Chow's endorsement of a limited role for null hypothesis significance testing is a needed corrective of research malpractice, but his decision to place this procedure in a hypothetico-deductive framework of Popperian cast is unwise. Various failures of this version of the hypothetico-deductive method have negative implications for Chow's treatment of significance testing, meta-analysis, and theory evaluation.

SummaryThe central thesis advocated by the author is that the so‐called hermeneutic method is actually the same as the hypothetico‐deductive method applied to materials that are “meaningful” . Five different interpretations of the role of the stranger in Ibsens “Peer Gynt” are discussed and shown to be examples of how interpretation‐hypotheses can be judged by confronting them with the data . The conclusion drawn from the analysis is this: there is no fundamental methodological difference between natural sciences and (...) humanities. (shrink)

After presenting the major objections raised against standard formulations of the H-D method of theory testing, I identify what seems to be an important element of truth underlying the method. I then draw upon this element in an effort to develop a plausible formulation of the H-D method which avoids the various objections.

세상에는 대부분 사람들이 믿는 통념이지만 실은 근거 없는 그런 견해도 있다. 우리나라 역사에 대해서도 근거 없이 믿고 있는 잘못된 신념들이 있다. 철학자인 나로서는 그런 신념을 만나면 먼저 개념(용법)분석을 시도한다. 분석 도구는 수학(연립방정식의 결정-과소결정(부정)-과잉결정(불능)), 자연과학(가설연역방법), 논리학(모순관계, 포함관계) 이다. 분석한 개념은 “주(炷: 심지)”와 “산(蒜: 달래)”, 단군의 “수(壽)”, 주몽의 아버지인 “해모수”와 “단군”의 용법, “해모수”의 세 가지 용법, “신기대보(神器大寶)” 등이다. 이 개념들을 분석해 보면 고대 한국 왕들이 장생불사(長生不死)의 철학을 믿었다는 것을 알 수 있다. 역사기록에 등장하는 용어를 그 당대 용법으로 이해하려면 엄격한 학문연구방법이 필요하다. 역사를 (...) 연구할 때 좀 더 치밀한 연구방법을 고민해야 한다. (shrink)

Hypothetico-deductive (H-D) confirmation builds on the idea that confirming evidence consists of successful predictions that deductively follow from the hypothesis under test. This article reviews scope, history and recent development of the venerable H-D account: First, we motivate the approach and clarify its relationship to Bayesian confirmation theory. Second, we explain and discuss the tacking paradoxes which exploit the fact that H-D confirmation gives no account of evidential relevance. Third, we review several recent proposals that aim at a (...) sounder and more comprehensive formulation of H-D confirmation. Finally, we conclude that the reputation of hypothetico-deductive confirmation as outdated and hopeless is undeserved: not only can the technical problems be addressed satisfactorily, the hypothetico-deductive method is also highly relevant for scientific practice. (shrink)

Many philosophers have claimed that Bayesianism can provide a simple justification for hypothetico-deductive inference, long regarded as a cornerstone of the scientific method. Following up a remark of van Fraassen, we analyze a problem for the putative Bayesian justification of H-D inference in the case where what we learn from observation is logically stronger than what our theory implies. Firstly, we demonstrate that in such cases the simple Bayesian justification does not necessarily apply. Secondly, we identify a set (...) of sufficient conditions for the mismatch in logical strength to be justifiably ignored as a "harmless idealization''. Thirdly, we argue, based upon scientific examples, that the pattern of H-D inference of which there is a ready Bayesian justification is only rarely the pattern that one actually finds at work in science. Whatever the other virtues of Bayesianism, the idea that it yields a simple justification of a pervasive pattern of scientific inference appears to have been oversold. (shrink)

Three related intuitions are explicated in this paper. The first is the idea that there must be some kind of probabilistic version of the HD-method, a 'Hypothetico-Probabilistic method', in terms of something like probabilistic consequences, instead of deductive consequences. According to the second intuition, the comparative application of this method should also be functional for some probabilistic kind of empirical progress, and according to the third intuition this should be functional for something like probabilistic truth approximation. In all (...) three cases, the guiding idea is to explicate these intuitions by explicating the crucial notions as appropriate 'concretizations' of their deductive analogs, being 'idealizations'. It turns out that the comparative version of the proposed HP-method amounts to the likelihood comparison method applied to the cumulated evidence. This method turns out to be not only functional for probabilistic empirical progress but also for probabilistic truth approximation. The latter is based on a probabilistic threshold theorem constituting for this reason the analog of the deductive success theorem. (shrink)

Having been neglected or maligned for most of this century, Newton's method of 'deduction from the phenomena' has recently attracted renewed attention and support. John Norton, for example, has argued that this method has been applied with notable success in a variety of cases in the history of physics and that this explains why the massive underdetermination of theory by evidence, seemingly entailed by hypothetico-deductive methods, is invisible to working physicists. This paper, through a detailed analysis of (...) Newton's deduction of one particular 'proposition' in optics 'from the phenomena', gives a clearer account than hitherto of the method - highlighting the fact that it is really one of deduction from the phenomena plus 'background knowledge'. It argues, that, although the method has certain heuristic virtues, examination of its putative accreditational strengths reveals a range of important problems that its defenders have yet adequately to address. (shrink)

