At the present stage, the problem of human ecology is determined, for all practical purposes, by the response of man to the conditions of the environment he has himself modified and created.

One of Bratman’s aims in Planning, Time, and Self-Governance is to develop his insights regarding planning to shed light on temptation. I focus on the main case of temptation Bratman appeals to in supporting his conclusion that it can be rational for an agent facing temptation to stick to her prior plan even if she finds herself with an evaluative judgment that favors deviating. Bratman’s reasoning is meant to be consistent with the priority of present evaluation, and to be (...) sensitive to Smart’s insight that, as Bratman puts it, ‘inference from the advantages of the general habit [of non-reconsideration] directly to a specific conclusion about what to do on the present occasion, once the question of what to do on the present occasion is raised, is fraught.’ My reasoning suggests that, interpreted in one way, the case Bratman uses to make his argument is not clearly a case of giving in to temptation (or else not a case that requires the sort of novel contribution Bratman thinks is needed); and interpreted otherwise, the case does not raise exactly the challenges Bratman suggests it does, and the challenges it does raise are not directly addressed by the solution Bratman provides. (shrink)

According to classical decision theory, an agent realises at time t the option with maximum expected utility (determined by his beliefs and desires at t), where the relevant options are possible actions performed at t. I consider an alternative according to which the relevant options are in general plans, complex courses of action extending into the future.

I sketch my general model of the roles of intentions in the planning of agents like us-agents with substantial resource limitations and with important needs for coordination. I then focus on the stability of prior intentions: their rational resistance to reconsideration. I emphasize the importance of cases in which one's nonreconsideration of a prior intention is nondeliberative and is grounded in relevant habits of reconsideration. Concerning such cases I argue for a limited form of two-tier consequentialism, one that is (...) restricted in ways that aim at blocking an analogue of Smart's concerns about rule-worship. I contrast this with the unrestricted two-tier consequentialism suggested by McClennen. I argue that my restricted approach is superior for a theory of the practical rationality of reflective, planning agents like us. But I also conjecture that an unrestricted two-tier consequentialism may be more appropriate for the AI project of specifying a high level architecture for a resource-bounded planner. (shrink)

Theoretical analyses of person–environment interaction describe complex models, addressing different levels of social systems, while models of the sense of community provide a base for transferring views of this interaction to the national level. This paper presents two studies that explored the structure of the sense of country and its relation to emigration plans and social identification. Study 1 involved 1,005 adults from Latvia. The Sense of Country Inventory included influence, perceived opportunities, belonging, and spatiotemporal commitment as the components of (...) this sense. The bifactor model demonstrated the best fit and confirmed the general factor, integrating components of the sense of country, and specific factors, emphasizing its complexity. The validation demonstrated that the general sense of country is the main negative predictor of emigration plans. Study 2 included 247 participants who completed the SOCI and Identification With All Humanity Scale. Correlating with national identification, the sense of country negatively predicted emigration plans that reflected the social identity continuity pathway. In turn, a negative relationship between the sense of country and global identification, which positively predicted emigration plans, revealed a social identity gain pathway. Together, the studies present the integrative nature of the sense of country and its links to emigration plans and national and global social identification. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic has been analysed and discussed from many disciplinary perspectives. An aspect that still needs critical exploration is the role—that is, the modes and forms—of regulatory interventions during the pan- demic. It is interesting to note in this regard that, in many studies, regulatory measures are labelled “non-pharma- ceutical interventions”, as if they do not have any specificity on their own and only represent a theoretically residual category. The main aim of this article is instead to focus on (...) the distinctive features of normative measures as such. As regards the article’s focus, it centres on the normative interventions in the first period of the pandemic—that is, 2020—with particular reference to Italy. We have chosen to focus on this period because the most extensive and severe restrictions introduced to combat Covid-19 were established at that time. And we have chosen to con- sider Italy because it was the first country, after China, to be hard hit by the virus and to react in a draconian manner. As regards the methodology, the article is based, in general and primarily, on an extensive interdisciplinary literature review. With reference to the Italian case, the study is additionally based on: first-hand data collection and analysis (especially concerning Italian normative measures mainly issued at the national level: their type, frequency, target, hierarchical relationships); second-hand data and analysis (for instance as regards the effectiveness of Italy’s and other countries’ regulatory measures). In discussing the Italian response to the Covid-19 pandemic, certain weaknesses have been identified; and possible lessons have been highlighted, in terms of both “planning” (i.e. the necessity to better pre-define concrete and circumscribed sets of actions) and of “meta-planning” (i.e. the necessity of better planning the way in which public authorities could and should plan and act). Although this article is mainly based on the Italian situation, what we can learn from this case is largely generalizable. (shrink)

