I discuss recent work in ergodic theory and statistical mechanics, regarding the compatibility and origin of random and chaotic behavior in deterministic dynamical systems. A detailed critique of some quite radical proposals of the Prigogine school is given. I argue that their conclusion regarding the conceptual bankruptcy of the classical conceptions of an exact microstate and unique phase space trajectory is not completely justified. The analogy they want to draw with quantum mechanics is not sufficiently close to support (...) their most radical conclusion. (shrink)

It is natural and important to have a formal representation of plain belief, according to which propositions are held true, or held false, or neither. (In the paper this is called a deterministic representation of epistemic states). And it is of great philosophical importance to have a dynamic account of plain belief. AGM belief revision theory seems to provide such an account, but it founders at the problem of iterated belief revision, since it can generally account only for one (...) step of revision. The paper discusses and rejects two solutions within the confines of AGM theory. It then introduces ranking functions (as I prefer to call them now; in the paper they are still called ordinal conditional functions) as the proper (and, I find, still the best) solution of the problem, proves that conditional independence w.r.t. ranking functions satisfies the so-called graphoid axioms, and proposes general rules of belief change (in close analogy to Jeffrey's generalized probabilistic conditionalization) that encompass revision and contraction as conceived in AGM theory. Indeed, the parallel to probability theory is amazing. Probability theory can profit from ranking theory as well since it is also plagued by the problem of iterated belief revision even if probability measures are conceived as Popper measures (see No. 11). Finally, the theory is compared with predecessors which are numerous and impressive, but somehow failed to explain the all-important conditional ranks in the appropriate way. (shrink)

We continue the work initiated in Herzig and Lorini (J Logic Lang Inform, in press) whose aim is to provide a minimalistic logical framework combining the expressiveness of dynamic logic in which actions are first-class citizens in the object language, with the expressiveness of logics of agency such as STIT and logics of group capabilities such as CL and ATL. We present a logic called ( Deterministic Dynamic logic of Agency ) which supports reasoning about actions and joint actions of (...) agents and coalitions, and agentive and coalitional capabilities. In it is supposed that, once all agents have selected a joint action, the effect of this joint action is deterministic. In order to assess we prove that it embeds Coalition Logic. We then extend with modal operators for agents’ preferences, and show that the resulting logic is sufficiently expressive to capture the game-theoretic concepts of best response and Nash equilibrium. (shrink)

Dynamical systems are mathematical structures whose aim is to describe the evolution of an arbitrary deterministic system through time, which is typically modeled as (a subset of) the integers or the real numbers. We show that it is possible to generalize the standard notion of a dynamical system, so that its time dimension is only required to possess the algebraic structure of a monoid: first, we endow any dynamical system with an associated graph and, second, we prove (...) that such a graph is a category if and only if the time model of the dynamical system is a monoid. In addition, we show that the general notion of a dynamical system allows us not only to define a family of meaningful dynamical concepts, but also to distinguish among a cluster of otherwise tangled notions of reversibility, whose logical relationships are finally analyzed. (shrink)

We construct a world model consisting of a matter field living in 4 dimensional spacetime and a gravitational field living in 11 dimensional spacetime. The seven hidden dimensions are compactified within a radius estimated by reproducing the particle–wave characteristics of diffraction experiments. In the presence of matter fields the gravitational field develops localized modes with elementary excitations called gravonons which are induced by the sources. The final world model treated here contains only gravonons and a scalar matter field. The gravonons (...) are localized in the environment of the massive particles which generate them. The solution of the Schrödinger equation for the world model yields matter fields which are localized in the 4 dimensional subspace. The localization has the following properties: There is a chooser mechanism for the selection of the localization site. The chooser selects one site on the basis of minor energy differences and differences in the gravonon structure between the sites, which at present cannot be controlled experimentally and therefore let the choice appear statistical. The changes from one localization site to a neighbouring one take place in a telegraph-signal like manner. The times at which telegraph like jumps occur depend on subtleties of the gravonon structure which at present cannot be controlled experimentally and therefore let the telegraph-like jumps appear statistical. The fact that the dynamical law acts in the configuration space of fields living in 11 dimensional spacetime lets the events observed in 4 dimensional spacetime appear non-local. In this way the phenomenology of CQM is obtained without the need of introducing the process of collapse and a probabilistic interpretation of the wave function. Operators defining observables need not be introduced. All experimental findings are explained in a deterministic way as a consequence of the time development of the wave function in configuration space according to Schrödinger’s equation without the need of introducing a probabilistic interpretation. (shrink)

The problem of the direction of time is reconsidered in the light of a generalized version of the theory of abstract deterministic dynamical systems, thanks to which the mathematical model of time can be provided with an internal dynamics, solely depending on its algebraic structure. This result calls for a reinterpretation of the directional properties of physical time, which have been typically understood in a strictly topological sense, as well as for a reexamination of the theoretical meaning of (...) the widespread time-reversal invariance of classical physical processes. (shrink)

In the epistemological tradition, there are two main interpretations of the semantic relation that an empirical theory may bear to the real world. According to realism, the theory-world relationship should be conceived as truth; according to instrumentalism, instead, it should be limited to empirical adequacy. Then, depending on how empirical theories are conceived, either syntactically as a class of sentences, or semantically as a class of models, the concepts of truth and empirical adequacy assume different and specific forms. (...) In this paper, we review two main conceptions of truth (one sentence-based and one model-based) and two of empirical adequacy (one sentence-based and one model-based), we point out their respective difficulties, and we give a first formulation of a new general view of the theory-world relationship, which we call Methodological Constructive Realism (MCR). We then show how the content of MCR can be further specified and expressed in a definite and precise form. The bulk of the paper shows in detail how it is possible to accomplish this goal for the special case of deterministic dynamical phenomena and their correlated deterministic models. This special version of MCR is formulated as an axiomatic extension of set theory, whose specific axioms constitute a formal ontology that provides an adequate framework for analyzing the two semantic relations of truth and empirical correctness, as well as their connections. (shrink)

