Thirdly, we report on actual cases (...) of biosecurity education that have been implemented. These include achievements in and lessons derived from the implementation of biosecurity education at the National Defense Medical College in Japan. These experiences are followed by presentation of the expert-level “Train-the-Trainer” programmes subsequently launched by the University of Bradford in the United Kingdom. These examples will help readers to understand how educators can enhance their own understanding about biosecurity issues and how they can then disseminate their knowledge through development of their own customised, relevantly-targeted and stage-tailored education programmes within their own life science communities. By providing these examples, we argue that education for life scientists, policy-makers and other stakeholders about social responsibility on dual-use issues is easily achievable and need not be expensive, time-consuming or over-burdening. We suggest that recurring classes or courses be held at appropriate times during educational programmes to accommodate the developing expertise and advancing learning stages of students. (shrink)

As boundaries between domesticity and the undomesticated increasingly blur for cohabitants of Vancouver Island, home to North America’s densest cougar population, predatorial problems become more and more pressing. Rosemary-Claire Collard responds on a pragmatic plane, arguing that the encounter between human and cougar is only ever destructive, that contact results in death and almost always for the cougar. Advocating for vigilance in policing boundaries separating cougar from civilization, therefore, she looks to Foucault’s analysis of modern biopower in the first volume (...) of his History of Sexuality for support in favor of a more contemporary notion of biosecurity. In response to Collard’s arguments, concerned with ethical conclusions drawn on the basis of her policy-based proposal, I challenge the prohibition she places on encounter. In the first section, “Becoming Killable,” I address her use of Donna Haraway’s phraseology, and in the second section, “Biological Dangers,” I scrutinize her reading of Foucault, arguing that the appeals she makes distort the mode of argumentation at work for each thinker. The final section, “Facing Cougar, Facing Death,” advocates further ethical possibilities generated on the basis of Foucault’s correlation between overcoming the fear of death and resisting abuses of power with respect to others. My contention is that our transgressing boundaries constructed to separate humanity from the inhumane curtails tendencies toward the marginalization and subjugation of those animal others whose very existence brings us face to face with the fact of our own mortality. (shrink)

The last 12 years have seen historically high levels of interest in biosecurity among life scientists, science policymakers, and academic experts on science and security policy. This interest was triggered by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the ‘anthrax letters’ attack of the same year, and two virology papers, published early last decade, that were thought to raise serious biosecurity concerns.1 Ethicists have come relatively late to the game, but, in recent years, a lively debate has developed on ethical issues (...) raised by biosecurity policy, and, more generally, on the ethics of producing and disseminating ‘dangerous’ biomedical knowledge. Unsurprisingly, this debate has taken on increased sense of urgency over the last 18 months as the journals Science and Nature, the United States National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, and the World Health Organization, among others, have been considering whether and how to publish two academic papers reporting means of enhancing the transmissibility of H5N1 influenza, or ‘bird flu’ .We hope that this issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics will substantially advance the emerging ethical debate in this area. The issue features five articles on the ethics of biosecurity: a feature article, by Allen Buchanan and Maureen Kelley ; three brief replies to this article, by Michael Selgelid , Thomas May , and Nicholas King ; and a stand-alone paper by Nicholas Evans , which discusses the recent H5N1 controversy and analyses the appeals to scientific freedom that have been made by some of its protagonists. In this ‘concise argument’, I can, regrettably, comment only on the Buchanan and Kelley piece.Buchanan and Kelley on the framing of the biosecurity debateBuchanan and Kelley aim to broaden and reframe the existing debate on biosecurity. They begin by noting that "science policy … ". (shrink)

In this article, we raise ethical concerns about the potential misuse of open-source biology : biological research and development that progresses through an organisational model of radical openness, deskilling, and innovation. We compare this organisational structure to that of the open-source software model, and detail salient ethical implications of this model. We demonstrate that OSB, in virtue of its commitment to openness, may be resistant to governance attempts.

