This paper outlines and demonstrates the viability of a consistent dialogic approach to the semantics of utterances in natural language. Based on the philosophical picture of language as dialogue, adumbrated by Mikhail Bakhtin and incorporating work in conversation analysis and cognitive-functional linguistics, I develop a method for analyzing both the function and the content of human utterances within a unified philosophical framework. I demonstrate the viability of this method of analysis by applying it to a brief conversational exchange (in (...) Hebrew), which is analyzed here in full detail. (shrink)

In this paper, an interpretation of "necessity", inspired by a Leibnizian idea and based on the method of dialogical logic, is introduced. The semantic rules corresponding to such an account of necessity are developed, and then some peculiarities, and some potential advantages, of the introduced dialogical explanation, in comparison with the customary explanation offered by the possible worlds semantics, are briefly discussed.

We present a new proof of soundness/completeness of tableaux with respect to dialogical games in Classical First-Order Logic. As far as we know it is the first thorough result for dialogical games where finiteness of plays is guaranteed by means of what we call repetition ranks.

Semantic noise, the effect ensuing from the denotative and thus functional variability exhibited by different terms in different contexts, is a common concern in natural language processing (NLP). While unarguably problematic in specific applications (e.g., certain translation tasks), the main argument of this paper is that failing to observe this linguistic matter of fact as a generative effect rather than as an obstacle, leads to actual obstacles in instances where language model outputs are presented as neutral. Given that a common (...) and long-standing challenge in NLP is the interpretation of ambiguous – i.e., semantically noisy – cases, this article focuses on an exemplar ambiguity-resolution task in NLP: the problem of anaphora in Winograd schemas. The main question considered is: to what extent is the standard approach to disambiguation in NLP subject to a stagnant “image of language”? And, can a transdisciplinary, dynamic approach combining linguistics and philosophy elucidate new perspectives on these possible conceptual shortcomings? In order to answer these questions we explore the term and concept of noise, particularly in its presentation as semantic noise. Owing to its definitional plurality, and sometimes even desirable unspecificity, the term noise is thus used as proof of concept for semantic generativity being an inherent characteristic in linguistic representation, and its concept is used to interrogate assumptions admitted in the resolution of Winograd schemas. The argument is speculative and theoretical in method, and the result is an analysis which provides an account of the fundamentally dialogical and necessarily open-ended effects of semantic noise in natural language. (shrink)

Recent work on the development of a dialogical approach to the logic of fiction stresses the notion of existence as choice. Moreover, this approach to existence has been combined with the notion of ontological dependence as deployed by A. Thomasson’s artifactual theory of fiction. In order to implement such a combination within the dialogical frame several predicates of ontological dependence have been defined. However, the definition of such predicates seems to lean on a model-theoretic semantics for modal (...) logic after all. The main aim of the present paper is to set a dialogical frame for the study of fictions in the context of the dialogical approach of CTT recently developed by S. Rahman and N. Clerbout where a fully-interpreted language is unfolded. We will herewith develop the idea that in such a setting fictional entities are understood as hypothetical objects, that is, objects (functions) the existence of which is dependent upon one or more hypotheses that restrict the scope of choices available. We will finish the paper by suggesting that this provides both a natural and genuinely dialogical way to understand R. Frigg’s take on scientific models as fictions and a new perspective on Thomasson’s notion of generic ontological dependence. Keywords: fiction, dialogues, dialogical logic, hypothetical objects, scientific models. (shrink)

In this paper, a critical discussion is made of the role of entailments in the so-called New Paradigm of psychology of reasoning based on Bayesian models of rationality (Elqayam & Over, 2013). It is argued that assessments of probabilistic coherence cannot stand on their own, but that they need to be integrated with empirical studies of intuitive entailment judgments. This need is motivated not just by the requirements of probability theory itself, but also by a need to enhance the interdisciplinary (...) integration of the psychology of reasoning with formal semantics in linguistics. The constructive goal of the paper is to introduce a new experimental paradigm, called the Dialogical Entailment task, to supplement current trends in the psychology of reasoning towards investigating knowledge-rich, social reasoning under uncertainty (Oaksford and Chater, 2019). As a case study, this experimental paradigm is applied to reasoning with conditionals and negation operators (e.g. CEM, wide and narrow negation). As part of the investigation, participants’ entailment judgments are evaluated against their probability evaluations to assess participants’ cross-task consistency over two experimental sessions. (shrink)

The objective of the present work is to develop a theory of meaning based on the method of transcendental phenomenology. The key idea of the project is to explain the constitution of the meaning by means of the analyses of the intentionality. We have investigated different intentional acts which are functioning in the expression and in constructing the meanings. In this regard we have studied, first, the act of the primordial expression, in which a content of an intuition is raised (...) to the realm of the ideal, and then the acts of the categorial synthesis, in which further meanings are constituted in the absence of their proper intuition. -/- We have investigated the effects of the phenomenological theory of meaning to the conception of pure logic. Dialogical semantics is shown to be an adequate framework, from the phenomenological point of view, to interpret logical reasoning and to explain the meaning of the logical constants as well. -/- We have also discussed the meanings of some logical connectives, and their formalizations, using our phenomenologico-dialogical method. In particular, the meaning explanations of negation(s), strict implication and necessity are given in a way which is not model theoretic nor proof theoretic, but based on the transcendental intentionality as manifested in the course of the dialogue. (shrink)