Behaviors of chaotic systems are unpredictable. Chaotic systems are deterministic, their evolutions being governed by dynamical equations. Are the two statements contradictory? They are not, because the theory of chaos encompasses two levels of description. On a higher level, unpredictability appears as an emergent property of systems that are predictable on a lower level. In this talk, we examine the structure of dynamical theories to see how they employ multiple descriptive levels to explain chaos, bifurcation, and other (...) complexities of nonlinear systems.. (shrink)

The impossibility of an indeterministic evolution for standard relativistic quantum field theories, that is, theories in which all fields satisfy the condition that the generators of space-time translation have spectra in the forward light-cone, is demonstrated. The demonstration proceeds by arguing that a relativistically invariant theory must have a stable vacuum and then showing that stability of the vacuum, together with the requirements imposed by relativistic causality, entails deterministic evolution, if all degrees of freedom are standard degrees of freedom.

This work addresses a broad range of questions which belong to four fields: computation theory, general philosophy of science, philosophy of cognitive science, and philosophy of mind. Dynamical system theory provides the framework for a unified treatment of these questions. ;The main goal of this dissertation is to propose a new view of the aims and methods of cognitive science--the dynamical approach . According to this view, the object of cognitive science is a particular set of (...) dynamical systems, which I call "cognitive systems". The goal of a cognitive study is to specify a dynamical model of a cognitive system, and then use this model to produce a detailed account of the specific cognitive abilities of that system. The dynamical approach does not limit a-priori the form of the dynamical models which cognitive science may consider. In particular, this approach is compatible with both computational and connectionist modeling, for both computational systems and connectionist networks are special types of dynamical systems. ;To substantiate these methodological claims about cognitive science, I deal first with two questions in two different fields: What is a computational system? What is a dynamical explanation of a deterministic process? ;Intuitively, a computational system is a deterministic system which evolves in discrete time steps, and which can be described in an effective way. In chapter 1, I give a formal definition of this concept which employs the notions of isomorphism between dynamical systems, and of Turing computable function. In chapter 2, I propose a more comprehensive analysis which is based on a natural generalization of the concept of Turing machine. ;The goal of chapter 3 is to develop a theory of the dynamical explanation of a deterministic process. By a "dynamical explanation" I mean the specification of a dynamical model of the system or process which we want to explain. I start from the analysis of a specific type of explanandum--dynamical phenomena--and I then use this analysis to shed light on the general form of a dynamical explanation. Finally, I analyze the structure of those theories which generate explanations of this form, namely dynamical theories. (shrink)

In this paper we analyze the relation between the notion of typicality and the notion of probability and the related question of how the choice of measure in deterministic theories in physics may be justified. Recently it has been argued that although the notion of typicality is not a probabilistic notion, it plays a crucial role in underwriting probabilistic statements in classical statistical mechanics and in Bohm’s theory. We argue that even in theories with deterministic dynamics, like classical statistical (...) mechanics and Bohm’s theory, the notion of probability can be understood as fundamentally objective, and that it is the notion of probability rather than typicality that may have an explanatory value. (shrink)

This paper argues for the following three theses: There is a clear reason to prefer physical theories with deterministic dynamical equations: such theories are both maximally simple and maximally rich in information, since given an initial configuration of matter and the dynamical equations, the whole evolution of the configuration of matter is fixed. There is a clear way how to introduce probabilities in a deterministic physical theory, namely as answer to the question of what evolution of a (...) specific system we can reasonably expect under ignorance of its exact initial conditions. This procedure works in the same manner for both classical and quantum physics. There is no cogent reason to subscribe to an ontological commitment to the parameters that enter the dynamical equations of physics. These parameters are defined in terms of their function for the evolution of the configuration of matter, which is defined in terms of relative particle positions and their change. Granting an ontological status to them does not lead to a gain in explanation, but only to artificial problems. Against this background, I argue that there is no conflict between determinism in physics and free will, and, in general, point out the limits of science when it comes to the central metaphysical issues. (shrink)

The paper considers the claim that quantum theories with a deterministic dynamics of objects in ordinary space-time, such as Bohmian mechanics, contradict the assumption that the measurement settings can be freely chosen in the EPR experiment. That assumption is one of the premises of Bell’s theorem. I first argue that only a premise to the effect that what determines the choice of the measurement settings is independent of what determines the past state of the measured system is needed for the (...) derivation of Bell’s theorem. Determinism as such does not undermine that independence . Only entanglement could do so. However, generic entanglement without collapse on the level of the universal wave-function can go together with effective wave-functions for subsystems of the universe, as in Bohmian mechanics. The paper argues that such effective wave-functions are sufficient for the mentioned independence premise to hold. (shrink)

The modal interpretation of quantum mechanics allows one to keep the standard classical definition of realism intact. That is, variables have a definite status for all time and a measurement only tells us which value it had. However, at present modal dynamics are only applicable to situations that are described in the orthodox theory by projective measures. In this paper we extend modal dynamics to include positive operator measures. That is, for example, rather than using a complete set of (...) orthogonal projectors, we can use an overcomplete set of nonorthogonal projectors. We derive the conditions under which Bell's stochastic modal dynamics for projective measures reduce to deterministic dynamics, showing that Brown and Hiley's generalization of Bohmian mechanics [quant-ph/0005026, ] cannot be thus derived. We then show how deterministic dynamics for positive operators can also be derived. As a simple case, we consider a Harmonic oscillator, and the overcomplete set of coherent state projectors. We show that the modal dynamics for this POM in the classical limit correspond to the classical dynamics, even for the nonclassical number state |n>. This is in contrast to the Bohmian dynamics, which for energy eigenstates, the dynamics are always non-classical. (shrink)

