The purpose of this paper is to examine the exposition of the doctrine of the mean in the ethical treatises and to determine the role and scope of mesotes within Aristotle's ethical and political theory. The examination of mesotes will reveal the strong connections, for Aristotle, between man, the city, experience, prudence, excellence and eudaimonia. Ultimately, the doctrine of the mean is, in the words of L.W. Rosenfield, an ‘analytical concept’, a component instrumental to Aristotle's theory. (...) Moreover, Aristotle's ethical and political theory is in accordance with the prescriptions of the doctrine of the mean. This is shown through an examination of the thesis, structure and main examples of the Politics, all of which are manifestations of Aristotle's recommendations in his exposition of the doctrine of the mean. (shrink)

While Aristotle is often lauded, especially by virtue ethicists, for his focus on and insight into virtue, a central aspect of his conception of virtue—the doctrine of the mean—is often derided as false if not indeed absurd. The reason for this disparity in reaction to Aristotle is that the doctrine of the mean has been severely misinterpreted as stating that there are a variety of parameters in which one must achieve a mean. Such a (...) class='Hi'>doctrine is false, but it is not Aristotle’s. In this paper, the author gives a more accurate account of the doctrine of the mean than has heretofore been given. According to this account, the doctrine simply states that virtue disposes one to feel one’s passions with an appropriate intensity. The author closes by considering Hursthouse’s famous criticisms of the doctrine of the mean, and he shows that they fail to be reasons for rejecting the doctrine. (shrink)

English translation, with Chinese source text, of a seminal Chinese classic.

Aristotle's famous claim that human beings are animals with rationality has a subtle and complicated articulation in his doctrine of the mean. This paper offers textual analysis of Aristotle's discussion of the mean as a resource for coming to terms with the thesis that humans naturally deliberate over the essence of their nature. Unlike other animals who tend to act without deliberation and without mediation, human beings are the animals who are capable of giving an account of (...) themselves. However, this also means that human beings are the animals whose nature it is to give an account. This paper proposes that Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, as it is found in the Nicomachean Ethics, helps to explain this circular, and in some ways puzzling, tension between having a nature and giving an account of one's nature. (shrink)

Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean states that each moral virtue stands opposed to two types of vice: one of excess and one of deficiency, respectively. Critics claim that some virtues—like honesty, fair-mindedness, and patience—are counterexamples to Aristotle’s doctrine. Here, I develop a generalizable strategy to defend the doctrine of the mean against such counterexamples. I argue that not only is the doctrine of the mean defensible, but taking it seriously also allows us to (...) gain substantial insight into particular virtues. Failure to take the doctrine seriously, moreover, exposes us to the risk of mistaking certain vices for virtues. (shrink)

Aristotle's doctrine of the mean states that a virtue is the mean state between two vices: a deficient and an excessive one. The Corporate Ethical Virtues Model defines the mean and the corresponding deficient vice for each of its seven virtues. This paper defines for each of these virtues the corresponding excessive vice and explores why organizations characterized by these excessive vices increase the likelihood that their employees will behave unethically. The excessive vices are patronization, pompousness, (...) lavishness, zealotry, overexposure, talkativeness, and oppressiveness. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: The Doctrine of the Mean outside Aristotle's Ethical Works The “Mean” in Action and Feeling The Central Doctrine of the Mean Virtue as a Mean Disposition and the Moral Education of the Passions Acknowledgments References Further reading.

Xiahui. While Confucius’ actions are intermediate between the actions of these three sages, the sages’ character traits do not bracket Confucius’ character traits. Instead, the failings of the three sages are skew to each other. Boyi lacks righteousness; Y i Yin lacks benevolence; and L iu Xiahui lacks wisdom. The comparison of the sages centers on the question of when to resign an advisory position. According to Mencius, one should resign only if one’s advice will not be heeded, or if (...) declining to resign would somehow lead to wrongdoing. Associating with wrongdoers and benefiting from the wrongdoing of others might lead to wrongdoing. Wrong motives might distort one’s advice. Insults from the advisee might be evidence of the futility of giving advice. But in themselves, fastidiousness, non-benevolent motives, and mistreatment by the advisee are not legitimate reasons to resign. (shrink)

Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is not a counsel to perform mean or moderate actions. It states that excellence of character is a mean state with regard to the having and displaying of emotions. All emotions are morally neutral; character is shown by displaying emotions on the right occasions, Not too often or too rarely, Not too strongly or too weakly, For sufficient and only sufficient reasons, Etc. The difficulties for such a view presented by justice (...) and such bad emotions as envy are discussed. The conclusion is that basically aristotle's theory can resist critical scrutiny. (shrink)

Rosalind Hursthouse; IV*—A False Doctrine of the Mean, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 57–72, https://doi.org/10.