Being a pragmatic and not a referential approach tosemantics, the dialogical formulation ofparaconsistency allows the following semantic idea tobe expressed within a semi-formal system: In anargumentation it sometimes makes sense to distinguishbetween the contradiction of one of the argumentationpartners with himself (internal contradiction) and thecontradiction between the partners (externalcontradiction). The idea is that externalcontradiction may involve different semantic contextsin which, say A and ¬A have been asserted.The dialogical approach suggests a way of studying thedynamic process of contradictions through (...) which thetwo contexts evolve for the sake of argumentation intoone system containing both contexts.More technically, we show a new, dialogical, way tobuild paraconsistent systems for propositional andfirst-order logic with classical and intuitionisticfeatures (i.e. paraconsistency both with and withouttertium non-datur) and present theircorresponding tableaux. (shrink)

Dialogue semantics for logic are two-player logic games between a Proponent who puts forward a logical formula φ as valid or true and an Opponent who disputes this. An advantage of the dialogical approach is that it is a uniform framework from which different logics can be obtained through only small variations of the basic rules. We introduce the composition problem for dialogue games as the problem of resolving, for a set S of rules for dialogue games, whether (...) the set of S-dialogically valid formulas is closed under modus ponens. Solving the composition problem is fundamental for the dialogical approach to logic; despite its simplicity, it often requires an indirect solution with the help of significant logical machinery such as cut-elimination. Direct solutions to the composition problem can, however, sometimes be had. As an example, we give a set N of dialogue rules which is well-justified from the dialogical point of view, but whose set N of dialogically valid formulas is both non-trivial and non-standard. We prove that the composition problem for N can be solved directly, and introduce a tableaux system for N. (shrink)

The term ‘parenthetical’ is applied to an almost unlimited range of linguistic phenomena, which share but one common feature, namely their being used parenthetically. Parenthetic use is mostly described in terms of embedding an expression into some host sentence. Actually, however, it is anything but clearwhat it means for an expression to be used parenthetically, from both a syntactic and a semantic point of view.Given that in most, if not all, cases the alleged host sentence can be considered syntactically and (...) semantically complete in itself, it needs to be asked what kind ofinformation the parenthetical contributes to the overall structure. Another issue to be addressed concerns the nature of the relation between parenthetical and host (explanation, question, etc.) and the question what is it that holds them together.Trying to figure out the basic function of parentheticals, the present paper proposes a semiotic analysis of parenthetically used expressions. This semioticanalysis is not intended to replace linguistic approaches1, but is meant to elaborate on why parentheticals are so hard to capture linguistically. Taking a dynamicconception of signs and sign processes (in the sense of Peirce, Voloshinov and Bahtin) as starting point, parentheticals are argued to render explicit the inherentdialogicity of signs and utterances. This inherent dialogicity is hardly ever taken into consideration in linguistic analyses, which take the two-dimensional linearityof language as granted. (shrink)

The title reflects my conviction that, viewed semantically,modal logic is fundamentally dialogical; this conviction is based on the key role played by the notion of bisimulation in modal model theory. But this dialogical conception of modal logic does not seem to apply to modal proof theory, which is notoriously messy. Nonetheless, by making use of ideas which trace back to Arthur Prior (notably the use of nominals, special proposition symbols which ‘name’ worlds) I will show how to lift (...) the dialogical conception to modal proof theory. I argue that this shift to hybrid logic has consequences for both modal and dialogical logic, and I discuss these in detail. (shrink)

Zimbabwean literature produced after the attainment of independence has been predominantly engrossed with thematisation of the postcolonial subaltern subjects’ existential conditions, enunciated together with gender politics, religion and socio-economic environment that frame politics of difference, and sites of suffering or resistance. These tropes remain absorbing and critical even in contemporary female-authored novels that also engage with a deeply fractured modern-day Zimbabwe. Tsitsi Dangarembga’s novel, This Mournable Body, offers important site to debate the enduring concerns of gender inequalities, politics, and religion. (...) A stylistic approach is adopted to identify the semiotic construction of the text and discuss the different styles that are deployed to foreground central tropes in the novel. The adoption of stylistics as an underlying conceptual model locates this current study in the interdisciplinary research which brings together gender, applied linguistics, poetics, politics, and religion, in order to provoke new ways of reading the dialogic and polyphonic elements of the text. The study contends that the politics of difference is an unsettling subject that profoundly impacts on gender relations and religio-political practices in a milieu where precarity is a major defining feature of the subaltern sections comprising women and the marginalised poor. Thus, the novel’s title figuratively foregrounds the (un)mournable bodies of the people, who are both dehumanised and heavily burdened by surviving at the margin.Contribution: Tsitsi Dangarembga’s novel, This Mournable Body demonstrates a deep concern with the plight of the subaltern people in a gendered society and how their conditions of the Othered bodies are further amplified by both religion and politics in present-day Zimbabwe. Thus the study contributes to the mounting discourses about politics of fragmentation and binary practices, and the ensuing agony suffered by the sidelined persons. The adopted stylistic reading of the focus novel underscores the interdisciplinary urgency to literary interpretative process. (shrink)

