This chapter contains sections titled: The Domains of Microevolution and Macroevolution Changing Meanings of Macroevolution An Expanding Hierarchy of Selection Origins of Novelty Mass Extinctions Is Evolution Uniformitarian? Conclusions Postscript: Counterpoint References.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Bridgeless Gap? Species Selection The Macroevolution Dispute as a Biological Controversy Postscript: Counterpoint Acknowledgments References.

This article focuses on the relationship between microevolution and macroevolution. The main purpose is to argue that up to the present time in the consolidation of the evolutionary synthesis macroevolution has been always conceived as dependent on microevolution. Such dependence was very clear in the synthesis, but seems to have been left aside by later authors. Nevertheless, we show that the criticisms of the synthesis since the decade of the 1970s did not modify that general trend: (...) the new perspectives reproduced the dependence of macroevolution on microevolution by means of strategies different than those appealed to by the traditional synthesis. (shrink)

Speciation is the process by which one or more species arises from a common ancestor, and “macroevolution” refers to patterns and processes at and above the species level – or, transitions in higher taxa, such as new families, phyla or genera. “Macroevolution” is contrasted with “microevolution,” evolutionary change within populations, due to migration, assortative mating, selection, mutation and drift. In the evolutionary synthesis of the 1930’s and 40’s, Haldane , Dobzhansky , Mayr , and Simpson argued that (...) the origin of species and higher taxa were, given the right environmental conditions and sufficient time, the product of the same microevolutionary factors yielding change within populations. Dobzhansky reviewed the evidence from genetics, and argued, “nothing in the known macroevolutionary phenomena would require other than the known genetic principles for causal explanation” . In sum, genetic variation between species was not different in kind from the genetic variation within species. Dobzhansky concluded that one may “reluctantly put an equal sign” between micro- and macroevolution. In this chapter, I review arguments for and against this "neo-Darwinian" consensus on speciation, as well as debates concerning macroevolution and punctuated equilibrium. (shrink)

The theory of punctuated equilibrium has been proposed as a challenge to the modern synthesis of evolutionary theory. Two important issues are raised. The first is scientific: whether morphological change as observed in the paleontological record is essentially always associated with speciation events. This paper argues that there is at present no empirical support for this claim: the alleged evidence is based on a definitional fallacy. The second issue is epistemological: whether macroevolution is an autonomous field of study, independent (...) from microevolutionary knowledge. It is herein argued that macroevolution and microevolution are not decoupled in two senses: identity at the level of events and compatibility of theories. But macroevolution is autonomous in the epistemologically important sense: macroevolutionary theories are not reducible to microevolutionary principles. It is finally pointed out that the discipline of macroevolution is notoriously lacking in theoretical constructs of great import and generality. (shrink)

The correspondence between Edgar Anderson and Ernst Mayr leading into their 1941 Jesup Lectures on “Systematics and the Origin of Species” addressed population thinking, the nature of species, the relationship of microevolution to macroevolution, and the evolutionary dynamics of plants and animals, all central issues in what came to be known as the Evolutionary Synthesis. On some points, they found ready agreement; for others they forged only a short term consensus. They brought two different working styles to this (...) project reflecting their different appreciations of what was possible at this point in evolutionary studies. For Mayr, it was a focused project with definitive short term conclusions imminent while Anderson viewed it as an episode in an ongoing historical process that, while exciting and suggestive, remained openended. Thus, Mayr and Anderson represent two distinct perspectives on the Evolutionary Synthesis in formation; by understanding both of their points of view, we can grasp more fully the state of evolutionary theory at this key moment. (shrink)

a discussion of contextual factors determining the domains of quantifiers. Since the time it was written, much more satisfying work on the topic has been done by Stanley, Williamson, Bach, and Gauker.

