Death concept, death definition, death criterion and death test pluralism has been described by some as a problematic approach. Others have claimed it to be a promising way forward within modern pluralistic societies. This article describes the New Jersey Death Definition Law and the Japanese Transplantation Law. Both of these laws allow for more than one death concept within a single legal system. The article discusses a philosophical basis for these laws starting from John Rawls' understanding (...) of comprehensive doctrines, reasonable pluralism and overlapping consensus. It argues for the view that a certain legal pluralism in areas of disputed metaphysical, philosophical and/or religious questions should be allowed, as long as the disputed questions concern the individual and the resulting policy, law or acts based on the policy/law, do not harm the lives of other individuals to an intolerable extent. However, while this death concept, death definition, death criterion and death test pluralism solves some problems, it creates others. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the concept of urban social sustainability to explore main themes and dimensions by a comprehensive comparative overview. The first objective of this research is to clarify the social sustainability definitions, principles and frameworks through reviewing the existing literature. Later, it attempts to recognize the major factors affecting social sustainability in urban context focusing on satisfaction of human needs. As a result, to connect between theory and practice, Maslow hierarchy of needs has been chosen on the (...) subject of human needs in urbanism. Finally, spatial qualities made by reflecting these needs to space designing such as Comfort, Privacy, Legibility, Diversity, Public Participation, Visual Richness, Sense of Place and Identity. In addition, reviewing studies conducted in different urban scales (Micro/Medium/Macro units) revealed that previous attempts on urban social sustainability emphasized more on Macro Scale (city) and Medium Scale (Neighborhood) units especially emphasizing on urban renewal and regeneration strategies especially in developed countries. (shrink)

This paper analyses two definitions of contingency. Both definitions have been widely accepted and used as to identify contingent events. One of them is primarily of a philosophical character, whereas the other is more commonly used in mathematics. Evidently, these two definitions do not describe the same set of phenomena, and neither of them determines the completely intuitive notion of contingency.Namely, carefully selected examples testify that the first definition is too narrow and the second too wide. These facts have (...) certain epistemological consequences. They must, therefore, serve as a warning for using the definitions only in a restrictive and cautious way when detecting random beliefs – those we cannot identify as knowledge. (shrink)

The modern (Russellian) theory of definition conceives definitions as abbreviations, so that the question of adequateness (let alone of truth-value) of definitions becomes meaningless. In this paper we show that beside Russellian conception of definitions understood as abbreviations, there is an Aristotelian conception, which exploits the notion of essence and that this conception can be rehabilitated from the standpoint of the modern logic (in particular by means of Pavel Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic). Also Carnap’s ‘explication’ indicates that what we (...) feel to be a definition is frequently distinct from a Russellian definition. (shrink)

The article focuses on the concept of the state in the works of the German sociologist M. Weber and his contemporary, the anarchist G. Landauer. Specifically, it is commonly thought that Weber has a unique interpretation of the state, its nature, and inalienable characteristics. This Weberian approach did not fit into any of the traditions that existed at that time in Germany (for example, represented by H. Kelsen, G. Jellinek, and O. von Gierke). However, the author of the article (...) tries to demonstrate that three main Weberian aspects of the state — 1) the monopoly on legitimate physical violence, 2) the relationship of domination, which is accompanied by a minimum desire to obey, and 3) the chance for the regular reproducibility of these relationships — are consonant with Landauer’s concept of the state. This discovered conceptual affinity allows one to look at Weber’s sociology from new angles, without being impacted by the personal beliefs of the German scientist, who very critically treated anarchism as a socio-political movement. In the final section of the paper, the author discusses the modern project of “anarchist sociology”, which also uses Weberian methodology. The paper argues that “anarchist sociology” might be a promising social science with ts unique vision of several key sociological topics, such as domination, power, or social inequality. (shrink)