Medical diagnosis has been traditionally recognized as a privileged field of application for so called probabilistic induction. Consequently, the Bayesian theorem, which mathematically formalizes this form of inference, has been seen as the most adequate tool for quantifying the uncertainty surrounding the diagnosis by providing probabilities of different diagnostic hypotheses, given symptomatic or laboratory data. On the other side, it has also been remarked that differential diagnosis rather works by exclusion, e.g. by modus tollens, i.e. deductively. By drawing on a (...) case history, this paper aims at clarifying some points on the issue. Namely: 1) Medical diagnosis does not represent, strictly speaking, a form of induction, but a type, of what in Peircean terms should be called ‘abduction’ (identifying a case as the token of a specific type); 2) in performing the single diagnostic steps, however, different inferential methods are used for both inductive and deductive nature: modus tollens, hypothetical-deductive method, abduction; 3) Bayes’ theorem is a probabilized form of abduction which uses mathematics in order to justify the degree of confidence which can be entertained on a hypothesis given the available evidence; 4) although theoretically irreconcilable, in practice, both the hypothetical- deductive method and the Bayesian one, are used in the same diagnosis with no serious compromise for its correctness; 5) Medical diagnosis, especially differential diagnosis, also uses a kind of “probabilistic modus tollens”, in that, signs (symptoms or laboratory data) are taken as strong evidence for a given hypothesis not to be true: the focus is not on hypothesis confirmation, but instead on its refutation [Pr (¬ H/E1, E2, …, En)]. Especially at the beginning of a complicated case, odds are between the hypothesis that is potentially being excluded and a vague “other”. This procedure has the advantage of providing a clue of what evidence to look for and to eventually reduce the set of candidate hypotheses if conclusive negative evidence is found. 6) Bayes’ theorem in the hypothesis-confirmation form can more faithfully, although idealistically, represent the medical diagnosis when the diagnostic itinerary has come to a reduced set of plausible hypotheses after a process of progressive elimination of candidate hypotheses; 7) Bayes’ theorem is however indispensable in the case of litigation in order to assess doctor’s responsibility for medical error by taking into account the weight of the evidence at his disposal. (shrink)

Many of the methods commonly used to research mathematical practice, such as analyses of historical episodes or individual cases, are particularly well-suited to generating causal hypotheses, but less well-suited to testing causal hypotheses. In this paper we reflect on the contribution that the so-called hypothetico-deductive method, with a particular focus on experimental studies, can make to our understanding of mathematical practice. By way of illustration, we report an experiment that investigated how mathematicians attribute aesthetic properties to mathematical (...) proofs. We demonstrate that perceptions of the aesthetic properties of mathematical proofs are, in some cases at least, subject to social influence. Specifically, we show that mathematicians’ aesthetic judgements tend to conform to the judgements made by others. Pedagogical implications are discussed. (shrink)

Kant’s transcendental philosophy of Kant is the metaphysics of possible experience related to the solution of the [semantic] problem set in his famous letter to M. Hertz (02.21.1772): “What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call 'representation' to the object?” There are two possible ways to solve it: empiricism and apriorism, – and Kant chooses the second of them, thus making his “Copernican Revolution”. In the Preface to the 2nd ed. Critique Kant correlates his (...) Copernican turn/revolution with "altered method of our way of thinking [in metaphysics]" [BXVIII] and considers it as an analogue of the hypothetico-deductive scientific method of Copernicus – Galileo – Newton. The analysis of structure of the Copernican Revolution shows that it is possible to pick out two vectors: the empirical (from the thing-in-itself to representations) and the noumenal ones (from the transcendental unity of apperception [or transcendental object] to objects of experience). The introduction of an a priori vector (resp. a priori forms) means that Kant's conception is not empirical, but Kant’s keeping empirical vector says that it is compatible with empirical realism [A370–1]. Thus, Kantian transcendentalism is a synthesis of realism (basic level) and transcendental idealism (as a meta-level superstructure above it), whose task is to find out and analyze the transcendental conditions [possibility] of our knowledge of objects. (shrink)

We owe most scientific knowledge to methods of inquiry that are never formally analyzed. The analysis of behavior does not call for hypothetico-deductive methods. Statistics, taught in lieu of scientific method, is incompatible with major features of much laboratory research. Squeezing significance out of ambiguous data discourages the more promising step of scrapping the experiment and starting again. As a consequence, psychologists have taken flight from the laboratory. They have fled to Real People and the human (...) interest of “real life,” to Mathematical Models and the elegance of symbolic treatments, to the Inner Man and the explanatory preoccupation with inferred internal mechanisms, and to Laymanship and its appeal to “common sense.” An experimental analysis provides an alternative to these divertissements.The “theories” to which objection is raised here are not the basic assumptions essential to any scientific activity or statements that are not yet facts, but rather explanations which appeal to events taking place somewhere else, at some other level of observation, described in different terms, and measured, if at all, in different dimensions. Three types of learning theories satisfy this definition: physiological theories attempting to reduce behavior to events in the nervous system; mentalistic theories appealing to inferred inner events; and theories of the Conceptual Nervous System offered as explanatory models of behavior. It would be foolhardy to deny the achievements of such theories in the history of science. The question of whether they are necessary, however, has other implications.Experimental material in three areas illustrates the function of theory more concretely. Alternatives to behavior ratios, excitatory potentials, and so on demonstrate the utility of rate or probability of response as the basic datum in learning. Functional relations between behavior and environmental variables provide an account of why learning occurs. Activities such as preferring, choosing, discriminating, and matching can be dealt with solely in terms of behavior, without referring to processes in another dimensional system. The experiments are not offered as demonstrating that theories are not necessary but to suggest an alternative. Theory is possible in another sense. Beyond the collection of uniform relationships lies the need for a formal representation of the data reduced to a minimal number of terms. A theoretical construction may yield greater generality than any assemblage of facts; such a construction will not refer to another dimensional system. (shrink)

This is an introductory overview of theories of scientific method.

The definition of Induction in the "topic" is but a description of the prearistotelian process of generalisation. - The genuine aristotelian theory of induction does not concern general propositions but the objectconstruction; it tries to give a logical solution to the theory of anamnesis. - The inductive syllogism is not a summative induction but a suggestion that the relation of extensions of classes is the only criterion for the projectibility of known cases on unknown. - The stoics accept contraposition as (...) the only form of scientific inference while the epicureans introduce a pure empirical criterion for sound general propositions. Both theories however, suggest an identification of the problem of induction with the problem of possibility. - Philoponos is the first author to give a classification of sciences from a methodological point of view. He rejects pure induction and proposes the hypothetico - deductive Method as a solution of the problem of induction. (shrink)

In this study of Auguste Comte's philosophy of science, an attempt is made to explicate his views on such methodological issues as explanation, prediction, induction and hypothesis. Comte's efforts to resolve the dual problems of demarcation and meaning led to the enunciation of principles of verifiability and predictability. Comte's hypothetico-deductive method is seen to permit conjectures dealing with unobservable entities.

