In this essay, we consider the formal and ontological implications of one specific and intensely contested dialectical context from which Deleuze’s thinking about structural ideal genesis visibly arises. This is the formal/ontological dualism between the principles, ἀρχαί, of the One (ἕν) and the Indefinite/Unlimited Dyad (ἀόριστος δυάς), which is arguably the culminating achievement of the later Plato’s development of a mathematical dialectic.3 Following commentators including Lautman, Oskar Becker, and Kenneth M. Sayre, we argue that the duality of the (...) One and the Indefinite Dyad provides, in the later Plato, a unitary theoretical formalism accounting, by means of an iterated mixing without synthesis, for the structural origin and genesis of both supersensible Ideas and the sensible particulars which participate in them. As these commentators also argue, this duality furthermore provides a maximally general answer to the problem of temporal becoming that runs through Plato’s corpus: that of the relationship of the flux of sensory experiences to the fixity and order of what is thinkable in itself. Additionally, it provides a basis for understanding some of the famously puzzling claims about forms, numbers, and the principled genesis of both attributed to Plato by Aristotle in the Metaphysics, and plausibly underlies the late Plato’s deep considerations of the structural paradoxes of temporal change and becoming in the Parmenides, the Sophist, and the Philebus. After extracting this structure of duality and developing some of its formal, ontological, and metalogical features, we consider some of its specific implications for a thinking of time and ideality that follows Deleuze in a formally unitary genetic understanding of structural difference. These implications of Plato’s duality include not only those of the constitution of specific theoretical domains and problematics, but also implicate the reflexive problematic of the ideal determinants of the form of a unitary theory as such. We argue that the consequences of the underlying duality on the level of content are ultimately such as to raise, on the level of form, the broader reflexive problem of the basis for its own formal or meta-theoretical employment. We conclude by arguing for the decisive and substantive presence of a proper “Platonism” of the Idea in Deleuze, and weighing the potential for a substantive recuperation of Plato’s duality in the context of a dialectical affirmation of what Deleuze recognizes as the “only” ontological proposition that has ever been uttered. This is the proposition of the univocity of Being, whereby “being is said in the same sense, everywhere and always,” but is said (both problematically and decisively) of difference itself. (shrink)

The author discusses the concept of an ideal object. The statement of O.I. Genisaretsky is quoted and problematized, stating that the obligatory feature that has been preserved for the object and the terms "object" and "ideal object" is, apparently, its representability or visibility. The author shows that ideal objects began to be created during the formation of ancient philosophy and thinking. Faced with contradictions, ancient thinkers dealt with this situation in different ways. If Protogoras recognized the right (...) of the reasoners to receive contradictions and, accordingly, to consider the world contradictory, then Parmenides considered the world consistent, arguing that the criterion for the correctness (truth) of knowledge is not a reasoning person, but this world, existence, which still needs to be reached with the help of correct thought. It was within the framework of the implementation of the Parmenides program that ideal objects began to be created, which, as the author shows, performed three main functions: they allowed us to think consistently, to know the world and its phenomena, to comprehend and interpret empirical phenomena (facts) in a different way. Based on the case of Plato's "Feast", the semiotic schemes on the basis of which Plato creates ideal objects are analyzed. It is argued that it is impossible to build ideal objects, bypassing schemes, since their inventors (creators) are people. By solving problems, they synthesize meanings belonging to different areas of consciousness. The analysis of Galileo's "Conversations" allowed the author to suggest that the construction of ideal objects is due to the historical type of philosophical or scientific thinking. The author considers it necessary, before claiming to create a modern doctrine of ideal objects, to analyze the main typical cases of the construction of these objects in philosophy and science, and such an analysis can make significant adjustments to the understanding of the nature and features of this concept. Nevertheless, he suggests, it is already clear that the construction of ideal objects is an important link in philosophical, scientific and a number of other types of thinking. (shrink)