On Virtue and Vice is a treatise in ethics. It offers a systematic and historical study of the Doctrine of the Mean. The book argues for a triadic approach to ethical notions (for example, Goodness and two forms of Badness and Justice and two forms of Injustice). The approach of the book is intertwined with a critical study of the relevant thought both of Western thinkers (Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and David Hume) and also of Eastern thinkers (...) (Confucius, Mencius and Chu Hsi). A further aim of the book is to apply the Doctrine to contemporary life. (shrink)

Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is expressed in quantitative terms, but this has been hard for some people to take literally, its more elaborate versions sometimes being described as “extremely silly.” Roughly two books of the Nicomachean Ethics are permeated with talk of character traits which are either deficient or excessive, however, and the aim of this paper is to examine how the doctrine might meet the objections of its critics.

According to Aristotle, morally virtuous person chooses and practices ‘what is mean’ well amongst actions and affections. It seems that the action(praxis) and affection(pathos) chosen and practiced by a person of morally virtuous character are what he means by the expression ‘the mean relative to us’(to meson pros hēmas). (EN2.6, 1106b14) Therefore, it is necessary to know what this expression means in order for our better understanding on not only virtuous actions and affections, but also moral virtue, the (...) character which makes such actions and affections possible. However, this expression often causes a controversy, because the sense of ‘us’(hēmas) in it is somewhat ambiguous. As a matter of fact, it is more than grasping the meaning of that simple word that we try to figure out what it means. The word ‘us’ in ‘the mean relative to us’ can be a standard according to which we judge the mean options amongst various actions and affections. That is, it can be said, Aristotle explains to which standard moral actions and affections are relative by the word ‘us’. If so, it is very important to figure out the sense of ‘us’ in that we are able to see what his idea is on some kind of moral standard by which we can judge what is good or not and thereby to understand what he would say about the relativity of moral virtue, if any. In this paper, we will first introduce a ‘character-relativity’ position that claims morally good actions and affections are according to the character of each agent. We will, then, criticize why this position is problematic and argue for a ‘circumstance-relativity’ position that the mean actions and affections are not to be judged or chosen by the agent’s character, but by the circumstance where the agent is. Furthermore, it will be argued, as long as the relativity of the mean is confined to the circumstance, ‘moral virtue’ is, as well, relative in the sense that morally good actions and affections can be decided according to the circumstance given. (shrink)

Originally introduced by Plato and Aristotle, the doctrine of the mean is the most prevalent theory of ethics among Islamic scholars. According to this doctrine, every virtue or excellence of character lies in the observance of the mean, whereas vices are the excess or deficiency of the soul in his functions. Islamic scholars have been influenced by the doctrine, but they have also developed and re-conceptualized it in innovative ways. Kindi, Miskawayh, Avicenna, Raghib Isfahani, Nasir (...) al-Din Tusi, and others are among the Islamic contributors to the subject. Some of their contributions are as follows: bringing together Aristotle's doctrine of the mean with Plato's psychology, dividing virtues into four higher geniuses, dividing vices into eight higher geniuses, setting various kinds of vices and virtues under these higher geniuses, adding the criteria of quality to Aristotle's quantitative evaluation of excess and deficiency, dividing various conceptualizations of justice, adding religious and mystical virtues into the existing list of virtues, and proposing a comprehensive model for curing diseases of the soul. (shrink)

It is sometimes claimed that Aristotle’s doctrine of the Mean is false or unhelpful: moral virtues are not typically flanked by two opposing vices as he claimed. However, an explicit restatement of Aristotle’s view in terms of sufficiency for an objective reveals that the Mean is more widely applicable than has sometimes been alleged. Understood as a special case of sufficiency, it is essential to many judgments of right and wrong. I consider some objections by Rosalind Hursthouse (...) to Aristotle’s theory and argue that they are based on a misunderstanding. However, there is indeed a tension in Aristotle’s view of goodness, hinted at in his claim that the good is "said in many ways". (shrink)