The paper explains and differentiates the concept of ‘fact’ in the legal setting. Fact and evidence, fact/falsity distinguished; fact and law considered -- a real difference or a pragmatic device? Questions of fact and degree considered, in themselves and in the context of jury trial and of appeals. Primary fact, factual inferences from primary fact, questions of classification of fact are considered. Whether inference is supported by evidence, and whether classification is correct may be questions of law. Issues of (...) fact and opinion, fact and comment, relative to freedom of speech, defamation etc: no clear distinction available. Legal problems concerning absence of workable distinctions. (shrink)

Definitions are traditionally seen as abbreviations, as tools for notational convenience that do not increase inferential power. From a Philosophy of Mathematical Practice point of view, however, there is much more to definitions. For example, definitions can play a role in problem solving, definitions can contribute to understanding, sometimes equivalent definitions are appreciated differently, and so on. This chapter reviews the literature on definitions and (to a certain extent) concepts in mathematical practice. It is structured according to four themes through (...) which definitions (and concepts) in mathematical practice have been studied. These themes concern (1) the nature of definitions, (2) whether and how concepts evolve, (3) definitions and concepts from a communal perspective, and (4) different values relating to definitions and concepts. (shrink)

In his recent article, ``Self-Consciousness'’, George Bealer has set outa novel and interesting argument against functionalism in the philosophyof mind. I shall attempt to show, however, that Bealer's argument cannotbe sustained.In arguing for this conclusion, I shall be defending three main theses.The first is connected with the problem of defining theoreticalpredicates that occur in theories where the following two features arepresent: first, the theoretical predicate in question occurswithin both extensional and non-extensional contexts; secondly, thetheory in question asserts that the relevant (...) theoretical states enterinto causal relations. What I shall argue is that a Ramsey-styleapproach to the definition of such theoretical terms requires twodistinct quantifiers: one which ranges over concepts, and theother which ranges over properties in the world.My second thesis is a corollary: since the theories on whichBealer is focusing have both of the features just mentioned, and sincethe method that he employs to define theoretical terms in his argumentagainst functionalism does not involve both quantifiers that range overproperties and quantifiers that range over concepts, that method isunsound.My final thesis is that when a sound method is used, Bealer's argumentagainst functionalism no longer goes through.The structure of my discussion is as follows. I begin by setting out twoarguments – the one, a condensed version of Bealer's argument, andthe other, an argument that parallels Bealer's argument very closely.The parallel argument leads to a conclusion, however, that, rather thanbeing merely somewhat surprising, seems very implausible indeed. Forwhat the second argument establishes, if sound, is that there can betheoretical terms that apply to objects by virtue of their first-orderphysical properties, but whose meaning cannot be defined via aRamsey-style approach.Having set out the two parallel arguments, I then go on to focus uponthe second, to determine what is wrong with it. My diagnosis will bethat the problem with the argument arises from the fact that it involvesdefining a theoretical term that occurs both inside and outside ofopaque contexts, for the method employed fails to take into account thefact that the types of entities that are involved in the relevanttruthmakers are different when a sentence occurs within an extensionalcontext from those involved when a sentence occurs within anon-extensional context.I then go on to discuss how one should define a theoretical term thatoccurs within such theories, and I argue that in such a case one needstwo quantifiers, ranging over different types of entities – on theone hand, over properties and relations, and the other, over concepts. Ithen show that, when such an approach is followed, the argument inquestion collapses.I then turn to Bealer's argument against functionalism, and I show,first, that precisely the same method of defining theoretical terms canbe applied there, and, secondly, that, when this is done, it turns outthat that argument is also unsound.Next, I consider two responses that Bealer might make to my argument,and I argue that those responses would not succeed.Finally, I conclude by asking exactly where the problem lies in the caseof Bealer's argument. My answer will be that it is not simply the factthat one is dealing with a theoretical term that occurs in bothextensional and non-extensional contexts. It is rather the combinationof that feature together with the fact that the theory in questionasserts that the relevant type of theoretical state enters into causalrelations. For the first of these features means that the Ramseysentence for the theory must involve quantification over concepts, whilethe presence of the second feature means that the Ramsey sentence mustinvolve quantification over properties in the world, and so no attemptto offer a Ramsey-style account of the meaning of the relevanttheoretical term can succeed unless one employs both quantification overconcepts and quantification over properties. Bealer, however, in hisargument against functionalism, uses a method of defining theoreticalterms that does not involve both types of quantification, and it isprecisely because of this that his argument does not in the end succeed. (shrink)

définitions de lege ferenda des décisions de défaut-congé et de radiation grâce à l'analyse des concepts et expressions biffure, défaut-congé et radiation. Illustrations en matières de procédure civile et sociale congolaises Lukusa Nsambayi.

