Most of the existing natural language processing systems for legal texts are developed for the English language. Nevertheless, there are several application domains where multiple versions of the same documents are provided in different languages, especially inside the European Union. One notable example is given by Terms of Service (ToS). In this paper, we compare different approaches to the task of detecting potential unfair clauses in ToS across multiple languages. In particular, after developing an annotated corpus and a machine learning (...) classifier for English, we consider and compare several strategies to extend the system to other languages: building a novel corpus and training a novel machine learning system for each language, from scratch; projecting annotations across documents in different languages, to avoid the creation of novel corpora; translating training documents while keeping the original annotations; translating queries at prediction time and relying on the English system only. An extended experimental evaluation conducted on a large, original dataset indicates that the time-consuming task of re-building a novel annotated corpus for each language can often be avoided with no significant degradation in terms of performance. (shrink)

This paper addresses the gender pay gap among Italian university graduates on entry to the labor market, and stresses the potential for gender stereotypes to impact subjective assessment of individual productivity. We build upon previous research about gender and wage inequality, introducing tournament theory as a framework for the gender pay gap analysis. We hypothesize that the effects of gender make occupational tournaments less fair in some arenas compared with others. As a consequence, men workers have higher probabilities of winning (...) the wage competition, but this process is uneven. Our data show that in contexts where stereotypes are most likely to occur, tournaments appear to be less fair and the unexplained component of the gender pay gap is higher. (shrink)

This paper offers a novel account of how complaints of unfairness arise in risky distributive cases. According to a recently proposed view in distributive ethics, the Competing Claims View, an individual has a claim to a benefit when her well-being is at stake, and the strength of this claim is determined by the expected gain to the individual’s well-being, along with how worse off the individual is compared to others. If an individual is at a lower level of well-being (...) than another, their claim to a given benefit is stronger. On this view, the strength of individuals’ claims are a function of their comparative well-being levels. In this paper, I instead argue that competing claims obtain only when a particular relationship obtains between the fates of individuals: that one individual’s gain is at the expense of another. This is a particular complaint that obtains when the fates of individuals are tied together in such a way that inequality that is to the detriment of the person who is worse off is guaranteed to obtain. I demonstrate that this complaint arises only when individuals are exposed to a particular type of risk that allows some to gain only if others lose. As such, I propose that complaints of unfairness occur less frequently than we might think if we take the Competing Claims View to be true. A purely comparative view is unable to account for this unique complaint of unfairness. I argue that this complaint is not only independently plausible, but can serve as a foundation for a more general account of competing claims complaints. (shrink)

Against Individualism: A Confucian Rethinking of the Foundations of Morality, Politics, Family, and Religion presents Henry Rosemont’s reflection on possible Confucian-based avenues for considering solutions to contemporary moral, political, and spiritual problems. Rosemont contends that the ideologies of capitalist economies, which are based largely on competition, and belief in autonomous individuality, including abstract notions of human rights, are fundamentally unable to deal effectively with many of today’s most pressing issues. For example, he argues against appealing to universalist principles in an (...) attempt to dissolve ethical and political tensions between cultures and states. In accordance with this orientation, his work is then best judged on the contributions it makes to constructing new perspectives on the problems addressed rather than how accurately he represents any tradition. In fact, Rosemont readily admits that he may be “unfair” to individualism or “creative[ly] misreading” early Confucianism. In this review article, I will argue that some of the differences Rosemont finds between his Confucian critique of individualism and the communitarian critique of individualism are, in fact, not all that dissimilar. For example, while Rosemont sees Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel as “individualists,” the general orientation of their communitarian response to libertarianism shares much in common with the Confucian “role ethics” perspective on the person and morality or ethics. In this way, I will argue that while Confucian role ethics and communitarian perspectives certainly have their respective emphases, they also have a lot to offer one another. (shrink)

This article begins with a review of the literature on the ethics of tax evasion and identifies the three main views that have emerged over the centuries, namely always ethical, sometimes ethical, and never or almost never ethical. It then reports on the results of a survey of HK and U.S. university business students who were asked to express their opinions on the 15 statements covering the three main views. The data are then analyzed to determine which of the three (...) viewpoints is dominant among the sample population. Although it was found that HK scores were significantly different from the U.S. scores, both HK and U.S. respondents were opposed to the view that tax evasion is always or almost always ethical. The strongest arguments justifying tax evasion were in cases where the government was corrupt, the tax system was unfair and unaffordable. The weakest arguments for justifying tax evasion were in cases where there was a selfish motive. The underlying cultural differences are further explored in hope of accounting for differing perceptions of ethics of tax evasion. Policy implications for increasing people’s awareness of ethics on tax evasion are also highlighted. (shrink)

This paper aims to bring a novel approach to the discussion of unfair advantages in sport by looking for a local criterion of fairness instead of a universal criterion. A local criterion of fairness would not solve the general dispute over what counts as an unfair advantage, but it would be beneficial in evaluating specific cases and could guide further discussion about them. We seek a local criterion of fairness by comparing the specific property advantages of Caster Semenya and Eero (...) Mäntyranta. South African Semenya is a middle‐distance runner whose right to compete in the female category has been challenged owing to her assumed difference of sex development and related high level of testosterone. Finnish Mäntyranta was a cross‐country skier with an exceptionally high haematocrit level. We examine whether there is a relevant difference between their advantages that would justify treating the athletes differently. We propose that the criterion ‘not attainable by other athletes in the same category’ could stand as a local criterion of fairness under certain conditions. However, its proper application requires further discussion on how to justify categories in sport. (shrink)

: How do people make decisions? Previous psychological research consistently shed light on the fact that decisions are not the result of a pure rational reasoning, and that emotions can assume a crucial role. This is particularly true in the case of moral decision-making, which requires a complex integration of affective and cognitive processes. One question that is still open to debate concern the individual factors that can affect moral decisions. Gender has been consistently identified as a possible variable of (...) interest for the adoption of different strategic behaviors, with men using more rational processes and women more deontological principles. In the present study we aimed at exploring the presence of gender differences in different decision-making scenarios. Results showed that the moral scenario led to a similar acceptance rate in both genders, while economic and shopping offers were more likely to be accepted by men. Also, women were more inclined to refuse unfair offers, which included a higher personal benefit at the expense of the opponent, even if this meant a total loss for both parties. Finally, correlational analyses revealed a different relation between risk propensity and decision-making in men and women in different scenarios. Keywords: Decision-making; Utilitarianism; Altruism; Moral Decision-making; Economic Decision-making Decisioni morali, economiche e d’acquisto a confronto. Effetti di genere e utilitarismo Riassunto: Come prendiamo le decisioni? La letteratura psicologica disponibile ha chiarito in ampia misura come le decisioni non siano il risultato di un ragionamento puramente razionale e che le emozioni possono assumere un ruolo cruciale. Questo è particolarmente vero nel caso delle decisioni morali, che richiedono una complessa integrazione tra processi affettivi e cognitivi. Una questione ancora aperta riguarda i fattori individuali che possono incidere sulle decisioni morali. Il genere è stato identificato come una possibile variabile da considerare rispetto all’adozione di comportamenti strategici differenti, in cui gli uomini sembrano più inclini a far uso di processi razionali e le donne a considerare principi deontologici. In questo lavoro abbiamo provato a esplorare la presenza di differenze di genere in diversi contesti decisionali. I risultati hanno mostrano come in ambito morale entrambi i generi siano portati ad accettare opzioni simili, mentre offerte economiche e commerciali sono accettate in misura maggiore dagli uomini. Le donne sarebbero più inclini a rifiutare offerte inique che comprendono benefici personali maggiori a discapito di una controparte, anche se questo implica una perdita totale da ambo le parti. Infine, le analisi correlazionali hanno mostrato una diversa relazione tra propensione al rischio e processi decisionali tra uomini e donne in contesti diversi. Parole chiave: Processi decisionali; Utilitarismo; Altruismo; Processi decisionali morali; Processi decisionali economici. (shrink)

This paper traces the history of remoteness in contract law, namely the legal formants (in Rodolfo Sacco’s terms) constraining the availability of contract damages in various legal systems. Our journey takes us through different times, continents and cultures, from the eighteenth century to the twenty–first century, across the law of France, United States, England and Wales, India and Australia, among other jurisdictions. While it might seem that civilian and common law traditions have very different morphological legal forms, once a closer (...) historical, cultural, and anthropological gaze is turned upon the legal formants involved, it can be seen that remoteness discloses a shared concern which may be common to many human societies and cultures. In other words, as a matter of social experience, humans who enter into transactions generally realise that it is impossible to know the future, or to know what all outcomes of the transaction will be. Consequently, it is recognised that it would be unfair and unjust to hold a defendant liable for all outcomes, and as our journey will show, legal systems seek guidance from other legal systems in their efforts to deal with this problem. (shrink)

Telic egalitarianism is famously threatened by the levelling down objection. In its canonical form, the objection purports to show that it is not, in itself, an improvement if inequality is reduced. In a variant that is less often discussed, the objection is that telic egalitarians are committed to believing that sometimes one ought to reduce inequality, even when doing so makes no one better off. The standard egalitarian response to this ‘all things considered’ variant of the levelling down objection is (...) to embed egalitarianism in a pluralist consequentialist moral theory. In section 1, I briefly recapitulate this familiar strategy. In section 2, I argue that this standard pluralist consequentialist response is inadequate. The inadequacy of the standard response, I argue, stems from the fact that the following are jointly inconsistent: (1) a commitment to levelling down's impermissibility; (2) standard pluralist egalitarian consequentialism; (3) inequality being of non-trivial importance; and (4) the most plausible measures of inequality's badness. In section 3, I show that egalitarians can better respond to the all-things-considered levelling down objection by embedding egalitarianism in a nonconsequentialist moral theory. (shrink)