One of the distinctive features of George Smith’s work on celestial mechanics is his emphasis on the role of what he calls “second-order phenomena” in the production of high-quality evidence. On Smith’s view, these gaps between theoretical predictions and observations can, under certain circumstances, be a source of evidence far stronger than that achievable through the hypothetico-deductive method. The practice of examining gaps between predictions and observations for the purposes of discovery and testing is commonplace in certain sciences (...) such as seismology, and has played an important role in their development. I use the term reasoning from residuals as a general term for this practice. I think it is worth investigating examples of this set of practices from the history of science, in order to understand the different ways in which reasoning from residuals is done, under what situations it is done, and how it contributes to the growth of knowledge in certain sciences. (shrink)

One way to show that text interpretation can be treated as a scientific problem is to show that the standards that are currently used in the natural sciences when dealing with problems not involving meaningful material can also be successfully employed in the case of text interpretation. These standards involve intersubjective intelligibility, testability with the use of evidence, rational argumentation, and making methodological decisions aiming at the attainment of truth, accuracy, simplicity and other epistemic values. In the case of text (...) interpretation—despite the fact that we deal with meaningful material—hypotheses can be formulated, consequences can be drawn by deduction, and these can be tested against empirical data. This claim is substantiated by the provision of an example of a scientific text. (shrink)

The basis of science is the hypothetico-deductive method and the recording of experiments in sufficient detail to enable reproducibility. We report the development of Robot Scientist "Adam," which advances the automation of both. Adam has autonomously generated functional genomics hypotheses about the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae and experimentally tested these hypotheses by using laboratory automation. We have confirmed Adam's conclusions through manual experiments. To describe Adam's research, we have developed an ontology and logical language. The resulting formalization involves over (...) 10,000 different research units in a nested treelike structure, 10 levels deep, that relates the 6.6 million biomass measurements to their logical description. This formalization describes how a machine contributed to scientific knowledge. (shrink)

There are three ways in which bridges may be built between science and theology: spirituality, methodology, and content. Spirituality is the power which drives each to address reality and the expectations with which each approaches the pursuit of truth. The methodology of science is summarized in terms of three activities: taxonomy; the hypothetico‐deductive cycle; derivative technology. The content of science, especially with respect to the phenomena of givenness, connectedness and openness in the life sciences, is correlated with theological (...) constructs. Attention is drawn to the role of the double helix in biology and a possible parallel is proposed to the function of the icon in religion and theology. (shrink)

When an empirical prediction E of hypothesis H is observed to be true, such observation is said to confirm, i.e., support (although not prove) the truth of the hypothesis. But why? What justifies the claim that such evidence supports the hypothesis? The widely accepted answer is that it is justified by induction. More specifically, it is commonly held that the following argument, (1) If H then E; (2) E; (3) Therefore, (probably) H (here referred to as ‘hypothetico-deductive confirmation (...) argument’), is inductively strong. Yet this argument looks nothing like an inductive generalization, i.e., it does not seem inductive in the term’s traditional, enumerative sense. If anything, it has the form of the fallacy of affirming the consequent. This paper aims to solve this puzzle. True, in recent decades, ‘induction’ has been sometimes used more broadly to encompass any non-deductive, i.e., ampliative, argument. Applying Bayesian confirmation theory has famously demonstrated that hypothetico-deductive confirmation is indeed inductive in this broader, ampliative sense. Nonetheless, it will be argued here that, despite appearance, hypothetico-deductive confirmation can also be recast as enumerative induction. Hence, by being enumeratively inductive, the scientific method of hypothetico-deductive confirmation is justified through this traditional, more restrictive type of induction rather than merely by ampliative induction. (shrink)

Williamson argues for the contention that substructural logics are ‘ill-suited to acting as background logics for science’. That contention, if true, would be very important, but it is refutable, given what is already known about certain substructural logics. Classical Core Logic is a substructural logic, for it eschews the structural rules of Thinning and Cut and has Reflexivity as its only structural rule. Yet it suffices for classical mathematics, and it furnishes all the proofs and disproofs one needs for the (...) hypothetico-deductive method in science. We explain exactly what Classical Core Logic is, why it is a substructural logic par excellence, and what the basic requirements would be for a logic to be ‘suited to acting as [a] background logic for science’. We also explain how Classical Core Logic meets all these requirements. We end by examining Williamson’s argument in order to expose where its error lies. (shrink)

We examine the contrast between the “Newtonian style” and the Cartesian, hypothetico-deductive method in order to expand on George Smith's account of working hypotheses and theory-mediation. We stress the pivotal role of theory-mediation in turning experience into well-defined phenomena and introduce the complementary notions of conditional and independent evidence. Conditional evidence is evidence in favor of an hypothesis that is based on phenomena that would not be constituted as phenomena without the hypothesis in question. Direct evidence is evidence (...) based on phenomena that are independently available. We use the distinction to interrogate the role of mathematical representation as the most basic constitutive posit of the Newtonian style, as the working hypothesis that enables all further theory-mediation. Our primary examples are Newton's struggles with motion in fluids and his defense of the Laws of Motion. (shrink)

The claims of randomized controlled trials to be the gold standard rest on the fact that the ideal RCT is a deductive method: if the assumptions of the test are met, a positive result implies the appropriate causal conclusion. This is a feature that RCTs share with a variety of other methods, which thus have equal claim to being a gold standard. This article describes some of these other deductive methods and also some useful non-deductive (...) methods, including the hypothetico-deductive method. It argues that with all deductive methods, the benefit that the conclusions follow deductively in the ideal case comes with a great cost: narrowness of scope. This is an instance of the familiar trade-off between internal and external validity. RCTs have high internal validity but the formal methodology puts severe constraints on the assumptions a target population must meet to justify exporting a conclusion from the test population to the target. The article reviews one such set of assumptions to show the kind of knowledge required. The overall conclusion is that to draw causal inferences about a target population, which method is best depends case-by-case on what background knowledge we have or can come to obtain. There is no gold standard. (shrink)