In this essay I propose two theories of truth and show how they deal with semantic paradoxes. Their most salient feature is that they are based on a gametheoretic understanding of logic and meaning. “Truth”, therefore, is understood dialogically, as agreement between parts. I compare this proposal with a similar one already existing in the literature —Dutilh Novaes and French 2018—, and highlight the advantages of mine. The theories of truth I present are non-trivial, substructural (in a sense to be (...) clarified) and capture strong intuitions about truth. Some philosophical recommendations in favor of our understanding of Dialogics are delivered along the way. (shrink)

PREFACEProf. Göran Sundholm of Leiden University inspired the group of Logic at Lille and Valparaíso to start a fundamental review of the dialogical conception of logic by linking it to constructive type logic. One of Sundholm's insights was that inference can be seen as involving an implicit interlocutor. This led to several investigations aimed at exploring the consequences of joining winning strategies to the proof-theoretical conception of meaning. The leading idea is, roughly, that while introduction rules lay down the (...) conditions under which a winning strategy for the Proponent may be built, the elimination rules lay down those elements of the Opponent's assertions that the Proponent has the right to use for building winning strategy. It is the pragmatic and ethical features of obligations and rights that naturally lead to the dialogical interpretation of natural deduction.During the Visiting Professorship of Prof. Sundholm at Lille in (2012) the group of Lille started delving into the ways of implementing Per Martin-Löf's Constructive Type Theory with the dialogical perspective. In particular, Aarne Ranta's (1988) paper, the first publication on the subject, was read and discussed during Sundholm’s seminar. The discussions strongly suggested that the game-theoretical conception of quantifiers as deploying interdependent moves provide a natural link between CTT and dialogical logic. This idea triggered several publications by the group of Lille in collaboration with Nicolas Clerbout and Juan Redmond at the University of Valparaíso, including the publication of the book (2015) by Clerbout / Rahman that provides a systematic development of this way of linking CTT and the dialogical conception of logic. However the Clerbout / Rahman book was written from the CTT perspective on dialogical logic, rather than the other way round. The present book should provide the perspective from the other side of the dialogue between the Dialogical Framework and Constructive Type Theory. The main idea of our present study is that Sundholm's (1997) notion of epistemic assumption is closely linked to the Copy-Cat Rule or Socratic Rule that distinguishes the dialogical framework from other game-theoretical approaches. One way to read the present book is as a further development of Sundholm’s extension of Austin's (1946, p. 171) remark on acts of assertion to inference. Indeed, Sundholm (2013, p. 17) gave the following forceful formulation: When I say therefore, I give others my authority for asserting the conclusion, given theirs for asserting the premisses.Per Martin-Löf, in recent lectures, have utilized the dialogical perspective on epistemic assumptions to get out of a certain circle that threatens the explanation of the notions of inference and demonstration. A demonstration may be explained as a chain of (immediate) inferences starting from no premisses. That an inference J1... Jn—————Jis valid means that the conclusion J can be made evident on the assumption that J1, …, Jn are known. The notion of epistemic assumption thus enters in the explanation of valid inference. We cannot, however, in this explanation understand 'known' in the sense of demonstrated, for then we are explaining the notion of inference in terms of demonstration, whereas demonstration has been explained in terms of inference. Martin-Löf suggests that we here understand 'known' in the sense of asserted, so that epistemic assumptions are judgements others have made, judgements for which others have taken the responsibility; that the inference is valid then means that, given that others have taken responsbility for the premisses, I can take responsibility for the conclusion:The circularity problem is this: if you define a demonstration to be a chain of immediate inferences, then you are defining demonstration in terms of inference. Now we are considering an immediate inference and we are trying to give a proper explanation of that; but, if that begins by saying: Assume that J1, …, Jn have been demonstrated – then you are clearly in trouble, because you are about to explain demonstration in terms of the notion of immediate inference, hence when you are giving an account of the notion of immediate inference, the notion of demonstration is not yet at your disposal. So, to say: Assume that J1, …, Jn have already been demonstrated, makes you accusable of trying to explain things in a circle. The solution to this circularity problem, it seems to me now, comes naturally out of this dialogical analysis. […]The solution is that the premisses here should not be assumed to be known in the qualified sense, that is, to be demonstrated, but we should simply assume that they have been asserted, which is to say that others have taken responsibility for them, and then the question for me is whether I can take responsibility for the conclusion. So, the assumption is merely that they have been asserted, not that they have been demonstrated. That seems to me to be the appropriate definition of epistemic assumption in Sundholm's sense. One of the main tenets of the present study is that the further move of relating the Socratic Rule rule with judgemental equality provides both a simpler and more direct way to implement the constructive type theoretical approach within the dialogical framework. Such a reconsideration of the Socratic Rule, roughly speaking, amounts to the following. 1.A move from P that brings-forward a play-object in order to defend an elementary proposition A can be challenged by O. 2.The answer to such a challenge, involves P bringing forward a definitional equality that expresses the fact that the play-object chosen by P copies the one O has chosen while positing A. For short, the equality expresses at the object-languaje level that the defence of P relies on the authority given to O to be able to produce the play-objects she brings forward. More generally, according to this view, a definitional equality established by P and brought forward while defending the proposition A, expresses the equality between a play-object (introduced by O) and the instruction for building a play-object deployed by O while affirming A. So it can be read as a computation rule that indicates how to compute O's instructions. Let us recall that from the strategic point of view, O's moves correspond to elimination rules of demonstrations. Thus, the dialogical rules that prescribe how to introduce a definitional equality – correspond – at the strategic level – to the definitional equality rules for CTT as applied to the selector-functions involved in the elimination rules. So, what we are doing here is extending the dialogical interpretation of Sundholm's epistemic assumption to the rules that set up the definitional equality of a type.The present work is structured in the following way:•In the Introduction we state the main tenets that guide our book•Chapter II contains a brief overview of Constructive Type Theory penned by Ansten Klev with exercises and their solutions. •Chapter III offers a novel presentation of the dialogical conception of logic. In fact, the first two sections of the chapter provide an overview of standard dialogical logic – including solved exercises, slightly adapted to the content of the present volume. The rest of the sections develop a new dialogical approach to Constructive Type Theory. •Chapters IV and V contain the main body of our study, namely the relation between the Socratic Rule, epistemic assumptions, and equality. The chapter provides the reader with thoroughly worked out examples with comments. •After the Final Remarks the book containsa.An appendix containing a an overview of all the rules for the new formulation of dialogical approach to constructive type theory developed in the book; b.a brief outline of Per Martin-Löf's informal presentation of the demonstration of the axiom of choice.c.two examples of a tree-shaped graph of an extensive strategy. Acknowledgments: Many thanks to Mark van Atten (Paris1), Giuliano Bacigalupo (Zürich), Charles Zacharie Bowao (Univ. Ma Ngouabi de Brazzaville, Congo), Christian Berner (Lille3), Michel Crubellier (Lille3), Pierre Cardascia (Lille3), Oumar Dia (Dakar), Marcel Nguimbi ((Univ. Marien Ngouabi de Brazzaville, Congo), Adjoua Bernadette Dango (Lille3 / Alassane Ouattara de Bouaké, Côte d'Ivoire), Steephen Rossy Eckoubili (Lille3), Johan Georg Granström (Zürich), Gerhard Heinzmann (Nancy2), Muhammad Iqbal (Lille3), Matthieu Fontaine (Lille3), Radmila Jovanovic (Belgrad), Hanna Karpenko (Lille3), Laurent Keiff (Lille3), Sébastien Magnier (Saint Dennis, Réunion), Clément Lion (Lille3), Gildas Nzokou (Libreville), Fachrur Rozie (Lille3), Helge Rückert (Mannheim), Mohammad Shafiei (Paris1), and Hassan Tahiri (Lisbon), for rich interchanges, suggestions on the main claims of the present study and proof-reading of specific sections of the text. Special thanks to Gildas Nzokou (Libreville), Steephen Rossy Eckoubili (Lille3) and Clément Lion (Lille3), with whom a Pre-Graduate Textbook in French on dialogical logic and CTT is in the process of being worked out – during the visiting-professorship in 2016 of the former. Eckoubili is the author of the sections on exercises for dialogical logic, Nzokou cared of those involving the development of CTT-demonstrations out of winning-strategies. Special thanks also to Ansten Klev (Prague) for helping with technical details and conceptual issues on CTT, particularly so as author of the chapter introducing CTT. (shrink)