Normative political theorists frequently compare hypothetical scenarios for the purpose of identifying reasons to prefer one kind of institution to alternatives. We examine three types of "unfair" comparisons and the reasoning errors associated with each. A theorist makes an _obscure comparison_ when one (or more) of the alternatives under consideration is underspecified; a theorist makes a _mismatched comparison_ when they fail to hold fixed the relevant contextual factors while comparing alternatives; and a theorist makes an _irrelevant comparison_ when they compare (...) alternatives assuming contextual factors that differ in important respects from those they "should" assume given their theoretical aims. We then introduce the notion of a modeling mindset and show how this mindset can help theorists detect and avoid the three types of error. We conclude with a reconstruction of Cohen's (2009) camping trip thought experiment to illustrate the approach. (shrink)

By comparative analysis of selected historical and contemporary pedagogical documents, professional development is recognized as a permanent and inseparable component of the teaching profession. Continuous training of educators is unfairly attributed only to the time of the lifelong education paradigm. Since its beginnings and attempts at legislation and its social establishment, pedagogical theorists have prescribed the continuing need for professional development for the purpose of professional development and career advancement, as well as the obligation of continuous learning. Already in (...) the first legal document of 1874, individual and extended education of all teachers was prescribed. In this way, professional development becomes a key component of the teaching profession and later of all educational staff. The analysis of historical documents has determined the one hundred and fifty-year legal and statutory regulation of a permanent obligation for the professional development of teachers, which is often not achieved in practice. After reaching the university level of initial education of all teachers, it is necessary to create the conditions for their systematic and effective professional development. (shrink)

It is worthwhile comparing Hylomorphic and Animalistic accounts of personal identity since they both identify the human animal and the human person.The topics of comparison will be three: The first is accounting for our intuitions in cerebrum transplant and irreversible coma cases. Hylomorphism, unlike animalism, appears to capture “commonsense” beliefs here, preserves the maxim that identity matters, and does not run afoul of the Only x and y rule. The next topic of comparison reveals how the rival explanations of transplants (...) and comas are both at odds with some compelling biological assumptions. The third issue deals with our practical concerns, most notably, the possibility of an afterlife. It turns out that the hylomorphic treatment of Purgatory raises the spectra of the “too many thinkers” problem and some considerable unfairness. Contrary to expectations, an animalist insistence on uninterrupted bodily continuity between this life and the next does not involve deceptive body snatching. (shrink)

When students experience unfairness and normlessness in their academic environment, it exemplifies the concept of social anomie. where students may justify dishonest actions such as exam cheating, plagiarism, and others. Academic honesty, a crucial moral characteristic, fundamentally relies on values, rules, and social norms. Against this backdrop, we conducted a mixed-methods study to capture students’ perspectives on academic dishonesty and social anomie. The current study questions investigate the levels of social anomie and academic dishonesty and the correlation between them (...) based on some variables. A sample consisted of 831 male and female students from one public university located in the middle part of Jordan. Data collection involved the use of multidimensional measures that captured various dimensions of social anomie (meaninglessness, distrust, and moral decline) and different behaviors of academic dishonesty (exam cheating, plagiarism, outside help, prior cheating, falsification, and lying about academic assignments). And to enhance generalizability and minimize selection bias, a qualitative data collection methodology was employed, with twenty-one male and female students randomly invited to participate. The findings reveal that the students exhibited a medium level of social anomie, indicating a notable presence of normative challenges in their academic environment. However, the level of academic dishonesty was relatively lower, suggesting a general adherence to ethical standards among the participants. Moreover, a positive correlation between social anomie and behaviors of academic dishonesty was observed, suggesting a link between the two constructs. It is worth noting that the results of the current study demonstrated consistency in the mixed-method approach used for data collection. Regarding gender differences, no significant variations were detected in the levels of social anomie among students. However, significant differences emerged in academic dishonesty, with higher levels reported among male students compared to their female counterparts. In terms of academic specialization, disparities in social anomie levels were evident, with students from humanities exhibiting higher levels compared to other specializations. Additionally, specific forms of academic dishonesty, namely falsification and unauthorized assistance, showed significant differences based on academic specialization, with higher levels reported among students from humanities. Interestingly, no significant differences were found in the levels of academic dishonesty based on academic level. This suggests that academic dishonesty may persist across different stages of university education. However, it is important to note that the study focused on a specific university setting and may not fully represent other educational contexts. (shrink)

This essay is a comparative analysis of results reported in this volume from studies in mainland China, the United States, Iran, and Hong Kong regarding organ donation incentives. They reveal widespread (but not unanimous) support for honorary incentives (such as notes or ceremonies of gratitude) and significant support for familist incentives (offering a donor’s family members priority should they need an organ transplant in the future). Opinions on financial incentives were much more mixed, with significant worries expressed regarding potential (...) exploitation and unfairness. These interviews also reinforce the importance of culturally appropriate constructions of any steps to increase organ donation rates. And, in addition to their comments on various types of incentive, interviewees in these chapters also offer insight into other measures that could be taken to increase organ donation. (shrink)

It is unfair to conclude that Western and Eastern differences have caused conflict in the practice of counselling, especially in mandated counselling. It is reasonable to assume that without the Western approach and understanding of counselling, the East would still be unable to develop their own theory of helping. How then does one compare different approaches? Such an assessment can be argued clearly from a cultural perspective as in the case of mandated counselling. This paper discusses the influence of culture (...) which has shaped the practice of mandated counselling and the appropriate practice of mandated counselling in a Malaysian setting. Many of the points discussed here are drawn from the data informed by seven informants in a research entitled ‘Mandated Counselling In Malaysia: A Heuristic Phenomenological Inquiry Of Involuntary Participation’. The phenomenon of counselling as originated and practised in the West, which has served as the significant model for the Malaysian style of counselling, is discussed. The concept of guidance and crisis intervention in counselling as practised in Malaysia has shaped the appropriate acceptance of mandated counselling. Respect for authority, a need to ‘save face’, directives from the authority and the values of we-ness makes mandated counselling in a Malaysian setting a relevant intervention. (shrink)

This paper compares Joseph Heath’s critique of the just deserts rationale for markets with an earlier critique due to Frank Knight, Milton Friedman, and Friedrich Hayek. Heath shares their emphasis upon the role of luck in prices based on supply and demand. Yet he avoids their claim that the inheritance of human capital is on a moral par with the inheritance of ordinary capital, as a basis for unequal shares of the social product. Heath prefers to argue that markets do (...) not tend to reward talent as such. The paper raises some doubts about this factual claim, and argues that sweeping the issue of talent under the rug threatens to make our theory of justice less egalitarian than it would otherwise be. The paper also addresses the objection that claims of unfairness based on the arbitrariness of the distribution of innate abilities will undermine self-respect. (shrink)

We provide ethical criteria to establish when vaccine mandates for healthcare workers are ethically justifiable. The relevant criteria are the utility of the vaccine for healthcare workers, the utility for patients (both in terms of prevention of transmission of infection and reduction in staff shortage), and the existence of less restrictive alternatives that can achieve comparable benefits. Healthcare workers have professional obligations to promote the interests of patients that entail exposure to greater risks or infringement of autonomy than ordinary members (...) of the public. Thus, we argue that when vaccine mandates are justified on the basis of these criteria, they are not unfairly discriminatory and the level of coercion they involve is ethically acceptable—and indeed comparable to that already accepted in healthcare employment contracts. Such mandates might be justified even when general population mandates are not. Our conclusion is that, given current evidence, those ethical criteria justify mandates for influenza vaccination, but not COVID-19 vaccination, for healthcare workers. We extend our arguments to other vaccines. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Overcoming Violence in Practice1Sarah K. PinnockIn Christian thought, the classic theological response to evil and suffering, known as "theodicy," operates on a metaphysical level. It aims to elucidate questions about God: God's power to prevent evil, God's goodness and justice, and God's purposes in allowing evil. It also examines questions about humanity: Are humans chronically prone to sin and violence? Does suffering serve good purposes? Does God redeem suffering? (...) In recent Christian attempts at theodicy, attention has focused on divine omnipotence and human freedom in attempts to exculpate God for cruelty in allowing the magnitude of suffering visible in such events as the Holocaust, where six million Jews and five million Poles, gypsies, homosexuals, and other noncombatants were killed under Nazi orders. Symmetrical with exploration of the "front end" explanatory questions of why bad things happen in a supposedly good world, theodicies also explore the "back end" justificatory questions of how God can heal the damage, unevenly and unfairly distributed, in this life or the afterlife. Key exemplars of modern theodicy are Leibniz and Hegel, thinkers who have greatly influenced twentieth-century analytic and continental philosophy of religion, respectively. Despite the urgency of responding to evil, theodicy has been criticized for its abstract, global approach to suffering and its programmatic focus on justifying God in the face of violence. My own critique of theodicy has epistemic and moral components. Theodicy rests on epistemological hubris, building precarious intellectual systems in pursuing knowledge of God. Additionally, theodicy is guilty of moral turpitude on account of its single-minded focus on explanation, which smooths over the scandal of suffering and overlooks the prevention and alleviation of violence.2Fortunately, there are more promising alternatives than theodicy in Christian thought. Particularly in the twentieth century, existentialist and Marxian philosophical movements have contributed to practical rather than theoretical emphases in response to theodicy questions. Reflection on the situatedness of the subject has prompted this shift as theology becomes more self-conscious of its cultural assumptions. Especially since the 1960s, contextual varieties of theology have emerged that recognize its socially embedded character. Theology is never purely dislocated conceptual reflection, innocent of ethical consequences, but a discourse with practical origins and effects. To use Marxian vocabulary, all theology is an "ideology" expressing the conscious and unconscious interests of a social group or class. This insight [End Page 73] does not dismiss the truth and power of theology, but forces closer examination of its production and implications. As Marx wrote in his "Theses on Feuerbach," "philosophers [and theologians] have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."3 Theology as a discourse must attend to how it functions within society to motivate opposition or acceptance of violence. Also, it must attend to how reliably it exposes and articulates violence within its vocabulary, and what social cases of violence it addresses.I propose that the shift toward practical or contextual Christian anti-theodicy responses to violence resonates with Buddhist attention to practice, rather than speculation, in answer to suffering. To use a well-known image from the Buddha's teaching, all human beings are like persons pierced with poisoned arrows. All suffer grievously because of craving and desire, and desperately long for relief. In such a condition of life, sliding toward death while suffering, what is the most urgent need: to find out how to remove the poisoned arrow and heal the wound, or to find out where the arrow came from and why it was shot?4 Of course, the moral of the story is that the alleviation of suffering is primary and urgent. It would be foolish to searchfor an explanation instead of a cure for the poison. Understanding the cosmic origins of suffering is a distraction, irrelevant to alleviating suffering and detrimental to practice. Preoccupation with metaphysical speculation does not produce wisdom. Such wisdom is the fruit of awareness resulting from meditation training.In presenting my ideas to a forum for Buddhist-Christian dialogue, I am very much aware of the perils of comparative thinking. My understanding of Buddhism reflects the Westernized transmission of Mahayana Zen Buddhist traditions, based on writings intended for an... (shrink)

