This article is an exploration of a democratic school where the author spent several years researching and engaging with teachers and students while investigating the practice of Philosophy for/with Children (P4C) within Irish Educate Together schools. I offer an account of how teachers in these contexts seek to reconcile and harmonise their P4C practice with their own educational and democratic outlooks. These perspectives were uncovered through a ‘lived enquiry’ study involving deep immersion in the day-to-day life of a (...) school as a researcher and P4C practitioner. Teachers seeking to reconcile their practice with their views in this context resulted in the children in their classrooms learning through democratic processes, where democracy is not merely prescribed, but instead becomes a way of life. By drawing upon excerpts of teacher interview data from my doctoral studies, I suggest that there is a ‘rough ground’ of practice where diverse and unique perspectives can be revealed when lived, deeply immersive and sensitive approaches are taken towards practitioners and their communities. The intertwining of Educate Together and P4C philosophies of education is explored, with particular emphasis on the notion of child-centredness, dialogue and philosophical enquiry with children. Expanding on the democratic educational ideas of Biesta and Fielding, I argue that there is a deeply contextual and philosophically compelling connection between teachers engaging in P4C, the atmosphere or environment in which dialogue with children can occur and a different understanding of democracy through education that may result. (shrink)

This paper provides a reinterpretation of Paulo Freire’s philosophy of hope and suggests that this interpretation may function as a fruitful ground for democratic education that aims to contest the prevailing neoliberal ‘common sense’. The paper defines hope as a democratic virtue required for resisting the discursive practises and affective mechanisms associated with the contemporary neoliberal ethos—those, which Carlos Alberto Torres characterizes as the “neoliberal common sense” and Lauren Berlant as “cruel optimism”. Conclusively, the paper constructs three (...) principles for democratic education –´history as possibility´, ´the ethics of intervention´, and ´democratization’—which are intended to function as a foundation for democratic education through which the virtue of hope can be fostered. These principles are argued to form a basis for reviving the political dimensions of education and thus allowing collective transformative action. (shrink)

Who should have the authority to shape the education of citizens in a democracy? This is the central question posed by Amy Gutmann in the first book-length study of the democratic theory of education. The author tackles a wide range of issues, from the democratic case against book banning to the role of teachers' unions in education, as well as the vexed questions of public support for private schools and affirmative action in college admissions.

Despite the growing body of literature and general interest in the intersection between the capabilities approach (CA) and education, little work has been done so far to theorize democratic education from a CA perspective. This essay attempts to do so by, first, getting clear about the theory of democracy that has emerged from Amartya Sen’s recent work and understanding how it informs his CA; and, second, by carefully drawing out the implications of these aspects of Sen’s thinking (...) for democratic education. Ultimately, I argue that Senian democratic education (SDE) is a composite of various learning processes that enhance one’s capability for social and political (democratic) participation. Particular attention is given to the learning that happens through one’s actual engagement in democratic practices and that which happens through one’s formal schooling. I call the former of these learning processes SDEp and the latter SDEs. SDEp is democratic life itself, and its effectiveness both depends on and contributes to the development of a culture of political participation within society. SDEs is best understood as the process of facilitating children’s achievement of democratic functioning, that is, children’s achievement of certain “beings and doings” associated with the emergence and exercise of their individual and collective democratic existence. (shrink)

In this paper, my aim is to reintroduce and reclaim the concept of civility for the ongoing debates on democratic education within the Arendt-inspired philosophy of education. I juxtapose a prominent interpretation related to theories of radical democracy and radical democratic education, referring to Gert Biesta’s work, which amends Arendt’s ideas with insights from Jacques Rancière. Conversely, I explore an alternative construction of what can be considered ‘an Arendtian perspective on democratic education’ coming (...) from another French philosopher, Étienne Balibar. Within this perspective the role of institutions is redeemed, and the primary concern shifts from the political agency of individuals to the conditions that allow the space of politics to be constituted and preserved. The discussion includes an analysis of Marius von Mayenburg’s play ‘Martyr’ to illustrate importance of thinking about education, especially democratic education, as a matter of civility. (shrink)

Matthew Lipman claims that the community of inquiry is an exemplar of democracy in action. To many proponents the community of inquiry is considered invaluable for achieving desirable social and political ends through education for democracy. But what sort of democracy should we be educating for? In this paper I outline three models of democracy: the liberal model, which emphasises rights and duties, and draws upon pre-political assumptions about freedom; communitarianism, which focuses on identity and participation in the creation (...) of political ends; and deliberative self-governance, whereby citizens deliberatively shape their collective lives in public forums—at various levels of government and in different political and social arenas. I argue that some kind of deliberative democracy is defensible as a preliminary justification for how citizens might shape their lives, and therefore compatible with other forms of democracy, insofar as they can result from democratic deliberations. Acceptance of such a view raises further questions about the purpose or aims of education consistent with this conception of democracy. I contend that it requires an educational model that is committed to aligning curriculum, pedagogy, assessment and school governance to produce a transformational environment that will inform our structures—a commitment to democratic education and not merely education for democracy. Lipman goes part of the way to achieving these ends, but learning how to be proficient at democratic decision-making is like all tasks children and adolescents learn to perform. It involves action, understanding, and awareness of what counts as doing the task adequately. (shrink)