Argumentations are at the heart of the deductive and the hypothetico-deductive methods, which are involved in attempts to reduce currently open problems to problems already solved. These two methods span the entire spectrum of problem-oriented reasoning from the simplest and most practical to the most complex and most theoretical, thereby uniting all objective thought whether ancient or contemporary, whether humanistic or scientific, whether normative or descriptive, whether concrete or abstract. Analysis, synthesis, evaluation, and function of (...) argumentations are described. Perennial philosophic problems, epistemic and ontic, related to argumentations are put in perspective. So much of what has been regarded as logic is seen to be involved in the study of argumentations that logic may be usefully defined as the systematic study of argumentations, which is virtually identical to the quest of objective understanding of objectivity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 479 Saint Thomas au XXe siecle: Actes du colloque du Centenaire de la "Revue thomiste." Paris: Saint-Paul, 1994. Pp. 475 (paper). In March of 1993 the Revue thomiste marked its centenary by sponsoring a three-day colloquium at the lnstitut Catholique of Toulouse on "St. Thomas in the 20th century." The commemoration resumed the following month with a conference at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland), site of the (...) journal's foundation. This volume assembles the papers presented at the Toulouse colloquium and a selection of those read in Fribourg. All of the contributions are in French. The volume opens with a letter (dated 11 March 1993) that His Holiness John-Paul II addressed to the Prior Provincial of the Toulouse Dominicans, under whose aegis the Revue thomiste is now published. The Pope pays tribute to the "lucid discernment" that has guided this journal in a "critical and constructive reflection on the major problems of our epoch, assuring it a place of choice in Catholic intellectual life" (p. 7). Next follows an editorial introduction by Serge-Thomas Bonino, O.P., who examines the pertinence of the Revue's motto vetera novis augere. Acknowledging that the Thomistic revival of this century has largely proven to be unsuccessful, to judge by the extent of its cultural impact, he concludes nevertheless that this failure may pave the way for an eventual renewal, on condition that the past achievements and deficiencies of Thomism come to be adequately understood. The present volume thus aims to assess the efforts of Francophone philosophers and theologians to advance the thought of Thomas Aquinas; it thereby provides us with a valuable status quaestionis, enabling Aquinas's contemporary disciples to measure better the challenge that lies before them. The first of the volume's three sections is devoted to historical studies on the Revue thomiste's role in the formation of contemporary Neo-Thomism and its contribution to some of the important theological controversies in the first half of this century. Francesco Baretta narrates the vicissitudes of the journal's inception and first years (1893-1905). Not until the establishment in 1907 of the Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques by members of the Dominican order's Paris province (the reasons that motivated the foundation of a rival journal are taken up by Andre Duval in a paper wholly devoted to this topic [pp. 96108 ]) did the Revue thomi~te come to be closely affiliated with the Toulouse province. Prior to this time it enjoyed the active collaboration of the order's three French provinces: Lyon, Paris, and Toulouse. Inspired by the recently promulgated Aeterni Patris (1879), the founders of the Revue thomiste sought to implement the encyclical's recommendation that the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas be brought into fruitful dialogue with modern science. Yet in so doing the Revue thomiste encountered serious obstacles, both theoretical and practical. Theoretically, the journal's chief collaborators were unable to recognize the originality of the hypothetico-deductive method and thus persisted 480 BOOK REVIEWS in thematizing modem science according to the epistemological categories of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Practically, they were unable (some exceptions aside) to enlist the support of contributors competent in both experimental science and scholastic thought. Thomism's engagement with modernity is taken up anew by Henry Donneaud, who charts the Revue thomiste's role in the nascent modernist crisis. During this period (1900-1908) the journal's rapprochement with the physical sciences attenuated, giving way to a preoccupation with modernism and its attendant controversies: the evolution of Catholic dogmas, the nature and role of apologetics, etc. Far from presenting a united front in the face of these theological developments, the principal collaborators of the Revue thomiste diverged in the fundamental orientation of their responses. Gradually, two very different Thomisms emerged: one, markedly conservative, refused any compromise with the new trends, condemning them in toto by appeal to a literalist, a-historical reading of the master; the other, progressive, sought to confront the modernists on their own terrain by drawing on the resources of a Thomistic doctrine open to amendment. After a period of internal strife the latter orientation became the more dominant of the two. The very... (shrink)