Aristotelova koncepcia definície v Druhých analytikách nepredstavuje len zásadný komponent dokazovacej vedy, ale v rôznych podobách je tiež zosobnená v spisoch jednotlivých vied a významným spôsobom ovplyvňuje podobu jeho filozofických a vedeckých skúmaní. I keď je systematickému výkladu spôsobov definovania venovaná celá druhá kniha tohto spisu, plné vyjasnenie účelu definícií sa ukáže až v širšom kontexte Aristotelovho modelu vedy. Cieľom štúdie je systematická interpretácia konceptu definície a predstavenie dvoch hlavných postupov definovania na podklade metódy vedeckého skúmania v spisoch Organonu.Podobu definície (...) do značnej miery utvára povaha objektov, ktoré vstupujú do vedeckého skúmania. V prvom rade je nutné zabezpečiť definície elementárnych objektov a vlastností, ktoré konštituujú predmet vedy. V tomto význame vystupujú definície ako jeden z bezprostredných počiatkov vedeckého sylogizmu. Postavenie takzvaných bezprostredných definícií je o to význačnejšie, že ich úlohou nie je len fixovať významy elementárnych pojmov vedeckého jazyka. Aristotelova metodológia vedy je vystavaná na esencialistických základoch a definície tak majú za úlohu zachycovať všetky nutné vlastnosti popisovaného druhu objektov, pričom zároveň z výmeru vylúčia tie vlastnosti, ktoré sú pre neho náhodné. Z toho nasleduje, že jednému druhu nutne náleží len jedna úplná a adekvátna definícia, čo vedcovi umožňuje vytvoriť spoľahlivý základ pre dokazovaciu fázu skúmania zaistením pravdivých premís, ktoré vyčerpávajúcim spôsobom popisujú svoj objekt.Na opačnom konci procesu vedeckého skúmania stoja sylogistické definície. Na rozdiel od prvého typu objektu definície, ich predmety sú komplexné a esencia nie je zjavná. Nakoľko cieľom definície je práve zobrazenie esencie, Aristoteles používa dôkaz ako nástroj jej zobrazenia. V tomto kontexte uvádza príklady prírodných fenoménov zatmenia a hromu, ktorých príčina je od nich odlišná, čo vytvára potrebu tohto špecifického postupu ich uchopenia. Na podklade Aristotelovho výkladu, štúdia analyzuje tieto dva typy definovania ako integrálnu súčasť vedeckej metódy a prirodzený dôsledok potreby adekvátneho postihnutia esencie predmetu skúmania. (shrink)

"Philosophical discussion of the notion of existence, or being, has centered on two main problems which have not always been very clearly distinguished. First, there is the problem of what we are to say about the existence of fictitious objects, such as centaurs, dragons, and Pegasus; second, there is the problem of what we are t o say about the existence of abstract objects, such as qualities, relations, and numbers. Both problems have tempted philosophers to say that there are inferior (...) sorts of existence a s well as the ordinary straightforward sort, and they therefore often suggest that we use the word "being" to cover both kinds but restrict "existence" to "being" of the common, non-fictitious, non-abstract sort. (Sometimes the term "reality" is proposed for "existence" or for "being.") T he problems of fiction and abstraction are different, how ever, for there are both real and fictitious abstractions. For example, the integer between two and four is real, but the integer between two and three is fictitious. On the other hand, there are both concrete and abstract fictions; for example, the winged horse of Bellerophon and the integer between two and three. Accordingly, philosophers have often dealt with the two problems in quite different ways and perhaps ought to do so. While these are the two main problems, there are others, f or example, that of what we are to say of the being of objects which have not yet begun, or have now ceased, to exist. The history of this subject, moreover, has been tangled with theological issues, to which it will be necessary to refer at certain points.". (shrink)