The modern mathematical theory of dynamical systems proposes a new model of mechanical motion. In this model the deterministic unstable systems can behave in a statistical manner. Both kinds of motion are inseparably connected, they depend on the point of view and researcher's approach to the system. This mathematical fact solves in a new way the old problem of statistical laws in the world which is essentially deterministic. The classical opposition: deterministic‐statistical, disappears in random dynamics. The main thesis (...) of the paper is that the new theory of motion is a revolution in the research programme of classical mechanics. It is the revolution brought about by the development of mathematics. (shrink)

A common way of characterizing Boltzmann’s explanation of thermodynamics in term of statistical mechanics is with reference to three ingredients: the dynamics, the past hypothesis, and the statistical postulate. In this paper I focus on the statistical postulate, and I have three aims. First, I wish to argue that regarding the statistical postulate as a probability postulate may be too strong: a postulate about typicality would be enough. Second, I wish to show that there is no need to postulate anything, (...) for the typicality postulate can be suitably derived from the dynamics. Finally, I discuss how the attempts to give preference to certain stochastic quantum theories (such as the spontaneous collapse theory) over deterministic alternatives on the basis that they do not need the statistical postulate fail. (shrink)

For the basic areas of physics‐classical mechanics, classical field theories, and quantum mechanics‐there are local dynamical theories that offer complete descriptions of systems when the proper subsidiary conditions also are provided. For all these cases there are global theories from which the local theories can be derived. Symmetries and their relation to conservation laws are reviewed. The standard model of elementary particles is mentioned, along with frontier questions about them. A case against reductionism in physics is presented.

A common way of characterizing Boltzmann’s explanation of thermodynamics in term of statistical mechanics is with reference to three ingredients: the dynamics, the past hypothesis, and the statistical postulate. In this paper I focus on the statistical postulate, and I have three aims. First, I wish to argue that regarding the statistical postulate as a probability postulate may be too strong: a postulate about typicality would be enough. Second, I wish to show that there is no need to postulate anything, (...) for the typicality postulate can be suitably derived from the dynamics. Finally, I discuss how the attempts to give preference to certain stochastic quantum theories (such as the spontaneous collapse theory) over deterministic alternatives on the basis that they do not need the statistical postulate fail. (shrink)

We call attention to different formulations of how physical laws relate to what is physically possible in the philosophical literature, and argue that it may be the case that determinism fails under one formulation but reigns under the other. Whether this is so depends on our view on the nature of laws, and may also depend on the inter-theoretical relationships among our best physical theories, or so shall we argue.

We observe that Schrödinger’s equation may be written as two real coupled Hamilton–Jacobi (HJ)-like equations, each involving a quantum potential. Developing our established programme of representing the quantum state through exact free-standing deterministic trajectory models, it is shown how quantum evolution may be treated as the autonomous propagation of two coupled congruences. The wavefunction at a point is derived from two action functions, each generated by a single trajectory. The model shows that conservation as expressed through a continuity equation is (...) not a necessary component of a trajectory theory of state. Probability is determined by the difference in the action functions, not by the congruence densities. The theory also illustrates how time-reversal symmetry may be implemented through the collective behaviour of elements that individually disobey the conventional transformation (T\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathrm{T}$$\end{document}) of displacement (scalar) and velocity (reversal). We prove that an integral curve of the linear superposition of two vectors can be derived algebraically from the integral curves of one of the constituent vectors labelled by integral curves associated with the other constituent. A corollary establishes relations between displacement functions in diverse trajectory models, including where the functions obey different symmetry transformations. This is illustrated by showing that a (T\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathrm{T}$$\end{document}-obeying) de Broglie-Bohm trajectory is a sequence of points on the (non-T\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathrm{T}$$\end{document}) HJ trajectories, and vice versa. (shrink)

This paper aims at a logico-mathematical analysis of the concept of chaos from the point of view of a constructivist philosophy of physics. The idea of an internal logic of chaos theory is meant as an alternative to a realist conception of chaos. A brief historical overview of the theory of dynamical systems is provided in order to situate the philosophical problem in the context of probability theory. A finitary probabilistic account of chaos amounts to the (...) theory of measurement in the line of a quantum-theoretical foundational perspective and the paper concludes on the non-classical internal logic of chaos theory. Finally, deterministic chaos points to a philosophy which asserts that chaotic systems are no less measurable than other physical systems where predictable and non–predictable phenomena intermingle in a constructive theory of measurement. (shrink)

We propose a novel framework that formalizes awareness within Relational Quantum Dynamics (RQD) by integrating Integrated Information Theory (IIT) with quantum measurement processes. In our approach, quantum interactions are not merely stochastic events, but are interpreted as intrinsic awareness updates that occur via Bayesian conditioning. Specifically, we define an awareness metric A(A : B) that combines the quantum mutual information generated during an interaction and Φ as a measure of integrated information. By modeling quantum measurements as stochastic processes and (...) determinizing these via outcome indexing, we construct a composite functor that maps probabilistic quantum instruments to deterministic awareness updates in a separate category of awareness states. We show that this functor preserves identities and composition, ensuring that multi-observer scenarios such as nested Wigner’s Friend or Frauchiger-Renner experiments produce a coherent alignment of facts once interactions occur, even though no single truth value exists prior to interaction. We outline experimental proposals, including nested observer experiments, gravitational entanglement tests, and the engineering of artificial observers with tunable integrated information, to test the predictions of our model. Our framework does not alter standard quantum mechanics but enriches its interpretation by positing that every quantum interaction is accompanied by an awareness update whose significance depends on both the amount of exchanged information and the integration capacity of the systems involved. This work provides a mathematically robust bridge between quantum foundations and cognitive science, suggesting that conscious experience may emerge naturally from the dynamics of quantum information. (shrink)