What kind of education is needed for democracy? How can education respond to the challenges that current democracies face? This unprecedented Handbook offers a comprehensive overview of the most important ideas, issues, and thinkers within democratic education. Its thirty chapters are written by leading experts in the field in an accessible format. Its breadth of purpose and depth of analysis will appeal to both researchers and practitioners in education and politics. The Handbook addresses not only (...) the historical roots and philosophical foundations of democratic education, but also engages with contemporary political issues and key challenges to the project of democratic education. (shrink)

A profound problem posed by education for any pluralistic society with democratic aspirations is how to reconcile individual freedom and civic virtue. Children cannot be educated to maximize both individual freedom and civic virtue. Yet reasonable people value and intermittently demand both. We value freedom of speech and press, for example, but want people to refrain from false and socially harmful expression. The various tensions between individual freedom and civic virtue pose a challenge that is simultaneously philosophical and (...) political. How can we resolve the tensions philosophically in light of reasonable political disagreements over the relative value of individual freedom and civic virtue? Instead of giving priority to one value or the other, this essay defends a democratic ideal ofconscious social reproduction, which consists of three principles:nonrepression, nondiscrimination, and democratic deliberation. (shrink)

This book examines how democratic education is conceptualised by exploring understandings of emotions in learning. The authors argue that emotion is both an embodiment and enhancement of democratic education: that rationality and emotion are not separate entities, but exist on a continuum. While democratic education would not exist if it were incommensurate with reason, making judgements about the human condition could not happen without invoking emotion. Synthesising Muslim scholarship with the perspectives of the Western (...) world, the book draws on scholars such as Ibn al-Arabi, Ibn Sina and Fazlur Rahman to offer an enriched and expanded notion of democratic education. This engaging and reflective work will be of interest and value to students and scholars of educational philosophy and cultural studies. (shrink)

Efforts to develop democratic schools have moved along particular rules and standards of ‘reasoning’ even when expressed through different ideological and paradigmatic lines. From attempts to make a democratic education to critical pedagogy, different approaches overlap in their historical construction of the reason of schooling: designing society by designing the child. These approaches to democracy make inequality into the premise of equality, assuming a consensual partition of the world and the need for specific agents to monitor partitioned (...) boundaries, thus reinserting differences as the basis of practice. Democracy, however, according to Jacques Rancière, only becomes visible when its partitioning is challenged under the opinion of equality. Yet, undoing the epistemological dogma of planning embodied in the notions of ‘critical’ and deliberative democracy might also involve confronting the comparative style of thought which provides the epistemological ‘rules’ that insert inequality as equality. Deleuze and Guattari's rhizome and Derrida's justice help extend Rancière's democracy and equality into unfamiliar terrain. What implications might this have for thinking about educational policy and curriculum? The argument, ironically, maintains Enlightenment attitudes about reason and rationality, but while ‘trying’ different epistemological rules and recognizing how the epistemological and ontological fold into one another it provides an alternative understanding of education and democracy. (shrink)

Curiosity is not prominent in investigations on democratic development. Nor is curiosity discussed in democratic education discourses. However, this article contributes to the present Special Issue the idea that the connection of curiosity and democracy should not be ignored. First, I show that curiosity’s connection with democracy has, regrettably, been largely bypassed in fields related to democratic theory and pedagogy. Then, I elaborate on how the emerging scholarship on curiosity’s intricacies makes it easier to perceive how (...) fruitful the study of curiosity’s role in democratic theory and education would be. In light of this recent rethinking of curiosity, I claim that studying a complex and ambiguous notion of curiosity (along with an equally complex and ambiguous epistemic restraint) is important for studying and advancing democracy and for enriching democratic citizenship education. (shrink)

: Educational historians, philosophers, and sociologists have long warned that the increasing encroachment of business logic in public schools bodes ill for democracy as a way of life. Many have concluded that the business person's interest in affecting public education is to bring about a greater bottom line, which, of course, is profit, albeit secured in the name of democratic freedom and social progress. These scholars have noted that the corporate parasite is eating away the insides of our (...) public schools and is reproducing its hereditary material (consumer materialism) within the bodies and souls of its captive hosts: our children. Through corporate advertisements on school walls, corporate-sponsored curriculum materials and programs, and corporate-sponsored fundraisers and contests (not to mention the enormous political influence corporations have in framing the very aim and purpose of public education), corporations use schools as conduits by which to establish consumption as the ultimate expression of participatory democracy and, thus, as the supreme good and standard of personal growth. Drawing upon the work of John Dewey, this paper articulates a conception of democracy and a democratic theory of education that privileges the social over the private, the public over the corporate, such that the homo-economicus ideal that our public schools train our children to aspire to on a daily basis is checked by a wider commitment to the good life, defined in more socially benevolent ways. (shrink)