Who’s the greatest of them all? A non-technical explication of Newton’s method in the Principia accompanied by some philosophical reflections In this essay, I seek to explicate the methodology which Newton used in the Principia in a non-technical way. Close attention will be paid to some important results in Books I and III of the Principia and to Newton’s argument for universal gravitation. Based on their discussion, Newton’s key inferential strategies will be brought to the fore. In addition, it will (...) be explained how Newton’s methodology differed from a standard hypothetico-deductive method. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:104 COMMENTARY ON PROFESSOR TWEYMAN ' S 'HUME ON EVIL' Philo concludes his long and celebrated debate with Cleanthes on the problem of evil (Parts X and Xl of Hume's Dialogues) with the assertion that the "true conclusion" to be drawn from the "mixed phenomena" in the world is that "the original source" of whatever order we find in the world is "indifferent" to matters of good and evil. (...) From what Philo says immediately thereafter it is clear that by the phrase "The true conclusion is..." he does not mean 'The truth is...' but rather something like 'The conclusion best supported by the available evidence is....' (D 212) Now according to both Nelson Pike and Stanley Tweyman, the claim made by Philo in these passages involves him in a shift or departure from the procedure he adopted in earlier dialogues when he examined the design argument set forth by Cleanthes. It is claimed that whereas in the earlier dialogues Philo emphatically professed a sceptical outlook — "the view requiring that one embrace no metaphysical position of one's own" (to quote Nelson Pike ) — in the quoted passage he seems to abandon this scepticism in favor of embracing what amounts to being a metaphysical position in natural theology. Pike thinks that this alleged shift is only an apparent one, that the central import of these passages is sceptical rather than metaphysical, and that here, as elsewhere in the earlier dialogues, Philo's sole purpose in offering a more plausible counter-hypothesis is to show that Cleanthes' hypothesis is false. Tweyman, on the other hand, argues that the shift is a very real one and that Hume does indeed "intend Philo's conclusion in Part XI to be a truth in natural theology [.]... Philo is 105 not arguing as a sceptic; rather he is employing the hypothetico-deductive method for testing Cleanthes' 2 hypothesis. " Let me say at once that I agree with Tweyman, as against Pike, that in these passages Philo does claim to put forward a truth Jji natural theology, and I also agree with just about everything that Tweyman says in his paper concerning the proper interpretation of Philo's views in Parts X and XI leading up to this conclusion. I follow the lead of those scholars who, at least since Kemp Smith, have argued that Philo's whole purpose in demonstrating such "truths" is to discredit natural theology in the eyes of a true Christian believer by dramatizing the enormous gulf between the very attenuated form of theism ("diaphonous deism" one scholar calls it), which is the most one can hope to get out of Cleanthes' experimental approach to religion, and the claim of Christian theism to which Cleanthes aspires. But I do not accept the view that Philo's claim in these dialogues represents any sort of sudden departure (and certainly not a "fundamental methodological difference") from his critical stance against the design argument in earlier dialogues. What I hope to show below is that not only does this view distort what Philo does in the earlier dialogues, but it also distracts our attention from the true nature of Hume's achievement in Parts X and XI of the Dialogues. (Incidentally, I will assume throughout the sequel that Kemp Smith's identification of Hume with Philo is essentially correct. ) It would indeed be extremely paradoxical, in the face of Philo's famous (or notorious) peroration at the end of Part VIII proclaiming the "complete triumph of the sceptic" in regard to "all religious 106 systems," to raise any doubts about Philo's acceptance of the sceptical import of his own earlier arguments. But this still leaves unsettled the question as to what sort of scepticism it is whose triumph Philo proclaims at this point and whether it is inconsistent with the conclusion he reaches at the end of his discussion of evil. One would have hoped that at this late stage in the scholarship on the Dialogues, if there is one issue on which all of us could agree it is that Philo at no time in the Dialogues takes the (easy) Pyrrhonian line against Cleanthes' "hypothesis of experimental theism." I mention this because at several places... (shrink)

According to the "confrontation model," integrated history and philosophy of science operates like an empirical science. It tests philosophical accounts of science against historical case studies much like other sciences test theory against data. However, the confrontation model's critics object that historical facts can neither support generalizations nor genuinely test philosophical theories. Here I argue that most of the model's defects trace to its usual framing in terms of two problematic accounts of empirical inference: the hypothetico-deductive method and (...) enumerative induction. This framing can be taken to suggest an unprofitable one-off confrontation between particular historical facts and general philosophical theories. I outline more recent accounts of empirical inquiry, which describe an iterative back-and-forth movement between concrete empirical exemplars to their abstract descriptions. Reframed along similar lines, the confrontation model continues to offer both conceptual insight and practical guidance for a naturalized philosophy of science. (shrink)

The article is concerned with the practicalist attempt to "solve" the problem of induction. The point of departure is the concept of counter-induction introduced by Max Black and his refutation of practicalism. If we are not to beg the question whether induction yields knowledge of the future, Max Black asserts, there is a symmetry between induction and counter-induction as methods. The main point of the article is to show that this assertion is false, at least when induction and counter-induction (...) are compared as regards their relations to hypothetico-deductive method. As regards these relations, there is a striking asymmetry. The author tries to establish the following conclusion: A theory can agree with all future data and yet be false because it does not agree with all past data. If we are not to be in a position where our theories are necessarily falsified either by past or future data, we must use induction rather than counter-induction. (shrink)

The work of George Smith has illuminated how Newton’s scientific method, and its use in constructing the theory of universal gravitation, introduced an entirely new sense of what it means for a theory to be supported by evidence. This new sense goes far beyond Newton’s well known dissatisfaction with hypothetico-deductive confirmation, and his preference for conclusions that are derived from empirical premises by means of mathematical laws of motion. It was a sense of empirical success that George was (...) especially well placed to identify and to understand, through his experience as an engineer specializing in failure analysis. For Newton, to understand how well his theory was supported by evidence, he had to anticipate, as far as possible, all the ways in which it might be wrong. This paper explores how Newton's empirical method shaped his thinking about space, time, and the relativity of motion. (shrink)

The goal of evolutionary theory is to (a) specify the general causal structure of evolving systems and (b) analyze evolutionary consequences that are expected to result from the proposed structure of the model systems. Biologists frequently emphasize the hypothetico-deductive method in evolutionary theory. I will show that this method primarily provides a tactical device for (b), while evolutionary synthesis requires a foundation of a unifying conceptual model for (a). Therefore, any successful strategy for a new synthesis requires both (...) a new conceptual insight of evolving systems, and tactical devices for analyzing new specific aspects of the evolutionary process. (shrink)

The evolution of medical reasoning is deeply intertwined with philosophical thought, beginning with Aristotle’s foundational work in deductive logic. Aristotle’s principles significantly influenced early medical practice, shaping the works of Galen and Avicenna, who made empirical observations that expanded clinical knowledge. During the Enlightenment, both inductive reasoning, as advocated by Francis Bacon, and deductive methods, as stressed by René Descartes, significantly advanced medical reasoning. These approaches proved insufficient when it came to handling uncertainty and variability in medical (...) outcomes. Nineteenth-century figures like William Osler advanced a probabilistic understanding of medicine. Karl Popper’s 20th-century hypothetico-deductive method, which introduced the concept of falsifiability and transformed scientific inquiry into a rigorous process of hypothesis testing, is a fundamental aspect of evidence-based medicine (EBM). EBM emerged as the dominant paradigm, combining empirical research, clinical expertise, and statistical inference to guide medical decisions. Looking forward, Bayesian reasoning offers a further refinement in medical reasoning. By incorporating prior knowledge and continuously updating probabilities with new evidence, Bayesianism addresses the limitations of frequentist methods and offers a more dynamic and adaptable framework for clinical decision making. As medical reasoning evolves, understanding this philosophical lineage is essential to navigating the future of patient care, where evidence must be both rigorously tested and individually tailored. (shrink)