How can probabilities make sense in a deterministic many-worlds theory? We address two facets of this problem: why should rational agents assign subjective probabilities to branching events, and why should branching events happen with relative frequencies matching their objective probabilities. To address the first question, we generalise the Deutsch–Wallace theorem to a wide class of many-world theories, and show that the subjective probabilities are given by a norm that depends on the dynamics of the theory: the 2-norm in (...) the usual Many-Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, and the 1-norm in a classical many-worlds theory known as Kent’s universe. To address the second question, we show that if one takes the objective probability of an event to be the proportion of worlds in which this event is realised, then in most worlds the relative frequencies will approximate well the objective probabilities. This suggests that the task of determining the objective probabilities in a many-worlds theory reduces to the task of determining how to assign a measure to the worlds. (shrink)

This is a major contribution to the theory of rational choice which will be of particular interest to philosophers and economists. The author sets out the foundations of rational choice, and then sketches a dynamic choice framework in which principles of ordering and independence follow from a number of apparently plausible conditions. However, there is potential conflict among these conditions, and when they are weakened to avoid it the usual foundations of rational choice no longer prevail. The thrust of (...) the argument is to suggest that the theory of rational choice is less deterministic than many suppose. (shrink)

One of the most profound insights of the dynamic systems perspective is that new structures resulting from the developmental process do not need to be planned in advance, nor is it necessary to have these structures represented in genetic or neurological templates prior to their emergence. Rather, new structures can emerge as components of the individual and the environment self-organize; that is, as they mutually constrain each other's actions, new patterns and structures may arise. This theoretical possibility brings into developmental (...) theory the important concept of indeterminism--the possibility that developmental outcomes may not be predictable in any simple linear causal way from their antecedents. This is the first book to take a critical and serious look at the role of indeterminism in psychological and behavioral development. * What is the source of this indeterminism? * What is its role in developmental change? * Is it merely the result of incomplete observational data or error in measurement? It reviews the concepts of indeterminism and determinism in their historical, philosophical, and theoretical perspectives--particularly in relation to dynamic systems thinking--and applies these general ideas to systems of nonverbal communication. Stressing the indeterminacy inherent to symbols and meaning making in social systems, several chapters address the issue of indeterminism from metaphorical, modeling, and narrative perspectives. Others discuss those indeterministic processes within the individual related to emotional, social, and cognitive development. (shrink)

The replicator dynamics and Moran process are the main deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory. The models are connected by a mean-field relationship—the former describes the expected behavior of the latter. However, there are conditions under which their predictions diverge. I demonstrate that the divergence between their predictions is a function of standard techniques used in their analysis and of differences in the idealizations involved in each. My analysis reveals problems for stochastic stability analysis in a broad (...) class of games, demonstrates a novel domain of agreement between the dynamics, and indicates a broader moral for evolutionary modeling. (shrink)

The state-of-art research in the field of life’s organization confronts the need to investigate a number of interacting components, their properties and conditions of sustainable behaviour within a natural system. In biology, ecology and life sciences, the performance of such stable system is usually related to homeostasis, a property of the system to actively regulate its state within a certain allowable limits. In our previous work, we proposed a deterministic model for systems’ homeostasis. The model was based on dynamical (...) system’s theory and pairwise relationships of competition, amensalism and antagonism taken from theoretical biology and ecology. However, the present paper proposes a different dimension to our previous results based on the same model. In this paper, we introduce the influence of inter-component relationships in a system, wherein the impact is characterized by direction (neutral, positive, or negative) as well as its (absolute) value, or strength. This makes the model stochastic which, in our opinion, is more consistent with real-world elements affected by various random factors. The case study includes two examples from areas of hydrobiology and medicine. The models acquired for these cases enabled us to propose a convincing explanation for corresponding phenomena identified by different types of natural systems. (shrink)

In ‘belief revision’ a theory is revised with a formula φ resulting in a revised theory . Typically, is in , one has to give up belief in by a process of retraction, and φ is in . We propose to model belief revision in a dynamic epistemic logic. In this setting, we typically have an information state (pointed Kripke model) for the theory wherein the agent believes the negation of the revision formula, i.e., wherein is true. (...) The revision with φ is a program *φ that transforms this information state into a new information state. The transformation is described by a dynamic modal operator [*φ], that is interpreted as a binary relation [ [*φ] ] between information states. The next information state is computed from the current information state and the belief revision formula. If the revision is successful, the agent believes φ in the resulting state, i.e., Bφ is then true. To make this work, as information states we propose ‘doxastic epistemic models’ that represent both knowledge and degrees of belief. These are multi-modal and multi-agent Kripke models. They are constructed from preference relations for agents, and they satisfy various characterizable multi-agent frame properties. Iterated, revocable, and higher-order belief revision are all quite natural in this setting. We present, for an example, five different ways of such dynamic belief revision. One can also see that as a non-deterministic epistemic action with two alternatives, where one is preferred over the other, and there is a natural generalization to general epistemic actions with preferences. (shrink)