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of biosafety in the biomedical sciences. While it is often assumed that biosafety is a purely technical matter that has little to do with philosophy or the humanities, biosafety raises important ethical issues that have not been adequately examined in the scientific or bioethics literature. This article reviews some pivotal events in the history of biosafety and biosecurity and explores three different biosafety topics that generate significant ethical concerns, i.e., risk assessment, risk (...) management, and risk distribution. The article also discusses the role of democratic governance in the oversight of biosafety and offers some suggestions for incorporating bioethics into biosafety practice, education, and policy. (shrink)

In 2001 a highly infectious animal disease, foot and mouth disease, broke out in the UK and spread rapidly. In May, when the spread seemed to be slowing down, new disease hotspots appeared in previously little affected regions, such as North Yorkshire. New biosecurity rules were imposed. Based on a series of semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, this article shows that the biosecurity measures farmers implemented during the epidemic meant more than just reducing the risk of spreading FMD. For (...) many, cleansing and disinfecting became Foot and Mouth. Biosecurity actions became invested with symbolic values and, in particular, were ritualised as part of the symbolic spatial construction of an otherwise 'invisible' enemy. (shrink)

This book is designed to be an easy-to-use guide to understanding the ethical and biosecurity implications of life science research. It provides a framework that will enable scientists, lab managers, researchers, students and teachers to anticipate how research may be used to cause harm, and to identify the steps that can be taken to minimise this risk. Life science research is covered by two international weapons treaties and the tools presented in this book will help scientists and researchers to (...) meet their responsibilities under these conventions. This book will help you: Assess real and potential risks in relation to your work Identify and implement a range of relevant ethical principles that need to be considered in your work Use an ethical framework to protect your work from misuse by others. If you've never been sure of how ethics relates to your work this toolkit will help you understand the challenges you do indeed face. Real-world case studies of biosecurity risks and failures will help scientists and all those who work to support science at all levels come to a new understanding of the widespread potential for misuse of research in the life sciences. By asking the questions set out in this book, scientists will be better able to recognise and reduce these risks. This framework is designed to be useful for senior scientists as well as students, and all researchers in between. (shrink)

Advances in the life sciences are occurring with extreme rapidity and accumulating a great deal of knowledge about life’s vital processes. While this knowledge is essential for fighting disease in a more effective way, it can also be misused either intentionally or inadvertently to develop novel and more effective biological weapons. For nearly a decade civil-academic society as well as States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention have recognised the importance of dual-use biosecurity education for life scientists (...) as a means to foster a culture of responsibility and prevent the potential misuse of advances in the life sciences for non-peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, the implementation of dual-use biosecurity education for life scientists has made little progress in institutions of higher learning. Professional societies and academic organizations have worked from the bottom-up in developing online dual-use biosecurity education modules that can be used for instruction. However, top-down help is needed from goverments if further progress is to be made in implementing biosecurity education for life scientists. (shrink)

Marine ecosystems are under increasing pressure from human activity, yet successful management relies on knowledge. The evidence-based policy (EBP) approach has been promoted on the grounds that it provides greater transparency and consistency by relying on ‘high quality’ information. However, EBP also creates epistemic responsibilities. Decision-making where limited or no empirical evidence exists, such as is often the case in marine systems, creates epistemic obligations for new information acquisition. We argue that philosophical approaches can inform the science-policy interface. Using marine (...) biosecurity examples, we specifically examine the epistemic challenges in the acquisition and acceptance of evidence to inform policy, discussing epistemic due care and biases in consideration of evidence. (shrink)

Dual Use Research of Concern constitutes a major challenge for research practice and oversight on the local, national and international level. The situation in Germany is shaped by two partly competing suggestions of how to regulate security-related research: The German Ethics Council, as an independent political advisory body, recommended a series of measures, including national legislation on DURC. Competing with that, the German National Academy of Sciences and the German Research Foundation, as two major professional bodies, presented a strategy which (...) draws on the self-control of science and, inter alia, suggests expanding the scope of research ethics committees to an evaluation of DURC. This situation is taken as an occasion to further discuss the scope and limits of professional self-control with respect to security-related research. The role of RECs as professional bodies of science is particularly analyzed, referring to the theoretical backgrounds of professionalism. Two key sociological features of professionalism – ethical orientation and professional self-control – are discussed with respect to the practice of biomedical science. Both attributes are then analyzed with respect to the assessment of DURC by RECs. In conclusion, it is stated that issues of biosecurity transcend the boundaries of the scientific community and that a more comprehensive strategy should be implemented encompassing both professional self-control and legal oversight. (shrink)