Theoretical models and correlational research suggest that anger and disgust play different roles in moral judgment. Anger is theorized to underlie reactions to crimes against persons, such as battery and unfairness, and disgust is theorized to underlie reactions to crimes against nature, such as sexual transgressions and cannibalism. To date, however, it has not been shown that induction of these two emotions has divergent effects. In this experiment we show divergent effects of anger and disgust. We use sounds to (...) elicit anger and disgust, and participants are then asked to consider moral vignettes. As compared to disgust and control condition, anger increases severity of judgments about crimes against persons, and disgust increases severity of judgments about crimes against nature, but not conversely. (shrink)

IntroductionAcademic integrity is the expectation that members of the academic community, including researchers, teachers, and students, to act with accuracy, honesty, fairness, responsibility, and respect. Academic integrity is an issue of critical importance to academic institutions and has been gaining increasing interest among scholars in the last few years. While contravening academic integrity is known as academic misconduct, cheating is one type of academic misconduct and is generally defined as “any action that dishonestly or unfairly violates rules of research or (...) education.Case studyThe case study presented in this paper describes the elements of academic misconduct in three Middle Eastern countries. Four categories of factors were analyzed, namely personal, cultural traits, contextual, and institutional. Moreover, a comparison of factors of misconduct is conducted in the three countries in order to examine how different learning environments and cultures can affect academic cheating. The study also investigates the role of teachers and administration system in enforcing integrity policy in educational institutes.Discussion and evaluationAn evaluation of the main causes of cheating and plagiarism among students in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan is conducted by analyzing students’ response to a 20 questions survey. The nonparametric Dunn’s statistical analysis is performed to compare the variance and frequency of factors that may affect academic integrity. The significant results are reported in terms of the Krushal F statistic and p-value < 0.05. The evaluation was a useful process that demonstrated the main factors affecting academic integrity in the three countries.ConclusionSurvey results show that the role of individual social-demographic and culture factors are significant for predicting misconduct in Saudi Arabia and Egypt but not in Jordan. Most students blamed their misconduct on laziness and willingness to achieve higher education performance. Students are more likely to cheat and plagiarize because they lack the ability or information to tackle assignments. Results illustrate that the cultural impact can be a significant factor in academic misconduct. Integrity policies and the level, at which they have been applied, have a large impact on student attitudes towards cheating and their academic misconduct. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Raimon Panikkar (1918-2010):Life and LegacyJ. Abraham Vélez de CeaThe interreligious theologian, intercultural philosopher, and pluralist mystic Raimon Panikkar died in Tavertet, Barcelona, on 26 August 2010. He was ninety-one. A pioneer of interreligious dialogue and comparative theology, Panikkar claimed to be at the same time yet without contradiction a Christian, a Buddhist, a Hindu, and a secular man.Panikkar's multiple religious belonging was not a matter of choice and (...) shallow eclecticism but rather a matter of personal experience and profound spiritual growth. His distinction between eclecticism and syncretism might be helpful to understand the complex nature of his religious identity. Eclecticism "is an uncritical mixture of religious traditions and an agreement among them obtained by chopping off all possible discrepancies in favor of an amorphous common denominator." On the contrary, syncretism "is allowing for a possible assimilation of elements by virtue of which these elements cease to be foreign bodies so that organic growth within each tradition is possible, and the mutual fecundation of religious traditions becomes a genuine option."1Another point I would like to clarify is that Panikkar's multiple religious belonging was not a question of being primarily Christian and secondarily something else, as if truth could be quantified. Panikkar objected to this "modern" way of thinking. I remember a conversation with him about this issue in which he compared these attempts to quantify religious identity to those who try to understand the Trinity as being either one or three. He said that if you begin counting you miss the point, and then he added in a defiant tone: "I am 100 percent Christian, 100 percent Hindu, 100 percent Buddhist, and 100 percent secular." When I insisted and told him that for many people multiple religious belonging is just not possible, Panikkar replied: "Well, it is my experience; I cannot help it."Panikkar's multiple religious belonging was often misunderstood and cost him the distrust of both Christians and Hindus. For instance, in 1966, Panikkar applied for a chair in Hindu philosophy at the prestigious Banaras Hindu University. Though [End Page 215] everybody agreed he was by far the most competent candidate, he was not offered the position because for many conservative Hindus Panikkar was not Hindu enough.Similarly, many conservative Catholics today would say that Panikkar went too far with his distinction between Christ and the historical Jesus; for them Panikkar was not Christian enough. However, this would be unfair. As I understand Panikkar, he was not trying to undermine any Christian claim. Quite the contrary, he was challenging what he perceived as a tribal Christology and a reduction of Christianity to a two-thousand-year-old sect. Time will tell, like it did with great thinkers such as Nāgārjuna (ca. 150-250), Śaṅ-kara (788-820), Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), and Meister Eckhart (ca. 1260-1327), who were also criticized at first by their respective traditions. Perhaps Panikkar was simply ahead of his time, and what today seems controversial to some will become the norm in the future; it would not be the first time.Panikkar was an embodiment of interreligious dialogue, and his theology was the result of such dialogue. He was born in Barcelona on 3 November 1918. His mother was a Catholic from Catalonia, and his father was a Hindu from Kerala, India. After studying philosophy and natural sciences in Barcelona, Madrid, and Bonn, he joined the recently created Opus Dei in 1940. It should be clarified that in the aftermath of the Spanish civil war and compared to the pre-Vatican II National Catholicism of Franco's regime, Opus Dei was a progressive Catholic organization for laypeople interested in sanctifying their professional work.Panikkar was ordained a Catholic priest in 1946 and became the chaplain of a student dormitory in Madrid (Colegio Mayor la Moncloa). That very year he earned his first doctorate, in philosophy, with a dissertation titled El concepto de naturaleza: Análisis histórico y metafísico de un concepto (Complutense University of Madrid, 1946, published in 1951). He was offered a position at the Complutense University but decided to continue with his pastoral work in Madrid, Barcelona... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 123.3 (2002) 524-526 [Access article in PDF] Frank Nisetich, trans. The Poems of Callimachus. With introduction, notes, and glossary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. lvi + 350 pp. Paper, $27.95. The front cover of this volume features the second century A.D. Oxyrhynchus papyrus fragment of the prologue to the Aetia, arguably the most influential programmatic piece in all Greek and Latin poetry. The back cover (...) announces an important new verse translation of the extant works of Callimachus, with a full introduction, notes that take up individual points of difficulty, a general index, an annotated index of all proper names and adjectives, comparative tables that reference translated fragments to the standard editions, and, as distinguishing this translation from others, a presentation of the translated fragments "as integral parts of the poetry books in which they originally figured, as these can be reconstructed in the light of modern research." The pages in between deliver everything that the front cover suggests and the back cover promises (with one qualification). On the whole, this is probably the most useful single volume available on Callimachus, certainly for the nonspecialist at whom it is aimed. [End Page 524]Nisetich's introduction leads the reader through the historical background, distinguishes what is known about Callimachus' life and literary career from what has been imputed, and, in the last two sections, surveys what has been recovered of his work and how it has been recovered. These last sections provide an excellent brief conspectus of Callimachean literary and textual criticism. The only thing lacking (this is the qualification mentioned above) in this otherwise admirably complete and up-to-date introduction is any significant communication of the nature and extent of Callimachus' influence, especially on Latin poetry. Surely it is tantalizing and a little unfair for the uninitiated to be told that Callimachus was "second to none but Homer in influence" (xv) but not to be told why or on whom or how. This omission is not corrected elsewhere in the book except, indirectly, for the necessary consideration of Catullus' translation of the Coma Berenices as possibly supplying omissions in the fragmentary Greek text.This brings us to what I see as the book's chief virtue, which lies in the presentation of the fragments, the disiecta membra poetae, as the constituents of lost organic wholes—not only of complete poems but also of poetry books artfully and deliberately arranged. Here, as throughout the entire book, Nisetich has taken good advantage of recent scholarship. His presentation of Callimachus' Hecale, which leads off the translations, has benefited from Hollis's study (Callimachus: Hecale [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990]). The remaining fragments presented here—the fragments of the Aetia and of the Iambi—are also well arranged and contextualized. The "Victory Song for Sosibios" rounds out the fragmentary poems. It is left freestanding, although its connections with the Aetia and the Coma Berenices in particular are explained. Nisetich translates only those fragments for which an adequate context can be reconstructed, a sound decision even if it does leave approximately six hundred of the eight hundred or so fragments in Pfeiffer's edition untranslated.Poems of Callimachus that we have in their entirety include sixty-three epigrams and six narrative hymns. The epigrams are helpfully arranged here by type (erotic, dedicatory, display, epitaph) rather than following any standard edition (although they are helpfully indexed to Pfeiffer as well as to the Planudean Anthology. The six narrative hymns are presented in their traditional order. An enlightening discussion in the introduction traces the thematic contours of this arrangement and suggests, convincingly, that it is deliberate on the part of Callimachus. We may have in Callimachus' Hymns the first extant poetry book.Stylistically the translation is clean and fluent but rather undistinguished as poetry. As a poet-translator, Nisetich was more successful with Pindar's pyrotechnics (Pindar's Victory Songs [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980]) than he is here with Callimachus' leptotes, which tends to come off as flat rather than subtle. His stated aim is more to serve the reader interested in what Callimachus... (shrink)