During the last hundred years medical language has been influenced by scientific and technological progress. As a result uncertainty in medical communication is increasing. This may have serious consequences not only for health care delivery but also for medical science. Disease classification, assessment of the validity of epidemiological investigations and comparison of the results of various investigations are examples of what will become less secure. The purpose of the article is to emphasise a main source of uncertainty — the problem (...) of interpreting definitions. Two issues of interpretation are explored. One concerns the logical status of a statement and the other the function of a statement. It is concluded that the security of medical language can be increased through the elucidation of the logical status and functions of statements making up medical concepts. (shrink)

In this paper Schlick's use of the term "concept" is analyzed and also secondarily the term "content." An unambiguous and straightforward use of such a basic term as "concept" which is of great importance in Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre in part should determine the value of Schlick's philosophical writing. Concepts are, for Schlick, either pure thought objects or signs. As thought objects, they do not exist at all. I t is shown that as thought objects concepts can be interpreted as (...) sets and that as signs they must be understood as physical designators. Concepts are thought by conceptual functions which Schlick compared with Brentano's intentions. A critical interpretation of conceptual functions is given. Additionally Schlick's theory of defining concepts is analyzed. (shrink)

Modern slavery is a major topic of concern in international law and global governance, in civil society, and in academic debates. Yet, what does modern slavery mean, and can its highly different forms be covered in a single concept? This paper discusses these questions in three steps: First, it develops common definitions of modern slavery. Second, it discusses critical rejections of these definitions. The two camps that adhere to the definitions of modern slavery, and that reject them, respectively, face (...) certain limits. In a third step, the paper takes up with the limits and the strengths of both. It suggests that the limits of definitions of modern slavery can be overcome by critical approaches; and that the limits of critical approaches can be overcome by definitions of modern slavery. The key is their integration into a human rights frame. Ultimately, the paper proposes an approach to modern slavery that neither relies on a binary distinction between slavery and non-slavery, nor does it strive for the abolishment of the concept of modern slavery. Rather, the paper calls for a normatively and contextually embedded approach within the human rights frame. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Exploring Visual Culture: Definitions, Concept, ContextsPaul DuncumExploring Visual Culture: Definitions, Concept, Contexts, edited by Matthew Rampley. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005, 257 pp., $32.00 paper.I review this new introductory text in light of its competition as a textbook for undergraduates and as an introduction for graduate students. Other such texts include Barnard, Elkins, Mirzeoff, Walker and Chaplin, and Sturken and Cartwright,1 which appears to be the (...) most widely used. Rampley's anthology stands up well among these competitors, especially for those who wish to transition from art to contemporary popular visual culture rather more gently than other texts that, for many students, might come as too abrupt a disjuncture from mainstream practice in schools of art and design. As Matthew Rampley states in his excellent introduction, if the book has an original contribution to make, it is to situate an acknowledgment of traditional practices and issues into the makeup of visual culture studies. Unlike other texts, mentioned above, which tend to stress screen and print media, Rampley's agenda is to remind readers of the historical origins of many recent developments as well as the contribution of cultural forms other than two-dimensional ones. Thus, chapters are included that trace the history and continuing contribution of traditional media; art, design, craft, and architecture each receive individual chapters. MacDonald, for example, describes the complex meanings of craft and its relationship to fine art and design from classical times to today, as well as summarizes the characteristics and politics of craft today. Furthermore, the influence of technology is charted principally through conventional art, and the chapters on photography, film, and fashion are likewise cast largely in terms of historical accounts of whether these forms should be considered to be art.The historical bias is equally evident in the pictures used to illustrate the text. While, for example, there are contemporary popular images, such [End Page 118] as a cover of the Sun newspaper and a photograph of Punks, there are as many crossover images—postcards of famous art portraits and a Michelangelo on a T shirt—as well as many conventional artworks. Delacroix, Corbert, Rauschenberg, David, Fuseli, and Van Goyen are each featured. Some of the popular images are also historical, such as George Mêlées 1902 classic film Voyage to Moon and advertisements from the1930s.Sometimes the historical material takes up much of the space, with recent developments given only cursory treatment, and sometimes the material is dealt with in ways that seem rather old-fashioned to this reader. For example, Glyn Davis's chapter on photography and film is primarily a potted historical account of the relationships between these two cultural forms and art. Further, Davis does not just describe the arguments for and against their inclusion as art but is clearly engaged with these issues himself, an engagement that many proponents of visual culture would find rather quaint—that is, rather less interesting than the particular contribution that these forms make to contemporary life and for whom the question, "Is it art?" is no longer of any particular interest. This art orientation also colors Davis's view of Hollywood films. Clearly preferring "art" films, he completely ignores the role of popular film in exploring the fears, anxieties, beliefs, and so on of the wider public. By contrast, Richard Williams argues against architecture as a form of art, with its limited concerns with aesthetics, style, and canonical buildings, in favor of architecture as discourse and spatial experience. He is more interested in the reception of architecture than its production—first with architecture as signs, as meanings that are mutable, contingent, and arbitrary; and, secondly, as ordinary urban lived experience, with how architecture is but one element within the experience of urban environments.Typical of the avoidance of technical terms in the book as a whole, Williams beautifully describes the difference between structuralism and poststructuralism without once mentioning either of these terms, and in a chapter on architecture he manages to use the term "postmodern" only once. Similarly, in Neil Mulholland's chapter on representation and realism, cultural border crossing and indigenization are both described, albeit briefly, though without recourse to these terms... (shrink)