Recent claims that artificial intelligence (AI) systems demonstrate “emergent abilities” have fueled excitement but also fear grounded in the prospect that such systems may enable a wider range of parties to make unprecedented advances in areas that include the development of chemical or biological weapons. Ambiguity surrounding the term “emergent abilities” has added avoidable uncertainty to a topic that has the potential to destabilize the strategic landscape, including the perception of key parties about the viability of nonproliferation efforts. To avert (...) these problems in the future, scientists, developers, policymakers, and other parties should take credible steps to strengthen the health of the scientific ecosystem around AI. (shrink)

This article explores a unique opportunity for shaping public health law and policy to reflect a greater balance between public and private goods in two areas of primary concern to human well-being: medicine and human biosecurity. This opportunity is presented both by the rapid changes likely to occur in these areas as a result of nanotechnology and the fact that multinational corporate actors have not yet had the opportunity to use their well-honed techniques of governance influence to modify public (...) health policy and law in this area to their own narrowly focused advantage. Such a rare opportunity to rethink some fundamental assumptions about a regulatory framework for globally important health issues in advance is one reason why issues concerning nanotechnology regulation in medicine and human biosecurity should have considerable interest to health law and policy scholars. (shrink)

Park rangers hold a unique set of knowledge—of science, of publics, of institutional structures, of place, and of self—that should be recognised as valuable. For too long, models of the knowledge of scientists and publics have set people like rangers in an inbetweener position, seeing them as good at communicating, translating or negotiating from one side to the other, but not as making knowledge that is powerful in its own right. In this paper we argue that focus groups with park (...) rangers across regional and conservation parks in Aotearoa/New Zealand reveal the complexity and multiplicity of rangers’ knowledge-making that shows the science-public model as incomplete. We argue further that the model is flawed for its focus on the making and holding of knowledge and not also on how it is enacted. Rangers, we argue, are responsible every day for making knowledgeable decisions for the health and well-being of parks and people. Making good decisions, though, requires not just knowledge but also care. An understanding of the many ways rangers know and enact their knowledge is important for biosecurity practice, especially in models of adaptive governance. (shrink)

The global distribution of laboratory mouse strains is valued for ensuring the continuity, validity and accessibility of model organisms. Mouse strains are therefore assumed mobile and able to travel. We draw on the concept of ‘animal mobilities’ to explain how attending to laboratory mice as living animal, commodity and scientific tool is shaping how they are transported through contemporary scientific infrastructures and communities. Our paper is framed around exploring how animal strains travel, rather than animals, as we show that it (...) is only through understanding strain mobility that we can explain how and why live animal movement can be replaced by germinal products. The research is based on qualitative fieldwork in 2018 and 2019 that included 2 weeks ethnography and interviews with key informants involved in the movement of laboratory animals. The empirical analysis discusses practices that relate to managing biosecurity and animal welfare concerns when moving laboratory animal strains. In closing we reflect more broadly on the contemporary ‘ethico-onto-epistemological’ entanglement that shapes who or what travels to support laboratory science data-making practices, and the intensity of care ‘tinkering’ practices that facilitate the movement. We explain how a laboratory animal strain exceeds its value solely as a mobile and thus exchangeable commodity, illustrated in how values that relate to animal sentience and infection-risk supports its material transformation. Consequently, it is becoming increasingly common for non-sentient germinal products – embryos and gametes - to replace live sentient animals when being moved. (shrink)

Recent claims that artificial intelligence (AI) systems demonstrate “emergent abilities” have fueled excitement but also fear grounded in the prospect that such systems may enable a wider range of parties to make unprecedented advances in areas that include the development of chemical or biological weapons. Ambiguity surrounding the term “emergent abilities” has added avoidable uncertainty to a topic that has the potential to destabilize the strategic landscape, including the perception of key parties about the viability of nonproliferation efforts. To avert (...) these problems in the future, scientists, developers, policymakers, and other parties should take cred- ible steps to strengthen the health of the scientific ecosystem around AI. (shrink)

This paper is about an avian influenza outbreak in South Africa’s commercial ostrich industry. The outbreak was managed according to international best practice and led to the destruction of 30,000 ostriches in two of South Africa’s provinces. However, the industry has a long history of managing low pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks in a different way. We use the 2004 outbreak and earlier approaches to managing disease to shed light on recent debates on how we might live differently with livestock diseases. (...) The paper is based on in-depth interviews with farmers, veterinarians, scientists and agriculture officials. (shrink)