We examined the role of verbal mediation in planning performance of English–Spanish-speaking bilingual children and monolingual English-speaking children, between the ages of 9 and 12 years. To measure planning, children were administered the Tower of London (ToL) task. In a dual-task paradigm, children completed ToL problems under three conditions: with no secondary task (baseline), with articulatory suppression, and with non-verbal motor suppression. Analyses revealed generally shorter planning times for bilinguals than monolinguals but both groups performed similarly on number of moves (...) and execution times. Additionally, bilingual children were more efficient at planning throughout the duration of the task while monolingual children showed significant gains with more practice. Children’s planning times under articulatory suppression were significantly shorter than under motor suppression as well as the baseline condition, and there was no difference in planning times between monolingual and bilingual children during articulatory suppression. These results demonstrate that bilingualism influences performance on a complex EF measure like planning, and that these effects are not related to verbal mediation. (shrink)

In a recent number of the Classical Quarterly Mr. F. M. Cornford argues against the commonly accepted view, according to which the tripartite social structure of the Republic is a corollary, in Plato′s mind, to the tripartition of the individual Soul. In the present paper I propose to examine the general plan of the dialogue, in the hope of showing that Plato′s conceptions of State and Soul were not, as generally assumed and as assumed by Mr. Cornford, ready-made (...) and clearly formulated in his mind before he began to write the Republic: that, on the contrary, we can detect profound and vital modifications of his original views as the argument proceeds: and that the conceptions of the Ideal State and the rightly constituted human soul grow out of one another and react on one another in such a way that it is impossible to give a simple answer, affirmative or negative, to the question ‘ Which is prior, the tripartition of State or the tripartition of Soul ?’. (shrink)

We are planning agents and we are, or so we suppose, responsible agents. How are these two distinctive aspects of our agency related? In his "Freedom and Resentment" Peter Strawson understands responsible agency in terms of "reactive attitudes" like resentment and gratitude, attitudes which are normally embedded in "ordinary inter-personal relationships." I draw on Strawson''s account to sketch an answer to my question about responsibility and planning. First, the fact that an action is plan-embedded can influence the agent''s degree (...) of culpability for that action; for such embeddings can constitute or indicate important facts about the quality of the agent''s will. Second, general planning incapacities can to some extent exempt an agent from normal judgments of responsibility. My argument for this second claim appeals to the normal roles of planning in "ordinary inter-personal relationships.". (shrink)

TWO OBJECTIONS are often levelled against Aristotle's theory of practical inference. The first is that he fails to discuss adequately the nature of reasoning about the ends of good living. Thus, while there is no shortage of examples of technical deliberation, such as how a doctor deliberates to bring about healing, we have no comparable examples of how a person of determinate character deliberates to promote the ends of that character. The second is that while Aristotle has an account of (...) how we reason to a decision to act now, he lacks a more general account of intention that can accommodate both present intention and future intention--that is, intending now to act later. The two challenges, I want to argue, are related, though often not by the objectors. Deliberation about how best to live over the course of a life requires a continuing interest in one's future self and a capacity to decide upon future ends that constrain the present and are constrained by it. An Aristotelian conception of the good life, with its intrinsic sense of completeness and unity, requires this close knit of present and future. But if this is so, then the capacity to deliberate about the future and to regulate the present in light of future plans will be particularly urgent in the case of living such a life. Deliberation about future intentions should, if anywhere, play a prominent role here. It will be a severe limitation on Aristotle's view if his account of deliberation precludes such a role for practical reason. (shrink)