Naturalistic Hermeneutics proposes the position of the unity of the scientific method and defends it against the claim to autonomy of the human sciences. Mantzavinos shows how materials that are 'meaningful', more specifically human actions and texts, can be adequately dealt with by the hypothetico-deductive method, the standard method used in the natural sciences. The hermeneutic method is not an alternative method aimed at the understanding and the interpretation of human actions and texts, but it is the same (...) as the hypothetico-deductive method applied to meaningful materials. The central thesis advocated by Mantzavinos is, thus, that there is no fundamental methodological difference between natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities. Advanced students and professionals across philosophy, social and political theory, and the humanities will find this a compelling and controversial book. (shrink)

Argumentations are at the heart of the deductive and the hypothetico-deductive methods, which are involved in attempts to reduce currently open problems to problems already solved. These two methods span the entire spectrum of problem-oriented reasoning from the simplest and most practical to the most complex and most theoretical, thereby uniting all objective thought whether ancient or contemporary, whether humanistic or scientific, whether normative or descriptive, whether concrete or abstract. Analysis, synthesis, evaluation, and function of (...) argumentations are described. Perennial philosophic problems, epistemic and ontic, related to argumentations are put in perspective. So much of what has been regarded as logic is seen to be involved in the study of argumentations that logic may be usefully defined as the systematic study of argumentations, which is virtually identical to the quest of objective understanding of objectivity. -/- KEY WORDS: hypothesis, theorem, argumentation, proof, deduction, premise-conclusion argument, valid, inference, implication, epistemic, ontic, cogent, fallacious, paradox, formal, validation. (shrink)

Copernican questions, 2006 ; It started with Copernicus, 2014 -- Copernican questions. What was Copernicus's revolution? ; What happens when your world changes? ; Copernican questions : rationality and realism ; The plan of the book -- Is science really rational? : the problem of incommensurability. Incommensurability of standards ; Incommensurability of values ; Incommensurability of meaning ; Evaluating meaning incommensurability ; Conversion : a concluding case study -- A walk on the wild side : social constructivism, postmodernism, feminism, and (...) that old-time religion. The constructivist challenge ; Postmodernism attacks! ; Is "objectivity" what a man calls his subjectivity? ; Is science godless? -- Ascending the slippery slope : scientific progress and truth. The evils of Whig history ; Social-constructivist history ; Does science converge toward truth? ; Assessing Laudan's Critique of Convergent Realism ; Scientists' own realism ; Could we be wrong about everything? -- Truth of consequences? Electrons : real particles or convenient fictions? ; Van Fraassen's constrictive empiricism ; Do we observe through microscopes? ; But what about things that are really unobservable? ; So what really is the goal of science? -- Mysteries of methods. Induction and deduction ; Aristotle : the first methodologist ; Bacon : scientific method renovated? ; The hypothetico-deductive method ; Hume on induction ; Popper and the rejection of induction ; Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) to the rescue? -- If you have science, who needs philosophy? The limits of science? ; The breakdown of philosophy ; Naturalizing epistemology ; Naturalizing ethics ; Philosophy in an age of science -- Science, scientism, and being human. Mind : physical or spiritual? ; Science and the human image ; Ape, angel, or neither? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RUSSELL AND WHITEHEAD ON THE PROCESS OF GROWTH IN EDUCATION1 HOWARD WOODHOUSE Educational Foundations / University of Saskatchewan Saskatoon, Sask., Canada S7N owo 1. RUSSELL, WHITEHEAD, AND PROCESS PHILOSOPHY W ere there no similarities between the philosophies of education of Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead, one would want to know why. Russell, after all, was Whitehead 's student as an undergraduate at Cambridge, his colleague and collaborator for (...) a dozen years working on the manuscript of Pri1!cipia Mathematica published in three volumes from 1910 to 1913, as well as his friend. Moreover, it was the sight of Whitehead's wife, Evelyn, in paroxysms of pain that prompted Russell's mystical experience in 1901, during which he tells us that he became a humanist, pacifist, and advocate of free schooling.2 In this paper, I consider the question of whether or not Russell's account of the process of growth in education is compatible with that of Whitehead. The question is important because it enables one to 1 Presented ar the annual meeting of rhe Association of Process Philosophy of Education, American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting, Chicago, 25-7 April 1991. Brian Hendley was the respondent. I would like to thank the audience for its penetrating questions, as well as Don Cochrane, Brian Hendley, John McMurtry and Viola Safr for their comments on an earlier draft. 2 Auto., I: 149. For a psychoanalytic interpretation of Russell's "mystical illumination ", see Bennett and Nancy Simon, "The Pacifist Turn: an Episode of Mystic Illumination in Russell's Life", Russell, no. 13 (Spring 1974): Il-12, 17-24. Jo Vellacott believes that the term "pragmatic pacifist" more accurately desctibes Russell's ". Russell and Whitehead on the Process ofGrowth. 139 Whitehead the precise investigation of the natural world. Both the logical method and the precision of ideas that are learned in mathematics form the foundations of science and philosophy. Indeed, the structures of the physical world mirror those of mathematics, since they, too, are based upon relations among entities.1O The kind of understanding afforded by mathematics, therefore, is also the basis of philosophy, since it puts students in contact with long-lasting ideas having fundamental value, and enables them to gain a kind of liberation from the concerns of the everyday world. (2) Both Russell and Whitehead uphold the idea· that science is based on those kinds of sense-experience to which human beings have ready access (colours, sounds, smells, and observable objects, etc.).II The problem facing science at this point is to show how its generalizations are based upon these experiences. For Russell, induction fails because we can never prove the principle on the basis of experience without thereby begging the question.I:'- This is because the prin~iple of induction appeals to the future or to those unexperienced parts of the past or present with which we are not acquainted. As a result, Russell prefers to adopt a hypothetico-deductive method by which it is possible· to move from the sense-experience of everyday life to a systematic understanding of the structures of the universe. In this way, science is able to progress by means of "an application of mathematical probability to premisses arrived at independently of induction."I3 Whitehead also argues for the need for "careful scrutiny" in the manner in which we infer the existence of "the physical world [which] is, in some general sense of the term, a deduced concept."I4 In other words, like Russell, he prefers a more deductive kind of approach, suggesting that the theory of induction is the despair of philosophy.I5 10 Whitehead, The Aims ofEducation, pp. 82, 84, 89, 134, 155-7. Russell, PoM, pp. 448-9,471; PLA in LK, p. 207. II Russell, "The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics" in Mysticism and Logic, pp. 145-79. Whitehead, of course, also includes feelings as integrating features of sense experience that allow us to relate the diverse elements of such experience into a unitary whole; see Process and Reality (New York: Free P., 1969), p. 244 and Part III. 12 Russell, PP, Chap. 6. His argument is mirrored by Whitehead, op. cit., pp. 235-6. lJ Russell, HK, p... (shrink)