CRISPR, a recently developed gene-editing tool, has become synonymous with rapid biological advancement. While gene editing had been performed in life sciences research for decades, genetic engineering with CRISPR is much more straightforward, faster, and less expensive—and thus, the technology has been rapidly democratized. CRISPR was built on a natural mechanism, the method by which bacteria resist infections from viruses called bacteriophage. Once infected, bacteria may recognize specific genetic sequences of the invading bacteriophage virus and chop its genetic material into (...) pieces. This bacterial immune response, discovered through basic research, has been exploited by scientists to develop a gene-editing tool... (shrink)

Biotechnology's promises has been widely recognized as a major enterprise accelerating the commodification of the biological. After the 9/11 events and the subsequent anthrax letters, biotechnologies have additionally been described as contributing to the construction of biosecurity risks. This paper proposes to investigate the collaboration between the FBI and the DIYbio network as a case study illustrating the productive entanglement of biological risks and promises. To do so, the paper explores the social construction of risks and promises associated with (...) the vision of distributed biotechnologies as enacted in this collaboration. We argue that the FBI needs to police the DIYbio network in order to disseminate a specific notion of bioterrorist risk, while, in a counter-intuitive manner, the DIYbio network benefits from being policed by the FBI as it helps them disseminate their socio-technological vision. If the entanglement of technoscientific risks and promises is a well established finding of the STS literature, our case study suggests that such entanglement now additionally comprises the sphere of biosecurity and the promises of a distributed biotechnology available to everyone. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 7, July 2020, Page 142-144.

Israel has a long history of concern with chemical and biological threats, since several hostile states in the Middle East are likely to possess such weapons. The Twin-Tower terrorist attacks and Anthrax envelope scares of 2001 were a watershed for public perceptions of the threat of unconventional terror in general and of biological terror in particular. New advances in biotechnology will only increase the ability of terrorists to exploit the burgeoning availability of related information to develop ever-more destructive bioweapons. Many (...) areas of modern biological research are unavoidably dual-use by nature. They thus have a great potential for both help and harm; and facilitating the former while preventing the latter remains a serious challenge to researchers and governments alike. This article addresses how Israel might best (1) prevent hostile elements from obtaining, from Israel’s biological research system, materials, information and technologies that might facilitate their carrying out a biological attack, while (2) continuing to promote academic openness, excellence and other hallmarks of that system. This important and sensitive issue was assessed by a special national committee, and their recommendations are presented and discussed. One particularly innovative element is the restructuring and use of Israel’s extensive biosafety system to also address biosecurity goals, with minimal disruption or delay. (shrink)

:This article analyzes the ethics of synthetic biology from a consequentialist perspective, examining potential effects on food and agriculture, and on medicine, fuel, and the advancement of science. The issues of biosafety and biosecurity are also examined. A consequentialist analysis offers an essential road map to policymakers and regulators as to how to deal with synbio. Additionally, the article discusses the limitations of consequentialism as a tool for analysing synbioethics. Is it possible to predict, with any degree of plausibility, (...) what the consequences of synthetic biology will be in 50 years, or in 100, or in 500? Synbio may take humanity to a place of radical departure from what is known or knowable. (shrink)

Continuing rapid developments in the life sciences offer the promise of providing tools to meet global challenges in health, agriculture, the environment, and economic development; some of the benefits are already being realized. However, such advances also bring with them new social, ethical, legal, and security challenges. Governance questions form an increasingly important part of the discussions about these advances--whether the particular issue under debate is the development of ethical principles for human genome editing, how to establish regulatory systems for (...) the safe conduct of field trials of gene drive-modified organisms, or many others. However there are continuing concerns that the knowledge, tools, and techniques resulting from life sciences research could also enable the development of bioweapons or facilitate bioterrorism. Between June 10 and 13, 2018, more than 70 participants from 30 different countries and 5 international organizations took part in an international workshop, The Governance of Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences: Advancing Global Consensus on Research Oversight, in Zagreb, Croatia. Hosted by the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, the workshop was a collaboration among the InterAcademy Partnership, the Croatian Academy, the Croatian Society for Biosafety and Biosecurity, and the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. This publication summarizes the presentations and discussions from the workshop."--Publisher's description. (shrink)