This article is an attempt to evaluate the Oregon plan from the perspective of a Scandinavian national health care system. The Nordic welfare states are marked by a strong emphasis on equality. As an example of an egalitarian system we present the Norwegian health care model in part one. In part two, the arguments in favor of a one tier system in Norway are presented and compared to Oregon's two tier system. Although we argue, in part three, that a comparison (...) of the degree of explicitness in the prioritization process shows that Norway has much to learn from Oregon, we do believe that the Norwegian system has some attractive elements that may function as an important corrective. In part four we present the Norwegian Guidelines for priority-setting and discuss the weight assigned to the severity of disease criterion. It is argued that the exclusion of information about the severity of disease partly explains the counterintuitive ranking of treatment-condition pairs in Oregon's initial method based on the principle of health maximization. A normative analysis of the conflicting norms of efficiency and equality of results is called for. The final part of the paper is devoted to the problem of rigidity. Henry J. Aaron has argued that the Oregon system is insensitive to inter-individual variations within each diagnosis-treatment pair. This objection is a severe one, since the system might end up treating patients unfairly on the individual level. To overcome this problem, we suggest a selection rule that should be more capable of dealing with the problem of rigidity. (shrink)

A collective duty gap arises when a group has caused harm that requires remedying but no member did harm that can justify the imposition of individual remedial duties. Examples range from airplane crashes to climate change. How might collective duty gaps be filled? This paper starts by examining two promising proposals for filling them. Both proposals are found inadequate. Thus, while gap-filling duties can be defended against objections from unfairness and demandingness, we need a substantive justification for their existence. (...) I argue that substantive justification can be found in the normative force of commitments individuals make to others with regard to ends. Along the way, I argue that gap-filling duties must be conceptualized differently in group agents, as compared to non-agent groups: in the former, gap-filling duties can be understood as duties to “take up the slack”; in the latter, this would be a category error. (shrink)

Sporting communities remain entangled in debate over whether and how to include transgender and intersex athletes in competition with cisgender athletes. Of particular concern is that transgender and intersex athletes may have unfair physiological advantages over their cisgender opponents. Arguments for inclusion of transgender and intersex athletes in sport attempt to demonstrate that such inclusion does not threaten the presumed physiological equivalence among competitors and is therefore fair to all. This article argues that the physiological equivalency rationale has significant limitations, (...) including an inordinate emphasis on sport as a comparative test. Instead, this article contends that arguments for narrativity rather than physiological equivalency show that exclusion is not only misguided but also undesirable: it is detrimental not only to the excluded athletes but to sport itself. The article yields several important consequences including calls for revisions to policies on transgender... (shrink)

Is the lower rate of kidney transplantation into African Americans medically and ethically justifiable? Or is it a form of racial discrimi nation comparable to if not worse than denial of employment opportunities, housing, and educational opportunities? This essay focusses on the medical problems associated with matching antigens in donors and recipients, and the implications of those problems for social justice.1 Racially discriminatory practices in bank lending, education, and hiring provide a context for understanding how medical criteria treat black recipients (...) unfairly. Although antigen matching is only one aspect of the general problem of finding medically suitable black recipients, it presents an especially interesting challenge for theories of justice, as well as for medical research. (shrink)

The debate on whether insurance companies should be allowed to use results of individuals’ genetic tests for underwriting purposes has been both lively and increasingly relevant over the past two decades. Yet there appears to be no widely agreed upon resolution regarding appropriate and effective regulation. There exists today a gamut of recommendations and actual practices addressing this phenomenon ranging from laissez-faire to voluntary industry moratoria to strict legal prohibition. One obvious reason for such a variance in views and approaches (...) is that there are competing bases for evaluating the outcomes of restricting insurers’ use of such information. For example, an outright ban on the use of genetic test results may seem the best method for protecting against unfair discrimination, while allowing their use may seem to be the best way to foster efficiency in the market for insurance. However, there is also a lack of understanding about how restricting the use of genetic information would play out in the market through the so-called phenomenon of adverse selection. Using economic analysis, we discuss how the type of adverse selection that occurs in insurance markets affects various arguments both in favour and against an outright ban on insurers’ use of genetic tests for pricing insurance. We review arguments based on moral principles . Practical concerns from the insurance industry based on actuarial principles and economic efficiency are also compared. Each perspective is shown to lead to a range of conflicting recommendations about how genetic information should be regulated and these conclusions depend critically on whether one conducts the analysis from the ex ante temporal perspective , from the interim temporal perspective , or from the ex post temporal perspective. (shrink)

The urgency of the research problem and its significance for theory and practice. The present time turns to be a qualitatively new stage that differs from the previous ones, namely by huge deployment of the modern period of the scientific and technological revolution, the consequence of these processes is posthuman turn. The main content of this turn is that people in their activities go beyond objective reality. The aim and objectives of the article. The aim of the research is socio-philosophical (...) analyses of the processes of posthuman formation in the conditions of societies’ techologization and informatization.The aim setting necessitates attaining the following research objectives: to consider the processes of posthuman formation; to analyse the nature of the scientific and technological revolution’s deployment and its influence on the formation of the man’s modern type; to reveal the peculiarities of introducing the scientific and technological achievements in all spheres of societies’ vital activity as well as its consequences for human development. Materials and methods. The research materials were represented by different approaches of both national and Western researchers regarding a new stage of the scientific and technological revolution, which, in fact, creates conditions for the posthuman’s emergence and development. A wide range of philosophical and general scientific methods of research was used in the work including metaphysical, dialectical and phenomenological methods as well as generalization, comparative analysis, system analysis and others. The research results. It is an undeniable fact that the modern man can not imagine their life without technology and gadgets. And this creates one of the main requests and tasks for humanity – that is to create a balance of the interaction between the man and technology, to find out the ways for people to conquer the consequences of the technical development. In our opinion, it is worth starting with the organization of our own behavior, which if necessary has to include interconnection with the nature, with other people, and so on. Conclusion. The consequences of such artificially created disparity will be unprecedented because earlier, despite all the differences, people were united by one important factor – they belonged to the same species of Homo Sapiens. Now then the mankind will be divided into two species. The posthuman’s emerging can destroy the whole system of liberal democracy currently existing in the west countries which basis, for example, is formed by natural rights concept implying that people are born equal in rights and are endowed with rights by birth. But this idea will lose its meaning as soon as the first posthuman appears. It is natural to ask the question whether people will share the general human nature if being divided into some species. During the earlier historical stages of development, the man just managed to overcome the disparity which had prevailed for almost the entire previous history. Nowadays the man risks ending up in a more unfair world than ever before. These dangers are caused by accelerated development of biotechnologies and their introducing into all spheres of human activity. Therefore, the consequences of the cultural and anthropological crisis the modern mankind is experiencing now are threatening and even disastrous for the existence and development of the individual. Indeed, the emergence of the posthuman is not a long-term prospect. We are witnessing the onset of posthuman. Technology gradually and steadily is replacing human. The mankind has to find a balance of human-technology interaction to survive as a species as well as to encourage and develop their human features. Since the man’s transformation into the posthuman would rather describe the death of human. It would also imply dehumanization and replacement of value orientations and models on technologies rather than human improving. (shrink)

Roy Wood Sellars (1880–1973) is often reduced to his role as father of Wilfrid Sellars. This is unfair because during the 1920s, ‘30s, and ‘40s, Roy Wood was one of the leading figures of the then prevailing American realist movement. In the present paper, I will focus on one particular facet of R. W. Sellars’ philosophical approach: his continual examination of Albert Einstein’s special theory of relativity. I shall primarily reconstruct his discussion of Einstein’s theory, as it can be found (...) in his seminal The Philosophy of Physical Realism (1932). In contrast to authors such as Bertrand Russell or Émile Meyerson, Sellars refused to interpret special relativity in a realist vein. In his view, it should be seen as an “ars mensurandi” and thus being interpreted purely operationally. As with Einstein himself, the concept of simultaneity was his paradigm case in point. However, Sellars opined that besides the physical (mensurational) concepts of time and simultaneity there also exists an ontological understanding of these notions. “Real” time and “absolute” simultaneity are, according to Sellars, the indispensable non-relativistic counterparts to Einstein’s respective relativistic conceptions. They are to be interpreted realistically since they prove, Sellars maintains, to be explanatory regarding events in Einstein-Minkowski’s world. In the course of the paper, I shall compare this view with the one defended by Henri Bergson. Furthermore, Sellars’ later approach from the 1940s and ‘50s will be briefly considered and critically discussed by confronting it with more recent attempts at ontologically ‘grounding’ special relativistic kinematics. (shrink)

_Purpose._ The paper is aimed at identifying the ways of scientist’s influence on the development of modern society as compared to those of intellectuals. _Theoretical basis._ The socio-anthropological approach to the role of scientists in post-industrial society shows the leading role of people of science as a social group in present-day society. However, philosophical axiology reveals that scientists in today’s society do not have the appropriate social status: neither in state governance nor in the sphere of forming public opinion. The (...) classical doctrine concerning intellectuals has suffered a crisis in recent decades, which is due to the growing gap between the group of intellectuals recognized by society and the sphere of science. A new theoretical approach to determining the role of present-day research scientists as intellectuals is necessary. _Originality._ Successful development of modern society in conditions of growing social turbulence necessitates the access of research scientists to the sphere of public communication. This is required both by the needs of science advancement itself – to receive its adequate funding and win wide public recognition, and by society’s needs – as it is scientists who can provide reliable diagnostics of social problems and formulate well-grounded programs for overcoming them. _Conclusions._ For overcoming social barriers and getting access to public space, scientists themselves have to recognize themselves as a destitute social group – those who are unfairly deprived of making principal decisions in today’s society. For that, scientists should become modern intellectuals. Unlike media intellectuals, scientists are to interact not with social masses but, first and foremost, with public elites. The scientist has to gain his/her independent status by achieving the recognition of his/her own ideas among social elites rather than by winning wide personal popularity. Hence, scientists must aim at obtaining the status of the elite for elites – this would reveal in scientists the deepest potential of a modern man. (shrink)