According to Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean, virtue and a good life involve a mean of feeling and action. This chapter focuses on David Pear's claim that the Doctrine is conceptually incoherent. It argues that there are serious difficulties in understanding what it could be for courage and its feelings to be in a mean. Courage involves plural and incommensurable values, victory and danger, and the respective emotions, confidence and fear––it is difficult to see how (...) these can be resolved into a mean. It is argued that this problem can be solved by seeing how incommensurable value and emotions can fuse into complex wholes of disparate and incommensurable values and emotions, and can thus be assessed as lying or not lying in a mean. (shrink)

Aristotle admits the possibility of many vices opposed to one virtue, but insists that there are always at least two, related as deficiency and excess. The doctrine that "virtue is in a mean" is thus both true and useful.

Two arguments in Eudemian Ethics 2 that are crucial to Aristotle’s definition of moral virtue as a mean state contain claims that Aristotle says are clear by induction. In these contexts, he explicitly appeals to examples coming from arts and sciences like gymnastic training and medicine for evidence. But Aristotle does not here, or elsewhere (at least in any extant work), including the parallel arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics, actually supply or discuss the evidence that makes these inductive arguments (...) clear. Fortunately, strong support for them can be found in the Hippocratic Corpus, especially in On Ancient Medicine and On Regimen. (shrink)

While there are a wide range of important differences in interpretation of doctrine to be seen even within any single school of East Asian philosophy, whether it be Confucian, Daoist, or Buddhist, it is on the other hand possible to identify broad patterns within East Asian philosophy in a cultural comparative context, especially when, for example, the East Asian philosophical tradition is viewed in contrast with Abrahamic theistic traditions, Platonic-influenced Western philosophy, Brahmanistic philosophy, or the worldviews of modern natural (...) science. (shrink)

This paper is a article of Pojeo Cho Yik (浦渚 趙翼: 1579~1655)’s point of view related to the book of Doctrine of the Mean (中庸) in the mid-Joseon Dynasty, when Neo Confucianism was overwhelming. At the age of 24, he wrote the Article of Doctrine of the Mean (jung yong seol 中庸說) which was explained the basic lines of the books related to the book of Doctrine of the Mean (中庸) to be written later. (...) He wrote the Indivisual Opinion of Zhongyong (jung yong sa ram 中庸私覽) at 29, and wrote the Hard-earned Zhongyong (jung yong gon deuk 中庸困得) at 37. This paper examines the transitions and consistency of his point of view of the Doctrine of the Mean (中庸) in Korean History of Classical Learning, focusing on the Indivisual Opinion of Zhongyong (中庸私覽) and the Hard-earned Zhongyong (中庸困得). The early research on his scholarship started from the work of clarifying the relationship between Wang Yangming (王陽明) and it has been mistaken as one of the schools derived from the teachings of Wang Yangming, but it turns out to be absolutely irrelevant. His thoughts and arguments are so strong in the colors of Neo Confucianism, whicd is derived from the teachings of Zhu Xi (朱熹). And the scholars who knew him at that time absolutely did not define his study as the study of Wang Yang-ming. We can not say that he is the opposite of Zhu Xi, just because his way of distinguishing sentences of the book of Doctrine of the Mean (中庸) is different from Zhu Xi. Because Zhu Xi had already mentioned it in his other works. And although he had been associated with the Yangming scholars, they had never mentioned him as a Yangming scholar. Cho Yik regarded Zhu Xi as the best person after Confucius, and genuinely admired him. His submission of opinions different from Zhu Xi only added to his meticulousness to further strengthen Zhu Xi’s neo Confucianism. (shrink)

This paper is the second phase of a project that was begun more than three years ago. The first phase culminated in the publication of a paper working toward a critical appropriation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.1 Therein Aristotle famously argues that human wellbeing (eudaimonia) is constituted by “activity of the soul in accordance with moral and intellectual virtue.”2 This earlier paper brought into focus all the main lines of Aristotle’s theoretical web in the N. Ethics: including the nature of the (...) soul, intellectual virtue, moral virtue, etc. That paper went on to give a developed critique of Aristotle’s theoretical web, and against that background it argued for a very different way of thinking about intellectual virtue, and it prepared the ground for different ways of thinking about moral virtue. This current paper explores the various conceptual understandings of “the mean” in Aristotelian and in Confucian thought. It begins with an explanatory sketch of “the mean” as understood in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and then in a second section goes on to explore “the mean” as presented in classical Confucianism. The third section of this paper offers some reflections oriented toward a tentative formulation of a modified conception of “the mean” as it might be construed from a humanistic Marxist perspective. (shrink)