Evolutionary theory (ET) is teeming with probabilities. Probabilities exist at all levels: the level of mutation, the level of microevolution, and the level of macroevolution. This uncontroversial claim raises a number of contentious issues. For example, is the evolutionary process (as opposed to the theory) indeterministic, or is it deterministic? Philosophers of biology have taken different sides on this issue. Millstein (1997) has argued that we are not currently able answer this question, and that even scientific realists ought (...) to remain agnostic concerning the determinism or indeterminism of evolutionary processes. If this argument is correct, it suggests that, whatever we take probabilities in ET to be, they must be consistent with either determinism or indeterminism. This raises some interesting philosophical questions: How should we understand the probabilities used in ET? In other words, what is meant by saying that a certain evolutionary change is more or less probable? Which interpretation of probability is the most appropriate for ET? I argue that the probabilities used in ET are objective in a realist sense, if not in an indeterministic sense. Furthermore, there are a number of interpretations of probability that are objective and would be consistent with ET under determinism or indeterminism. However, I argue that evolutionary probabilities are best understood as propensities of population-level kinds. (shrink)

‘Gouldian arguments’ appeal to the contingency of a scientific domain to establish that domain’s autonomy from some body of theory. For instance, pointing to evolutionary contingency, Stephen Jay Gould suggested that natural selection alone is insufficient to explain life on the macroevolutionary scale. In analysing contingency, philosophers have provided source-independent accounts, understanding how events and processes structure history without attending to the nature of those events and processes. But Gouldian Arguments require source-dependent notions of contingency. An account of contingency is (...) source-dependent when it is indexed to some pattern and some process. Positions like Gould’s do not turn on the mere fact of life’s contingency—that life’s shape could have been different due to its sensitivity to initial conditions, path-dependence or stochasticity. Rather, Gouldian arguments require that the contingency is due to particular kinds of processes: in this case, those which microevolutionary theory cannot account for. This source-dependent perspective clarifies both debates about the nature and importance of contingency, and empirical routes for testing Gould’s thesis. (shrink)

In his thought-provoking book, Alex Mesoudi argues for an evolutionary, unifying framework for the social sciences, which is based on the principles of Darwinian theory. Mesoudi maintains that cultural change can be illuminated by using the genotype-phenotype distinction, and that it is sufficiently similar to biological change to warrant a theory of culture-change based on evolutionary models. He describes examples of cultural microevolution, within-population changes, and the biologically inspired population genetics models used to study them. He also shows that (...) some aspects of large-scale cultural transformation can be studied by using ecological models and phylogenetic comparative techniques. We argue that although Mesoudi's evolution-based perspective offers many useful insights, his ambition—the unification of the social sciences within a Darwinian framework through the use of the methods and models he describes—suffers from a major theoretical limitation. His reductive approach leads to overlooking culture as a system with emergent processes and features. Mesoudi therefore does not engage with any of the central past and present theories in sociology and anthropology for which the systems view of culture is central, and he does not analyze the emergent, high-level properties of human cultural-social systems. We suggest that a systems perspective, using some analogies and metaphors from developmental biology, can complement the evolutionary approach and is more in tune with a systems view of society. Such an approach, which stresses feedback and self-sustaining interactions within social networks, and engages with the insights of sociological and anthropological theories, can contribute to the understanding of cultural systems by highlighting the evolution of processes of social cohesion, and by making use of the mathematical approaches of complexity theory. (shrink)

Eight Domains of Phenomenology and Research Methods is a unique text that explains how the foundational literature representing our lifeworld experience aligns theory with research methods.

As an outcome of scientific thinking, evolutionary theories change in accordance with progress made. Here, we trace the evolution of evolutionary thought through seven different research schools that have arisen since the introduction of Darwin’s Origin of Species. These schools include Darwinism, the Modern Synthesis, Micro-, Meso-, and Macroevolution, Ecology, and Reticulate Evolution. The schools of Darwinism and the Modern Synthesis together lie at the foundation of the Neo-Darwinian paradigm. This paradigm has now expanded into the schools of (...) class='Hi'>Microevolution, Mesoevolution, and Macroevolution that respectively study how genes, organisms, and species evolve over time. The school of Ecology instead investigates how genes, organisms, and species interact with one another and with the physical environment in space. The Eco-Evo-Devo paradigm attempts to integrate the tenets of Ecology with those of Micro-, Meso-, and Macroevolutionary research. The Reticulate Evolution school studies non-selectionist mechanisms such as symbiosis, symbiogenesis, lateral gene transfer, infective heredity, and hybridization. This paper outlines the major research directions and points of controversies that arise between these distinct schools. It furthermore situates the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis and Third Way of Evolution along these schools. The call for an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis originated in the Mesoevolution school, while scholars active in the Third Way of Evolution movement are developing ways to recognize the important contributions made by all evolution schools. (shrink)