With the increasingly heard voices of gays, lesbians and bisexuals in American society and their demands for recognition have come the responses of religious conservatives. In this article I consider whether the extreme moral positions that religious conservatives take are defensible. More specifically, I want to consider whether teachers who embrace such conservative positions should be permitted to act on them in their classrooms. My arguments lead me to distinguish between moral democratic and moralistic positions. The former I examine (...) using the virtue of recognition and the principle of non-oppression. I conclude that democracy requires the positive portrayal of homosexuality in schools and precludes teachers expressing their beliefs against it. (shrink)

Political polarization is often argued to be a major threat to democracy. This article examines whether the two different forms of polarization, ideological and affective, may risk some of the core assumptions of democratic legitimacy. The paper argues that ideological polarization is linked with increasingly radical ideological positions being accepted as legitimate contributions to democratic processes, which may lead to the erosion of the democratic culture of society. Affective polarization, in turn, presents a risk to the type (...) of political collaboration that characterizes legitimate democratic processes. The article presents some remarks on how these forms of polarization could be pre-emptively addressed in education: first, by demonstrating to students the practical consequences of neglecting the core democratic principles of toleration (Forst) and reciprocity (Rawls) in society; and second, through forms of political action that engage students’ political emotions in support of democratic principles and way of life in a nonpartisan way. (shrink)

What makes a democratic school democratic? This question is answered using the example of the Swiss education system; the focus, however, is not on the usual pedagogic perspective of teaching democracy, but on the democratic organization of the education system. The discussion concentrates on two basic requirements for a democratic education organization: on the one hand, education for all under the equal rights premise calls for the definition of an educational minimum for (...) all students. At the same time, defining this minimum presupposes selection among the students. For part of the students are -- through the use of public funds -- being educated beyond the minimum; a situation which needs to be democratically legitimized. The selection is based on academic performance; as yet, a valuable alternative to this type of selection does not exist. On the other hand, it is essential in a democratic education organization that the authorities put in charge of certain responsibilities are democratically legitimized and controlled. The same applies to newly created authorities, such as principalships or autonomous schools, the introduction of which has been demanded repeatedly for some time now. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Teaching about homosexuality, especially in a positive light, has long been held to be a controversial issue. There is, however, a view of the capacity for reason that finds that those who deem homosexuality to be controversial will ultimately contradict themselves, becoming unreasonable. By this standard of reason, homosexuality should be treated as non controversial in schools. In this essay, John Petrovic argues that this epistemic position is problematic. Instead, he defends a Deweyan epistemology that casts reason as, in part, (...) a set of socially acquired habits of mind. People who have been socialized into heterosexist habits of mind must be exposed to counterhegemonic discourses. One such discourse can be found in the public values of liberal democracy through which the practice of reason must be pursued. Petrovic discusses the practical guidance provided by assuming a view of normative reason versus habituated reason in terms of both pedagogy and curriculum. (shrink)

In Democratic Education in a Globalized World (Routledge, 2019) I defend a discourse theory of global justice as the appropriate normative1 ground for conceiving educational justice and citizenship education under conditions of economic and political globalization. In addition, I articulate democratic conceptions of global educational justice and citizenship education that recognize a moral-political right to democratically adequate education and call for the creation of transnational democratic consciousness. Based on these conceptions I spell out (...) school practices such as historically informed, cross-cultural learning within socially diverse settings that would contribute to realizing these conceptions. In this article I reply to liberal perfectionist, communitarian-conservative and empiricist-historical critiques of Democratic Education in a Globalized World from Michael Festl, Martin Beckstein and Michael Geiss, respectively. I emphasize the feasibility of injustice-reducing educational practices, I explain how a discourse theory of justice accommodates considerations of both the good and the right, and I justify why the grim record of past educational experience does not render pointless the pursuit of progressive aims through education. (shrink)

Much work in the field of education for democratic citizenship is based on the idea that it is possible to know what a good citizen is, so that the task of citizenship education becomes that of the production of the good citizen. In this paper I ask whether and to what extent we can and should understand democratic citizenship as a positive identity. I approach this question by means of an exploration of four dimensions of (...) class='Hi'>democratic politics—the political community, the borders of the political order, the dynamics of democratic processes and practices, and the status of the democratic subject—in order to explore whether and to what extent the ‘essence’ of democratic politics can and should be understood as a particular order. For this I engage with ideas from Chantal Mouffe and Jacques Rancière who both have raised fundamental questions about the extent to which the ‘essence’ of democratic politics can be captured as a particular order. In the paper I introduce the figure of the ignorant citizen in order to hint at a conception of citizenship that is not based on particular knowledge about what the good citizen is. I introduce a distinction between a socialisation conception of citizenship education and civic learning and a subjectification conception of citizenship education and civic learning in order to articulate what the educational implications of such an ‘anarchic’ understanding of democratic politics are. While the socialisation conception focuses on the question how ‘newcomers’ can be inserted into an existing political order, the subjectification conception focuses on the question how democratic subjectivity is engendered through engagement in always undetermined political processes. This is no longer a process driven by knowledge about what the citizen is or should become but one that depends on a desire for a particular mode of human togetherness or, in short, a desire for democracy. (shrink)