본 논문은 『中庸』을 더 쉽게 이해하기 위하여 『詩經』과 『中庸』에서 시가 담고 있는 사상을 비교⋅분석하고, 인용양상과 역할 및 그것이 담고 있는 중용철학을 살펴보는 연구이다. 『中庸』은 오직 『詩經』만을 인용하였고, 모두 16차례 인용이 보인다. 한번만 제외하고모두 출처가 『詩經』이라는 것을 밝혔는데, 이것은 『詩經』의 권위에 의탁하여 중용의 도를설명한다는 것을 나타낸다. 또한 일정한 형식 없이 필요한 부분만을 취하였다. 따라서 『詩經』 본래의 뜻과 『中庸』에서의 뜻이 달라지는 경우가 있었으며, 본의대로 수용되더라도뜻이 확장되는 경우도 있었다. 『詩經』의 시 중에서는 雅가 가장 많이 인용되었고, 다음으로 頌이다. 雅와 頌은 정악의 노래로써, 조회할 때와 (...) 제사에 쓰인다. 엄숙하며 공경하는내용으로 선왕의 덕을 드러내 중용의 도를 설명하기에 적합했을 것이다. 『中庸』의 장별로 살펴보면 1〜11장까지는 시가 인용되지 않았고, 중반부터 시작되어후반부에 집중적으로 인용되었다. 12장에 처음 인용되었으며, 26〜33장에서 가장 많이인용되었다. 특히 전편을 요약하여 마무리하는 33장은 시가 논지를 전개하고 있는데, 이것은 반복하여 간절한 뜻을 보여주기 위하여 『詩經』시를 활용한 것으로 보인다. 『中庸』의 4대절 분류로 볼 때 전반부에 속하는 1대절은 도의 근원과 실현 방법을 설명하는 부분으로 강령이 제시되었다. 중⋅후반부인 2대절부터 4대절까지는 1대절에서 제시한 강령을 설명하고, 중용의 도를 실천하는 방법⋅실천한 인물⋅공효를 밝히는 부분이다. 따라서 중⋅후반부에서는 시에 의탁하여 논지를 전개하고 증명하는 사례가 많았다. 인용된 시들은 『中庸』의 철학인 도의 費隱과 인도의 실천이 천도로 확장된다는 내용을 담고있다. 또한 성왕들의 사례를 시를 통해 보여줌으로써 유학의 목표인 수기치인을 실현해야함을 말하고 있다. 『中庸』에서 『詩經』을 인용한 의도와 인용된 시의 의미와 역할 등을 살펴보는 일은 『中庸』을 이해하는데 많은 도움을 될 것이다. (shrink)

《中庸原論:儒家情感形上學之創發與潛變》認為，孔子的心性之學包括兩個部分，即「心學」與「情學」。 儒學內化就是道德情感與良知之心內化為天命之性，成為道德實踐的內在本體和形上根據。 《中庸》作為思孟學派的早期作品，承擔着為儒學建立道德本體和尋找道德終極根源的形上課題。在這兩個課題中，道德情感都具有本質的意義，《中庸》初步建立起來的儒家形上學可以說是一種情感形上學。 宋明時期，孔子的「心學」得到充分發展，朱子是孔子「心學」之認知派，陸王是孔子「心學」之良知派，孔子的「情學」卻隱而不彰。 直到明末，劉蕺山才重新認識到道德情感的重要地位，並在一定程度上復歸了思孟學派心性情為一的義理結構。 楊少涵，河南桐柏人，副教授，碩士生導師。1999年7月畢業於鄭州大學，獲文學學士學位。2006年3月畢業於南京政治學院上海分院，獲哲學碩士學位。2009年6月畢業於上海復旦大學，獲哲學博士學位。201 1年6月於上海師范大學博士后出站。現任為華僑大學哲學與社會發展學院副教授。先后在《哲學研究》、《光明日報》等報刊上發表論文二十余篇。校理古籍《中庸集說》（衛湜著，漓江出版社，2011年）一部。.