Although the idiom “genesis and structure” is usually associated with the rise of structuralism in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the two notions are arguably among the most persistent methods in the history of modern philosophy. This article outlines the emergence of “genetic epistemology” in the seventeenth century, when the seemingly antithetical character of the conceptual pair was reworked into a productive epistemological theory, especially in Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, who increasingly used diachronic (genetic) narratives to explain (...) the synchronic (structural) features in their theories. Against Cassirer, I argue that it was Descartes rather than Hobbes who first presented structural issues genetically. In Descartes’ natural philosophy, his frequent claims that showing how a thing is produced reveals its true nature foreshadow precisely what Hobbes and Isaac Barrow later describe as causal definitions of geometric figures, in which the process of ideal generation by motion is what constitutes the very essence of a figure. I link this method to the historicizing discourse on origins in the Enlightenment and conclude by suggesting that there is a trace of Platonic idealism in genetic epistemology. (shrink)

In this study, Paola Marrati approaches—in an extremely insightful, rigorous, and well-argued way—the question of the philosophical sources of Derrida's thought through a consideration of his reading of both Husserl and Heidegger. A central focus of the book is the analysis of the concepts of genesis and trace as they define Derrida's thinking of historicity, time, and subjectivity. Notions such as the contamination of the empirical and the transcendental, dissemination and writing, are explained as key categories establishing a guiding (...) thread that runs through Derrida's early and later works. Whereas in his discussion of Husserl Derrida problematizes the relationship between the ideality of meaning and the singularity of its historical production, in his interpretation of Heidegger he challenges the very idea of the originary finitude of temporality. This book is essential reading not only for those interested in the philosophical roots of deconstruction, but for all those interested in the central questions of history and temporality, subjectivity and language, that pervade contemporary debates in cultural, literary, and visual theory alike. (shrink)

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Vol. 2, number 1, Autumn 1987, pp. 84-104. R.M. Nugayev. The genesis and structure of models in the modern theory of gravity. Abstract. The analysis of theory-choice problem in modern theory of gravity necessitates consideration of the genesis and the structure of the systems of gravitational abstract objects. My approach to physical theory structure uses and develops the ideas of V.S.Stepin. The basic equations of general relativity - Einstein’s equations – are (...) shown to describe the relations between the abstract objects of the basic model only. The whole theory of gravity chain consists of general relativity, nonmetric theories of gravitation, Newton’s theory of gravitation and special theory of relativity. All these theories describe the relations between the abstract objects of partial ideal models subordinated to the basic one. (shrink)

In this study, Paola Marrati approaches—in an extremely insightful, rigorous, and well-argued way—the question of the philosophical sources of Derrida's thought through a consideration of his reading of both Husserl and Heidegger. A central focus of the book is the analysis of the concepts of genesis and trace as they define Derrida's thinking of historicity, time, and subjectivity. Notions such as the contamination of the empirical and the transcendental, dissemination and writing, are explained as key categories establishing a guiding (...) thread that runs through Derrida's early and later works. Whereas in his discussion of Husserl Derrida problematizes the relationship between the ideality of meaning and the singularity of its historical production, in his interpretation of Heidegger he challenges the very idea of the originary finitude of temporality. This book is essential reading not only for those interested in the philosophical roots of deconstruction, but for all those interested in the central questions of history and temporality, subjectivity and language, that pervade contemporary debates in cultural, literary, and visual theory alike. (shrink)

This paper identifies an aesthetics implicit in Spinoza’s philosophy through the concept of a genesis of the aesthetic. A genesis of the aesthetic indicates that a philosophy of art is not yet fully formed in his work, but can emerge as a consequence or effect of his thought. This aesthetic theory would evaluate the work of art primarily in its relationship to truth. Following the architectonics of Spinoza’s own thought, this paper constructs a progression – moving from the (...) imagination, to reason, to intuition – toward a concept of aesthetic practices that aligns itself ever more closely with the freedom, perfection, and affirmation of infinite substance itself. The specific forms of aesthetic reception and production flowing from Spinoza’s ideal of wisdom unite two seemingly disparate paradigms: the aesthetic as essentially affirmative, as a joy in the individual power of every individuated thing, on the one hand; and the cultivation of a critical, ethically informed aesthetics of liberation, one capable of occupying different positions with respect to state or sovereign power, on the other hand. (shrink)