The connection of education to democracy is an issue of central importance to communities committed to liberty and justice. In her influential book Democratic Education Amy Gutmann addresses this connection. In doing so she takes up a position regarding democracies and the teaching of truth which is indefensible, and which removes any ban on manipulating citizens. Also indefensible is Gutmann's position concerning publicly-funded community colleges and universities. These she deems “nonselective” institutions; a mistake that obscures the unequal (...) distribution of opportunities for democratically-required education. The outcome is to reveal Gutmann's analysis of democratic education and democratic participation to be, in important respects, inadequate. (shrink)

Should public schools provide students with opportunities to write poetry? If so, why? The modern education reform movement insists that students be able to answer questions citing specific textual evidence. In practice, this means that American public education focuses on standardized testing and gives students few opportunities to say something new. In this essay, I explain how Charles Taylor’s expressivist thesis justifies a place for poetry in the public-school curriculum. According to Taylor, the designative-instrumentalist theory of language emphasizes (...) its role in transmitting pre-existing thoughts. The constitutive-expressivist theory of language, on the contrary, maintains that people form and clarify their thoughts in expressing them. For the latter view, poetry is a way to give voice to one’s authentic self, one’s community, and the cosmos. This article brings this insight into contemporary debates about the curriculum and explains the democratic value of encouraging students to express themselves. (shrink)

Gert Biesta criticises deliberative models of democracy and education for being based on an understanding of democracy as a ‘normal’ order, which involves certain ‘entry conditions’ for democratic participation. As an alternative, Biesta introduces the idea of democracy as ‘disruption’ and the associated subjectification conception of education both of which he draws from the work of Jacques Rancière. This paper challenges Biesta’s critique of deliberative democracy by demonstrating that the ‘entry conditions’ for deliberation serve an important normative (...) function. It is also suggested that Biesta’s critique dismisses some important dimensions of the deliberative model. The paper further contests Biesta’s conceptions of democracy and education by arguing, first, that his position involves certain contradictions that are problematic especially from a normative perspective. Second, the paper argues that Biesta’s conceptions of democracy and education might result in dismissing crucially important questions concerning the long-term evaluation and improvement of democratic and educational institutions. (shrink)

Nussbaum’s moral cosmopolitanism informs her capability-based theory of justice, which she uses in order to develop a distinctive model of cosmopolitan democratic education. I characterize Nussbaum’s educational model as a ‘statist model,’ however, because it regards cosmopolitan democratic education as necessary for realizing democratic arrangements at the domestic level. The socio-cultural diversity of virtually every nation, Nussbaum argues, renders it mandatory to educate citizens in a cosmopolitan fashion. Citizens must develop empathy and sympathy towards all (...) co-citizens of their domestic polities and cope effectively with socio-cultural diversity. I criticize Nussbaum’s statist model, because it neglects that due to the ways in which international institutions already constrain national decision-making, citizens will not fully enjoy the human freedom of co-determining the political choices that affect their lives unless international affairs are further democratized. Therefore I suggest extending Nussbaum’s statist model and outline an ‘internationalist model’ of cosmopolitan democratic education. (shrink)

This book explores the development of practical wisdom, or phronesis, within the stories of four mature students studying for degrees in art and design. Through an analysis informed by the ideas of Basil Bernstein and Aristotle, the authors propose that phronesis – or the ability to deliberate well – should be an intrinsic part of a democratic education. As a number of vocational and academic disciplines require deliberation and the ability to draw on knowledge, character and experience, it (...) is essential that no student feels their experience puts them at a disadvantage. The authors argue that democratic education should allow each participant to feel enhanced, included and able to participate in order to create a constructive and reciprocal dialogue. This work will be of value to students and scholars interested in democratic education, the experiences of non-traditional students, and the sociology of education. (shrink)