In this short paper, we propose a special class of quantum systems with implicit quantum uncertainties without any probability structure followed by the dynamical behavior of the systems. When a system is deterministic or random, it does not capture the essence of freedom of choice (FOC), which is the ability to make decisions followed by one’s preferences, free from both deterministic and random outcomes. The proposed special class of quantum systems contains non-deterministic yet non-random outcomes, and so they open (...) the possibility of having FOC within the systems. We also examine examples of such a special class of quantum systems that do not violate the postulates of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

The theoretical framework adopted in the exact sciences, for constructing and testing deterministic theories on the one hand, and modelling and analysis of observed phenomena on the other, is often implicitly assumed to be that of structural stability. In view of recent developments in nonlinear dynamics, it is argued here that in general it may not be possible to assume strict determinism and structural stability simultaneously; either strict determinism holds, in which case the fragility framework may turn out to be (...) the appropriate framework for the study of certain phenomena in the exact sciences, or ‘structural stability’ is restored at the expense of introducing stochasticity. In this sense a certain degree of indeterminacy may be unavoidable even at the classical level. (shrink)

The paradigm of Laplacean determinism combines three regulative principles: determinism, predictability, and the explanatory adequacy of universal laws together with purely local conditions. Historically, it applied to celestial mechanics, but it has been expanded into an ideal for scientific theories whose cogency is often not questioned. Laplace’s demon is an idealization of mechanistic scientific method. Its principles together imply reducibility, and rule out holism and emergence. I will argue that Laplacean determinism fails even in the realm of planetary dynamics, and (...) that it does not give suitable criteria for explanatory success except within very well defined and rather exceptional domains. Ironically, the very successes of Laplacean method in the Solar System were made possible only by processes that are not themselves tractable to Laplacean methodology. The results of some of these processes were first observed in 1964, and violate the Lapacean requirements of locality and predictability, opening the door to holism and nonreducibility, i.e., emergence. Despite the falsification of Laplacean methodology, the explanatory resources of holism and emergence remain in scientific limbo, though emergence has been used somewhat indiscriminately in recent scientific literature. I make some remarks at the end about the proper use of emergence in its traditional sense going back to C.D. Broad. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.1 (2005) 83-85 [Access article in PDF] Lacan, Science, and Determinism Douglas McConnell Grant Gillett Keywords Lacan, the unconscious, free will Van Staden And Hinshelwood's commen-taries raise a number of issues, but there are two particular themes common to both that we pick up in this response.The first theme concerns the reconcilability of Lacanian theory to the disciplines of analytic philosophy and "Anglo-American positivist (...) psychiatry." This is closely related to the relationship between the unconscious and the empirical sciences discussed in the editorial (McConnell and Pickering 2005). The second theme concerns the relevance of Lacanian theory to our understanding of free will and the structure of the mind. Lacan, Analytic Philosophy, and Scientific Psychiatry First, psychoanalysis or psychotherapy generally should not try to reunite with neuroscience because of the fundamental difference in their approaches to the patient, which is likely to mean that even if a theoretical rapprochement can be found, a working relationship is unlikely.Although there are many facets of Lacan's theory that were not addressed in our paper and even if many of those are totally irreconcilable to analytic philosophy, we believe that we have addressed the most ontologically fundamental issues and that these can genuinely contribute to and challenge analytic philosophy of mind.As Hinshelwood points out, psychiatry does operate with a philosophical basis, critical (or sometimes relatively uncritical) scientific realism (even though it may not be acknowledged), and it as such it can legitimately be contributed to or challenged by the philosophical aspects of Lacanian theory outlined in our paper.In fact, the theoretical basis is evinced in van Staden's commentary when he remarks on the relation between Lacanian theory and psychiatry: "... the unconscious is not only structured like a language but actually reflects and is produced by linguistic interaction between the subject and others. This is a difficult claim to verify, no doubt, but it prompts further related questions... whether the conscious mind is structured like a language" (van Staden 2005, 78). And one must ask whether this is the kind of claim that can be verified or whether it is a hermeneutic claim (in somewhat the way suggested by Jaspers), serving more as a framing belief to allow people to make sense of what has influenced them in their life histories and is currently played out in their relationships with others. We would lean toward this interpretation of the unconscious, explicitly distancing ourselves from any overreaching, quasi-scientific realism about unconscious contents and mental structures, but clinging to the thought that dealing with such contents is an essential part of the therapeutic encounter. [End Page 83]Looked at in this way, both the Lacanian unconscious and conscious mental life bear the imprint of language due to the subject's immersion and participation in the symbolic realm. This may seem a "difficult claim to verify," but because verification is linked to the scientific framework of inquiry rather than the hybrid that is clinical knowledge, we would better regard it as being difficult to establish as an axiom of therapy. The linguistic structure of the conscious and unconscious mind is, on this account, a conceptual implication of the role of the symbolic register in thought and not a thesis that requires verification (a Wittgensteinian thesis espoused by a number of contemporary philosophers, including Dummett and Davidson).As it happens, cognitive science has found linguistic structure to be important in operations of the cognitive unconscious (arguably different from the dynamic unconscious due to the former's dependence on scientific experiment and the latter's connections to life history rather than mere psychological or cognitive traits [see Gillett and McConnell 2005]). Given that language and problem solving are so closely intertwined, it would suggest that cognitive science was overlooking something important rather than damaging Lacanian theory if linguistic structure did not appear on cognitive science's "radar." So, how does language logically (in the sense defended by Husserl and Frege, that is, to do with the sense or content of thoughts not merely the processes underpinning one's contingently evolving stream... (shrink)