It is now clear that two prominent nuclear domains, interchromatin granule clusters (IGCs) and Cajal bodies (CBs), contribute to the highly ordered organization of the extrachromosomal space of the cell nucleus. These functional domains represent structurally stable but highly dynamic nuclear organelles enriched in factors that are required for different nuclear activities, especially RNA biogenesis. IGCs are considered to be the main sites for storage, assembly, and/or recycling of the essential spliceosome components. CBs are involved in the biogenesis (...) of several classes of small RNPs as well as the modification of newly assembled small nuclear RNA. We have summarized data on the molecular composition, structure, and functional roles of IGCs and CBs in the nuclei of mammalian somatic cells and oocytes of some animals with a special focus on insects. We have focused on similarities and differences between the IGCs and CBs of oocytes and the well‐studied CBs and IGCs of cultured mammalian somatic cells. We have shown the heterogeneous character of oocyte IGCs and CBs, both in structure and molecular content. We have also demonstrated the unique capacity of oocytes to form close structural interactions between IGC and CB components. We proposed to consider these joint structures as integrated entities, sharing the features of both IGCs and CBs. (shrink)

Every doctoral thesis requires contextualization within its specific discipline's theoretical bases. For a visual arts practice-based thesis, the relevant bases include those of aesthetics and visual perception. This article reviews a Western history of the domain of visual aesthetic theory, addressing both the _analytical_ philosophical efforts to define art and the _continental_ approaches, which construe art as social construction. It then reviews a third, normative stance that foregrounds cognitive value before definition or sociological context—an _aesthetic cognitivist_ position, art practice as (...) a means of acquiring and sharing experiential knowledge and understanding. Contemporary concerns about environmental aesthetics and somaesthetics are also addressed in the Introduction. Aesthetic theories are related to visual perception theories as an aid to fulfilling the scholarly requirements for a practice-based thesis. (shrink)

Although macroevolution has been the subject of sustained attention in the history and philosophy of science (HPS) community, only in recent years have science educators begun to more fully engage with the topic. This chapter first explores how science educators have conceptualized macroevolution and how their perspectives align with the views from HPS. Second, it illustrates how science educators’ limited engagement with HPS scholarship on macroevolution has influenced construct delineation, measurement instrument development, and educational arguments about which (...) aspects of macroevolution are most important for students to learn. Third, it discusses how scientific debates about the causal factors responsible for macroevolutionary patterns have been exploited by creationists and have impacted the teaching of evolution. Finally, it emphasizes that the rich perspectives that HPS has to offer on the important topic of macroevolution have yet to be integrated into science education scholarship. (shrink)

This paper locates the contributions of Kauffman and Ayala to this symposium in the context of recent discussions of the adequacy of the Modern Synthesis. The neglect of morphology and development described by Kauffman is understandable in view of the belief that selection is the most powerful evolutionary force. His idea that properties of order may be explained by nonselective mechanisms is also examined. The paper subsequently takes up Ayala's criticism of S.J. Gould's view that macroevolution is a process (...) "decoupled" from microevolution. It is argued that the idea of species selection makes Gould's antireductionism ontological in character; this contrasts with Ayala's contention that the decoupling is merely epistemological. (shrink)