One frequently used argument in the discussion on human enhancement is that enhancement is a form of cheating. This argument is well-known in relation to doping in sports, but recently it has also been used with regard to cognitive enhancement in the context of education and exams. This paper analyses the enhancement-is-cheating argument by comparing sports and education, and by evaluating how the argument can be interpreted in both contexts. If cheating is understood as breaking the rules in order to (...) gain an unfair advantage over others, it can be argued that some enhancements are a form of cheating. This problem of cheating is, however, relatively easy to remedy by either changing the rules, or by instituting controls and sanctions. This does not, therefore, constitute a categorical objection to enhancement. A further analysis of the intuitions behind the enhancement-is-cheating argument, however, shows that if sports and education are understood as “practices”, with their own internal goods and standards of excellence, some potential problems of enhancement can be articulated. These concern the internal goods and standards of excellence that are characteristic of specific practices. Seen from this perspective, the important question is how enhancement technologies might be embedded in specific practices—or how they might corrode them. (shrink)

As in many parts of the world, Islam in Southern Philippines is generally seen as subjecting women to unfair treatment. The concept of gender justice is thought to be non-existent. Among the minority populations in the region are the Tausug of Sulu who practice an Islam that is heavily influenced by their pre-Islamic traditions, popularly known in the community as Adat or customary laws. This study, conducted from January to June 2004, documents and analyzes the influence of the traditional Islamic (...) practices of the Tausug in relation to women's rights and gender justice in marriage, divorce, polygamy, custody of children, inheritance, property rights and leadership; and makes recommendations regarding some reform initiatives that could improve the status of women and the general issue of gender justice in the Muslim communities in southern Philippines. The study found no violation of women's rights in the Tausug Islamic community and that gender justice actually exists. The Tausug believe that because of their strong and dynamic traditions, their practice or interpretation of Islam is more liberal and accommodating. Generally, compared with other Islamic communities in the area, the human rights situation of the women in Sulu is much better. Women were found to be enjoying considerable freedoms, including access to public office and other leadership positions. One could argue, therefore, that the Tausug community is a good example of an Islamic community where women's rights are respected and gender justice prevails. What remains to be done is to sustain this favorable environment and to safeguard it from certain sectors of the Islamic society and male chauvinists bent on undermining gender justice in the area. (shrink)

Introduction: The teacher-student relationship in medicine determines the bond established with the patient. Objective: This study was designed to compare if first and third year medical students at a university perceived incidents perpetrated by teachers as morally wrong. Materials and methods: A semi-structured survey was used with open and closed items; specifically, participants were asked to relate a morally wrong incident, classified to six categories. Results: 80.7% in the third-year students and 30.4% of the first-year students perceived incidents that involved (...) mostly auxiliary personnel and evaluations. Verbal abuse and unfair assessment were the categories mentioned the most. Discussion: A morally wrong incident is a general concept, differing from other studies that specifically analyze abuse, also evident in this concept. Conclusion: A lack of respect and justice could indicate a lack of moral commitment. (shrink)

This response to Barbara Herrnstein Smith's article, “The Chimera of Relativism: A Tragicomedy,” presents some thoughts on how the debates about “relativism” upon which Smith comments could be refigured in the light of this symposium's theme of “comparative relativism.” If the notion of relativism can be rendered relative unto itself, as the notion of a “comparative” relativism would seem to suggest, then how might one understand its “position” within the kinds of debates in which Smith's paper, by way (...) of commentary, also participates? In particular, if part of Smith's aim is to defuse some of the unfair thoughts that have fueled the antirelativist industry in academia, then how might one think of the character of such “anti-anti-“moves themselves? What manner of academic debate does a properly relative notion of relativity allow for? The response herein to these questions takes off from the obvious thought that, properly squared, relativism cannot be understood as a “position”—one that should or could be “defended,” albeit in the Geertzian “anti-anti-“mode that Smith's article seems sometimes to adopt. Rather, it would imply a somewhat different way out of the tribal deadlocks that Smith so elegantly helps put to rest (relativists vs. positivists, etc.); namely, a manner of debate in which a generalized relativity of thinking, including the relativity of that thought itself, would make a merit of academic opposition at all levels. This piece suggests, in other words, a manner of debating in which the “anti-” would be both proffered and received as a manner of compliment rather than attack. (shrink)

The use of statistics in medical research has been compared to a religion: it has its high priests, supplicants, and orthodoxy. Although the comparison may be more unfair to religion than to research, a useful lesson can nonetheless be drawn: the practice of clinical research may benefit—as does the spirit—from critical self-examination. Arguably, no aspect of the conduct of clinical trials is currently more controversial—and thus in as dire need of critical examination—than the use of placebo controls. The ethical and (...) scientific controversies associated with placebo-controlled trials, never far below the surface, have once again seized public attention. Clearly, concern about these issues within the professional community runs deep and wide, as evidenced by the volume of response generated by Kenneth Rothman and Karin Michels's recent Critique. Criticisms of the use of placebo controls in clinical research are scattered through the literatureo; our objective is to present the case against placebos in a compendious form that takes account of scientific and statistical as well as normative issues. (shrink)

There is strong sentiment for a policy which would exclude foreigners from access to organs from American cadaver donors. One common argument is that foreigners are free riders; since they are not members of the community whichgives organs, it would be unfair to allow them toreceive such a scarce resource.This essay examines the philosophical basis for the free rider argument, and compares that with the empirical data about organ donation in the U.S. The free rider argument ought not to be (...) used to exclude foreign nationals because it is based on fallacious assumptions about group membership, and how the giving community is defined. Polls show that even among the seventy-five per cent of Americans who support organ donation, only seventeen per cent had taken the small step of filling out donor cards. Therefore, it goes against logic to define the giving community as coextensive with American residency, while excluding foreigners who might well have become donors had they lived in countries which provided that option. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell famously disparaged Thomas Aquinas as having ‘little of the true philosophic spirit’, because ‘he does not, like the Platonic Socrates, set out to follow wherever the argument may lead.’ Like many of Russell's pronouncements, this is breathtakingly supercilious and unfair. Still, even an enthusiastic admirer of Aquinas may worry that there is something in it, that there is something wrong with religious ‘commitments’ in philosophy. I examine Russell's objection by comparing standards of permissibility in epistemology with standards of (...) permissibility in ethics, where these issues are better understood. I conclude that the epistemic standard behind Russell's criticism is no less contentious in epistemology than, say, direct utilitarianism is in ethics. (shrink)

Cost-effectiveness analysis is the standard analytical tool for evaluating the aggregate health benefits of treatments, interventions, or health programs. It works by comparing the ratio of costs and benefits of different alternatives. The lower the ratio, the more effective the treatment, intervention, or program. The use of cost-effectiveness analysis can ensure that scarce health care resources are allocated in a way that maximizes the satisfaction of health needs. According to a common objection, however, the use of cost-effectiveness analysis for setting (...) priorities in the allocation of health care resources may lead to unfair discrimination against people with disabilities.The aim of the first part of this .. (shrink)

As one of the most influential comparative philosophers of our time, Henry Rosemont, Jr. is known for his unrelenting criticisms against Western libertarian ideas, and for advocating ideas derived from classic Confucian thought. One of the criticisms against him is that his views are one-sided, and hence unfair to Western libertarian ideas. In this paper, I argue that Rosemont’s one-sidedness is deliberate. His theory is not intended to be a balanced account. I will illustrate that Rosemont’s way of conceiving (...) the human self is not peculiar to him, but characteristic of those who take philosophy as a way of life, such as Mencius and Sartre. I shall argue that their practices suggest a gong-fu perspective, with which we evaluate philosophical theories according to their functions in shaping people’s behaviors and with consideration of the context of their uses. (shrink)

In this article, I maintain that the social process of labour commodification, through which the individual capability to uphold a decent welfare is bound to participation in the labour market, poses a problem of justice from the republican prospective on freedom as non-domination. I first discuss the reasons we might hold that capitalism brings a form of systemic domination by virtue of one of its intrinsic features: unequal access to the means of production. Then, I argue for a minimum de-commodification (...) of labour power as a criterion of justice, adding that it should be conceived as a cosmopolitan proviso because states unfairly suffer from their limited economic capacity to neutralize capitalist systemic domination. Lastly, I compare the normative account of global justice that I am proposing in this article with sufficientarianism, with the capability approach, and with Thomas Pogge’s ‘Global Resources Dividend’. (shrink)

This paper has described three uses of Extreme Case formulationsto assert the strongest case in anticipation of non-sympathetic hearingsto propose the cause of a phenomenonto speak for the rightness (wrongness) of a practice.The interactants in the illustrations were engaged in several types of activities, among which were complaining, accusing, justifying, and defending. As concluding remarks, a few comments will be made about why participants use Extreme Case formulations in these activities.Part of the business of complaining involves portraying a situation as (...) a legitimate complainable. This may take the form of protraying the offense committed and/or the suffering endured in a way such that it would not be dismissed as minor. So as to legitimize a complaint and portray the complainable situation as worthy of the complaint, a speaker may portray the offense and/or the suffering with Extreme Case formulations. In both accusing and defending, participants ofyen present their strongest cases, including specifying Extreme Cases of their claims.Part of justifying a course of actions may involve portraying the precipitating circumstance as necessitating the action. The precipitating circumstance may be a problem circumstance which is portrayed as unfair, immoral, embarrassing, uncomfortable, or in some other way undesirable and/or intolerable. There is a shared assumption that the worse the problem, the more necessary it is to do something about it. In justifying, speakers use Extreme Case formulations to portray the circumstances that precipitated their actions as demanding their actions.A problem that participants have when engaged in, or reflecting on, conflicts, complaints, criticism, compliments, praise, etc. is to attribute the cause of the phenomenon. Who or what is responsible for the conflictual, complainable, praise-worthy state of affairs? One method that is used to determine what or who is responsible, i.e. to make an attribution, involves comparing the case in question to other similar cases. Through this procedure, persons determine that they are (are not) responsible for the state of affairsin questions. Extreme Case proportional formulations (‘everyone,’ ‘all,’ ‘every time’) are used to indicate that any individual member of that category is not responsible for the state of affairs; that responsibility is to be attributed elsewhere.The social order essentially is a moral order (Garfinkel, 1967). One of the ways of knowing what is acceptable and right is by finding out how people behave. There often is a shared assumption operating (one that is called into question on occasion): how people behave tells us what is the right way to behave. Proportional measures reporting the frequency or prevalence of practices are used to propose and substantiate the rightness and wrongness of those practices. Extreme Case formulations (‘all the time,’ ‘everybody,’ ‘no one’) propose behaviors are acceptable and right or unacceptable and wrong. (shrink)