Ralph Johnson's Manifest Rationality (2000) is a major contribution to the field of informal logic, but the concept of argument that is central to its project suffers from a tension between the components that comprise it. This paper explores and addresses that tension by examining the implications of each of five aspects of the definition of ‘argument’.

in Encyclopedia of Consciousness, ed. William P. Banks, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming in 2009.

BACKGROUND: Ontologies play a major role in life sciences, enabling a number of applications, from new data integration to knowledge verification. SNOMED CT is a large medical ontology that is formally defined so that it ensures global consistency and support of complex reasoning tasks. Most biomedical ontologies and taxonomies on the other hand define concepts only textually, without the use of logic. Here, we investigate how to automatically generate formal concept definitions from textual ones. We develop a method that (...) uses machine learning in combination with several types of lexical and semantic features and outputs formal definitions that follow the structure of SNOMED CT concept definitions. RESULTS: We evaluate our method on three benchmarks and test both the underlying relation extraction component as well as the overall quality of output concept definitions. In addition, we provide an analysis on the following aspects: How do definitions mined from the Web and literature differ from the ones mined from manually created definitions, e.g., MeSH? How do different feature representations, e.g., the restrictions of relations' domain and range, impact on the generated definition quality?, How do different machine learning algorithms compare to each other for the task of formal definition generation?, and, What is the influence of the learning data size to the task? We discuss all of these settings in detail and show that the suggested approach can achieve success rates of over 90%. In addition, the results show that the choice of corpora, lexical features, learning algorithm and data size do not impact the performance as strongly as semantic types do. Semantic types limit the domain and range of a predicted relation, and as long as relations' domain and range pairs do not overlap, this information is most valuable in formalizing textual definitions. CONCLUSIONS: The analysis presented in this manuscript implies that automated methods can provide a valuable contribution to the formalization of biomedical knowledge, thus paving the way for future applications that go beyond retrieval and into complex reasoning. The method is implemented and accessible to the public from: https://github.com/alifahsyamsiyah/learningDL. (shrink)