In spite of several attempts to explicate the relationship between a scientific hypothesis and evidence, the issue still cries for a satisfactory solution. Logical approaches to confirmation, such as the hypothetico-deductive method and the positive instance account of confirmation, are problematic because of their neglect of the semantic dimension of hypothesis confirmation. Probabilistic accounts of confirmation are no better than logical approaches in this regard. An outstanding probabilistic account of confirmation, the Bayesian approach, for instance, is found to (...) be defective in that it treats evidence as a formal entity and this creates the problem of relevance of evidence to the hypothesis at issue, in addition to the difficulties arising from the subjective interpretation of probabilities. This essay purports to satisfy the need for a successful account of hypothesis confirmation by offering an original formulation based on the notion of instantiation of the relation urged by an hypothesis. (shrink)

I have applied a fairly general, learning theoretic perspective to some questions raised by Reichenbach's positions on induction and discovery. This is appropriate in an examination of the significance of Reichenbach's work, since the learning-theoretic perspective is to some degree part of Reichenbach's reliabilist legacy. I have argued that Reichenbach's positivism and his infatuation with probabilities are both irrelevant to his views on induction, which are principally grounded in the notion of limiting reliability. I have suggested that limiting reliability is (...) still a formidable basis for the formulation of methodological norms, particularly when reliability cannot possibly be had in the short run, so that refined judgments about evidential support must depend upon measure-theoretic choices having nothing to do in the short run with the truth of the hypothesis under investigation. To illustrate the generality of Reichenbach's program, I showed how it can be applied to methods that aim to solve arbitrary assessment and discovery problems in various senses. In this generalized Reichenbachian setting, we can characterize the intrinsic complexity of reliable inductive inference in terms of topological complexity. Finally, I let Reichenbach's theory of induction have the last say about hypothetico-deductive method. (shrink)

This article will introduce Isaac Newton’s fundamental methodological concepts applied for a solution concerning a question of gravity in his Principia Mathematica. The method of deduction of propositions from phenomena can be described as demonstrative induction. The main aim is to show that this method proposed by Newton explicitly contains a criticism of hypothetico-deductive methodology as an inadequate approach to the study of nature. As opposed to hypothetico-deductive method, demonstrative induction is capable of producing theories with (...) much richer empirical and epistemological value. Delimitation against hypothetically deduced theories is closely connected with criticism of mechanical materialism, most notably in a form proposed by René Descartes. Consequently, it has led Newton to not only reject the universality of mechanical premise but also to certain level of immunization against all competitive hypothetically based theories. (shrink)

A number of authors have drawn attention to the contributions to geology of Robert Hooke, and it has been pointed out that in several ways his ideas were more advanced than those of Steno, who is sometimes taken to be the founder of geology as a scientific discipline. Moreover, it has been argued that in a number of instances Hooke should receive the credit for ideas which are usually believed to have originated in the work of James Hutton. This recognition (...) of the significance of Hooke's work is regarded by the present writer as being well founded. But, by contrast, the relationship between Hooke's geological ideas and his views on the proper methods for conducting scientific enquiries has been largely overlooked, and his views on the methodology of science, as revealed in his Posthumous works, have received little discussion. Moreover, on one of the few occasions on which they were discussed, by William Whewell, they were belittled. Whewell regarded Hooke's methodological contribution as merely ‘an attempt to adapt the Novum organon to the age which succeeded its publication’, 5 and he implied that the ‘same imperfections’ were to be found in the writings of both Hooke and Bacon. The influence of Bacon is, to be sure, most obvious in Hooke's general philosophy. Nevertheless, it will be argued that Hooke had a much clearer idea than did Bacon of the importance of so-called ‘hypothetico-deductive’ methods in science, and that in many ways his methodological views represent a significant advance on those of Bacon. (shrink)

As a youngster of perhaps 8 years, Charles S. Peirce was given a chemistry laboratory in which he probably did experiments in qualitative analysis. These experiments were modeled on the hypothetico-deductive method of inquiry. I argue that this laboratory experience initiated Peirce’s life-long interest in logic and the logic of science, and flowered in his “pragmaticism.”.

BACKGROUND: Representing is about theories and theory formation. Philosophy of science has a long-standing interest in representing. At least since Ian Hacking's modern classic Representing and Intervening analytical philosophers have struggled to combine that interest with a study of the roles of intervention studies. With few exceptions this focus of philosophy of science has been on physics and other natural sciences. In particular, there have been few attempts to analyse the use of the notion of intervention in other disciplines where (...) intervention studies are important, such as in nursing research. One unintended consequence of this is that the relations between representing and intervening tend to be less understood outside the natural sciences. OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN: This article highlights a number of possible topics on which nursing science and analytic philosophy of science can fruitfully interact. The basic idea is simple. Building on a characterisation of interventions in terms of what is intervened on and with respect to what, we suggest that interventions in nursing research typically are a blend of varieties belonging to the three dimensions of agency, epistemology, and ontology. The details of the blend determine the relation of the particular intervention study to traditional representational categories such as inductivism and hypothetico-deductive method, and have a bearing on its explanatory power and other more theory independent features of research as well. The framework we suggest should be relevant for nurse researchers who want to adopt a more general and analytically entrenched perspective on representing and intervening than the methodological boundaries in nursing research typically allow. (shrink)