In _Animacies_, Mel Y. Chen draws on recent debates about sexuality, race, and affect to examine how matter that is considered insensate, immobile, or deathly animates cultural lives. Toward that end, Chen investigates the blurry division between the living and the dead, or that which is beyond the human or animal. Within the field of linguistics, animacy has been described variously as a quality of agency, awareness, mobility, sentience, or liveness. Chen turns to cognitive linguistics to stress how language habitually (...) differentiates the animate and the inanimate. Expanding this construct, Chen argues that animacy undergirds much that is pressing and indeed volatile in contemporary culture, from animal rights debates to biosecurity concerns. Chen's book is the first to bring the concept of animacy together with queer of color scholarship, critical animal studies, and disability theory. Through analyses of dehumanizing insults, the meanings of queerness, animal protagonists in recent Asian/American art and film, the lead in toys panic in 2007, and the social lives of environmental illness, _Animacies_ illuminates a hierarchical politics infused by race, sexuality, and ability. In this groundbreaking book, Chen rethinks the criteria governing agency and receptivity, health and toxicity, productivity and stillness—and demonstrates how attention to the affective charge of matter challenges commonsense orderings of the world. (shrink)

Gain-of-function research involves experimentation that aims or is expected to increase the transmissibility and/or virulence of pathogens. Such research, when conducted by responsible scientists, usually aims to improve understanding of disease causing agents, their interaction with human hosts, and/or their potential to cause pandemics. The ultimate objective of such research is to better inform public health and preparedness efforts and/or development of medical countermeasures. Despite these important potential benefits, GOF research can pose risks regarding biosecurity and biosafety. In 2014 (...) the administration of US President Barack Obama called for a “pause” on funding of GOF experiments involving influenza, SARS, and MERS viruses in particular. With announcement of this pause, the US Government launched a “deliberative process” regarding risks and benefits of GOFR to inform future funding decisions—and the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity was tasked with making recommendations to the US Government on this matter. As part of this deliberative process the National Institutes of Health commissioned this Ethical Analysis White Paper, requesting that it provide review and summary of ethical literature on GOFR, identification and analysis of existing ethical and decision-making frameworks relevant to the evaluation of risks and benefits of GOFR, decision-making about the conduct of GOF studies, and the development of US policy regarding GOFR, and development of an ethical and decision-making framework that may be considered by NSABB when analyzing information provided by GOFR risk-benefit assessment, and when crafting its final recommendations. The ethical and decision-making framework ultimately developed is based on the idea that there are numerous ethically relevant dimensions upon which any given case of GOFR can fare better or worse : research imperative, proportionality, minimization of risks, manageability of risks, justice, good governance, evidence, and international outlook and engagement. Rather than drawing a sharp bright line between GOFR studies that are ethically acceptable and those that are ethically unacceptable, this framework is designed to indicate where any given study would fall on an ethical spectrum—where imaginable cases of GOFR might range from those that are most ethically acceptable, at one end of the spectrum, to those that are most ethically problematic or unacceptable, at the other. The aim should be that any GOFR pursued should be as far as possible towards the former end of the spectrum. (shrink)

Enclosed is a guidebook for philanthropists, advocates, and policymakers who want to do the most good possible. This book introduces the philosophy of “longtermism,” the idea that it is particularly important that we act now to safeguard future generations. -/- The future is vast in scale: depending on our choices in the coming centuries, the future could stretch for eons or it could dwindle into oblivion, and be inordinately good or inordinately bad. And yet future generations are utterly disenfranchised in (...) the world today: they cannot participate in our markets, our movements, or our civil society. This presents 21st Century philanthropists with a historically unprecedented opportunity to do good by protecting the long-term future. -/- The essays within are from the pioneers who have developed the intellectual foundations of longtermism, as well as the experts and advocates who are now putting it into practice. Readers will hear the case for longtermism from professors at the University of Oxford and Longview’s own founders; longtermist policy proposals from political philosophers, members of the House of Lords, and the All-party Parliamentary Group for Future Generations; the case for work on biosecurity, artificial intelligence, and climate change from leading experts; and the first ever essay on longtermist cultural change from the former Chief of Cabinet to the Finnish President. -/- Together, these essays chart the path forward toward maximising the good that we do for our grandchildren, our grandchildren’s grandchildren, and every generation beyond. (shrink)