Nicolas Pujol | : L’auteur montre, à partir d’une analyse critique de la catégorie de « sacré », que le modèle d’intégration de la spiritualité à l’hôpital proposé par Kenneth I. Pargament véhicule des normativités qui peuvent générer des tensions éthiques sur le plan de la clinique. Cet article rappelle qu’une catégorie comme celle de « spiritualité » doit demeurer un outil opérationnel qui participe à la connaissance du monde, et que, pour cela, elle doit sans cesse faire l’objet de (...) questions et d’évaluation de la part de ceux et celles qui l’utilisent. | : The author of the article proposes a critical analysis of the way in which Kenneth I. Pargament approaches the concept of “sacred” to define “spirituality” in the medical context. It shows how his definition of “spirituality” using the concept of “sacred” potentially creates ethical tensions in the hospital. “Spirituality” has to remain an “operational tool” and must always be examined before being used by care professionals. (shrink)

The article offers an analysis of Józef Bocheński's studies of the concept of nation. Bocheński acknowledges that there are difficulties in defining a nation. After that he claims that he will attempt to propose a definition of the Polish nation. Nation is a social group centered around some cultural ideal. The analysis shows that Bocheński did not avoid serious logical problems. First of all, he constantly falls into a circular reasoning. Furthermore, it is called into question if it (...) makes sense to refer to a cultural ideal or ideology while defining a nation. Is not such an attempt essentially bound to become circular? A doubt is also raised whether nowadays, in the face of constant migration of people and cultural ideals, one can continue to reasonably talk about nations. (shrink)

Much of the scholarship on Kant’s theory of concept formation has focused on the question of whether his theory suffers from circularity, i. e., whether it presupposes the very concepts whose origin it should explain. In this article, I defend Kant against a well-known objection raised by Hannah Ginsborg. Ginsborg, I argue, overlooks the relatively narrow aim of Kant’s theory of concept formation. Kant explicitly frames it as an account of a concept’s inherent generality, or form. However, (...) Ginsborg’s objection is not about a concept’s form; it concerns the concept’s content. Moreover, Kant addresses the issue that she raises in his theory of definitions, which explains how a concept’s content can be revised and perfected. Kant considered all empirical concepts to be incomplete and imprecise. For this reason, he denied that they can be properly defined. Kant also did not regard the content of empirical concepts as fixed or permanent. Indeed, he expected that we would continually expand and revise their content on the basis of experience. I argue that these facts, along with the narrow scope of Kant’s theory of concept formation, effectively defuse Ginsborg’s objection. (shrink)

Anil Gupta; XV*—Remarks on Definitions and the Concept of Truth1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 227–246, https.

Several recent commentators argue that Thomas Hobbes’s account of the nature of science is conventionalist. Engaging in scientific practice on a conventionalist account is more a matter of making sure one connects one term to another properly rather than checking one’s claims, e.g., by experiment. In this paper, I argue that the conventionalist interpretation of Hobbesian science accords neither with Hobbes’s theoretical account in De corpore and Leviathan nor with Hobbes’s scientific practice in De homine and elsewhere. Closely tied to (...) the conventionalist interpretation is the deductivist interpretation, on which it is claimed that Hobbes believed sciences such as optics are deduced from geometry. I argue that Hobbesian science places simplest conceptions as the foundation for geometry and the sciences in which we use geometry, which provides strong evidence against both the conventionalist and deductivist interpretations. (shrink)

This paper provides an overview of the contemporary debate on the concepts and definitions of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Sustainability (CS). The conclusions, based on historical perspectives, philosophical analyses, impact of changing contexts and situations and practical considerations, show that "one solution fits all"-definition for CS(R) should be abandoned, accepting various and more specific definitions matching the development, awareness and ambition levels of organizations.

This discussion note addresses Caleb Hazelwood’s ‘Practice-Centered Pluralism and a Disjunctive Theory of Art’. Hazelwood advances a disjunctive definition of art on the basis of an analogy with species concept pluralism in the philosophy of biology. We recognize the analogy between species and art, we applaud attention to practice, and we are bullish on pluralism—but it is a mistake to take these as the basis for a disjunctive definition.