This edited book brings together research work in the field of constructive semantics with scholarship on the phenomenological foundations of logic and mathematics. It addresses one of the central issues in the epistemology and philosophy of mathematics, namely the relationship between phenomenological meaning constitution and constructive semantics. Contributing authors explore deep structural connections and fundamental differences between phenomenology and constructivism. Papers are drawn from contributions to a prestigious workshop held at the University of Friedrichshafen. Readers will discover insight (...) into structural connections between the phenomenological concept of meaning constitution and constructivist concepts of meaning. Discussion ranges from more specific conceptualizations in the philosophy of logic and mathematics to more general considerations in epistemology, inferential semantics and phenomenology. Questions such as a possible phenomenological understanding of the relationship between structural rules and particle rules in dialogical logic are explored. Significant aspects of both phenomenology and dialectics, and dialectics and constructivism emerge. Graduates and researchers of philosophy, especially logic, as well as scholars of mathematics will all find something of interest in the expert insights presented in this volume. (shrink)

Quotation has been much studied in philosophy. Given that quotation allows one to diagonalize out of any grammar, there have been comparatively few attempts within the linguistic literature to develop an account within a formal linguistic theory. Nonetheless, given the ubiquity of quotation in natural language, linguists need to explicate the formal mechanisms it employs. The central claim of this paper is that once one assumes a dialogical perspective on language such as provided by the KoS (KoS is not (...) an acronym, despite emphasizing a Konversationally Oriented Semantics) framework, formalized in a rich type theory like Type Theory with Records, much of the mystery evaporates. In particular, one can utilize as denotations for quotative constructions entities that are independently motivated for dialogue processing—utterance types and locutionary propositions, Austinian propositions about speech events. (shrink)

The logics of formal inconsistency are logics tolerant to some amount of contradiction, but in which some versions of explosion still hold. The main result of this paper is a reconstruction of two such logics in the dialogical framework. By doing so, we achieve two things. On the one hand, we provide a formal approach to argumentative situations where some contradictions may occur while keeping the idea that there may still be situations in which some propositions are ‘safe’ in (...) the sense of immunity to the contradictions. On the other hand, we open a new line of study on these logics, in the context of the game-theoretical approach to semantics born in the 1960s, with various interesting perspectives, some of which are discussed at the end of this article. (shrink)

chapter The whole and its parts Towards a holistic understanding of language Human beings are social entities. We are a family member, a brother or a sister ...