Kant's account of the experience of the sublime in nature and the incommensurability of its bases in the two European traditions of philosophy that feed into modern cognitive psychology, the holism of Leibniz and the analytic reductionism of Locke, are used to develop a new theory of human nature in terms of developmental interactions between initially separate cognitive domains. More recent illustrations of this separation/interaction are found in debates over 'emergence' in modern science and theories of consciousness. Shifting from (...) competitive epistemologies to a resulting ontology of human nature, the cognitive development of mind through childhood can itself be understood as multiple but necessarily incomplete fusions between person knowing and a thing/tool knowing , based here on a Vygotskian model of their reciprocal internalizations, and leading into our ostensibly differentiated and humanly unique multiple adult intelligences. A consequence is that human consciousness, while based on these selective and necessarily partial domain integrations, as in the separate directionalities of spirituality and science/technology, is fundamentally and permanently unbalanced. Kant's sublime and Rudolf Otto's related analysis of numinous-uncanny feeling exemplify the inner dynamism of this intrinsic unbalance, constituting the species specific form of the perpetual orientation to novelty that drives us forward toward the very best and very worst of the human condition. (shrink)

Although macroevolution has been the subject of sustained attention in the history and philosophy of science (HPS) community, only in recent years have science educators begun to more fully engage with the topic. This chapter first explores how science educators have conceptualized macroevolution and how their perspectives align with the views from HPS. Second, it illustrates how science educators’ limited engagement with HPS scholarship on macroevolution has influenced construct delineation, measurement instrument development, and educational arguments about which (...) aspects of macroevolution are most important for students to learn. Third, it discusses how scientific debates about the causal factors responsible for macroevolutionary patterns have been exploited by creationists and have impacted the teaching of evolution. Finally, it emphasizes that the rich perspectives that HPS has to offer on the important topic of macroevolution have yet to be integrated into science education scholarship. (shrink)

The evolutionary synthesis of the 1930s and 1940s integrated the study of biological microevolution and biological macroevolution into the theoretically consistent and hugely productive field of evolutionary biology. A similar synthesis has yet to occur for the study of culture, and the social sciences remain fragmented and theoretically incompatible. Here, it is suggested that a Darwinian theory of cultural evolution can promote such a synthesis. Earlier non-Darwinian theories of cultural evolution, such as progress theories, lacked key elements of (...) a Darwinian theory of cultural evolution that are necessary to promote a synthesis, while other contemporary theories of cultural evolution, such as memetics, make too stringent neo-Darwinian assumptions that are inconsistent with evidence regarding cultural transmission. Several examples are given which indicate the beginnings of an evolutionary synthesis for culture, where patterns of cultural macroevolution have been explained in terms of underlying cultural microevolutionary forces. Finally, it is argued that experimental simulations of cultural evolution can play an important role in this emerging synthesis. (shrink)

This essay asks whether and how a Reformational epistemology should distinguish different types of knowledge within a unified conception of knowledge as a whole. I begin with the thesis that knowledge, in its deepest meaning, is not a thing to possess but a complex relationship to inhabit. It encompasses human knowers, practices of knowing, the knowable, known results, guiding principles, and procedures of confirmation. Within this complex relationship, humans achieve insight of various sorts. After briefly distinguishing artistic from scientific knowledge, (...) I examine two other social domains of knowledge, namely, technology and religion. Taking issue with Hendrik Hart, I then argue for the religious legitimacy of propositional beliefs, provided they support genuinely religious knowledge, which is post-propositional. Knowledge, I conclude, takes on distinct contours within different social domains; some of them, like art and technology, provide pre-propositional insight, and others, like religion, offer insight that is post-propositional. (shrink)

Each science has its own domain of investigation, but one and the same science can be formalized in different languages with different universes of discourse. The concept of the domain of a science and the concept of the universe of discourse of a formalization of a science are distinct, although they often coincide in extension. In order to analyse the presuppositions and implications of choices of domain and universe, this article discusses the treatment of omega arguments in three very different (...) formalizations of arithmetic. In Peano's formalization the domain is a restricted class of individuals, while the universe of discourse is the unrestricted class of all individuals. In Gödel's formalization the domain is a restricted class of individuals as in Peano's formalization, but the universe of discourse coincides with the domain. In Whitehead-Russell's formalization the domain is a class of logical notions in Tarski's sense, that are necessarily not individuals, whereas the universe of discourse is the unrestricted class of individuals as in Peano's formalization. The present approach emphasizes the viewpoint that the universe of discourse of a given discourse is important in determining which propositions are expressed by which sentences. (shrink)