I argue for a novel answer to the question “What is hope?”. On my view, rather than aiming for a compound account, i.e. analysing hope in terms of desire and belief, we should understand hope as an irreducible concept. After criticizing influential compound accounts of hope, I discuss Segal and Textor's alternative of describing hope as a primitive mental state. While Segal and Textor argue that available developments of the standard definition do not offer sufficient conditions for hope, (...) I question the deep‐seated idea that desire and belief are even necessary conditions for hope. My suggestion is that we should take seriously the fact that we hope in a great variety of ways and should question the search for elements that are common to all cases. A promising alternative follows the Wittgensteinian idea that cases of hope are related in terms of family resemblance, i.e. are multiply realizable on the ontological level while falling under the non‐definable concept of hope. (shrink)

The article delves into the conceptual frameworks surrounding artificial intelligence (AI) by juxtaposing it with natural intelligence and delineating the correlated notions. It enumerates the issues propelling the discourse on the explored topics. The author proposes a bifurcation between two polar concepts of artificial intelligence. The first is dubbed “imitative,” where AI is perceived in relation to natural intelligence as its technical recreation, capable of not only emulating but significantly outstripping its natural counterpart. A prerequisite for embodying this concept (...) is understanding natural intelligence; three approaches are examined: (a) acknowledging the lack of a precise understanding of natural intelligence, (b) exploring it from a biological perspective, and (c) analyzing it from a psychological perspective. The author articulates their own interpretation of natural intelligence, portraying it as a multifaceted amalgam of cultural, historical, social, and anthropological elements. From this vantage point, natural intelligence emerges not merely as a natural formation (thereby, discussions about the laws governing its function and evolution are warranted), but also as an “extra-natural” formation, its existence dictated by randomness and uniqueness, meaning natural intelligence evolves in a “singular” manner. In the context of comparing natural and artificial intelligence, the discussion encompasses several issues: the feasibility of the control of natural intelligence processes, the structure of neural networks, the superiority of computer programs in chess, the use of neural networks to write academic papers, and so forth. The conclusion posits that given artificial intelligence, despite its complexity, remains a technical invention orchestrated and brought to fruition by humans as a tool; society, if inclined to bestow AI with autonomy for tackling specific tasks, ought to do so prudently to prevent self-detriment and retain the ability to curtail or utterly revoke such autonomy. (shrink)

“Brain death,” the determination of human death by showing the irreversible loss of all clinical functions of the brain, has become a worldwide practice. A biophilosophical account of brain death requires four sequential tasks: agreeing on the paradigm of death, a set of preconditions that frame the discussion; determining the definition of death by making explicit the consensual concept of death; determining the criterion of death that proves the definition has been fulfilled by being both necessary and (...) sufficient for death; and determining the tests of death for physicians to employ at the patient's bedside to demonstrate that the criterion of death has been fulfilled. The best definition of death is “the cessation of functioning of the organism as a whole.” The whole-brain criterion is the only criterion that is both necessary and sufficient for death. Brain death tests are used only in the unusual case in which a patient's ventilation is being supported. Brain death critics have identified weaknesses in its formulation. But despite its shortcomings, the whole-brain death formulation comprises a concept and public policy that make intuitive and practical sense and that has been well accepted by many societies. (shrink)

The question of how people represent emotions is eminently important for a number of different domains of psychological research. The present study tested the assumption that emotion concepts are represented similar to theories in that they are comprised of a set of causally interrelated features. Using emotional scenarios and investigating the emotion concepts of anger, anxiety, and sadness it was found that people's representations of emotion concepts essentially involved the representation of the causal relation of emotion features and that the (...) causal status of a feature determined the feature's centrality in the concept. Moreover, people's representations of emotion concepts corresponded to basic assumptions of cognitive emotion theories, namely that cognitive appraisals cause other surface features of emotion, like expression and behaviour. By providing evidence for a theory-based representation, the present results show that the classical and the prototype approach are insufficient to model the representation of emotion concepts. (shrink)