The main aim of the present paper is to show that the recently developed dialogical approach to Martin-Löf’s Constructive Type Theory, called Immanent Reasoning, provides the means for distinguishing François Recanati’s process of free enrichment and saturation, meets his own objections against perspectives based on unarticulated constituents and opens a new venue to pragmatic modulation, where the speaker-receiver interaction is integrated into the notion of enrichment. In such a setting enrichment operates on proof-objects that make fully articulated event-propositions true. (...) The point is that distinguishing what makes a proposition true from the proposition made true offers a simple and clean way to avoid conflating the contextual elements that enrich a proposition with the proposition itself. Such a framework abounds in means for expressing reference structures such as anaphora, including time and/or location reference. Furthermore, the notion of dependent types of CTT and the associated formation rules allow for a straightforward analysis of composition of meaning at work in Recanati’s cases concerning occasion meaning as determined by context. The brand of dialogical contextualism, grounded on the play-level, advocated herewith is not a form of propositional syncretism. The framework offers a straightforward response to the failure of third excluded in some instances of faultless disagreement without giving up the notion of propositional content. More generally, this suggests an alternative way to tackle the interface pragmatics semantics underlying the notion of pragmatic modulation by integrating into the interface the dialogical game of asking and giving reasons. (shrink)

This contribution is concerned with a particular model theoretic semantics of the object language of quantum physics. The object language considered here comprises logically connected propositions, sequentially connected propositions and modal propositions. The model theoretic semantics arises from the already established dialogic semantics, if the pragmatic concept of the dialog-game is replaced by a "metaphysical" concept of the game. The game is determined by a game tree, the branches of which constitute a set, the set of "possible (...) worlds" of an individual quantum physical system. The semantic concepts like truth, falsity and valuation are defined with respect to this set. (shrink)

This paper explores some ways how perceptual-cognitive accounts of anorexia can benefit from philosophy. The first section focuses on the three dimensions of anorexia most open to a contribution from philosophy: the dimensions of language, perception and cognition. In the second section, I offer a brief overview of what philosophy has to say regarding these dimensions, especially as they relate to two crucial issues: introspection and meaning. I draw from current philosophy of language, especially from the arguments against using internal (...) perception as a model for the way we express our own bodily states. I draw also from current philosophy of interpretation, especially from debates concerning the criteria for handling dialogical misunderstanding. I use these insights to expose some dangers in assuming and working with oversimplified accounts of introspection and meaning. I then suggest refined and updated accounts and examine their applicability and usefulness in the diagnosis and treatment of anorexia. (shrink)

Being a pragmatic and not a referential approach to semantics, dialogi-cal logic does not understand semantics as mapping names, propositions and relationships into the real world to obtain an abstract counterpart of it, but as dealing (handeln) with them in a particular way. This allows a very simple formulation of free logic the core of which can be expressed in a nutshell, namely: in an argumentation, it sometimes makes sense to restrict the introduction of singular terms in the (...) context of quantification to a formal use o f them. That is, the proponent is allowed to use a constant if f this constant has been explicitly conceded by the opponent. More technically, we show a new, dialogical way to build free logic systems fo r first-order logic with classical and intuitionistic features and present their corresponding tableaux. I. In tro d u ctio n I I. F r e e logics ON DIALOGUES A ND ONTOLOGY THE DIAL OGICAL APPROACH TO FREE LOGIC The proposition "God does not exist" contains a paradox sometimes referred to as Plato's beard: if God does not exist and the proposition should be true, standard referential semantics fo r quantified logic fails to give meaning to the name "God". But, given compositionality, since the meaning of a sentence is combined from the meanings o f its parts,-G o d d o e s not exist" does not evaluate. It is easy to see that related difficulties appear in every formula that contains singular terms. In standard logic, it is impossible to state that God is either good or evil without presupposing his existence, or that the round * My work on this article has been supported by the Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung which I wish to thank expressly. (shrink)

We present a generic denotational semantic framework for protocols for dialogs between rational and autonomous agents over action which allows for retraction and revocation of proposals for action. The semantic framework views participants in a deliberation dialog as jointly and incrementally manipulating the contents of shared spaces of action-intention tokens. The framework extends prior work by decoupling the identity of an agent who first articulates a proposal for action from the identity of any agent then empowered to retract or revoke (...) the proposal, thereby permitting proposals, entreaties, commands, promises, etc., to be distinguished semantically. (shrink)