This is the third of the four essays in Part II of the book on liberalism and traditionalist education; all four are by authors who would like to find ways for the liberal state to honour the self-definitions of traditional cultures and to find ways of avoiding a confrontation with differences. David Blacker’s essay on civic friendship and democratic education develops a Rawlsian conception of civic friendship, the scaffolding of which is necessarily provided by the wide range (...) of comprehensive conceptions of the good that characterize democratic societies. Thus, Blacker argues, a democratic civic education ‘allows citizens to embrace democracy on their own terms, drawing support for democracy’s requisite political conceptions from the perspectives of citizens’ many different secular and/or religious comprehensive doctrines’. For Blacker, a conception of civic friendship that is friendly to citizens’ multiple comprehensive doctrines also entails a substantial lowering of the ‘wall of separation’ between church and state so that courts might be more willing than they currently are to allow the use of state funds to support religious groups, in particular where these groups perform functions within public schools that converge with public interests. The essay concludes by proposing and defending two American educational policy initiatives that are consistent with Blacker’s politically liberal ideal of civic friendship – the revival of a ‘school stamps’ plan first proposed in the 1970s, and a modified version of a ‘clergy in the schools’ programme recently struck down by a federal circuit court in Texas. (shrink)

Reprinted with permission and previously published in: Farhang: Quarterly Journal of the Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies (Tehran, Iran), 22(69), pp. 117-138. -/- One of the aims of this paper is to explore the relationship between democracy and epistemology. This inevitably raises questions about the purpose and aims of education consistent with conceptions of democracy. These ultimately rest on the practical applicability and outcomes of competing visions of democracy without appeal to pre-political or prior goods, nor to certain (...) knowledge about justice or right; that is, to the dominant liberal discourse of citizenship that has become indistinguishable from the citizenship implicit in official policy documents. I argue in favour of a notion of citizenship conceived of in terms of learning processes that have a developmental and transformative impact on the learning subject, and an educational model that is more attuned to the procedural concerns of deliberative democracy than civics and citizenship education which tend to be underpinned by preconceptions of liberal citizenship, values and democracy. (shrink)

This paper argues that it is important for educators in democratic education to understand how the rise of right-wing populism in Europe, the United States and around the world can never be viewed apart from the affective investments of populist leaders and their supporters to essentialist ideological visions of nationalism, racism, sexism and xenophobia. Democratic education can provide the space for educators and students to think critically and productively about people’s affects, in order to identify the (...) implications of different affective modes through which right-wing populism is articulated. Furthermore, this paper points out that ‘negative’ critique of the affective ideology of right-wing populism is not sufficient for developing a productive counter politics. An affirmative critique is also needed to set alternative frames and agendas which endorse and disseminate alternative concepts and affective practices such as equality, love and solidarity. These ideas provide critical resources to democratic education for developing a culture and process of democracy that transcends the negativity of mere critique of either right-wing populisms or inadequate forms of democracy. (shrink)

Education-related responses to our current democratic crisis have largely been focused on schooling children and youth. This narrow focus has foreclosed or diverted our attention from other possibilities for democratic education, especially as it relates to adult citizens and the ways in which such education can — and must — extend beyond schools and other formal educational institutions. In this paper, Tony DeCesare aims to theorize these possibilities in order to lay some philosophical groundwork for (...) an idea of adult democratic education (ADE) that can help us combat our current democratic crisis and, more generally, strengthen our commitment to and practice of democracy. Drawing on the capability approach, he argues for prioritizing two related capabilities in our theorizing of ADE: (1) democratic capability, and (2) the capability to participate in ADE. These two capabilities are both deeply interconnected and central to a theoretical framework for ADE that is grounded in the capability approach. (shrink)

The article proposes two anthropological movements as guidelines for an education in democratic citizenship more capable of overcoming reductionisms and trivializations: a return to oneself, suggested by Hannah Arendt and a movement towards others, suggested by Edgar Morin. The text also takes the opportunity to formulate a reflection on the relevance of the global educational challenge of compulsory schooling for the construction of a more sensitive and open humanity.

This volume reconsiders pragmatist conceptions of democratic education, especially John Dewey's. It addresses what democratic education can mean in the face of the current threats that are undermining democracy. Since the middle of the twentieth century, liberal philosophers have been skeptical of fostering values through public education. Since liberal democracy must embrace different worldviews, education, especially public education, must refrain from teaching values as far as possible. Given the recent undermining of democratic (...) nation states and their liberal foundations, this educational abstinence can be interpreted as one of the drivers of the current crisis of democracy. This volume sketches how a renewed democratic education, in the model of John Dewey and other forms of pragmatist educational philosophy, might look today. The volume identifies the conceptual, political, and technological challenges to education and democracy, and explores how a new democratic education could translate into the classroom. John Dewey and Contemporary Challenges to Democratic Education will appeal to scholars and advanced students interested in pragmatism and American philosophy, philosophy of education, and political philosophy. (shrink)