The article raises the problem of the ambiguity and polysemantic nature of the complex and heterogeneous semantics of the concept of science. This concept includes theories and methods, models and classifications of reality, scientific laws and laws of nature, scientific thinking, scientific publications, experiments and laboratory activities, scientific institutes and research teams, scientific research, expertise and scientific disciplines, scientific knowledge and scientific truth, etc. Nevertheless, with all the abovementioned complexity, science exhibits the properties of a single, dynamically developing (...) complex phenomenon and, accordingly, requires an appropriate interdisciplinary, complex definition that is sensitive to its fundamental contexts: thematic, social and temporal. (shrink)

The concept of a “chemical speciation”, as defined by in the year 2000, is grounded in an empiricist semantics. It is a static concept, as it is associated with the ontological category of the chemical state of the distribution of chemical species in a system and is further restricted to chemical species of a single element as it excludes chemical species with more complex chemical systemic subunits, such as molecular species, crystals, or nanoparticles. In this work, we propose (...) a new definition of “chemical speciation” based on a semantics of meaning, applying Mario Bunge’s philosophical system. Chemical speciation is the distribution of chemical systemic subunits amongst defined chemical species in a system. Additionally, we propose two dynamic concepts associated with chemical speciation: chemical species transformation and chemical species evolution. These concepts aim to account for the chemical changes that explain both the diversity of chemical species sharing common systemic subunits and the historical emergence of new modes of chemical speciation. These modes, in turn, explain the appearance of new systemic chemical subunits and novel substantial properties. Our definitions have the advantage of being consistent with general theories of the evolution of matter, such Assembly Theory. Additionally, at the chemical level, this approach encompasses broader systemic chemical subunits beyond elemental particles, allowing for the chemical speciation of families of molecules, crystals, nanoparticles, etc. Finally, our proposal offers the advantage of overcoming the issue of arbitrariness in choosing the reference systemic chemical subunit by linking this choice to the concepts of substantial property, and function. (shrink)

Science starts by using terms such as ‘temperature’ or ‘fish’ or ‘gene’ to preliminarily delimitate the extension of a phenomenon, and concludes by giving most of them a technical meaning based on an explanatory model. This transforma- tion of the meaning of the term is an essential part of its naturalization. Debating on the definition of ‘disease’, what most philosophers of medicine have examined is the pre-naturalized meaning of the term: for that reason they have focused on the task (...) of delimiting disease and non-disease (health), mainly used conceptual analysis as a method of choice, and considered the nosological level of ‘disease judgments’ rather than the pathophysiological or psychopathological level of disease mechanisms, thus making them impervious to most scientific discoveries. By focusing instead on the naturalized concept of disease and following some suggestions by philosophers of biology and scientists in cutting-edge fields of biomedical research, they could gar- ner results from a comparison of the mechanisms of diseases. This would ultimately result in a general theory of disease linked with our most general theories on living beings, among them, systems biology and network medicine. Before undertaking such a task, preliminary questions arise: is it likely that there are biological features common to different types of disease? Is it a philosopher’s job to determine what they consist in? What use would such a general theoretical definition of disease be? (shrink)

Religion is a phenomenon of the spiritual life of mankind, its world-view basis, which regulates the daily life and behavior of man, and also allows communication with the "supernatural" through the rites.The overwhelming majority of definitions of the religious phenomenon relies mainly on two categories of religious studies: "supernatural" and "faith." For example, religion is defined as: "a spiritual phenomenon, which expresses not only the belief in the existence of a supernatural Beginning, which is the source of existence of all (...) existing, but also acts as a means of communicating with him, entering into his world.". (shrink)

This paper defends the concept of racialization against its critics. As the concept has become increasingly popular, questions about its meaning and value have been raised, and a backlash against its use has occurred. I argue that when “racialization” is properly understood, criticisms of the concept are unsuccessful. I defend a definition of racialization and identify its companion concept, “racialized group.” Racialization is often used as a synonym for “racial formation.” I argue that this is (...) a mistake. Racial formation theory is committed to racial ontology, but racialization is best understood as the process through which racialized – rather than racial – groups are formed. “Racialization” plays a unique role in the conceptual landscape, and it is a key concept for race eliminativists and anti-realists about race. (shrink)