The law of responsibility (compensation), which was formed around the concept of the ḍamān and was developed by the scholars within the system of furû‘ al-fiqh (substantive law) over time, constitutes one of the important parts of Islamic law. Although compensation law (ḍamān) was not addressed as a private subject in the first period fiqh literature, it is seen that the literature on this specific area started to emerge after the early period. It is the Hanafi jurists who first brought (...) together these issues that are scattered in the classical books of fiqh that are related to the law of responsibility. Compensation law took its classical form in the texts of the early periods and was shaped around the views of the founding imams of the Ḥanafī school (madhab). It has later been expanded with the fatwā and interpretations of the Sheikhs (mesāikh) of Hanafi in the type of waqi'at works. These works were a product of the need for the law to adapt to the new conditions. These issues, which are related to the compensation law in the Hanafi school have been covered as a special section (chapter) in the studies that are classified as waqi'at, such as Usrūshanī’s al-Fuṣūl fī al-muʿāmalat (Fuṣūl al-Usrūshanī), ʿImād al-Dīn al-Marginānī’s Fuṣūl al-iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām and Shaykh Badr al-Dīn’s Jāmiʿal-Fuṣūlāyn. Later, the topics discussed in these works were developed and continued, and ultimately separate works related to this field have been copyrighted. In this study, the kinds of development and expansion which are in the literature and related subjects will be discussed by examining the above-mentioned works. Therefore; first of all, the first examples of Hanafi jurists related the compensation will be analysed comparatively. Afterwards, the place of ad-Ḍamānāt fī al-furūʻ al-Ḥanafīyyah of Fuḍayl Chalābī (d. 991/1583), one of the Zenbillizade’s, will be addressed.Summary: The core idea of the law of responsibility, which constitutes one of the important parts of Islamic law, was stated in the Qur'an and Hadith, and then have accumulated by the contributions of the jurists (fuqaha), as they developed the idea of the law of responsibility within the furû‘ al-fiqh in relation to the systematic of the legal school (madhab) that they belonged to.These issues, which constitute one of the important parts of the law, were addressed by sprinkling among the topics in almost every part of classical fiqh books. In other words, the subject of ḍamān (responsibility) was not considered as a separate subject in the fiqh works of the first period. In this way, it is seen that the literature on compensation law started to emerge in the following periods, and at first several independent sections on this subject, and then separate works specific to this field, albeit limited in number, were written.It is the Ḥanafī jurists who first brought together these issues that are scattered in the classical fiqh books related to the law of responsibility. Compensation law, which took its classical form in the texts from early periods, shaped around the views of the pioneering imams of the Ḥanafī school, has been expanded with the fatwā and interpretations of the Sheikhs (mesāikh) of Ḥanafī in the waqi'at works, which is a product of the need for the law to adapt to new conditions. Firstly, one of the Ḥanafī jurists, Majd al-Dīn al-Usrūshanī (d. 637/1240) dealt with the responsibilities arising from the contract and unfair acts in the 29th section of his book named al-Fuṣūl fī al-muʿāmalat under the title “Types of Compensation Required to be Paid and Their Situation”. The method and system that Usrūshanī started in this work, the Ḥanafī jurisits ʿImād al-Dīn al-Marginānī in the Fuṣūl al-iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām and Shaykh Badr al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī Samāwnā in the Jāmiʿ al-Fuṣūlāyn continued to develop the compensation section in their books. Afterwards Fuḍayl Chalābī (d. 991/1583), one of the members of Zenbillizade’s family, enriched these issues and made it an individual work, named ad-Ḍamānāt fī al-furūʻ al-Ḥanafīyyah. Marginānī titled the issues that Usrūshanī had handled in the compensation section and systemised it even more by gathering the fatwās on the related issues under one heading. It is noteworthy to mention that when the compensation sections of both works are compared, the way the subjects handled are exactly the same. But unlike Usrūshanī, Marginānī added the compensation for damages to the fetus in the womb and the responsibility of the person who brought back the fleeing slave at the end of the chapter. On the other hand, unlike them, Shaykh Badr al-Dīn added only the responsibility of the person who found the lost item. Considering that almost all of the topics in the compensation section of Sheikh Badr al-Dīn existed exactly in the compensation section of Marginānī, and that most of them were stated in Usrūshanī’s al-Fuṣūl, it is necessary to say that all of these discussions are based on Usrūshanī as the main backbone of this particular subject and that his work has a unique place in the Islamic legal literature. Chalābī’s ad-Ḍamānāt, is the first work that was written as a separate book in the field of compensation law. Even though in some modern works claim that the work Ghānim al-Baghdādī’s (d. 1030/1620) book named Majma‘ al-ḍamānāt fī madhhab al-Imām al-A'zam Abī Ḥanīfa al-Nu'mān was the first written book in this field; it is known that Chalābī's ad-Ḍamānāt had been written before Baghdādī’s Majma‘ al-ḍamānāt. As a matter of fact, the work of Chalābī had been completed in 984 Hijra, and the Baghdādī’s Majma‘ al-ḍamānāt was completed in 1027 Hijra. Although the subject sequence in Baghdādī’s work is different; this work is regarded as a continuation of the same tradition.An examination of the systematic and the content of the work reveals that Chalabi’s ad-Ḍamānāt is the continuation of the type of writing that Usrūshanī started and developed by Marginānī and Shaykh Badr al-Dīn. When compared with the compensation sections of these works before him, Chalābī has added new compensation issues to his book that are not addressed in these three works; such as partnership, mudaraba, suretyship (kafāla) transfer (ḥawāla), peace, legal disability (hajr), freedom of trade (idhn) and testament. Among the works mentioned above, works out of Shaykh Badr al-Dīn’s Jāmiʿ al-Fuṣūlāyn and Baghdādī’s Majma‘ al-ḍamānāt are available as manuscripts in the libraries. Therefore, these works have not been used much in modern studies on compensation. In addition, the Chalābī's ad-Ḍamānāt is almost unknown. Although there is little information about this work in some bibliographic studies, it is noteworthy to state that this work is not used as a source in contemporary studies written in Arabic on compensation law. The fact that this work is available as manuscripts in Istanbul libraries is probably the reason for this outcome. It is also very difficult to say that this work is known and used sufficiently in studies written in Turkish.Usrūshanī’s al-Fuṣūl fī al-muʿāmalat and Marginānī’s Fuṣūl al-iḥkām are currently in the form of manuscripts, so there is no comprehensive study on the whole work and the compensation section. It is possible to see the compensation issues discussed in the work, since Shaykh Badr al-Dīn’s Jāmiʿ al-Fuṣūlāyn, which has been published as printed, was translated into Turkish by an editorial group under the presidency of H. Yunus Apaydın. In addition, Kemal Yıldız, who translated the compensation section in this translation, published this section in Jāmiʿal-Fuṣūlāyn as a separate book with the name of “Sources of the Jāmiʿ al-Fuṣūlāyn and Compensation in the Practice of Ḥanafī School”. Yıldız, first introduced the sources of the Jāmiʿ al-Fuṣūlāyn in the first part of this work and then translated the compensation section from beginning to end by adding his own explanations and evaluations around the subject during the second part. Even though some introductory information about the books of Usrūshanī and Marginānī is presented in Yıldız’s study, the absence of information on the contents of the compensation sections of these books does not allow the opportunity for the researchers to evaluate on the subject wholly. (shrink)

This paper argues that if motivation by rightness de re is praiseworthy, then so is motivation by rightness de dicto. I argue that these two types of moral motivation have been unfairly compared, in light of a widespread failure to appreciate the structural similarities between them. These structural similarities become clear when we think more carefully about the nature of motivation and about moral metaphysics. I then argue that the two types of moral motivation are on a par by discussing (...) a series of minimal pairs. I argue that in good cases, in which the agent succeeds in doing what she is motivated to do, both motivations seem praiseworthy, and that bad cases, in which the agent fails, arise for motivation by rightness de re in precisely the same way as they do for motivation by rightness de dicto. I then offer a way to evaluate the unsuccessful agents, according to which someone's motivations can still be praiseworthy even if her actions and moral beliefs are both blameworthy, and someone can have certain praiseworthy motivations while lacking others. On my view, most of us are deeply flawed agents who nonetheless have some redeeming features—including our moral motivations. (shrink)

While both economic and social considerations of fairness and equity play an important role in financial decision-making, it is not clear which of these two motives is more primal and immediate and which one is secondary and slow. Here we used variants of the ultimatum game to examine this question. Experiment 1 shows that acceptance rate of unfair offers increases when participants are asked to base their choice on their gut-feelings, as compared to when they thoroughly consider the available information. (...) In line with these results, Experiments 2 and 3 provide process evidence that individuals prefer to first examine economic information about their own utility rather than social information about equity and fairness, even at the price of foregoing such social information. Our results suggest that people are more economically rational at the core, but social considerations (e.g., inequality aversion) require deliberation, which under certain conditions override their self-interested impulses. (shrink)