In Zhongyong 中庸 (The Doctrine of the Mean), cheng 诚 (sincerity) is the “Dao of all Daos”, the “virtue of all virtues”, and thus connects the Dao of humans and that of Heaven. The Dao of humans can reveal the sincerity in the Dao of Heaven in two approaches: to contemplate on sincerity and to conduct in sincerity. Meanwhile, sincerity in the Dao of Heaven is unfolded in everything’s seeking for its own nature and destiny, thus the most (...) fundamental approach for the Dao of humans to reveal the sincerity in the Dao of Heaven is for humans to seek for everything’s own nature and destiny. (shrink)

성격적 탁월함(ethike arete)은 ‘지나침과 모자람 사이의 중용적 상태(mesotes)’라는 이론적 정의를 제시하는 『니코마코스 윤리학』 2.6의 논의를 연구자들은 통상 아리스토텔레스의 중용론이라고 부른다. 그런데 이 ‘중용적 상태(mesotēs)’의 ‘진의(眞意)’는 무엇일까? 일부 연구자들은 ‘아리스토텔레스가 이런 논변을 통하여 ‘우리가 처하게 되는 일상에서 최선이자 이상적인 선택은 필연적으로 중도적 행위와 감정이므로, 우리는 항상 이런 중도를 잘 파악하고 추구해야 한다’고 말하는 것으로 주장한다. 필자는 이런 입장의 대표자인 Kraut(1989)의 중도론적 해석을 비판한다. 먼저 크라우트의 주장을 분석하여 그의 주장의 근저에 있는 전제들이 무엇인지 전제가 보일 것이다. 그리고 EN 2.1~2.6의 맥락 분석을 통해 (...) 중용론이 ‘실천적 지침’이며, 중용 개념의 본질적 의미가 개별적 행위와 감정에 있다는 크라우트의 전제 및 주장이 잘못되었음을 논증할 것이다. 그리고 아리스토텔레스가 ‘중용적 상태’(mesotēs)라는 표현의 진의가 무엇인지 필자의 고찰을 제시하며 이 글을 마칠 것이다. (shrink)

Frances Kamm sets out to draw and make plausible distinctions that would show how and why it is, in some circumstances, permissible to kill some to save many more, but is not so in others. To do so she draws on a famous, and famously artificial, example of Judith Thomson, which illustrates the fact that people intutitively reject some instances of such killings but not others. The irrationality, implausibility and in many cases the self-defeating nature of such distinctions I had (...) attempted to expose in my 'The Survival Lottery' over 25 years ago. I still think these distinctions irrational and implausible and I will try, in this response, to show why this remains the case and why doctrines of additional effects, to however many powers they are taken, remain unhelpful in ethics. (shrink)

Meinong's doctrine of the modal moment and the watering-down of extranuclear properties to surrogate nuclear counterparts was offered in response to Russell's problem of the existent round square. To avoid an infinite regress of successively watered-down factualities, Meinong stipulates that the modal moment itself cannot be watered-down. This limits free assumption, since it means that the idea of the existent-cum-modal-moment round square cannot be entertained in thought. It is possible to eliminate the modal moment and watering-down from Meinongian semantics (...) in favor of a strict enforcement of the distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties. This provides a simpler, more economical Meinongian object theory, and regains unrestricted free assumption. (shrink)