Prompted by the centenary of the founding of Summerhill, in my contribution to this JOPE Suite on Democratic Education, I briefly explore both the admiring reciprocity and the subsidiary but significant differences of praxis between A.S. Neill and Alex Bloom, two remarkable pioneers of education in and for participatory democracy as a way of life. Because A.S. Neill's work is internationally renowned and Alex Bloom's has yet to re-establish the worldwide recognition it had in his own lifetime, (...) my emphasis is on the contribution of Alex Bloom, in large part because he is amongst the most radical pioneers of democratic education the UK state sector has ever known. To a significant degree, the aspirations and actualities of Bloom's work rebutted Neill's insistence that pioneers within the state sector of education could not innovate in ways that would significantly challenge the status quo. Indeed, Alex Bloom extended participatory democratic educational aspirations in ways which Neill did not. Most importantly, these not only entailed a commitment to community engagement, they did so in conditions of abject poverty and profound psychological trauma following the ravages of the Second World War London Blitz with its attendant evacuation and subsequent return to the ruins of their former homes.In the first section, I take as my starting point Alex Bloom's strongly supportive review of A.S. Neill's book The Problem Family and Neill's visit to Bloom's school in the East End of London, some five years later. Foregrounding the dialectic of practice and aspiration, I touch on some of the key issues that emerged for both Neill and Bloom at that time.Challenging Neill's later affirmation that the only significant freedom one can introduce into a state school is ‘a free attitude on the teacher's part, his or her being on the side of the child’ and his reported view that Bloom and others might be able to experiment in methods of teaching or ways of organising the timetable, ‘but not in methods of living’, the second section explores the nature and interrelationship of six key strands woven into the fabric of Alex Bloom's truly remarkable work that exemplified the grounded possibility and vibrant actuality of participatory democracy as a way of living and learning together that prefigures a more just, creative and caring form of human engagement.Locating the foundation of Alex Bloom's praxis within the 20th-century personalist philosophical tradition and its Adlerian psychological counterpart, the brief concluding section draws in particular on the work of John Macmurray who argues, as did Bloom in his own writing and his daily praxis, that ‘The first priority in education—if by education we mean learning to be human—is learning to live in personal relation to other people. Let us call it learning to live in community’. (shrink)

Through a series of conversations, Fintan McCutcheon and Joanna Haynes explore McCutcheon's reflections on school leadership in the contexts of the Educate Together movement (in the Republic of Ireland) and, specifically, in his aspiration to build an optimally democratic school in Balbriggan. Much of the academic and professional literature on school leadership depicts the role of school leaders as expressing a strong vision for the school, with charismatic communication and strategic skills, and putting explicit emphasis on high educational (...) standards. On the ground, the school leader is required to maintain executive governance standards, is accountable to a range of hierarchies and audiences and is in a custodian role to traditions of school culture and human resource relationships. Taken together, these academic, professional and contractual obligations can corral the school leader into practice of limited scope, obstructed by protocol, risk-averse and curtailed in creativity and, in relation to developing a democratic school, lacking in the necessary room for innovation. The conversation focuses on the rough ground of incident and messiness, identified through critical moments of school life when the aspirations to be democratic, to lead democratically, to teach democracy and to create a sustaining democratic school culture are lived-out. Through this dialogue, the conversants observe a practice of school leadership grounded in practical reason. The dialogue touches on and threads congruence between the on-the-ground risk-taking, rule-breaking, action orientation, nuanced dialogue, passionate engagement and deep reflection that characterise day-to-day school leadership practice. It concludes with ideas concerning the dynamics of forms of democracy that can prevail. (shrink)

In his early lectures, published as On the Future of Our Educational Institutions, Nietzsche attempts to expose contemporary education as overly extensive and being weakened, and as such, failing to turn pupils and students into men of culture. The aim of my paper is to present a comprehensive consideration of the present condition of democratic educational institutions through Nietzsche's clairvoyantly pessimistic assessment. I enter the discussion through two Nietzschean concepts, levelling and misarchism, which, although not found in the (...) mentioned text explicitly, resonate throughout Nietzsche's 1872 lectures and were to become increasingly important with each subsequent publication. Regardless of the common trend in the so-called Nietzsche studies to analytically strive for and determine the true or the correct interpretation of his works, ideas and concepts, my paper presupposes the inevitable evasiveness of his philosophy, and focuses rather on the very insight of his that can be of great use in seeking answers to the crucial question of the present democratic society: what can be expected of our educational institutions? (shrink)

Doing philosophy for/with children and exposing students to multiple perspectives, exemplified within the Austrian Centre of Philosophy with Children’s implementation project of the Philosophical Enquiry Advancing Cosmopolitan Engagement (PEACE) curriculum in schooling, may offer a valuable written, taught, and tested curriculum for democratic citizenry. This paper provides an analysis that seeks to present, describe, critique, and make recommendations on the PEACE curriculum. The paper asks the question: In what ways does the Philosophical Enquiry Advancing Cosmopolitan Engagement as a 21st (...) century curriculum address education for democratic citizenry? In this evaluation the ways in which issues of culture and identity, human rights and democracy are perceived and addressed, along with issues of critical thinking and reasoning in verbal and non-verbal language are attended. Concepts of collaboration, cooperation, teacher support and development are also critiqued. This critique is based on a ten-day Austrian Center of Philosophy with Children conference and training course on the PEACE curriculum, and consists of open-ended interviews, personal observations, and published reports on pre- and post-test results of the PEACE curriculum. Exploring the integration of the Austrian Center of Philosophy with Children PEACE curriculum and the Philosophy for/with Children methodology, this paper utilizes Hansen’s (1995) five principles for guiding curriculum development practice as a framework for analysis. It is hoped that findings and recommendations from this study may stir further exploration and contribute to the work of Philosophy for/with Children in democratic education for 21st century citizenry worldwide. (shrink)