A scholarly yet very readable analysis and criticism of Marxism according to the "Moscow orthodoxy," stressing problems of Marxist theory of knowledge, of science and of history, and virtually omitting consideration of Marxist economics. Attempting to be partisan without being unfair, the author devotes the final chapters to an exposition of democratic theory and compares it to Marxism. The obscurities of the democratic theory make the constructive argument less authoritative than the destructive criticisms. This does not, however, remove the main (...) value of what is an enlightening study of competing political philosophies.--R. G. S. (shrink)

It is really impossible to say anything worth saying about Plato in general within the limits of a single article. Indeed, the more one studies Plato the more impossible does it become—if the concept of degrees of impossibility may be used in a philosophical journal. The reasons for this are manifold. The first lies in the supreme greatness of Plato as a thinker. Hardly anyone who has made a serious effort to study Plato has escaped receiving the impression of him (...) as probably the greatest thinker of all ages. The difficulty is intensified by the particular form in which his greatness is conveyed to us. One may make a distinction, a relative distinction at least, between different philosophers in this respect. With some, their message is conveyed to us with comparative rapidity, even perhaps on the first careful reading, and subsequent study adds little except in the way of detail. Among these it would perhaps not be unfair to place Hume. Others, on first reading, will appear obscure and difficult, sometimes even repellent. It is only after a much more careful study that their real greatness emerges, and they may go on increasing in stature at every subsequent reading. Such, I believe, to be the experience of the majority of readers with Kant. Plato is almost unique in that he makes his impression in both ways. Almost everyone is captivated by him at first reading, but it is only to those who take the trouble of reading him again and again with the intellectual effort that he himself would have demanded. (shrink)

The Islamic thought has experienced many ruptures in history. One of them is the Mihna period. The main argument of the mihna period, which started during the reign of the Abbasid Khalifa Me'mun, was the issue of the khalq al-Qur'an. The leading figures of the period were dictated to accept the idea that the Qur'an was created. Those who took an opposing stance were oppressed and tortured. In this period, people like Ahmed b. Hanbal, who did not bow to oppresion, (...) were made heroic by the people. This time, the reverse Mihna period started and those who spoke about the people of the Qur'an were criticized. Many of the muhaddith considered the approach to the issue of the khalq al-Qur'an as a bid'ah. This situation has created a field of criticism for people and segments who do not like each other. For this reason, unfair perceptions have been created about some people and their authorities in the society have been targeted with unfounded claims. Therefore, it is important to consider the approaches of Islamic scholars or sects to the subject objectively and to evaluate them in this context. In this study, the approaches of Dâwûd az-Zâhirî (d. 270/884), the founder of the Zâhirî sect, who were negatively affected by the situation in question, and other Zâhirî scholars to 'khalq al-Qur'an' were examined. In addition to the perception made about them, it is aimed to determine the accuracy of the discourses attributed to them. In this context, first of all, the views attributed to them are (i) The Qur'an in our hands, which consists of paper and ink, is not created, whereas the Qur'an in the preserved tablet is not created. (ii) The Qur'an is muhdes (created). (iii) The Qur'an is muhdes, and it is a creature in terms of its pronunciation. (iv) When the Qur'an is recited, the pronunciation that occurs as a result of the movements made by the servant to extract the letters has been classified as creature. These discourses attributed to them were compared with the information found in the works of Zâhirî scholars and it was determined whether they were consistent or not. As a result of the researches, Dâwûd az-Zâhirî, who was in Nishapur during the years when the mihna process continued, expressed some discourses about the creation of the Qur'an; however, with the end of the mihna, it was concluded that he gave up his discourses in question. Ibn Abi Asim (d. 287/900), Ibn Niftawayh (d. 323/935), Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064), and Ibn al-Kaysarani (d. 507/1113), who are among the apparent scholars, have openly stated that the Qur'an is not a creature and they also blaspheme those who claim otherwise. In addition, it has been observed that the perception made independently of the correctness or falsity of the discourses attributed to them negatively affects the Zâhirî scholars in many ways. For example, it is because of this that Zâhirî scholars who are exposed to such perceptions lose value both in the eyes of the public and in the scientific assemblies. (shrink)

Fairness in sport is not just about assigning the top prizes to the worthiest competitors. It is also about the way the prize structure itself is organised. For many sporting competitions, although it may be acceptable for winners to receive more than losers, it can seem unfair for winners to take everything and for losers to get nothing. Yet this insight leaves unanswered some difficult questions about what stakes fairness requires and which principles of stakes fairness are appropriate for particular (...) competitions. In this article I specify a range of different principles of stakes fairness that could regulate sporting competitions. I also put forward a theoretical method for pairing up appropriate principles of stakes fairness with given sporting competitions. Specifically, I argue that the underlying rationales for holding sporting competitions can provide useful guides for identifying appropriate principles of stakes fairness. I then seek to clarify and work through some of the implications of this method for a sample of real world controversies over sporting prize structures. I also attempt to refine the method in response to two possible objections from indeterminacy and relativism. Finally, I compare and contrast my conclusions with more general philosophical debates about justice. (shrink)