As a member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, I was involved in early deliberations about the appropriateness of publishing this avian influenza research when manuscripts were referred to us from two scientific journals during their review process, via the U.S. government. As described by David Resnik in this issue, we grappled with benefits and risks, and in our initial, unanimous decision recommended limited publication, alerting the world to the possibility of evolved transmissibility in these viruses but (...) with redaction of the exact genetic mutations that would enable anyone skilled in the art to synthesize these potentially dangerous viruses. However, after additional discussion, both internal and external to the board, we were asked to reconsider the situation, and this time a majority voted in favor of full publication. I was one of the minority that opposed full publication. Resnik points to the difficulties of performing a formal risk‐benefit assessment without the means of quantifying these two terms and suggests application of reasoning based on the precautionary principle instead. This makes sense. But there are three other issues that should be highlighted. (shrink)

The discourse on the fundamental issues raised by synthetic biology, such as biosafety and biosecurity, intellectual property, environmental consequences and ethical and societal implications, is still open and controversial. This, coupled with the potential and risks the field holds, makes it one of the hottest topics in technology assessment today. How a new technology is perceived by the public influences the manner in which its products and applications will be received. Therefore, it is important to learn how people perceive (...) synthetic biology. This work gathers, integrates and discusses the results of three studies of public perceptions of synthetic biology: an analysis of existing research on how media portray synthetic biology across 13 European countries and in the USA, the Meeting of Young Minds, a public debate between prospective politicians and synthetic biologists in the Netherlands and the experiences of citizen panels and focus groups in Austria, the UK and the USA. The results show that the media are generally positive in their reports on synthetic biology, rather unbalanced in their view of potential benefits and risks, and also heavily influenced by the sources of the stories, namely scientists and stakeholders. Among the prospective Dutch politicians, there were positive expectations as well as very negative ones. Some of these positions are also shared by participants in public dialogue experiments, such as not only the demand for information, transparency and regulation but also a sense of resignation and ineluctability of scientific and technological progress. (shrink)

Two theories on the origins of COVID-19 have been widely circulating in China and the West respectively, one blaming the United States and the other a highest-level biocontainment laboratory in Wuhan, the initial epicentre of the pandemic. Both theories make claims of biological warfare attempts. According to the available scientific evidence, these claims are groundless. However, like the episodes of biological warfare during the mid-twentieth century, the spread of these present-day conspiracy theories reflects a series of longstanding and damaging trends (...) in the international scene which include deep mistrust, animosities, the power of ideologies such as nationalism, and the sacrifice of truth in propaganda campaigns. Also, the threats associated with biological warfare, bioterrorism, and the accidental leakage of deadly viruses from labs are real and growing. Thus, developing a better global governance of biosafety and biosecurity than exists at present is an urgent imperative for the international community in the broader context of a looming Cold War II. For such a governance, an ethical framework is proposed based upon the triple ethical values of transparency, trust, and the common good of humanity. (shrink)

Most of the reports on synthetic biology include not only familiar topics like biosafety and biosecurity but also a chapter on ‘ethical concerns’; a variety of diffuse topics that are interrelated in some way or another. This article deals with these ‘ethical concerns’. In particular it addresses issues such as the intrinsic value of life and how to deal with ‘artificial life’, and the fear that synthetic biologists are tampering with nature or playing God. Its aim is to analyse (...) what exactly is the nature of the concerns and what rationale may lie behind them. The analysis concludes that the above-mentioned worries do not give genuine cause for serious concern. In the best possible way they are interpreted as slippery slope arguments, yet arguments of this type need to be handled with care. It is argued that although we are urged to be especially vigilant we do not have sufficiently cogent reasons to assume that synthetic biology will cause such fundamental hazards as to warrant restricting or refraining from research in this field. (shrink)

In the United States a rapidly increasing regulatory burden for life scientists has led to questions of whether the increased burden resulting from the Select Agent Program has had adverse effects on scientific advances. Attention has focussed on the regulatory “fit” of the Program and ways in which its design could be improved. An international framework convention to address common concerns about biosecurity and biosafety is a logical next step. Keywords Biosafety - Biosecurity law - Biosecurity regulations (...) - Scientist - Laboratories - Research - Bioterrorism - Terrorism. (shrink)