Mein Beitrag behandelt zentrale Probleme der Methodologie der Textinterpretation im Lichte der neueren Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie. Nach Vorbemerkungen zum Begriff der Interpretation wende ich mich den Methoden der Bildung und kritischen Prüfung von Interpretationshypothesen zu. Wie ist das Verhältnis von Daten und Hypothesen im Falle der Textinterpretation? Wie können Interpretationshypothesen epistemisch gerechtfertigt bzw. gestützt werden? Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen untersuche ich die Anwendung der Hypothetisch-Deduktiven Methode und der Methode des Schlusses auf die beste Erklärung auf die Textinterpretation. Der Vergleich zeigt, (...) dass die Methode des Schlusses auf die beste Erklärung vorzuziehen ist. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:86 GOING OUT THE WINDOW: A COMMENT ON TWEYMAN Whether your scepticism be as absolute and sincere as you pretend, we shall learn bye and bye, when the company breaks up: We shall then see, whether you go out at the door or the window; and whether you really doubt; if your body has gravity, or can be injured by its fall; according to popular opinion, derived from our (...) fallacious senses and more fallacious experience. My paper is divided into two sections. In the first section I will summarize and comment on Stanley 2 Tweyman' s paper and in the second section present an alternative reading of Parts X and XI of the Dialogues. SECTION I In his paper Tweyman claims that, although Philo's argument in Parts I-IX of the Dialogues are Pyrrhonian, in Parts X and XI a major change of strategy occurs in which Pyrrhonian arguments are replaced by hypothetico-deductive ones. Recent scholarship on Hume's Dialogues has revolved around two questions: (1) the identification of the sources and personages of the Dialogues and (2) Hume's attitude toward religion. Tweyman and I agree that Philo speaks for Hume. We differ on the character of Philo's challenge to Cleanthes' experimental theism. Philo's methodological shift in Parts X and XI is said to consist in his presentation of scientific hypotheses for appraisal, in contrast to the alternative hypotheses of the earlier Parts, where sceptical arguments are used to undermine Cleanthes' position. I take it that the scientific hypotheses in question are construed realistically 87 and not instrumentally; they are supposedly true or false and permit deductions to be made from them. The first evidence of the methodological shift, we are told, occurs in Part VIII in which Philo speaks in the third and not the first person, "a clear signal to the reader... that his Pyrrhonism... has now been abandoned." (Tweyman, 77) I find this claim unconvincing since in the majority of instances throughout the passage Philo writes in first-person fashion (D 186). Any detectable changes here seem to me to be purely stylistic in character. Tweyman uses the terms 'scepticism' and 'Pyrrhonism' interchangeably. His account of Pyrrhonism involves two theses, the second of which is derived from the first: (1) scepticism involves suspense of judgment between alternative beliefs; and (2) Philo presents his "position in order to show that the hypothesis advanced by Cleanthes is false." (Tweyman, 76) In his sceptical mode in Parts I-IX Philo makes no truth claim for the hypotheses he sets out. But, according to Tweyman,...this does not establish that Philo is a Pyrrhonian throughout the Dialogues, and that he always supports positions... to argue against the hypothesis advanced by Cleanthes. (Tweyman, 76) Tweyman gives two examples of Philonian scepticism in Parts I-VIII. The first is the debate in Part IV over the deity's relation to the world. Cleanthes contends that the deity is external to his creation, and Philo questions the validity of Cleanthes' causal inferences. (D 160) The second is the argument in Parts VI and VII in which Philo argues that the available data do not support the hypothesis of an intelligent designer. I find the account at this point unexceptionable. 88 The first example in which Philo's arguments become "distinctly un-Pyrrhonian" (Tweyman, 77) is the passage in which Philo details the 'inconveniences' of anthropomorphism. Philo begins by saying:...you can still persevere in your anthropomorphism and assert the moral attributes of the Deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of the same nature with these virtues in human creatures? (D 198) But, he continues, "the course of nature tends not to human or animal felicity." ( Ibid. ) Cleanthes' has asserted human happiness, a thesis which Philo denies. We are no longer dealing with an alternative hypothesis designed to undermine Cleanthes' account but with "the hypothetico-deductive method for testing Cleanthes' hypothesis." (Tweyman, 78) Part XI divides into the three sections which are each discussed to show that Philo's arguments are not Pyrrhonian. since the argument is similar in all three cases, I will remark only on the discussion of the 'indifference hypothesis,' Philo's argument that... (shrink)

Studies in Archaeology: Philosophy and Archaeology presents the circumstances under which archeological hypotheses can be considered confirmed or disconfirmed. This book discusses the role of analogy in archeological reasoning, particularly in ascribing functions to archeological items. Organized into seven chapters, this book begins with an overview of the relationship between archeology and philosophy. This text then examines the importance of laws for archeology and discusses some essential features of law statements. Other chapters consider the strong claims for the hypothetico- (...) class='Hi'>deductive method of confirmation in various works by archeologists. This book discusses as well the different uses of analogical reasoning in archeology and provides a discussion of the structure of analogical arguments, criteria for evaluating them, and their relations to the Bayesian arguments for confirmation. The final chapter deals with several issues related to the development of a theory of archeology. This book is a valuable resource for archeologists and philosophers. (shrink)

In Ancient Greece, when philosophy began, it included all the theoretical knowledge. But later, in the time of Aristotle, specialized sciences started to emerge and the scope of philosophy grew smaller and smaller. The question is what to do when philosophy has lost its competence to deal with any relevant topic. The paper discusses three possible views of the relation between philosophy and science: anti-scientism, conceptual analysis and naturalism. All these approaches deal with various disadvantages. For anti-scientism it is mainly (...) the inability to explain the unprecedented success of modern science. Proponents of conceptual analysis are confronted with Quine’s attack on analytic statements and its consequences for a priori truths. Finally, naturalistic philosophers might be threatened by hegemony of science and its universal application of hypothetico-deductive method. The worst scenario for naturalistic philosophers is not as bad as some worry. Philosophers can solve their traditional problems using the knowledge of well-established special sciences, even though they might play the role of high-end science journalists. (shrink)