The present paper reports a study of conversational acts in dialogical interaction. Conversation in which the use of a vulgar term [à la bieb żobbi] in the Maltese language was used was recorded and analysed for the present purpose. The term is demonstrated to serve social psychological functions. We documented three modes governing its use in conversation, that is, (a) as a personality descriptor, (b) as a strategy for shutting down an alternative view, and (c) as a strategy for (...) shifting dialogue to more neutral and less threatening grounds for the subject. We further document a number of modalities that govern justifications for using the vulgar term in conversation. We argue that the use of vulgarity can serve to achieve semantic barriers in dialogue and that these apply to internal conversations as much as they do to dialogical engagement with another. We further argue that semantic barriers can be overcome in ways that shift conversation to less threatening grounds. (shrink)

In classical India, Jain philosophers developed a theory of viewpoints ( naya-vāda ) according to which any statement is always performed within and dependent upon a given epistemic perspective or viewpoint. The Jainas furnished this epistemology with an (epistemic) theory of disputation that takes into account the viewpoint in which the main thesis has been stated. The main aim of our paper is to delve into the Jain notion of viewpoint-contextualisation and to develop the elements of a suitable logical system (...) that should offer a reconstruction of the Jainas’ epistemic theory of disputation. A crucial step of our project is to approach the Jain theory of disputation with the help of a theory of meaning for logical constants based on argumentative practices called dialogical logic . Since in the dialogical framework the meaning of the logical constants is given by the norms or rules for their use in a debate, it provides a meaning theory closer to the Jain context-sensitive disputation theory than the main-stream formal model-theoretic semantics. (shrink)

Social representations research has tended to focus upon the representations that groups have in relation to some object. The present article elaborates the concept of social representations by pointing to the existence of “alternative representations” as sub-components within social representations. Alternative representations are the ideas and images the group has about how other groups represent the given object. Alternative representations are thus representations of other people's representations. The present article uses data from Moscovici's analysis of the diffusion of psychoanalysis to (...) examine how people engage with alternative representations. It is demonstrated that there can be more or less dialogical relations with alternative representations. The analysis concludes by considering seven “semiotic barriers” which work to neutralise the dialogical potential of alternative representations, thus on the one hand enabling groups to talk about the views of others, while, on the other hand, remaining unchallenged by those views. (shrink)

The article, being a part of the just prepared book, deals with two different interpretations of Nietzschean text. C. G. Jung devoted five years' Seminar to discuss "Thus spoke Zarathustra" in the Psychological Club (1934–39), M. Heidegger was giving lectures and developing his controversy (Auseinandersetzung) with Nietzsche between 1934–48, some pauses including. The thesis exposed in the article suggests that in Nietzsche's text they were looking for the kind of language, capable to generate transformation of individual and general culture of (...) being. The quest for such a regenerative code is explored in three main semantic fields: the "natural", the sacred and the artistic. The task of regaining "natural" character of human unity, despite of theoretical inadequacy of the category of "nature"; the aim of taking care of alive essence of sacrum as well as the possibilities of regeneration that may be found in the sphere of artistic experience, are considered in the light of Jungian and Heideggerian perspectives of reading Nietzsche. Ambivalence of their interpretations helps to show also certain continuous difficulties to get access to the sources of life. To endure these, at first unknown, conditions of our lives, allows the mind to learn and shape thinking from experience. Jung's and Heidegger's dialogues with Nietzsche may let us see that enduring in the unknown does not have to paralyze the growth of thinking. (shrink)

The failure of logical omniscience is perfectly compatible with deductive closure if we link the latter with the strategy level and the failure of logical omniscience with the play level.

Réseau LACTO (Langage, Argumentation et Cognition dans les Traditions Orales) Quatrième Rencontre du Réseau Lacto CELHTO, bureau de l'Union Africaine, Niamey, Niger, du 22 au 25 septembre 2015 : JEU ET ORALITE DANS LES SOCIETES A TRADITION ORALE According to the main stream approaches to epistemic notions, knowledge and belief are understood as propositional operators. Thus, • Gildas believes that there is a witch in his village is understood as expressing a proposition. Moreover, • Gildas knows that Gödel proved the (...) completeness of first-order logic, expresses a proposition too. The difference between both is that a belief-proposition can be true if it is " factually " false: in our case the proposition can be true in relation to Gildas's belief, that is, despite the fact that there is no witch in his village. Furthermore, assuming that there is not witch in his village, the following proposition is false • Gildas knows that there is a witch in his village. If the latter is false, from the point of view of the mainstream, there was not knowledge at all, rather it was from the start a belief that has not been verified. 1 The present paper is part of an ongoing project in the context of the research-program Argumentation, Decision, Action (ADA) and the project Logique, Argumentation et Cognition dans les Traditions Orales (LACTO) both supported by the Maison Européenne des Sciences de l' Homme et de la Société-USR 318 and by the laboratory UMR 8163: STL. (shrink)

In this paper we provide an interpretation of Aristotle's rule for the universal quantifier in Topics Θ 157a34–37 and 160b1–6 in terms of Paul Lorenzen's dialogical logic. This is meant as a contribution to the rehabilitation of the role of dialectic within the Organon. After a review of earlier views of Aristotle on quantification, we argue that this rule is related to the dictum de omni in Prior Analytics A 24b28–29. This would be an indication of the dictum’s origin (...) in the context of dialectical games. One consequence of our approach is a novel explanation of the doctrine of the existential import of the quantifiers in dialectical terms. After a brief survey of Lorenzen's dialogical logic, we offer a set of rules for dialectical games based on previous work by Castelnérac and Marion, to which we add here the rule for the universal quantifier, as interpreted in terms of its counterpart in dialogical logic. We then give textual evidence of the use of that rule in Plato's dialogues, thus showing that Aris... (shrink)

The article argues that cognitive linguistic theory may prove an alternative to the Montague paradigm for designing natural language understanding systems. Within this framework it describes a system which models language understanding as a dialogical process between user and computer. The system operates with natural language texts as input and represent language meaning as entity-relationship diagrams.