The allegedly alternative theories of Phyletic Gradualism and Punctuated Equilibria are examined as regards the nature of their differences. The explanatory value of both models is determined by establishing their actual connection with reality. It is concluded that they are to be considered complementary rather than mutually exclusive at all levels of infraspecific, specific, and supraspecific evolution. So, in order to be described comprehensively, the pathways of evolution require at least two distinct models, each based on a discrete range of (...) real phenomena. [Phyletic Gradualism; Punctuated Equilibria; evolutionary theories; divergence models; additive speciation; microevolution; macroevolution; anagenesis.]. (shrink)

Intuitively, proper referential extensions of psychological and moral terms exclude artifacts. Yet ordinary speakers commonly treat AI robots as moral patients and use psychological terms to explain their behavior. This paper examines whether this referential shift from the human domain to the AI domain entails semantic changes: do ordinary speakers literally consider AI robots to be psychological or moral beings? Three non-literalist accounts for semantic changes concerning psychological and moral terms used in the AI domain will be discussed: the technical (...) view (ordinary speakers express technical senses), the habit view (ordinary speakers subconsciously express ingrained social habits), and the emotion view (ordinary speakers express their own affective empathetic emotional states). I discuss whether these non-literalist accounts accommodate the results of relevant empirical experiments. The non-literalist accounts are shown to be implausible with respect to the ordinary use of agency-terms (e.g., “believe,” “know,” “decide,” etc.), and therefore I conclude that the concepts ordinary speakers express by agency-terms in reference to AI robots are similar to the concepts they express when applying the same terms to humans. When ordinary speakers extend emotion-terms and/or moral-patiency-terms to AI robots, however, I argue that semantic changes have taken place because ordinary speakers are in fact referring to their own affective empathetic emotional states rather than AI robots. This argument suggests that the judgments made by ordinary speakers regarding the proper referential extensions of emotion-terms and moral-patiency-terms are fallacious. (shrink)

When philosophers of physics explore the nature of chance, they usually look to quantum mechanics. When philosophers of biology explore the nature of chance, they usually look to microevolutionary phenomena, such as mutation or random drift. What has been largely overlooked is the role of chance in macroevolution. The stochastic models of paleobiology employ conceptions of chance that are similar to those at the microevolutionary level, yet different from the conceptions of chance often associated with quantum mechanics and Laplacean (...) determinism. (shrink)

Stephen Jay Gould’s views on the ontology of species were an important plank of his revisionist program in evolutionary theory. In this paper I cast a critical philosopher’s eye over those views. I focus on three central aspects of Gould’s views on species: the relation between the Darwinian and the metaphysical notions of individuality, the relation between the ontology of species and macroevolution, and the issue of contextualism and conventionalism about the metaphysics of species.