This paper and its companion (‘‘The Planning Theory of Law I: The Nature of Legal Institutions’’) provide a general introduction to Scott Shapiro’s Planning Theory of Law as developed in his recent book Legality. The Planning Theory encompasses both an account of the nature of legal institutions and an account of the nature of legal norms. The first paper concerns the account of legal institutions. This paper concerns the account of legal norms.

De 1940 à 1942, un certain nombre de scientifiques français se réfugie en Amérique avec leur famille. Ils font partie - souvent sans en avoir conscience - d'un plan de sauvetage organisé depuis New York par deux de leurs collègues, Henri Laugier et Louis Rapkine, avec l'aide financière et logistique de la fondation Rockefeller. La reconstitution des différentes étapes qui jalonnent le parcours du candidat à l'exil prouve que le gouvernement de Vichy ne fit pas obstacle, par principe, au (...) départ temporaire de ses intellectuels de renom, même juifs. Quant aux États-Unis, ils favorisèrent l'accueil des seuls savants susceptibles d'enrichir durablement la vie intellectuelle américaine. (shrink)

The participatory economics model (ParEcon) of Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel represents an important contribution to the debate about feasible alternatives to capitalism. What distinguishes the model from other proposals, like market socialism or cybersocialism, is the central role given to the participation of citizens in economic planning. Citizens form workers’ and neighbourhood consumers’ councils which develop production and consumption proposals. These councils form federations responsible for the coordination of planning. An Iteration Facilitation Board plays a mere perfunctory role in (...) the facilitation of the planning process. This way, economic planning is done entirely by the citizens themselves rather than planners at a central planning agency. The ParEcon model is thereby supposed to be more democratic than historical central planning.In this paper, I consider whether three possible justifications for democracy can also be used to support this kind of participatory economy. These justifications can be referred to as (1) the protection of citizens’ interests, (2) the revealing of preferences and (3) liberty. In my paper, I show that these three justifications of democracy do not in fact support democratic participation in concrete economic plans in the way envisaged by Albert and Hahnel. Instead of individual plans, citizens should choose general planning procedures. This prevents citizens from being subjected to the arbitrary power of their co-workers or neighbours. Such an algorithmic planning process also prevents central planners from holding arbitrary power since, much like the Iteration Facilitation Board in the ParEcon model, they simply facilitate the prescribed planning process without retaining significant discretion. As I elaborate in the case of consumption planning, citizens can still participate in planning, however they do so through their individual choices rather than a democratic vote. Individual citizens should not require the approval of their neighbours for their personal consumption. (shrink)