In 1992, the United States Supreme Court, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, upheld the ruling in Roe v. Wade, namely that women have a right “to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State.”1 However, since this ruling, some states have imposed regulations that greatly limit this right by restricting access. Texas is a recent example of this. Two proposed restrictions in House Bill 2, which will be discussed (...) in detail below, will force all but eight clinics that are located in metropolitan areas to shut down. The U.S. Supreme Court put the proposed restrictions on hold in October 2014, allowing several clinics to remain open while the restrictions are being appealed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. If the restrictions are passed, however, those clinics will be forced to shut down and, as a result, many women in Texas will be required to travel more than 100 miles in order to access a safe and legal abortion. Much of the focus of these restrictions has been on women and rightly so. However, I want to turn the attention to physicians. The requirements exacerbate unfair treatment of abortion providers compared with other physicians. Abortion providers face threats from the public—some of which turn into violent attacks—and they are often ostracized by their fellow medical practitioners. There are so few abortion providers to begin with and the proposed requirements limit these physicians’ opportunities to practice the branch of medicine of their choosing. Although the HB 2 requirements may not result in an unconstitutional undue burden on physicians, the challenges created by the bill limit physicians’ abilities to provide abortions. As a result of these limits, HB 2 creates an unconstitutional undue burden for women seeking abortions by creating barriers directed at abortion providers and clinic staff who are willing and able to provide abortions. The first of the two controversial HB 2 requirements is the admitting privileges requirement: “A physician performing or inducing an abortion must, on the date the abortion is performed or induced, have active admitting privileges at a hospital that is located not further than 30 miles from the location at which the abortion is performed or induced.”2 The second requirement is the ambulatory surgical center requirement: “The minimum standards for an abortion facility must be equivalent to the minimum standards adopted under [Texas Health & Safety Code] [...] for ambulatory surgical centres.”3 In order to meet these state-mandated obligations, some abortion clinics would have to spend more than $1 million in upgrades if they wish to remain open. The District Court decided that the ambulatory surgical center requirement places an unconstitutional undue burden on women, and that the two requirements together place an undue burden on women in Texas and especially in the Rio Grande Valley where the nearest clinic is a couple hundred miles away.4 Later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision and argued, “the admitting privileges requirement is constitutional on its face.”5 While the regulations are being appealed, the Supreme Court granted a stay of injunction, allowing about twelve abortion clinics to reopen until a final decision regarding the regulations is made. The District Court ruled that the purpose of the two regulations was to create a substantial obstacle for women seeking abortions in Texas. While the defendants argued that the regulations were designed to make abortions safer and reduce risk, the Court decided that this was not the case. An abortion, especially a first-term abortion, is a very safe procedure and is safer than many other routine surgical procedures. As stated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, “Unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.”6 The undue burden in this case is imposed, not through restricting women’s access directly, but by restricting physicians’ freedom to perform abortions. The admitting privileges requirement has reduced the number of physicians who can perform abortions and the ambulatory surgical center requirement has reduced the number of clinics where abortions can be performed. The American Medical Association states, “[t]he Principles of Medical Ethics of the AMA do not prohibit a physician from performing an abortion in accordance with good medical practice and under circumstances that do not violate the law.”7 This means that physicians are not required to perform abortions, except in emergency situations, but can as long as the procedure is done safely and does not violate the law. The new Texas regulations, however, are so restrictive that few abortion providers, limited to only four urban areas, can legally perform abortions. Physicians do not have an absolute right to perform abortions as opposed to women who have an absolute right to have access to an abortion. Physicians do face many challenges that other professionals face in terms of obtaining qualifications and finding work. Abortion providers, however, face challenges that most other physicians do not. The restrictions imposed by these regulations exacerbate unfair treatment toward abortion providers and place further obstacles in their path in terms of providing the service they want and are qualified to provide. Both abortion clinics and abortion providers are being treated differently from other medical clinics and physicians. For instance, “grandfathering of existing facilities and the granting of waivers from specific requirements is prohibited for abortion providers, although other types of ambulatory surgical facilities are frequently granted waivers or are grandfathered.”8 Many abortion clinics cannot afford the necessary upgrades. Furthermore, it is extremely expensive to open a brand new clinic that complies with the ambulatory surgical center requirements. Being grandfathered in would be the only option available to abortion clinics that cannot afford the upgrade. However, unfair treatment of abortion clinics and providers is preventing those clinics from being grandfathered into the new system. As a result, many abortion clinics may be forced to close. Admitting privileges are proving difficult or impossible for physicians both to obtain and, for those who have already been granted privileges, to keep. Dr. Sherwood Lynn, an obstetrician-gynecologist who has performed abortions for decades, describes the process of obtaining admitting privileges and the difficulties abortion providers face. After sending in an application a physician must wait for the hospital to send them the required materials, “but if the address of the practice on the application is of an abortion provider or clinic, [the hospital] won’t send [them] the package of materials required. [They] simply can’t apply.”9 Dr. Lynn and several other physicians have surmised that hospitals are only withholding privileges from qualified physicians who perform abortions and that other physicians do not face this discriminatory treatment. Hospitals have also revoked privileges granted to physicians after learning that the physicians perform abortions. For instance, in Texas two doctors, “received notices [...] informing them that their admitting privileges to the University General Hospital of Dallas have been revoked, with the hospital’s CEO claiming the hospital was unaware they were providing abortion care and that the hospital believed such care would damage its reputation.”10 What is curious about this revocation is that, “federal and state laws [...] forbid hospitals from discriminating against doctors who perform abortions,” and yet hospitals are clearly doing just that.11 Dr. Pamela Richter, another abortion provider in Texas, had her temporary admitting privileges revoked with no explanation and because of this, the clinic where she performed abortions, Reproductive Services, can no longer provide abortions at all.12 As the hospital gave no reason for the revocation, it not clear Dr. Richter’s privileges were revoked because she performs abortions. Dr. Richter, however, has performed over 17,000 abortions and her privileges were revoked soon after HB 2 was introduced.13 According to the Texas Hospital Association, giving admitting privileges to doctors who do not work for the hospital is expensive and time-consuming but this does not account for the fact that hospitals are revoking previously granted privileges from physicians whom they learn are providing abortion services.14 As mentioned previously, the District Court found that the admitting privileges requirement and the ambulatory surgical center requirement do not further ensure the health and safety of women undergoing an abortion. Several physicians have testified to this fact. Dr. Lynn stated in an interview: The admitting privileges requirements are [...] absolutely unnecessary. If you have a number of patients waiting for procedures, and something happens and a patient needs to be transferred to a hospital, you’re not going to leave everyone else and go to the hospital. That makes no sense. You’re going to refer that person to a gynecologist at the hospital. There is no safety issue involved here. If a patient shows up with an emergency, every hospital is required to admit that patient. They have to by law.15 It is rare that complications will arise from an abortion performed in a clinic. Dr. Richter, for example, has performed more than 17,000 abortions and not once had to send a patient to a hospital because of complications resulting from the procedure. According to Dr. Lynn even if abortion providers were granted privileges to hospitals, it is unlikely that they will exercise them. In essence, having admitting privileges at a hospital does nothing to further ensure the safety of an already safe procedure. The only result of the admitting privileges requirement is to limit certain physicians’ ability to perform legal abortions. Not only do the HB 2 requirements fail to further ensure the health and safety of women, the HB 2 requirements may actually create more health risks to women who cannot access the eight remaining clinics. The first risk is that the remaining clinics would have an influx of patients that they may not be able to handle, forcing women to wait longer for an appointment. As stated by the District Court, “[e]ven assuming every woman in Texas who wants an abortion [...] could travel to one of the four metropolitan areas where abortions will still be available, the cumulative results of HB 2 are that, at most, eight providers would have to handle the abortion demand of the entire state.”16 Furthermore, “[t]hat the State suggests that these seven or eight providers could meet the demand of the entire state stretches credulity.”17 Abortion is a time sensitive procedure. It is safest when performed early in a pregnancy. The increase in patients to these remaining clinics, assuming all women in Texas can access them, will increase wait times and may force women to have abortions later in pregnancy. In the worst-case scenario, a woman would not see an abortion provider at all before viability. Such instances may be rare, but they are possible. In such cases, women’s access to legal abortions becomes impossible and thereby violate the ruling in Roe. Clinics may be able to avoid the aforementioned problems if they hire more physicians. However, there are two barriers to hiring more physicians. First, as mentioned previously, admitting privileges to Texas hospitals are difficult, if not impossible, for abortion providers to obtain. Second, given the negative treatment of abortion providers by anti-abortion groups, many physicians are not willing to perform abortions. The harassment abortion providers face is unique to those physicians and many physicians will not perform abortions for that reason. In an article published in the Austin Chronicle, anti- abortion activist Abby Johnson, “discusses how her group investigated appraisal district records to find the new location of where an Austin abortion physician plans to work.”18 Johnson states, “These abortionists are feeling the pressure from the pro-life movement in Texas. I think they feel like they’re on the run. And that’s how we want to keep it.”19 If the HB 2 requirements are passed and there remain at most eight abortion providers in Texas, these activists will concentrate on those clinics and, “the dangerous impact of their intimidation tactics will be exacerbated.”20 Even if the number of physicians needed to meet the demand in Texas can obtain admitting privileges and work at one of the remaining clinics, they may choose not to do such work because they are putting themselves at risk. The harm abortion providers face from such anti-abortion groups is not unique to Texas. There are stories from all over the country and from other countries where abortion is legal of physicians receiving death threats. Dr. George Tiller, an abortion provider in Kansas, was killed outside his church and had received numerous death threats prior to this. The HB 2 requirements are making it so that abortion providers either cannot provide their services any longer or will face increased threats and increased danger to themselves. Physicians are allowed to conscientiously object to providing medical interventions in certain circumstances for moral and religious reasons. However, there are limits on this right. According to the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, “[w]hen conscientious refusals conflict with moral obligations that are central to the ethical practice of medicine, ethical care requires that the physician provide care despite reservations or that there be resources in place to allow the patient to gain access to care in the presence of conscientious refusal.”21 I would argue fear for one’s safety in the face of immediate threats is perhaps a stronger ground on which to refuse to provide care than a personal belief that abortion is immoral or against one’s religion. ACOG also states, “[p]roviders with moral or religious objections should either practice in proximity to individuals who do not share their views or ensure that referral processes are in place so that patients have access to the service that the physician does not wish to provide.”22 This responsibility has been largely disputed by the medical community but in cases of rape, incest, and health risks to women, referrals must be made without exception. However, under the requirements of HB 2, working in proximity to an abortion provider may not be possible because they are so geographically limited. Referrals are supposed to be made within reason. Some areas of Texas, such as the Rio Grande Valley, are up to 200 miles away from the nearest clinic that would remain open if HB 2 is passed. Referrals may simply not be feasible given the geographical distances and the decreasing number of available physicians. As mentioned above, there are two risks to the health and safety of women as a result of HB 2. The second of these is that if a woman cannot access one of the remaining clinics, she may seek out a more convenient but illegal and unsafe abortion, which is far more likely to result in a dangerous complication. Dr. Lynn states, “[b]ecause of the restrictions lawmakers impose, women will seek abortions illegally, and we’re going to see a rise in septic abortions.”23 Some areas of Texas might effectively revert back to a pre-Roe era where abortions were performed in unsanitary conditions by unqualified people resulting in dangerous medical complications far more often than legal abortion procedures do now. Physicians like Dr. Lynn who want to prevent this from happening generally cannot do so without facing legal sanction. Physicians have a duty to provide safe medical care and if they cannot obtain admitting privileges, they cannot exercise this duty. ACOG released a statement expressing their objections to the new requirements. They state that HB 2 is, “plainly intended to restrict the reproductive rights of women in Texas through a series of requirements that improperly regulate medical practice and interfere with the patient-physician relationship.”24 Executive Vice-President of ACOG, Hal C. Lawrence III stated: The Texas bills set a dangerous precedent of a legislature telling doctors how to practice medicine and how to care for individual patients. ACOG opposes legislative interference, and strongly believes that decisions about medical care must be based on scientific evidence and made by licensed medical professionals, not the state or federal government.25 Abortion is one of only a few areas of medicine where the legislature imposes so many regulations restricting particular physicians’ ability to practice medicine. Not only are abortions providers being regulated by the state, they are also facing clear discrimination from others within the medical community. The state is closing down clinics that do not meet the ambulatory surgical center requirements and hospitals are denying physicians admitting privileges because they perform abortions. In summary, abortion providers are being discriminated against both by the legislature and other members of the medical community. Other physicians who do not perform abortions are not denied admitting privileges on discriminatory grounds. Clinics that cannot afford upgrades to become an ambulatory surgical center are being grandfathered in, while abortion clinics are being forced to close down. Ob-Gyns who conscientiously object to performing abortions and who are not located in close proximity to at least one abortion provider cannot effectively fulfill their duty to refer patients. Lastly, given the barriers these regulations will create, there will likely be a rise in complications resulting from abortions provided under grossly unsafe conditions. Physicians, whose duty it is to provide safe and effective medical care, are being denied the right to exercise this duty. While this denial may not be unconstitutional, it is certainly unjust and discriminatory and creates obstacles that other physicians do not face. Most importantly, these obstacles are creating an undue burden for women. The HB 2 requirements do not increase the health and safety of abortions; all they do is create substantial obstacles for women. In light of these observations, the requirements seem to me to be in clear violation of Casey, in which it was decided that, “[u]nnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on that right.”26 These regulations do just what Casey was meant to prohibit and this is accomplished through limiting physicians’ ability to practice safe abortions across the state of Texas. Therefore, the HB 2 requirements may not impose an undue burden on doctors but they do impose an undue burden on women. PDF available: Rachel Hill, "Texas HB 2," Voices in Bioethics. References: 1 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, pg. 2. 2 Whole Women’s Health v. Lakey, pg. 2. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., 4. 5 Ibid., 2. 6 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, pg. 16 7 AMA Code of Medical Ethics, “Opinion 2.01 – Abortion,” American Medical Association. 8 Whole Women’s Health v. Lakey, pg. 10. 9 Dr. Sherwood Lynn, “A Texas Ob-Gyn Details the Horrific Consequences of Abortion Restrictions,” Cosmopolitan. 10 Feminist Newswire, “Texas Hospitals Revoke Admitting Privileges to Abortion Providers,” Feminist Majority Foundation Blog. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Glenn Hegar, “Texas Hospital Association’s Statement of Opposition to Section 2 of the Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 5,” Texas Hospital Association. 15 Dr. Lynn, “A Texas Ob-Gyn.” 16 Whole Women’s Health v. Lakey, pg. 10. 17 Ibid. 18 Mary Tuma, “Undercover Audio Reveals Anti-Abortion Tactics: Anti-abortion activists monitor and track providers, patients,” Austin Chronicle. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Committee on Ethics, “The Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Reproductive Medicine,” The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. 22 Ibid. 23 Dr. Lynn, “A Texas Ob-Gyn.” 24 “Ob-Gyns Denounce Texas Abortion Legislation: Senate Bill 1 and House Bill 2 Set Dangerous Precedent,” The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. 25 Ibid. 26 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, pg. 16. (shrink)