This book is a manifesto for what John Alcock calls “orthodox sociobiology,” the systematic study of the biological basis of all social behavior following the premise that behaviors and their mechanisms evolve under the primary influence of natural selection acting on individual differences in genetic success. Sociobiology focuses narrowly on finding adaptive explanations for social behaviors while attempting a grand synthesis of biological and social sciences. Alcock's book is largely defensive, aimed at refuting criticisms and a perception that, twenty‐five years (...) after its proclamation, sociobiology is moribund. Alcock's defense relies not on an extensive review of relevant literature but on the persuasiveness of arguments illustrated with favored examples. He emphasizes sociobiology of human cultures and prescribes practical applications for restructuring societal institutions.The major argument against orthodox sociobiology is summarized in Edward O. Wilson's book Consilience : “We know that virtually all of human behavior is transmitted by culture. We also know that biology has an important effect on the origin of culture and its transmission. … Culture allows a rapid adjustment to changes in the environment through finely tuned adaptations invented and transmitted without correspondingly precise genetic prescription. In this respect human beings differ fundamentally from all other animal species” . This argument denies that human social behaviors are best understood as biologically evolved adaptations and places them outside the domain of the genetical theory of natural selection.Alcock's major claim for sociobiology's triumph is its use of comparative methodology to identify ultimate causes of social behaviors. Over the past twenty‐five years, evolutionary biologists have developed rigorous systematic methodologies for making comparative inferences in evolutionary research. Such explicitly phylogenetic approaches provide more powerful tests of ultimate causality in evolution than the comparative methods available when sociobiology was first proposed. Although the success of sociobiology would seem to lie in its ability to use the strongest comparative methods to test its major claims, Alcock's examples rely entirely on archaic methodology that no contemporary evolutionist should accept.The hypothesis of adaptation predicts that a character enhances its possessor's ability to utilize resources for survival or reproduction relative to alternatives against which it has been tested evolutionarily. Phylogenetic analysis of species possessing the character and their closest relatives identifies the comparisons appropriate for testing this hypothesis. Hypothetical adaptations are mapped onto phylogenies to identify their origins, antecedent conditions, associated characters, environmental contexts, and selective regimes. Alcock forfeits the power of evolutionary study by arguing that sociobiologists “can only use data from unrelated species known to experience similar selection pressures” in the “independent convergence test” of adaptation. No animal species are completely unrelated, nor are their behaviors adaptive in an absolute sense. Even comparisons of analogous characters across species must consider phylogeny because homologous genes and developmental programs can be utilized for analogous roles in different species. Without a firm grounding in phylogenetic principles, Alcock's methods cannot effectively test hypotheses of evolutionary causality.Alcock spends much effort defending sociobiology against the criticism that its major claims constitute untestable adaptationist stories. David Barash's sociobiological interpretations of mating behavior in bluebirds receive particular attention because Stephen Jay Gould criticized them as untestable. Alcock shows that Barash and others have empirically rejected some explanations in favor of better ones, although the hypotheses tested and the knowledge gained reside entirely in proximate mechanisms, not the ultimate causes that constitute sociobiology's main challenge. Gould's criticism therefore withstands Alcock's counterarguments.Readers unfamiliar with evolution should consult recent books such as Brian Hall's Evolutionary Developmental Biology , Jeffrey Levinton's Genetics, Paleontology, and Macroevolution , and John Avise's Phylogeography to see evolutionary disciplines that have triumphed over the past twenty‐five years. These disciplines contrast with sociobiology in their methodological rigor and profound reformulation of major theories. By contrast, Alcock's sociobiology seems essentially unchanged from the 1970s. If twenty‐five years of sociobiological study have produced only a repetition of its initial conjectures, their effectiveness as testable hypotheses seems doubtful.Alcock acknowledges “human evolutionary psychology” as a new subdiscipline of sociobiology. Indeed, orthodox sociobiology seems to be relocating from biology to psychology departments. My interpretation of this move is that sociobiology has not kept pace with evolutionary biology and therefore has sought refuge in a traditionally nonevolutionary discipline that has not yet incorporated the current critical standards of comparative evolutionary research.Sociobiology has served evolutionary biology mainly by revealing the limits of reductionist selective arguments, thereby directing us to move beyond them. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to introduce first-order versions of logics of evidence and truth, together with corresponding sound and complete Kripke semantics with variable and constant domains. According to the intuitive interpretation proposed here, these logics intend to represent possibly inconsistent and incomplete information bases over time. The paper also discusses the connections between Belnap-Dunn’s and da Costa’s approaches to paraconsistency, and argues that the logics of evidence and truth combine them in a very natural way.

The molecular aspects of the microtubule system is a research area that has developed very rapidly during the past decade. Research on the assembly mechanisms and chemistry of tubulin and the molecular biology of microtubules have advanced our understanding of microtubule formation and its regulation. The emerging view of tubulin is of a macromolecule containing spatially discrete sequences that constitute functionally different domains with respect to self‐association, interactions with microtubule associated proteins (MAPs) and specific ligands. Recent studies point to (...) the role of the carboxyl‐terminal moiety of tubulin subunits in regulating its assembly into microtubules. These investigations combined with further studies on the spatial relationships between tubulin domains should provide new insights into the detailed structural basis of microtubule assembly. (shrink)