Biological research with legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a biological threat to public health and/or national security is termed dual use. In Poland there are adequate conditions for conducting experiments that could be qualified as dual use research, and therefore, a risk of attack on Poland or other countries exists. Optimal solutions for limiting such threats are required, and the national system of biosecurity should enable early, reliable, and complete identification of this type of research. (...) Scientists should have a fundamental role in this process, their duty being to immediately, upon identification, report research with dual use potential. An important entity in the identification system of dual use research should also be the Central Register of Biological and Biomedical Research, which gathers information about all biological and biomedical research being conducted in a given country. Publishers, editors, and review committees of journals and other scientific publications should be involved in evaluating results of clinical trials. The National Council of Biosecurity should be the governmental institution responsible for developing a system of dual use research threat prevention. Its role would be to develop codes of conduct, form counsel of expertise, and monitor the problem at national level, while the Dual Use Research Committee would be responsible for individual cases. In Poland, current actions aiming to provide biological safety were based on developing and passing an act about genetically modified organisms (GMO’s) and creating a GMO Committee. Considering experiences of other nations, one should view these actions as fragmentary, and thus insufficient protection against dual use research threats. (shrink)

It is increasingly suggested that shortages in the supply chain for human blood could be met by the development of techniques to manufacture human blood ex vivo. These techniques fall broadly under the umbrella of synthetic biology. We examine the biopolitical context surrounding the ex vivo culture of red blood cells through the linked concepts of alienation, immunity, bio-value and biosecuritization. We engage with diverse meanings of synthetic blood, and questions about how the discourses of biosecurity and privatization of (...) risk are linked to claims that the technology will address unmet needs and promote social justice. Through our discussion we contrast communitarian ideas that culturing red blood cells ‘extends the gift’ of adult blood donation with understandings of the immunitary logics that underpin the cord-blood economy. (shrink)

methods that have shown promise for improving extreme risk analysis, particularly for assessing the risks of invasive pests and pathogens associated with international trade. We describe the legally inspired regulatory regime for banks, where these methods have been brought to bear on extreme ‘operational risks’. We argue that an ‘advocacy model’ similar to that used in the Basel II compliance regime for bank operational risks and to a lesser extent in biosecurity import risk analyses is ideal for permitting the (...) diversity of relevant evidence about invasive species to be presented and soundly evaluated. We recommend that the process be enhanced in ways that enable invasion ecology to make more explicit use of the methods found successful.. (shrink)

The two significant zoonotic bacterial infections that have remained a concern due to the complex dynamics involved in transmission and global prevalence are anthrax and brucellosis. The present paper attempts to address some of the most important zoonotic pathogens, highlighting their epidemiology, clinical manifestations, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention strategies. Anthrax is largely transmitted through direct contact with the infected animals or their products resulting in cutaneous, inhalational, and gastrointestinal forms, all with specific clinical outcomes and approaches for treatment. Similarly, the (...) genus Brucella primarily transmits brucellosis to humans by occupational exposure and consumption of contaminated animal products. Its presentation may be acute, chronic, or in relapse. Diagnosis is made by a combination of serological, molecular, and culture-based techniques, while the treatment focuses on antimicrobial regimens specific to the pathogen. However, this increases the problem of antimicrobial resistance, which makes their effective management challenging, necessitating an integrated approach. Mitigating risks through biosecurity measures, vaccination, public health education, and a One Health approach that includes human, animal, and environmental health, all facilitate prevention and control of an outbreak. Advanced surveillance and diagnostic technologies further support the prompt interventions to contain outbreaks. It then goes on to highlight the importance of interdisciplinarity for decreasing the global burden of zoonotic bacterial diseases. (shrink)

A portrait of Australian flying fox life in the Anthropocene illuminates startlingly familiar stories. These animals are participants in most of the major catastrophic events, as well as contestations about rescue, of contemporary life on Earth: warfare, man-made mass death, famine, urbanisation, emerging diseases, climate change, biosecurity, conservation, and local/international NGO aid. They are endangered, and are involved in all four of the major factors causing extinctions: habitat loss, overexploitation, introduced species, and extinction cascades. My account of flying foxes (...) in Australia rests on the understanding of species articulated both vigorously and eloquently by Donna Haraway : we and others are entangled in knots of species who are co-shaping each other in layers of reciprocating complexity. I seek to engage both the living, warm-blooded beings whose lives are threatened, and the excruciatingly dynamic deathscape that is surrounding them/us. Positioned, like much of life on Earth today, in zones of increasing conflict and terror, the lives and deaths of flying foxes tell us that in the Anthropocene there is no way out of entanglements within multispecies communities. Rather than seeking to erect more impenetrable barriers against others, relational ethics for living and dying in the Anthropocene urge us to assume ever greater mutuality and accountability as intradependent members of the suffering family of life on Earth. (shrink)