La presente investigación se propone mostrar la génesis y desarrollo de la tentativa matriz de la filosofía de Gilles Deleuze, el empirismo trascendental. Para ello, se realizará una revisión de las problemáticas por las que atraviesa dicha tentativa a lo largo de la obra de este pensador. Cuidadosa atención recibirán a propósito de la génesis del empirismo trascendental el problema del hábito y el de la constitución de la subjetividad, que Deleuze reconoce en Hume (Empirisme et subjectivité, 1953). A partir (...) de ellos, se establecerán los caracteres principales del que se identifica como problema de los principios, en cuyo seno se define una relación particular entre principio y génesis. Gracias al establecimiento riguroso de dicha relación, Deleuze integra los aportes del empirismo y los de la filosofía trascendental bajo una misma propuesta filosófica. Esta propuesta tendrá a la vista el desarrollo de una crítica sistemática hacia lo dado, con lo cual tanto el objeto como el sujeto del pensar precisarán ser sometidos a una indagación acerca de su génesis. Definido el empirismo trascendental como la tentativa filosófica que apunta a pensar la génesis trascendental o actualización de lo dado, esta investigación espera dar cuenta del ámbito de dicha génesis así como de los principios de determinación que la rigen. Para ello se estudiarán las nociones de campo trascendental, plan de inmanencia y continuo ideal (Différence et répétition, 1968; Logique du sens, 1969). Al abordar esta última noción, se pondrá especial interés en dilucidar la reformulación que efectúa Deleuze de los princip ios de razón suficiente, de indiscernibilidad y de continuidad de Leibniz (Le Pli, 1988). (shrink)

Genesis of the early quantum theory represented by Planck’s 1897-1906 papers is considered. It is shown that the first quantum theoretical schemes were constructed as crossbreed ones composed from ideal models and laws of Maxwellian electrodynamics, Newtonian mechanics, statistical mechanics and thermodynamics. Ludwig Boltzmann’s ideas and technique appeared to be crucial. Deriving black-body radiation law Max Planck had to take the experimental evidence into account. It forced him not to deduce from phenomena but to use more theory instead. (...) The experiments forced Planck to apply the statistical technique to radiation in increasing portions. Planck’s theories in no way were generalizations of existing experimental results. They represented the stages of an ambitious programme of Maxwellian electrodynamics and statistical mechanics reconciliation. (shrink)

In contemporary political discourse, the "clash of civilizations" rhetoric often undergirds philosophical analyses of "democracy" both at home and abroad. This is nowhere better articulated than in Jacques Derrida's Rogues, in which he describes Islam as the only religious or theocratic culture that would "inspire and declare any resistance to democracy". Curiously, Derrida attributes the failings of democracy in Islam to the lack of reference to Aristotle's Politics in the writings of the medieval Muslim philosophers. This paper aims to analyze (...) this gross misconception of Islamic philosophy and illuminate the thoroughgoing influence the Muslim philosophers had on their Christian successors, those who are so often credited as foundations of Western political philosophy. In so doing, I compare the ideal states presented by Averroes and Dante – in which Aristotelian influence is intimately interlaced – and offer an analysis thereof as heralds of what we might call the secularization of the political, inspiring those democratic values that Derrida believes to be absent in the rich philosophy of the Middle Ages. (shrink)

The purpose of the study is to identify the influence of the temporality of Enlightenment on the genesis and evolution of classical ideologies of Modernity. The scientific novelty it consists in the fact that the classical ideologies of modernity are presented as competing strategies for the appropriation of time by collective subjects of historical dynamics. In conservatism, the object of appropriation is an idealized past, in liberalism – an intense present, in Marxism – a bright future. As a result, (...) it can be concluded that it was the presence of a trimodal ideology, which included conservatism, liberalism and Marxism, that created the prerequisites for the simultaneous existence and dynamic development of multiple Modernities implemented within the framework of a common cultural and civilizational project. (shrink)

Although Hegel's absolute idealism is often presented as a solipsistically self-grounding, the Realphilosophie offers us an another image of Hegel which not only challenges standard interpretations, but more importantly gives us valuable resources to rethink living being. The zero-level determinacy of nature as “the idea in its otherness” has two consequences. Firstly, the starting point of any philosophy of nature must be a realism, insofar as nature's material constitution shows itself as unthought-like. Secondly, if idealism is to be viable, it (...) must prove itself to be a result of nature's immanent auto-development. Taking as my guide the category of “trembling” (Erzittern) and exploring its intimate connection with the emergent ideality of bodies producing sound, the chemical process and the voice of animals, I aim to show how the Realphilosophie is a reconstruction of the painful odyssey of the material genesis of the autopoietic self-referentiality of the concept as it is paradoxically begotten, by immaculate conception, in the pure extimacy of nature. The dialectics of nature is not a naturephilosophical theory of material being as implicit, self-unfolding productivity which necessarily leads to life via an intrinsic teleology, but rather an account of the contingent material emergence of unpredictable kinds of ontological determinacies from within the immanent field of mechanical nature. Only a naturalized idealism/idealized naturalism is capable of arguing for the ontological irreducibility of living being while simulta eously articulating its dependence upon different scientific domains which form its ontogenetic ground. It avoids both eliminative materialism and naïve vitalism. (shrink)