That Darwinism has been immune generally from philosophical and scientific criticism says something about its iconic status as a paradigm. As Alvin Plantinga has said, “Darwinian evolution has become an idol of the contemporary tribe... part of the intellectual orthodoxy of our day.” After many decades of presumptive authority as a paradigm, some philosophers and scientists are at last examining whether Darwinian theory ought to be persuasive. Dennis Bonnette’s book is an outstanding addition to this important new examination. In fourteen (...) chapters and an epilogue, compressed into 145 pages of exposition, Dennis Bonnette summarizes both the strengths and weaknesses of modern evolutionary theory. In the first four chapters of the book he tests whether evidence for macroevolution is convincing. Relying on the unpublished manuscripts of the Australian philosopher Austin M. Woodbury, he concludes that neither the fossil record nor the fact of microevolution justifies the enthusiastic conviction, so common in the academy and even the popular culture, that macroevolution is the case. In addition to criticisms marshaled by Woodbury, creation scientists have exposed over the past several decades a number of problems endemic to the way paleontologists have interpreted the fossil record. Still, Bonnette is willing cheerfully to concede that evolution may be true: “we should remember that the weakness of arguments favoring evolution does not necessarily prove that evolution does not occur”. As a Catholic and a philosopher, Bonnette wonders what its truth would mean for philosophy and theology. In accord with the way Catholic thinkers have commented on the subject, Bonnette argues that the doctrine of evolution, if rightly interpreted, coheres with a sound philosophy of nature, metaphysics, and theology. This conclusion, reiterated and justified throughout the book, and effectively summarized in the closing chapters, separates Bonnette’s position from that of the creation scientists, whom he treats with scrupulous fairness, as he does representatives of atheistic or naturalistic evolutionism. (shrink)

Abstract: The natural lottery is a metaphor about the way luck affects the allocation of personal attributes, talents, skills, and defects. Susan Hurley has argued that it is incoherent to regard individual essential properties (IEPs) as a matter of lottery luck. The reason is that a lottery of identity-affecting properties generates the ‘non-identity problem’. For this reason among others she suggests substituting lottery luck with ‘thin luck’, i.e. luck as non-responsibility, which would allow us to coherently regard IEPs as a (...) matter of luck.I argue that we are not not-responsible for our IEPs. Therefore, the coherent range of ‘thin luck’ is not broader than that of lottery luck. Moreover, justice theorists need to be worried about the non-identity problem only to the extent that IEPs affect life prospects and it is far from evident that they do. After addressing some connected aspects of Hurley's analysis, I discuss the type of reasons that justify seeking to expand domain of justice and the ways of doing this, for instance by abandoning lottery luck. I close by suggesting, however, that if Parfit's view of ‘what matters about identity’ is correct, its application to the case of identity-affecting lotteries may prove the expansion of the domain of justice superfluous, as IEPs belong to it as it is. (shrink)

The allegedly alternative theories of Phyletic Gradualism and Punctuated Equilibria are examined as regards the nature of their differences. The explanatory value of both models is determined by establishing their actual connection with reality. It is concluded that they are to be considered complementary rather than mutually exclusive at all levels of infraspecific, specific, and supraspecific evolution. So, in order to be described comprehensively, the pathways of evolution require at least two distinct models, each based on a discrete range of (...) real phenomena. [Phyletic Gradualism; Punctuated Equilibria; evolutionary theories; divergence models; additive speciation; microevolution; macroevolution; anagenesis.]. (shrink)

Based on a 12-year bibliographic record collected from the Web of Science database, the present study aims to provide a macroscopic overview of the knowledge domain in financial decision making. A scientometric and bibliometric analysis was conducted on the literature published in the field from 2010 to 2021, using the CiteSpace software. The analysis focuses on the co-occurring categories, the geographic distributions, the vital references, the distribution of topics, as well as the research fronts and emerging trends of financial related (...) decision making. The steady increase of papers published year by year demonstrated the increasing interest on this topic at the international level. The scientometric analysis of the literature showed that financial decision, investment decision, and financing decision stood out of the crowd of the research on FDM, suggesting their important role in FDM and its research. The results of citation burst analysis predicted the focus of topics, i.e., the impact of individual differences such as financial literacy, gender and age on FDM in the coming years. Different from the traditional approach of literature review, this bibliometric analysis offers a scientometric approach to reveal the status quo and the development trend of FDM by macro and quantitative means. In addition, future research directions for the field are recommended. (shrink)