Governments must keep agricultural systems free of pests that threaten agricultural production and international trade. Biosecurity surveillance already makes use of a wide range of technologies, such as insect traps and lures, geographic information systems, and diagnostic biochemical tests. The rise of cheap and usable surveillance technologies such as remotely piloted aircraft systems presents value conflicts not addressed in international biosurveillance guidelines. The costs of keeping agriculture pest-free include privacy violations and reduced autonomy for farmers. We argue that physical (...) and digital privacy in the age of ubiquitous aerial and ground surveillance is a natural right to allow people to function freely on their land. Surveillance methods must be co-created and justified through using ethically defensible processes such as discourse theory, value-centred design and responsible innovation to forge a cooperative social contract between diverse stakeholders. We propose an ethical framework for biosurveillance activities that balances the collective benefits for food security with individual privacy: establish the boundaries of a biosurveillance social contract; justify surveillance operations for the farmers, researchers, industry, the public and regulators; give decision makers a reasonable measure of control over their personal and agricultural data; and choose surveillance methodologies that give the appropriate information. The benefits of incorporating an ethical framework for responsible biosurveillance innovation include increased participation and accumulated trust over time. Long term trust and cooperation will support food security, producing higher quality data overall and mitigating against anticipated information gaps that may emerge due to disrespecting landholder rights. (shrink)

Among various issues that concern human beings, there are a few that are of current interest and have really grabbed our attention: love for nature, environmental defense, and worries about Biodiversity and Biosecurity. The article considers one particular aspect regarding the bioethical concern of using animals in experiments that might benefit both humans and animals. The problematic aspect of the bioethical use of animals in scientific experimentation has been and will remain crucial for human life. Additionally, the results of (...) this type of research could contribute to animal welfare, which have an impact on public health. (shrink)

Time plays in different ways in relation to pandemics. Since the early 2000s, for instance, a sense of urgency has been cultivated in anticipation of the "next pandemic"—a rather generative framework that set in place a body of knowledges, practices, resources, and infrastructures unevenly distributed around the world in preparation for a health crisis that was always just around the corner. The omnipresence of the pandemic-to-come created a time of preparedness, of an ongoing expectation of a threat projected into the (...) near future. When the pandemic finally became present, response schemes developed within the realms of biosecurity and of global public health triggered off the time of... (shrink)

Introduction -- The serenity of the wise man -- The seventh day of history -- The guarantor-state -- Biosecurity -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- Index.

Synthetic biology is rather a new field of science and technology. Societal, regulatory, legal, ethical, safety and security aspects of this field have already been analysed in much detail and discussed very widely in recent years. There is, however, a dearth of empirical studies on the points of view of relevant stakeholders in countries where SB is still in the process of emergence. Slovenia is one of them, and accordingly, the article analyses the situation of SB in this small country, (...) focusing on the points of view of various stakeholder groups concerning three aspects of SB: the policy framework, the ethical-legal discourse and the issues of biosafety and biosecurity. It is argued that Slovenia has missed many opportunities to foster the domestic development of the field; in particular, considering that at an early stage, young Slovenian researchers participated very successfully in the International Genetically Engineered Machine competition. (shrink)

Central to the argument of ‘Biodefense and the Production of Knowledge: Rethinking the Problem’ are claims that the vast majority of ethical debate about biodefense research to date has focused on the dual use problem, and the focus of ethical discussion of dual-use research has been on the need to strike ‘a proper balance of only two dominant values: biosecurity and “open science”’ —the idea being that ‘under current conditions other values can and ought to be ignored because the (...) stakes are so high’.1With regard to , Buchanan and Kelley's main point is that policy making regarding biodefense and dual use should be seen as an ‘optimisation problem’—the aim should be to achieve the greater good of society, where all relevant values are taken into account, rather than limiting attention to just two values—security and open science—in particular. While, as other commentators have argued, it is questionable whether these authors have provided an accurate account of ethical discussion of biodefense and dual use to date, in this brief commentary my purpose is to argue that the values of security and open science should themselves be seen as proxies for other values and that solution to …. (shrink)