For philosophers of education who hold on to the optimistic hope that democracy education can play a part in halting the decline of democracy, Davids and Waghid point the way towards its potential contribution when approached by making inclusion foundational to democratic education. Taking a poststructuralist approach as the best way to articulate an expanded conception of inclusion, this book makes the case that there is an urgent need for a reconsidered conception of democratic (...) class='Hi'>education that appropriately addresses race, ethnicity and gender. This review's critical appreciation of Davids and Waghids book explores their analysis of inclusion, noting its illuminating use of examples of exclusion in South African education which are also relevant to wider contexts beyond the specificities of apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa. In raising some questions about their arguments, I express reservations about the book's predominant focus on race, ethnicity and gender as markers of identity. This is at the expense of class and material exclusion—and hence of distributive justice as a dimension of democratic inclusion. The review concludes with a discussion of how philosophy of education itself might be democratically inclusive, in response to the authors' account of whiteness and their experiences of exclusion. (shrink)

We argue for a reconsideration of the claim that Spinoza’s perfectionist conception of education was ushering in a form of radical humanism distinctly favorable to democratic ideals. With the rise of democratic societies and the corresponding need to constitute educational institutions within those societies, a more thoroughgoing commitment to democratic social ideals arose, first and foremost in American educational thought. This commitment can be seen especially in Dewey’s philosophy of education. Specifically, Dewey and Spinoza had (...) strikingly distinct conceptions of the overall aims of schooling. While Spinoza takes the aim of education to be the perfection of a student’s original nature, Dewey takes education to involve the collective acquisition of an additional nature, reflecting the norms and expectations of one’s specific community. In this paper, we juxtapose these two distinct conceptions of education alongside one another, with an eye towards illuminating the limitations of a perfectionist theory of education for the individual, as we find it in Spinoza, within a democratic society. (shrink)

Is the idea that the self‐determination of all citizens influences progress towards democracy not merely a dream that breaks itself against the hard historical reality of political societies? Is not the same fate reserved for all pedagogical innovations in democratic education that depend on this great dream? It is commonplace to assert this logic to demonstrate the inapplicability of the ideas of both democracy and of democratic education. Though this argument is prominent and recurring in the (...) history of political and educative ideas, in response we can ask ourselves if the gap between the ideal and the reality is effectively insuperable and must be considered an incontestable fact. The double objective of this article is to determine explicitly the meaning and extent of this gap in the context of democracy and of education and to demonstrate that this gap is neither static nor permanent, but is susceptible to being narrowed, from generation to generation. (shrink)

This book presents a collection of contemporary discourses that reconsider the relationship of democracy as a political ideology and American ideal and education as the foundation of preparing democratic citizens in America.

This article explores Hegel’s Philosophy of Right as a work on education that responds to two democratic ideals: the ideal of individual integrity, which demands that individuals come to know the principles that animate them of their own accord, and the ideal of collectivism, which demands that individuals be at home in a shared world. While the great political works of Plato and Rousseau fasten on one of these ideals at the expense of the other, I show that (...) Hegel’s political philosophy accepts both. The result is what I call the paradox of democratic education. Hegel solves this paradox through a three-fold pedagogical strategy which speaks to the transformational possibilities of institutions as well as more directly to the needs of the “ironic consciousness.” This strategy reveals a Hegel who calls on us to strengthen our commitment to a democratic polity through a deeper conception of the requirements of democratic education. (shrink)