RésuméL'analyse du développement des activités électriques du cerveau chez l'enfant au moyen d'examens électro‐encéphalographiques répétés en série longitudinale nous donne l'occasion d'exprimer quelques considérations générales sur les notions d'organisation, de continuité et discontinuité du développement des fonctions cérébrales. Du point de vue méthodologique, une premihre difficulté provient de ce que la technique utilisée est à la fois objective et subjective: objective en tant qu'elle comporte un enregistrement physique très exact des activités physiologiques du cerveau, exprimées par des variations de potentiel (...) électrique , subjective du fait que les tracCs obtenus doivent être analysCs et interprétés empiriquement par un spécialist.e expérimenté. Même si I'on recourt à certains procédés physiques d'analyse des tracés , on ne peut définir objectivement que certains parametres élémentaires, tels que la fréquence, le voltage et les relations de phase. Ces méthodes d'analyse objectives restent incapables toutefois d'exprimer le 〈pattern〉, c'est‐à‐dire la configuration temporo‐spatiale de l'activité Clectrique dans ce qu'elle à d’〈essentiel〉 et de 〈général〉; elles ne peuvent se substituer entibrement à l'analyse qualitative et subjective. Une autre difficulté technique réside dans le fait que si les examens ne sont pas répétés à des intervalles suffisamment courts et égaux ou si un examen est omis, il peut résulter d'un intervalle trop grand entre deux examens une impression inadéquate de discontinuité du développement.Ces écueils méthodologiques évités, l'analyse des examens EEG en séries longitudinales montre que le développement des activités Clectriques cérébrales s'effectue de faqon continue et progressive, conformément à un plan d'organisation . Ce plan s'exprime partiellement lors dechaque examen, mais de façon compléte seulement dans le pattern définitivement organisé de l'adolescent de 15 ans. Dans cette continuité du développement, on peut distinguer toutefois certaines époques, où I'organisation du 〈pattern〉électrographique paraît s'intensifier, se précipiter et se consolider. Ces époques, qui produisent alors l'impression d'une certaine discontinuité, méritent le nom de stades. On les rencontre chez I'enfant à l'âge de 6 à 7 ans, 9 à 9,6 ans, 11 ans, 13 ans et 15 ans. Le dkveloppement complet exprimé par le 〈pattern〉 electrographique de l'adolescent de 15 ans se caractérise par une différenciation, systématisation, stabilisation et localisation des activités éklectriques cérébrales. II existe en outre une correspondance entre cette conception du développement, baske sur l'analyse d'examens Clectro‐enckphalographiques en série longitudinale et celle de Piaget et Inhelder, basée sur des tests psychologiques des fonctions cognitives: conception du développement sous forme d'une succession de paliers d'équilibre d'extension toujours plus large et de mobilité toujours plus grande en même temps que de stabilité croissante. Enfin, il existe par ailleurs une concordance entre la chronologie des stades du développement électro‐physiologique et celle du développement des fonctions cognitives. (shrink)

We are purposive agents; but we—adult humans in a broadly modern world—are more than that. We are reflective about our motivation. We form prior plans and policies that organize our activity over time. And we see ourselves as agents who persist over time and who begin, develop, and then complete temporally extended activities and projects. Any reasonably complete theory of human action will need in some way to advert to this trio of features—to our reflectiveness, our planfulness, and our conception (...) of our agency as temporally extended. These are, further, features that have great significance for the kinds of lives we can live. For these two reasons I will say that these are among the core features of human agency. A theory of human action needs to say what these core features consist in and how they are related to each other. And such a theory needs also to clarify the relation between these core features of our agency and the possibility that we are fully embedded in an event causal order. (shrink)

Advance care planning is a process that encourages people to identify their values, to reflect upon the meanings and consequences of serious illness, to define goals and preferences for future medical treatment and care, and to discuss these goals with family and health-care providers. Advance care planning is especially important for those who are chronically ill, as patients and their families face a variety of complex healthcare decisions. Participating in advance care planning has been associated with improved outcomes; yet, despite (...) over 25 years of public awareness campaigns, research, and interventions developed to increase participation, advance care planning completion rates for people with chronic illnesses are no different than those in the general public (approximately 25%). Advance care planning has traditionally used an individualistic approach to autonomy, which puts forward an understanding of agents as independent, rational and self-interested persons. Because this individualistic approach has been largely unsuccessful in improving advance care planning uptake, a re-examination of the philosophical underpinnings of this practice and an exploration of alternative frameworks is warranted. In offering this exploration, we briefly outline two current perspectives on autonomy: the individualistic view and the relational view as articulated by feminist philosophers. Using a critical examination of the theoretical and empirical work on this topic, we argue that the individualistic view of autonomy does not sufficiently capture the relational and social complexities of the decision-making process of advance care planning. To offer a counterpoint, we examine the relational view of autonomy and suggest that this perspective is better aligned with the process of advance care planning. Specifically, we demonstrate that a relational model of autonomy is well suited to exploring advance care planning for four main reasons: (1) it recognizes the importance of relationships, (2) it reflects the fluctuating nature of autonomy in chronic illness, (3) it recognizes vulnerability, and (4) it is consonant with empirical work examining the advance care planning process. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to give an account and a rational reconstruction of the heuristic advice provided by Aristotle in the Topics and Prior Analytics in regard to the difficulty or ease of strategic planning in the context of a dialectical dialogue. The general idea is that a Questioner can foresee what his refutational syllogism would have to look like given the character of the thesis defended by the Answerer, and therefore plan accordingly. A rational reconstruction (...) of this advice will be attempted from three perspectives: strategic planning based on the acceptability of Answerer’s thesis, strategic planning based on the predicational form of the thesis, strategic planning based on the logical form of the thesis. In addition, we will provide an illustration of the potential of this heuristic advice as we apply it to the interpretation of a fragment from Plato, presuming that, in a similar way, a reading of this kind might be more generally applicable in the interpretation of the Platonic dialogues. (shrink)