Although biologists and philosophers of science generally agree that genes cannot determine the forms of biological and psychological traits, students, journalists, politicians, and other members of the general public nonetheless continue to embrace genetic determinism. This article identifies some of the concerns typically raised by individuals when they first encounter the systems perspective that biologists and philosophers of science now favor over genetic determinism, and uses arguments informed by that perspective to address those concerns. No definitive statements can yet be (...) made about why genetic determinism has proven so resilient in the face of empirical evidence pointing up its deficiencies, but conveying the essential interdependence of 'nature' and 'nurture' to the general public will likely require deployment of the arguments that systems theorists ordinarily use to reject genetic determinism. In addition, the elaboration of new metaphors that focus attention on the dynamic nature of trait construction will likely prove valuable, because re-conceptualizing notions like 'genes' and 'nature' will probably be one of the most effective ways to help students and the general public abandon the genetic determinism that biologists now recognize as indefensible. (shrink)

This book places thermodynamics on a system-theoretic foundation so as to harmonize it with classical mechanics. Using the highest standards of exposition and rigor, the authors develop a novel formulation of thermodynamics that can be viewed as a moderate-sized system theory as compared to statistical thermodynamics. This middle-ground theory involves deterministic large-scale dynamical system models that bridge the gap between classical and statistical thermodynamics. The authors' theory is motivated by the fact that a discipline as cardinal (...) as thermodynamics--entrusted with some of the most perplexing secrets of our universe--demands far more than physical mathematics as its underpinning. Even though many great physicists, such as Archimedes, Newton, and Lagrange, have humbled us with their mathematically seamless eurekas over the centuries, this book suggests that a great many physicists and engineers who have developed the theory of thermodynamics seem to have forgotten that mathematics, when used rigorously, is the irrefutable pathway to truth. This book uses system theoretic ideas to bring coherence, clarity, and precision to an extremely important and poorly understood classical area of science. (shrink)

A double delayed hybrid stochastic prey-predator bioeconomic system with Lévy jumps is established and analyzed, where commercial harvesting on prey and environmental stochasticity on population dynamics are considered. Two discrete time delays are utilized to represent the maturation delay of prey and gestation delay of predator, respectively. For a deterministic system, positivity of solutions and uniform persistence of system are discussed. Some sufficient conditions associated with double time delays are derived to discuss asymptotic stability of interior equilibrium. For a stochastic (...) system, existence and uniqueness of a global positive solution are studied. By using the invariant measure theory and singular boundary theory of diffusion process, existence of stochastic Hopf bifurcation and stochastic stability are investigated. By constructing appropriate Lyapunov functions, asymptotic dynamic behavior of the proposed hybrid stochastic system with double time delays and Lévy jumps is discussed. Numerical simulations are provided to show consistency with theoretical analysis. (shrink)

We present a logic, $$\mathbf {ELI^r}$$ ELI r, for the discovery of deterministic causal regularities starting from empirical data. Our approach is inspired by Mackie’s theory of causes as INUS-conditions, and implements a more recent adjustment to Mackie’s theory according to which the left-hand side of causal regularities is required to be a minimal disjunction of minimal conjunctions. To derive such regularities from a given set of data, we make use of the adaptive logics framework. Our knowledge of (...) deterministic causal regularities is, as Mackie noted, most often gappy or elliptical. The adaptive logics framework is well-suited to explicate both the internal and the external dynamics of the discovery of such gappy regularities. After presenting $$\mathbf {ELI^r}$$ ELI r, we first discuss these forms of dynamics in more detail. Next, we consider some criticisms of the INUS-account and show how our approach avoids them, and we compare $$\mathbf {ELI^r}$$ ELI r with the CNA algorithm that was recently proposed by Michael Baumgartner. (shrink)

Free bosonic fields are investigated at a classical level by imposing their characteristic de Broglie periodicities as constraints. In analogy with finite temperature field theory and with extra-dimensional field theories, this compactification naturally leads to a quantized energy spectrum. As a consequence of the relation between periodicity and energy arising from the de Broglie relation, the compactification must be regarded as dynamical and local. The theory, whose foundamental set-up is presented in this paper, turns out to be (...) consistent with special relativity and in particular respects causality. The non trivial classical dynamics of these periodic fields show remarkable overlaps with ordinary quantum field theory. This can be interpreted as a generalization of the AdS/CFT correspondence. (shrink)

We present a logic, \, for the discovery of deterministic causal regularities starting from empirical data. Our approach is inspired by Mackie’s theory of causes as INUS-conditions, and implements a more recent adjustment to Mackie’s theory according to which the left-hand side of causal regularities is required to be a minimal disjunction of minimal conjunctions. To derive such regularities from a given set of data, we make use of the adaptive logics framework. Our knowledge of deterministic causal regularities (...) is, as Mackie noted, most often gappy or elliptical. The adaptive logics framework is well-suited to explicate both the internal and the external dynamics of the discovery of such gappy regularities. After presenting \, we first discuss these forms of dynamics in more detail. Next, we consider some criticisms of the INUS-account and show how our approach avoids them, and we compare \ with the CNA algorithm that was recently proposed by Michael Baumgartner. (shrink)

If quantum mechanics is interpreted as an objective, complete, physical theory, applying to macroscopic as well as microscopic systems, then the linearity of quantum dynamics gives rise to the measurement problem and related problems, which cannot be solved without modifying the dynamics. Eight desiderata are proposed for a reasonable modified theory. They favor a stochastic modification rather than a deterministic non-linear one, but the spontaneous localization theories of Ghirardi et al. and Pearle are criticized. The intermittent fluorescence of (...) a trapped atom irradiated by two laser beams suggests a stochastic theory in which the locus of stochasticity is interaction between a material system and the electromagnetic vacuum. (shrink)