Ordinary dialogical logic offers processing memory as a history of dialogues. Find a reference in this history is an ambiguous process, which can transform in complex or impossible issues the questions that compose a dialogue. Thus, two researches of justifications overlap in a dual problem of justification. In addition, this consideration of the memory uses a lot of technical resources.We propose a dialogical formalism that solves these problems: double justification, composition, memory saving. To do this, we will develop (...) "special" rules that will reconfigure the formalism and consider the metaphysical and philosophical concepts in this logical system and its interpretations.This article is divided into three parts:A presentation of the dialogical framework oriented towards the presentation of the problem of double justification.A re-interpretation of this framework in terms of matrices: the logical formulas modeled on the linguistic and mathematical language reading are replaced by a concept borrowed from the game semantical approach.A brief summary of the new approaches presented by this method: reaffirmation of the clear separation between different levels of analysis and economy on the amount of memory required. (shrink)

In line with [2], [12, 13, 14] carefully studies the Leibnizian notion of suspensive condition—notion that Leibniz sometimes names moral condition. Thiercelin points out Leibniz’ will to provide a rigorous definition of that kind of condition. Leibniz not only establishes a link between the legal notion of condition and the logical notion of condition, but he also grasps the problematic of suspensive condition through its epistemic and dynamic features. In this paper we start from Thiercelin’s reflections about Leibniz’ suspensive condition. (...) Thiercelin’s work offers an inventory of different clauses that a logical conditional must fulfill to capture the legal meaning of suspensive condition. Our aim is to compare such a definition with the Public Announcement operator semantics ([16]) taking advantage of both its model theoretic semantics and its dialogical semantics (introduced for the first time in [5]). We show that the public announcement operator entails the same dynamic and epistemic features than the ones that Leibniz requires with its notion of suspensive condition. (shrink)

C.S. Peirce defended a pragmatist view of assertion in terms of its normative effect. This paper has two goals. First, to reconstruct and assess Peirce’s argument for the thesis that to assert a proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth. Second, to argue that Peirce interpreted “responsibility for truth” as the acquisition of a dialogical commitment, namely, the duty to defend the proposition asserted by giving reasons upon challenge.

We argue that no attempt of reducing meaning to a systematic set of rules, according to which the role of linguistic expressions is to be normatively defined, can be abstracted from an irreducibly decisional compound. By comparing Lorenzen ’s project of building an Ortho-language and Brandom ’s inferentialist take on meaning, we distinguish two ways of acknowledging this fact, while claiming that Lorenzen ’s take is more genuinely constructive, insofar as choices be thought of as genuine features of constructions. It (...) brings into a new perspective the relation between dialogical constructivism and Brouwer ’s intuitionism. Finally we bring up a philosophical argument for the claim that interaction rules should be indexed on players and on their choices, when providing deontic bases to semantics. (shrink)

One usually makes assertions by means of uttering indicative sentences like “It is raining”. However, not every utterance of an indicative sentence is an assertion. For example, in uttering “I will be back tomorrow”, one might be making a promise. What is to make an assertion? C.S. Peirce held the view that “to assert a proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth” (CP 5.543). In this thesis, I interpret Peirce’s view of assertion and I evaluate Peirce’s reasons for (...) holding it. I begin by reconstructing and assessing Peirce’s case for such view as it appears in (EP 2.140, 1903), (EP 2.312-313, 1904), and (CP 5.546, 1908). Then, I continue by elaborating on three aspects of Peirce’s view of assertion, namely, assertion as an act involving a certain kind of responsibility, the proposition as what is asserted, and responsibility for truth as a responsibility to give reasons. With respect to these three aspects, I argue for the following claims: (1) Peirce construed the responsibility involved in asserting as a moral responsibility; (2) Peirce held that propositions are types; and (3) Peirce was committed to a dialogical interpretation of “responsibility to give reasons”. Finally, I end by presenting two objections to Peirce’s view of assertion and its corresponding replies. I conclude that Peirce’s account of assertion is a valuable contribution to the philosophical debate on assertion. (shrink)

This paper is based on a semantic foundation of quantum logic which makes use of dialog-games. In the first part of the paper the dialogic method is introduced and under the conditions of quantum mechanical measurements the rules of a dialog-game about quantum mechanical propositions are established. In the second part of the paper the quantum mechanical dialog-game is replaced by a calculus of quantum logic. As the main part of the paper we show that the calculus of quantum logic (...) is complete and consistent with respect to the dialogic semantics. Since the dialoggame does not involve the 'excluded middle' the calculus represents a calculus of effective (intuitionistic) quantum logic. In a forthcoming paper it is shown that this calculus is equivalent to a calculus of sequents and more interestingly to a calculus of propositions. With the addition of the 'excluded middle' the latter calculus is a model for the lattice of subspaces of a Hilbert space. (shrink)