The term “time-plan” is introduced in the article to sum up the diversity of temporal processes described by Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944) in the frameworkof the general Planmässigkeit of nature. Although Uexküll hardly had any connections with his contemporary philosophies of time, the theme of the subjectivetimes and timing of the organisms forms an essential part of his umwelt theory. As an alternative to the dominance of evolutionary time in biological discussions, Uexküll took perceptual and developmental times of (...) organisms as his natural scientific priorities. While discussing the characteristics of the latter, Uexküll departs from an epigenetic position. Discussion about perceptual time entails detecting the primary units of time (moments) as well as how the succession of moments results in the perception of movement. The last part of the article will explicate the significance of the “time plan” concept for biophilosophical discussions. It is suggested that the bioethical question rising from Uexküll’s works may take the following form: do other biological subjects besides humans have a right to their own timing? (shrink)

When information grows abundant, attention becomes a scarce resource. As a result, agents must plan wisely how to allocate their attention in order to achieve epistemic efficiency. Here, we present a framework for multi-agent epistemic planning with attention, based on Dynamic Epistemic Logic. We identify the framework as a fragment of standard DEL, and consider its plan existence problem. While it is undecidable in the general case, we show that when attention is required for learning, all instances (...) of the problem are decidable. (shrink)

We present a new model of skilled performance in geometry proof problem solving called the Diagram Configuration model (DC). While previous models plan proofs in a step‐by‐step fashion, we observed that experts plan at a more abstract level: They focus on the key steps and skip the less important ones. DC models this abstract planning behavior by parsing geometry problem diagrams into perceptual chunks, called diagram configurations, which cue relevant schematic knowledge. We provide verbal protocol evidence that DC's (...) schemas correspond with the step‐skipping inferences experts make in their initial planning. We compare DC with other models of geometry expertise and then, in the final section, we discuss more general implications of our research. DC's reasoning has important similarities with Larkin's (1988) display‐based reasoning approach and Johnson‐Laird's (1983) mental model approach. DC's perceptually based schemas are a step towards a unified explanation of (1) experts' superior problem‐solving effectiveness, (2) experts' superior problem‐state memory, and (3) experts' ability, in certain domains, to solve relatively simple problems by pure forward inferencing. We also argue that the particular and efficient knowledge organization of DC challenges current theories of skill acquisition as it presents an end‐state of learning that is difficult to explain within such theories. Finally, we discuss the implications of DC for geometry instruction. (shrink)

This paper argues that the “Canberra Plan” picture of physicalistic reduction of mind--a picture shared by both its proponents and opponents, philosophers as diverse as David Armstrong, David Chalmers Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Joe Levine and David Lewis--neglects ground (Fine, 2001, 2012). To the extent that the point of view endorsed by the Canberra Plan has an account of the physical/functional ground of mind at all, it is in one version trivial and in another version implausible. In its (...) most general form, the point of view of the Canberra Plan is committed to unacceptably treating indexical or name-related facts as part of the ultimate physical/functional ground of the mental. (shrink)