Abstract:This essay applies lessons from John Dewey’s theory of democracy and democratic education to the modern development of information communications technologies and the assertion that the development of such technologies will lead to a more open, more democratic society. Given the continuity of the technology and its applications with structures of oppression within modern society, any attempt to resolve or democratize technology through skills-based training is bound to fail, as this does not resolve the cultural habits that (...) enable oppression through technology. To this end, what is necessary is democratic education that recognizes the unique contexts in which students become individuals and furnishes flexible habits of transaction. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Problems with a Weakly Pluralist Approach to Democratic EducationSheron Fraser-BurgessIntroductionPluralism embodies wide acknowledgement of various forms of difference. Appeals to pluralism involve arguments for the proliferating of differences as a social and moral ideal. Rather than being a formal political regime such as with democracy or social liberalism, in the extant political philosophy literature, pluralism brings considerations of diversity and equality to bear in philosophical analysis of traditional (...) systems of government.As a critique, pluralism falls along a continuum, which can be conceived of as iterations of the standing of particular ways of life, with respect to constraints of both equality and justice. At one end of the spectrum, all conceptions of the human good share a prima facie equality that belie overarching moral norms as a criterion of ranking. Questions about the incumbency of individual liberty motivate movement toward the opposing end, as allowing for the most just society warrants giving precedence to such values. The source of pluralism’s critical role is its inherent demand of a cogent resolution of the moral and, at times, political tension between equality and freedom.This article considers two forms of pluralism that lie near opposing extremes of the continuum and their implication for education. According to Horace Kallen’s and John Gray’s strong pluralism, the claim to the fact of differing values, cultures, etc., has primacy. As a corollary, maintaining the integrity of the social groups as holders of those values becomes central. In conflict with liberal democratic principles, however, protecting group values may occur at the expense of individual detractors within the group or may pose a threat of harm to others outside of the group who do not share these values.On the other hand, one form of weak pluralism, Amy Gutmann’s deliberative democracy, constrains pluralism on political grounds of individual [End Page 1] freedom. Deliberative democracy subsumes the holding of all values, including those shared with a social group, to the requirements of democracy. Both theories are considered as attempts to reconcile principles of treating everyone equally with not unjustly limiting individual freedom in a democracy. I raise principled and practical issues from education that call into question whether each theory satisfactorily resolves the conflicting demands of both equality and liberty. A third alternative is proposed as a salient consideration for democratic education. I begin with the pluralism of Horace Kallen and its relationship to that of John Gray.Strong PluralismHorace Kallen’s Cultural PluralismIn this section, I discuss Horace Kallen’s seminal account of cultural pluralism from the early twentieth century, classifying it with the strong value pluralism articulated by John Gray. Gray’s and Kallen’s pluralism have in common both the sanctioning of the fullest expression of difference and difficulties with making sense of the intuitive pull toward a criterion for the ranking of values that democracy dictates. I then consider the educational implications of Kallen’s view, particularly with respect to its actual influence upon multi-cultural initiatives of the 1970s and 1980s.Kallen coined the term “cultural pluralism” in the early twentieth century (Kallen 73). At this time, America was experiencing a great deal of social upheaval because of the huge influx of European and Asian immigrants. Movements such as nativism and Americanization fueled xenophobic sentiment. In this milieu, the full acculturation of new immigrants became a priority. In education, schooling policies penalized immigrant expressions of cultural identity, such as speaking one’s native language and practicing cultural traditions (Kallen 4).Kallen was one of the voices advocating not only that new immigrants should be allowed to maintain their cultural identity but also that a formal political solution be initiated which accommodated the predilection to do so. Nathan Glazer explains that there was at that time a general blindness to the possibility that “these groups or elements within them would not want to acculturate and assimilate but would want to preserve their corporate characters and distinctiveness even if prejudice and discrimination disappeared.” According to Glazer, such was the doctrine of assimilation for the first forty years of the twentieth century (7). [End Page 2]Kallen’s pluralism is a departure from the prevailing view in... (shrink)

This book explores the complicated question of the regulating of speech at universities in South Africa. The authors discuss whether the potential harm of hate speech is sufficient justification for limiting free speech—and how doing so may affect the democratic project.

Joseph Dunne’s essay begins by examining the ways in which schooling in modern liberal–democratic societies tend to function as the agent of cultural homogenization and alienation, and thus block liberal–democratic efforts to offer meaningful recognition of local cultures and to promote the skills and dispositions required for participatory democratic citizenship. The danger here, Dunne points out, is that when the homogenizing elements of modern schooling become dominant, they might serve to encourage an ‘insouciant cosmopolitanism that may fail (...) to meet people’s needs for identity ’. The chapter concludes by reflecting on some possible educational responses that might offer some hopeful ways of addressing such dismal extremes. In particular, he is interested in the educational possibilities offered by a reconfiguration of national identities and state institutions in the emerging European Community in the context of national, cultural, and religious strife that currently besets Northern Ireland. Thus, like Waldron, Dunne sees local cultural identities – be they national, religious, or cultural – as complexly related to, but potentially compatible with, cosmopolitan historical forces. (shrink)

In the novel The City and the City, by China Mieville, the reader follows the Kafkaesque journey of Inspector Tyador Borlu through a labyrinthian political conspiracy set in two politically autonomous yet territorially overlapping cities: Beszel and Ul Qoma. Although “grosstopically” interwoven like topographic doppelgangers, the two cities are perceived as distinct political and cultural territories. Even as citizens from the two cities intermingle on divided streets, live in buildings where different floors exist in different cities, and children climb on (...) trees territorially split (“crosshatched”) down the center, they must learn to “unsee” and “unnotice” one another. The major role of education is to teach .. (shrink)