There has been a longstanding interest in discovering or uncovering resemblances among what are ostensibly diverse religious schemas by employing a range of methodological approaches and tools. However, it is generally considered a problematic undertaking. Jonathan Z. Smith has produced a large body of work aimed at explicating this and has tacitly based his model of comparison on metaphor, which is traditionally understood to connote similarity between two or more things, as based on a linguistic or pragmatic assessment. However, another (...) possible approach is cognitive. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have championed the view of “conceptual metaphor,” which regards metaphor as being pervasive not only in language, but also in thought and action. Indeed, according to them, it basically structures our conceptual operations and hence views of the world through partially mapping knowledge across ontological domains, generally from the concrete to the abstract. I shall argue that a similar mechanism can fruitfully be applied to comparing religious schemas, as based on the postulated relationship between the domains of human and divine, physical and abstract, and as realized through expressions of journeying and reflection. (shrink)

The current issue looks into the concept of Man and in particular at the anthropological domain that this notion has represented at different times in the history of modern and contemporary western thought. It does this, however, by focusing on its cut-off points, where questions have revealed a fundamental instability at the root of the very concept of “human’’, thus attempting to show that every “theory of human nature’’ must by its very nature look beyond human nature as it identifies (...) and ‘brings out’ to the point of alienation the inner grammar and constitutive logic of that combination of forces commonly known as ‘Man’. In mapping out a sketch of the elements that make up the setting for this problem, we have set out to give this collection the structure of a round trip. As our starting point for this selection we have taken the mechanistic and naturalistic revolution in the theory of human nature which, starting from Descartes in the heyday of the modern era, for the first time assigns to physiological investigation autonomous prerogatives in defining the human, bringing in a wide range of anthropological paradoxes concerning the dividing lines between Man, machine and animal. These paradoxes were to push philosophical reflection itself, with Kant, towards the new shores of a moral and pragmatic theory of human nature which was to be characteristic of the whole second part of the modern era and which is richly dealt with in this volume. The same paradoxes had to be faced again with the arrival of Darwinian evolutionary theory, when they had to be integrated with the problems that had arisen in the moral and idealistic thinking of the early 19th century. So by closing with the concept of the “post-human’’, the return of this selection to its starting point perhaps brings us to the point of connection between the two poles around which philosophical reflection on human nature has revolved – nature and spirit – and the culmination of a duality that seems to us to identify and delineate the domain of the human that western thought has been mapping out from the early 17th century until today. Hoping you enjoy the read, we invite you to look forward to the next issue of Azimuth, due in October 2013, dealing with Aesthetics and Politics. -/- . (shrink)

The syntactic domain of tense is the clause: tense appears in some form in every clause of a tensed language. Semantic interpretation of tense requires information from context, however. This has been clear at least since Partee's 1984 demonstration of the anaphoric properties of tense. In this talk I will show that the facts about context are quite complex, perhaps more so than has been appreciated. There are three patterns of tense interpretation, depending on the type of discourse context in (...) which a clause appears. I will introduce the notion of discourse mode to account for the different types of context.1 I offer an interpretation of tense in Discourse Representation Theory, a framework which is organized to deal with information from the context. I also show that a syntactically based theory can handle contextually-based tense interpretation. In §1 I set out the basic analysis of tense and show how it applies to sentences in isolation. §2 discusses types of discourse context and patterns of tense interpretation; §3 considers the formal analysis of tense; §4 concludes with a summary and a prediction about temporal interpretation in tenseless languages. (shrink)

This main article for a Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology philosophical case conference is intended to raise philosophical, psychiatric, and public policy issues concerning the relationship between concepts of criminality, mental disorder, and the classification of mental disorders. After introducing the basic problem of the confounding of “vice” and mental disorder concepts in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition—Text Revision, the author summarizes three different cases from the literature that illustrate the problem of the vice–mental disorder relationship. (...) Four general aspects of the conceptual issues are presented to frame the discussion, and general questions in a range of domains are posed for commentators. (shrink)