"This book develops a rigorous theory of indeterminism as a local and modal concept. Its crucial insight is that our world contains events or processes with alternative, really possible outcomes. The theory aims at clarifying what this assumption involves, and it does it in two ways. First, it provides a mathematically rigorous framework for local and modal indeterminism. Second, we support that theory by spelling out the philosophically relevant consequences of this formulation and by showing its fruitful (...) applications in metaphysics. To this end, we offer a formal analysis of modal correlations and of causation, which is applicable in indeterministic and non-local contexts as well. We also propose a rigorous theory of objective single-case probabilities, intended to represent degrees of possibility. In a third step, we link our theory to current physics, investigating how local and modal indeterminism relates to issues in the foundations of physics, in particular, quantum non-locality and spatio-temporal relativity. The book also ventures into the philosophy of time, showing how the theory's resources can be used to explicate the dynamic concept of the past, present, and future based on local indeterminism"--. (shrink)

This paper explores whether human proactivity can be considered an expression of free will. The discussion involves two paradigms, which are mutually complementary and encompass psychological proactivity and reactivity. Both paradigms raise the question of linear and non-linear determinism, which inevitably leads to the issue of free will. The analysis attempts to find a compromise between linear and non-linear determinism through the approach of human dialectical complexity (Lebed & Bar-Eli, 2013). This refers to the relationships of two types of complex (...) subsystems within a human: the perceptual-motor dynamic system (PMDS), which is mostly determined by linear impacts and expressed through reactive behavior, and the “free-will”Footnote1 complex system (FCS), which is mostly determined by non-linear redundant determinism and expressed through proactive dynamics. In summary, it is concluded that there cannot be a categorical assertion of the permanent existence of free will in human functioning. The human dialectical complexity expressed by both proactivity and reactivity causes the “floating” presence of free will depending on the prevalence of proactive control factors and the non-linear determination of a living human system. (shrink)

Chaos-related obstructions to predictability have been used to challenge accounts of theory validation based on the agreement between theoretical predictions and experimental data. These challenges are incomplete in two respects: they do not show that chaotic regimes are unpredictable in principle and, as a result, that there is something conceptually wrong with idealized expectations of correct predictions from acceptable theories, and they do not explore whether chaos-induced predictive failures of deterministic models can be remedied by stochastic modeling. In this (...) paper we appeal to an asymptotic analysis of state space trajectories and their numerical approximations to show that chaotic regimes are deterministically unpredictable even with unbounded resources. Additionally, we explain why stochastic models of chaotic systems, while predictively successful in some cases, are in general predictively as limited as deterministic ones. We conclude by suggesting that the way in which scientists deal with such principled obstructions to predictability calls for a more comprehensive approach to theory validation, on which experimental testing is augmented by a multifaceted mathematical analysis of theoretical models, capable of identifying chaos-related predictive failures as due to principled limitations which the world itself imposes on any less-than-omniscient epistemic access to some natural systems. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.3 (2005) 235-237 [Access article in PDF] Determined by Chaos: The Nonlinear Dynamics of Free Will Jessica Wahman Keywords free will, chaos theory, determinism, materialism In "antidepressants and the Chaotic Brain: Implications for the Respectful Treatment of Selves," Douglas Heinrichs provides an intriguing justification of individuated and longer term therapy for depressive clients. He does not reject medication as a therapeutic strategy, nor does (...) he question the materialist basis of the traditional medical model. Rather, he offers a physically deterministic account of depression that is at the same time compatible with a sense of human agency and individuality. Heinrichs suggests that human physiology and its psychiatric disorders are better accounted for by the nonlinear dynamics of chaos theory than by the traditional account of neurotransmitter production and reuptake. Because the latter, microscopic, explanation suggests a direct cause-and-effect relationship between synaptic activity and subjective affect, it cannot account for the wide variation of responses to the same medications, nor can it satisfy the client's fears that her drug-induced well-being is not fully hers to control. Chaos theory, he asserts, can provide a better explanation by treating the human organism as a complex holistic system whose patterns resemble a topographical map of probability more than they do a unidirectional vector model of cause to effect. Like the weather, human affect and behavior are physically determined but difficult to predict, and so careful attention to both the individual history of the client and the uniqueness of responses to medication are a necessary part of any successful therapeutic program.Connected to this theory of nonlinear physiology is Heinrichs's account of autonomy and agency under this rubric. He notes that a psychology based on chaos theory is not only compatible with the notion of free will, it can better explain why the successful use of medication actually increases freedom and autonomy instead of limiting it. It is here that I wish to focus my comments, because his interpretation of free will may give us, to borrow a phrase from Daniel Dennett, a "variet[y] of free will worth wanting" (1984, title page). Free will, in this case, is not a metaphysical ability to act above and beyond our material causes, but is instead a property of the material system itself, namely when that system feels itself capable of greater psychic mobility around the topographical map of probabilistic patterns.According to this model, our ability to reason, plan, and act on the decisions we make is itself a [End Page 235] part of our chaotically determined neurologic system. When we are healthy, we are able to reason in our best interests and act on those reasons. This is modeled as an ability for the organism to metaphorically "move about" the map of its own possibilities, and more important, to both enter and escape certain states, known as chaotic attractors, into which it is likely to be drawn. "Where" we wind up, psychologically speaking, at any point in time is determined by our own system, and so we may say that in such a case we are autonomous and our choices are made freely. Depression, on the other hand, can be compared to a deep groove in the map, a chaotic attractor that is hard to escape, and so the system quite literally becomes "stuck in a rut." This is subjectively experienced as the tendency for thought processes and activities to fall into negative and self-defeating patterns despite the best efforts of the client to escape these habits. So long as the organism does not have a sense of being "trapped" in an attractor (whether a depressive or, for example, manic or compulsive state), then that organism may be said to be free. Medication and the therapy that accompanies it, so far as it facilitates our ability to escape deep chaotic attractors, promotes our own freedom of will. If a car cannot spin its way out of a ditch, does the tow truck hinder or promote its freedom by hauling it back onto solid pavement where it may again... (shrink)