We argue that no attempt of reducing meaning to a systematic set of rules, according to which the role of linguistic expressions is to be normatively defined, can be abstracted from an irreducibly decisional compound. By comparing Lorenzen’s project of building an Ortho-languageand Brandom’s inferentialist take on meaning, we distinguish two ways of acknowledging this fact, while claiming that Lorenzen’s take is more genuinely constructive, insofar as choices be thought of as genuine features of constructions. It brings into a new (...) perspective the relation between dialogical constructivism and Brouwer’s intuitionism. Finally we bring up a philosophical argument for the claim that interaction rules should be indexed on players and on their choices, when providing deontic bases to semantics. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Preface v -- CRITIQUE -- 1. Culture and Semantics 1 -- 2. What is 'Cartesian' in Linguistics? 8 -- 3. Computer, Brain and Grammatical Theory 22 -- DYNAMICAL SEMANTICS -- 4. From Discrete Signs to Dynamic Semantic Continuum 37 -- 5. Catastrophe Theoretic Semantics: -- Towards a Physics of Meaning 50 -- 6. Ontological and Cognitive Bases of karaka Theory 60 -- 7. 'Force Dynamics' as a Dynamical Sem-antics Model 72 -- METAPHOR -- (...) 8. Body, Space and Metaphorical-Cultural Worlds 85 -- 9. Metaphors in Grammar 103 -- SEMIOTICS -- 10. Dynamics in Nar-rative Structures 123 -- 11. -Perspectives in the Semiotics of Objects 139 -- 12. The Semantics of 'Nukespeak' 149 -- POST-STRUCTURALISM I POSTMODERNISM -- 13. Language, Power, and Plurality 155 -- 14. On Difference(s) 160 -- 15. Dialogics, or the Dynamics of Intersubjectivity 170 -- 16. Writing, hifinity, and Dialogicality 178 -- 17. Lacan, Derrida and the Vicissitudes of the 'Sign' 185. (shrink)

We can be hacked because there are not indiscreet questions but there are imprudent answers. The main aim of this paper is actually to learn how to create the best possible answers, the most prudent ones, in order to remain as safe as we can. That is what Hunting Hackers means: to think about what piece of information was relevant for the hacker and why that one in particular and not another. If we could preview our flaws then we would (...) be able to keep our zone safer from hackers. In order to reach this objective, we will analyse how the cryptic language known as Russian Cards operates. This study does not intend to show how the cryptic language is broken into, but to take advantage of the learning gifted in knowing the flaw itself. It is precisely in the learning of the flaw that we can find the answer to what and why we may be hacked. In proportion to the amount of flaw information at our disposal, we will be able to hunt hackers: to stop them completely or, at least, to weaken a possible hacker attack. (shrink)

In this note I discuss some issues around the law of Identity of Indiscernibles and, above all, its difference with the so-called law of indiscernibilty of identicals. In this way I distinguish between the notions identity, sameness and equality, through a phenomenological discussion and using the key idea of intentionality. In order to formulate the Leibnizian law of Identity of Indiscernibles, and examine its validity, we need higher order logic. I will give semantic rules for a second-order logic with identity (...) in the framework of the dialogical logic, introduced by P. Lorenzen. Then I will demonstrate the validity of the law of Identity of Indiscernibles by means of the introduced logic. (shrink)

In its origins Dialogical logic constituted the logical foundations of an overall new movement called the Erlangen School or Erlangen Constructivism that should provide a new start to a general theory of language and of science. In relation to the theory of language, according to the Erlangen-School, language is not just a fact that we discover, but a human cultural accomplishment whose construction reason can and should control. The constructive development of a scientific language was called the Orthosprache-project. Unfortunately, (...) the Orthosprache-project was not further developed and somehow seemed to fade away. Perhaps, one could say that one of the reasons is that the semantic links between dialogical logic, that was restricted to logical constants, and the more general linguistic aspirations of the Orthosprache were not sufficiently developed and then the new theory of meaning of dialogical logic seemed to be cut off from the project of setting the basis for a general theory of meaning.In the present paper we would like to contribute to precise one possible way in which a general dialogical theory of meaning could be linked to dialogical logic. More precisely, the main aim of the article is to set the basis for the meaning of elementary sentences in the context of dialogical interaction. (shrink)

We can be hacked because there are not indiscreet questions but there are imprudent answers. The main aim of this paper is actually to learn how to create the best possible answers, the most prudent ones, in order to remain as safe as we can. That is what Hunting Hackers means: to think about what piece of information was relevant for the hacker and why that one in particular and not another. If we could preview our flaws then we would (...) be able to keep our zone safer from hackers. In order to reach this objective, we will analyse how the cryptic language known as Russian Cards operates. This study does not intend to show how the cryptic language is broken into, but to take advantage of the learning gifted in knowing the flaw itself. It is precisely in the learning of the flaw that we can find the answer to what and why we may be hacked. In proportion to the amount of flaw information at our disposal, we will be able to hunt hackers: to stop them completely or, at least, to weaken a possible hacker attack. (shrink)