『중용』과 『대학』 이해에 나타난 윤휴의 사천지학의 구조는 인간이 하늘을 섬겨야만 하는 근본 원리, 하늘을 섬기는 구체적 실천 방법, 하늘을 섬긴 지극한 효과로 이루어져 있다. 그는 인간의 性과 道란 天의 命으로 정해져 있기 때문에, 인간이란 性과 道의 근원인 天을 섬겨야만 하는 숙명적인 존재라고 이해한다. 즉 사천이란 다름 아닌 인간의 본원에 대한 섬김을 의미한다고 본다. 사천을 실천하는 구체적 방법으로 畏天, 存心養性, 중용과 중화의 실천, 五達道와 九經의 실천, 삼강령과 팔조목의 실천을 제시한다. 이러한 방법을 통해 사천을 지극히 하게 되면, 천지가 제자리를 잡고 만물이 길러지는 (...) 효과를 이룰 수 있다고 파악한다. 그에게 있어서 이러한 천지가 제자리를 잡고 만물이 길러진 경지란 다름 아닌 오달도와 구경이 실현된 경지이며, 자신의 性을 다하고[明明德] 남의 性을 다하게 하여[新民] 극치에 이른 경지이며[止於至善], 平天下가 이루어진 경지인 것이다. 이와 같이 윤휴가 강조한 사천지학의 지향점은 성리학의 지향점과 정확하게 일치한다고 하겠다. 그러나 그 출발점에서는 큰 차이를 보인다. 성리학에서는 天을 理로 이해하고, 이러한 天理는 性으로 내재되어 있다고 보고, 性 안에 내재된 천리를 자각하고 그 천리를 인륜에서 실현하는 것을 학문의 궁극적 목표로 삼는다. 물론 윤휴도 천리가 性으로 내재된 점을 인정하여 천명으로 받은 性을 인륜에서 실현하는 것을 학문의 궁극적 목표로 삼는다. 그러나 그 전제 조건으로 性의 근원인 天이 인륜과 日用 사이에 항상 顯現하고 있음을 인식하고 자각하여, 天을 두려워하고 경외하는 畏天의 마음을 가져야 함을 강조한다. 이러한 윤휴의 외천에 대한 강조는 성리학의 理法으로서의 天은 인간으로 하여금 자발적이고 적극적인 인륜 실천을 하도록 도모하는데 일정한 한계가 있다고 보고, 인간의 인륜 실천을 提高하기 위한 방안을 모색한 결과라 할 수 있다. (shrink)

The complexity of the scholastic view of descent stems from the attempt to find a reply to three different questions at the same time: those pertaining to the meaning of propositions, the relationships of inference between propositions, and the truth conditions of propositions. From each of these issues there arises a different sequence of developments to this doctrine, each of which has its own problems and solutions. Initially, the concept of descent is introduced in response to the problem of (...) determining the meaning of quantified propositions. This is the first axis of the development of the doctrine of descent, according to which descent consists of the construction of individual propositions which make explicit the meaning of the quantified proposition. The appearance of these new propositions, however, gives rise to the second axis in the development of the doctrine of descent. As soon as we have this multiplicity of singular propositions, it is possible to forget where they came from and how, simply considering the problem of their logical relationship with the original quantified proposition. This is how descent comes to be viewed not as an analysis of the meaning of the proposition, but as a relationship of consequence: that which could be established between a quantified proposition and a set of singular propositions. Lastly, when descent is considered as a relationship of consequence, it is possible to develop this doctrine in a third direction, given that this relationship between a quantified proposition and a set of singular propositions can be used as a means of showing the truth or falsehood of the quantified proposition. Pardo’s text is a good example of the problems which the concept of descent inevitably encounters when it is approached from three points of view which are superimposed upon each other without regard for their radical diversity. (shrink)

전우는 유학은 性을 근본으로 하는 학문이고, 心을 근본으로 삼는 학문은 이단이며, 반드시 心은 性을 근본으로 삼아야 한다고 주장한다. 그는 유학에서 性을 근본으로 삼는 이유는 性은 純善한 형이상자로 無爲하여 가변성이 전혀 없기 때문이라고 생각한다. 有爲한 형이하자로 有善有惡하여 惡으로 흐를 가변성이 내재되어 있는 心은 근본이 될 수 없다는 입장이다. 그의 이러한 사상은 『중용』을 해석하면서 크게 두 가지 특징으로 나타난다. 첫째, 그는 『중용』은 도학의 내용을 담고 있으며, 도학이란 道 즉 性을 學하는 학문으로 유학의 본령이 性에 근본함을 밝힌 학문으로 파악한다. 따라서 그는 자신의 중심 (...) 사상인 ‘心本性’이 자신의 사견이 아니라 유학의 본령임을 입증하는 입장에서 『중용』을 해석한다. 둘째, 그는 『중용』에 나오는 주요 개념들에 대해 그것이 무위한 것인지 유위한 것인지 명확하게 구분한다. 그는 유학의 道를 후세에 전하는 것이 자신의 사명이라고 여겼다. 자사가 당시에 이단에 의해 도학이 失傳될 것을 걱정하여 『중용』을 지은 심정으로, 그도 유위한 心을 理로 여기거나 心을 근본으로 삼아야 한다고 주장하는 이단에 의해 도학이 실전될 것을 걱정하는 심정으로 『중용』을 재해석한 것이라고 생각된다. (shrink)