The paper explores certain phenomena which arise in stories, conversations, and human activity in general when the plans of two individuals are formed and carried out in an interactive situation. A notation system for representing interacting plans is introduced and applied in the analysis of a small portion of “Hansel and Gretel.” The analysis illustrates how a single actor plan can be modified by the needs of cooperative interaction with others and how cooperative interactive episodes can be transformed (...) and used deceptively by one party in achieving his or her own covert goals. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the Canberra Plan is ill-equipped to offer a satisfactory theory of gender. Insofar as the Canberra Plan aims to provide a general and unified approach to philosophical theorising, this is a significant problem. I argue that this deficit in their method stems from the robust role assigned to pre-theoretical beliefs in constructing philosophical analyses. I utilise a critical conception of ideology to explain why our pre-theoretic beliefs about certain social kinds are (...) likely to deliver politically dubious metaphysics of the social world. The first half of the paper is dedicated to exercising this theoretical shortcoming. In the second half, I suggest a way in which the Canberra Plan can address and rectify this problem, with a view to maintaining the theoretical viability of the Canberra Plan with respect to politically important concepts. (shrink)

This article deals primarily with the examination of two key and exegetically demanding expressions in the text of the General Epistle of James, which relate to fundamental biblical principles on planning the future of the believer and reconciling human life with God’s will expressed in Holy Scripture. The first one is the hapax legomenon Ἄγε νῦν, the significance of which is closely related to updating of the affected principles with practice. The second term is ποιήσοµεν, which, in most translations, (...) translates as ‘remain’ and does not reflect the core idea of the examined verse. We prove that a more authentic and appropriate translation is ‘work’. Our aim was to find out what new interpretive possibilities the original biblical text offers. The constitutive starting point for research is Novum Testamentum Graecum – Editio Critica Maior. We then compared these texts with the Slovak Ecumenical Bible. The method of our exegetical work was not primarily comparison, but a linguistic analysis and historical-critical exegesis, the result of which is a completely new proposal for the translation of the scrutinised texts. Auxiliary materials were the most important patristic and exegetical commentaries. In conclusion, we state that the analysis made it possible to find a new translation of the researched text, which can really contribute to the improvement of further review and publication of the ecumenical translation of the Bible into various languages.Contribution: The article examines the source Greek biblical text of James 4:13–15 and reveals a new interpretation of it. This interpretation brings a new, biblical light into the field of planning, which is one of the most current topics nowadays. With its content and especially its conclusions, it contributes to the goals of this theological journal, the subject of which is also the research of Greek biblical manuscripts. (shrink)

This article explores the relevance of the Theory of Planned Behavior to whistleblowing research, and considers whether its widely tested validity as a model of the link between attitudes, intention, and behavior might make it an appropriate candidate for a general theory to account for whistleblowing. This proposition is developed through an empirical test of the theory's predictive validity for whistleblowing intentions. Using a sample of 296 Korean police officers, the analysis showed that attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral (...) control all had significantly positive main effects on internal whistleblowing intentions, but for external whistleblowing intentions only subjective norm was significant. The implications of these findings for applying the Theory of Planned Behavior to whistleblowing research are discussed. (shrink)

Planning organizes our actions and conditions our effective-ness. To understand this philosophical hint better, the author investigates and juxtaposes two important accounts in action theory. He discusses the concept of a plan proposed by Tadeusz Kotarbiński in his praxiology (theory of efcient action), and the so called “planning theory of intention” by Michael E. Bratman. The conceptual meeting of these two proposals helps to remove aws in Kotarbiński’s action theory, it also shows the way, in which we can enrich (...) the idea of plans in the frame-work of intentions. Generally, praxiology occurs to be still an important perspective in action theory, which particularly shows how we can improve our understanding of planning when confronted with infuentialcontemporary accounts. (shrink)