The characteristic difference between laws and accidental generalizations lies in our epistemic or inductive attitude towards them. This idea has taken various forms and dominated the discussion about lawlikeness in the last decades. Likewise, the issue about ceteris paribus conditions is essentially about how we epistemically deal with exceptions. Hence, ranking theory with its resources of defeasible reasoning seems ideally suited to explicate these points in a formal way. This is what the paper attempts to do. Thus it will (...) turn out that a law is simply the deterministic analogue of a sequence of independent, identically distributed random variables. This entails that de Finetti's representation theorems can be directly transformed into an account of confirmation of laws thus conceived. (shrink)

We discuss two supertasks invented recently by Laraudogoitia [1996, 1997], Both involve an infinite number of particle collisions within a finite amount of time and both compromise determinism. We point out that the sources of the indeterminism are rather different in the two cases - one involves unbounded particle velocities, the other involves particles with no lower bound to their sizes - and consequently that the implications for determinism are rather different - one form of indeterminism affects Newtonian but not (...) relativistic physics, while the other form is insensitive to the classical vs relativistic distinction. We also note some interesting linkages among supertasks, indeterminism and foundations problems in the general theory of relativity. (shrink)

Orthodox quantum mechanics is technically built around an element that von Neumann called Process 1. In its basic form it consists of an action that reduces the prior state of a physical system to a sum of two parts, which can be regarded as the parts corresponding to the answers ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ to a specific question that this action poses, or ‘puts to nature’. Nature returns one answer or the other, in accordance with statistical weightings specified by the (...) class='Hi'>theory. Thus the standard statistical element in quantum theory enters only after the Process-1 choice is made, while the known deterministic element in quantum theory governs the dynamics that prevails between the reduction events, but not the process that determines which of the continuum of allowed Process-1 probing actions will actually occur. The rules governing that selection process are not fixed by the theory in its present form. This freedom can be used to resolve in a natural way an apparent problem of the orthodox theory, its biocentrism. That resolution produces a rationally coherent realization of the theory that preserves the basic orthodox structure but allows naturally.. (shrink)

Before being considered as independent fields, business cycles and productivity growth had long been regarded as closely interrelated dynamics. Growth and cycles theories and models developed independently. On one side, the growth analysis developed analyzing the existence and stability of a long-run deterministic growth path. On the other side, business cycles theory focused on the understanding of detrended data movements considering growth as an exogenous trend, independent of the cycle. This dichotomy is still present in the modern literature. _Business (...) Cycles and Growth Theory_ examines the role of monetary and financial factors in growth cycles dynamics interaction. It offers new perspectives for modelling growth cycles dynamics underlining the possibility of building an 'incomplete business cycles theory', as well as highlighting the existence of a convergence between the last theoretical developments of both growth and business cycles literatures. A significant read, this book demonstrates that such a convergence can provide benchmarks for a new paradigm of models in which endogenous growth mechanism, because it offers a strong propagation for shocks, can be the core of a new business cycles dynamics. (shrink)

Digital innovations are rapidly changing the contemporary workplace. Big Tech companies marketing algorithmic management increasingly decide on the Future of Work. Political responses, however, often focus on managing the impact of these technologies on workers. They leave the question of how these technologies are designed or how workers can determine their own futures unanswered. This approach risks surrendering the Future of Work debate to techno-determinist imaginaries aligned with corporate interests. Using Cornelius Castoriadis’ early writings on worker struggles in French Tayloristic (...) factories and his later oeuvre on conflictual social imaginaries, I propose an agonistic approach to the Future of Work. Not merely companies implementing workplace technologies, but also workers themselves possess agency in determining the Future of Work. Workers’ frequent contestations against machinic surveillance and technologically mediated coordination of the labour process disclose an alternative Future of Work in which technologies are used to enhance worker autonomy rather than bureaucratic control. Worker struggles at Amazon Mechanical Turk illustrate this agonistic dynamic: Amazon mobilizes algorithmic management to fragment and control a workforce of globally dispersed remote workers, but the latter form online social communities and create counter-technologies to reappropriate control over the labour process. (shrink)

We show that the Bohmian approach in terms of persisting particles that move on continuous trajectories following a deterministic law can be literally applied to quantum field theory. By means of the Dirac sea model—exemplified in the electron sector of the standard model neglecting radiation—we explain how starting from persisting particles, one is led to standard QFT employing creation and annihilation operators when tracking the dynamics with respect to a reference state, the so-called vacuum. Since on the level of (...) wave functions, both formalisms are mathematically equivalent, this proposal provides for an ontology of QFT that includes a dynamics of individual processes, solves the measurement problem, and explains the appearance of creation and annihilation events. 1Bohmian Mechanics from Quantum Mechanics to Quantum Field Theory2The Dirac Sea Model3Equilibrium States and the Vacuum4Excitations of the Vacuum and the Fock Space Formalism5The Appearance of Particle Creations and Annihilations6The Merits of the Bohmian Approach. (shrink)

This account of the dynamical theory of chaos leads to a metaphysical picture of a world with an open future, in which the laws of physics are emergent‐downward approximations to a more subtle and supple reality and in which there is downward causation through information input as well as upward causation through energy input. Such a metaphysical picture can accommodate both human and divine agency.