Scott Shapiro’s theory that law is a social plan is helpful in seeing law essentially as a tool of human creation and as such is sympathetic to understanding law in terms of the social functions it performs, a method I argue for elsewhere. I focus here on two problems with the theory as presented. The planning theory does not adequately explain the persistence of law beyond the utility of those who implement it. Generally, plans can cease to exist as (...) soon as those engaged in them have no more use for them. Laws however, must usually be declared invalid or otherwise nullified for them to have no further effect. Shapiro’s use of self-certification to explain how law is differentiated from other forms of social planning is ad hoc and threatens circularity when he admits it to be a matter of degree. Both of these issues can be better solved by seeing law as an institutionalised abstract artefact, with a greater emphasis upon the nature of institutions doing much of the work done by the idea of planning. (shrink)

Drawing on models of the interaction order, we describe how planning is an inherently social activity. We argue that planning as a practice involves five core elements: mirroring, identifying, coordinating, timing, and surmounting. Specifically, planning depends on (1) a realization of likely responses of others, (2) a recognition of communal understandings, grounded in local cultures, (3) a commitment to collaborative engagements with allies, (4) an adjustment to temporal sequences involving the use of “in time” strategies and tactics, and (5) an (...) ability to overcome or avoid obstacles and blocking moves set by competitors and adversaries. Planning is evident in micro-, meso-, or macro-level domains. To demonstrate how planning is a social accomplishment, we analyze three distinct ethnographic sites: the world of competitive chess, dependent on the micro-interactions of two competitors; the meso-level process of homebuying, requiring the aid of real estate agents as allies; and macro-level structures in directing social movement activism in a contentious action field. Planning extends beyond cognitive achievement and is central to a sociology of the future. (shrink)

Despite the growing interest in developing a micro-level understanding of strategy practices, there are few studies focusing on the official textual expression of these practices in the form of strategic plans. Using a large corpus of strategic plans from public and third sector organizations, this article examines the particular features of the strategic plan genre of communication. This corpus is systematically compared with nine other corpora derived from the same general domain or having similar expected characteristics. Our analysis (...) combines linguistic analysis with an analysis of the moves characteristic of the genre. The article seeks to advance a genre-based view of strategy practices to study the professional and institutional practices of strategists. (shrink)

Within the planning discourse two poles have materialised over the last decades: a participatory ideal guided by substantive rationality, opposed to an algorithmic governmentality subordinated to instrumental reason. This rift within socialist thought is also observable when it comes to the discovery of needs. The paper understands this discovery procedure primarily as a forecasting problem and demonstrates how many authors dedicated to a participatory planning process call for consumers to write down their desires in the form of wish lists. As (...) a response to this epistemically questionable discovery procedure, the state of the art in capitalist demand-forecasting at enterprises like Amazon is presented, where machine-learning algorithms excel at modelling interrelated time series on a global level by extrapolating demand patterns in real-time. The paper closes with a proposal to reconfigure this predictive apparatus for socialist ends and raises questions concerned with the political implications of centralising decision-making in black-box algorithms. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with those elements of planning knowledge that are common to both understanding someone else's plan and creating a plan for one's own use. This planning knowledge can be divided into two bodies: Knowledge about the world, and knowledge about the planning process itself. Our interest here is primarily with the latter corpus. The central thesis is that much of the knowledge about the planning process itself can be formulated in terms of higher‐level goals and (...) plans called meta‐goals and meta‐plans. These entities can then be used by the same understanding and planning mechanisms that process ordinary goals and plans. However, the meta‐planning knowledge now enables these mechanisms to handle much more complicated situations in a uniform manner.Systems based on meta‐planning would have a number of advantages over existing problem solving and understanding systems. The same knowledge could be shared by both a planner and understander, and both would be able to handle complex situations elegantly. In addition, in planning, the use of meta‐planning has several advantages over more traditional methods involving constraints or critics. Meta‐planning allows the full power of a problem solver to be applied to situations that are generally amenable only to special purpose processing. In addition, meta‐planning facilitates the representation of some situations that are difficult to express otherwise. We have begun to introduce meta‐planning knowledge into two systems: PAM, a story understanding program, and PANDORA, a problem solving and plannin̈g system. (shrink)