The article examines the transformation of the understanding of humanism from the Renaissance to the modern era, focusing on the mechanism of exclusion that defines the key framework of social action, including in the present day. This social mechanism pushes declared values beyond observable reality, generates cognitive paralysis, and ultimately points to the existence of an alternate reality that dominates a morally depleted society. The replacement of reality with constructs fabricated by various doctrinal groups is identified as a major delusion (...) of our times, luring people into self-deception, seducing them with illusory values, and confusing the noble with the ignoble. The mechanisms of exclusion serve as the essential foundation for excluding thought, values, and ideals from everyday social life. This exclusion is evident in ancient democracy, which despised slaves; in Russian literature, which flirted with serfdom; and most notably in modern autocracy and liberalism, which focus solely on their own kind. The article takes as its starting point the transitional state of society where, under the conditions of the Reformation, Renaissance values understood as humanism are reduced to post-Renaissance “humanism.” From this perspective, the treatise of F.I. Niethammer is analyzed for its contribution to the modern understanding of humanism in contrast to the educational philanthropinism of J.B. Basedow. The article reveals the connection between the term “humanism” and German anti-Semitism, showing that humanism, as conceived in the German context, was intended for ethnic insiders and educationally stood as an antithesis to the Frankfurt Philanthropin, the largest German educational institution opened in a Jewish ghetto for children from poor families. The author concludes with historical parallels and findings that identify the characteristics of modern societies shaped by the discussed mechanism of exclusion. (shrink)

Salomon Maïmon argues that the formal determination of experience in Kant’s first Kritik insufficiently answers the question ‘quid juris?’. As an alternative to Kant’s theory, he develops a genetic transcendentalism in which experience is completely determined a priori. Discussing this genetic approach, I focus on how the spatiotemporal determinations of conscious experience are traced back to pure ideal relations. Relying on Leibniz and his theory of space and time, I explain how the extensive magnitudes of consciousness are founded in (...) intensive magnitudes of what Maïmon calls ‘pure thought’. As the latter is the transcendental ground for both sensibility and the understanding, Maïmon’s theory contains a radical form of immanence, much like the philosophy of Spinoza and Gilles Deleuze. (shrink)

I argue that Nietzsche's thought of eternal recurrence is merely a kind of thought experiment that has two forms of engagement. The first form of engagement is destructive and results in the principles of classical logic being reduced to epistemic nihilism. In this first form, Nietzsche is thinking eternal recurrence, as it is presented in previous philosophers, to its end. The second form of engagement does not require the presuppositions of classical logic and is made through the affect of disgust. (...) This second mode of engagement can result in two outcomes; suicidal pessimism or life affirmation. The work on eternal recurrence that scholars typically think of as published has very little positive commitment to the ontological or metaphysical status of eternal recurrence. However, if eternal recurrence does represent the physical nature of the universe, as Nietzsche sometimes speculates about in his notebooks, this would not hurt either his destructive or his affective argument. The affective form of engagement allows us to think about the emergence of this affirmative ideal without strong positive commitment to any particular metaphysics or epistemology. The appearance of such an ideal may be multiply realizable over various physical organizations of the universe. The new life affirming ideal which emerges is not a form of humanism. Rather, Nietzsche thinks that the thought of eternal recurrence will produce "the 'humanity' of the future." The thought of eternal recurrence selects out, via suicidal pessimism, those who cannot affirm life. This fosters the development of a new humanity that can affirm life and create a new kind of happiness unknown to humans previously. This new ideal, amor fati [love of fate], is not simply a reconciliation with suffering and hardship of the past. Rather, one must want and hope that such a thing is the case. This ideal, held by the most powerful people of the future, is an expression of will to power. This ideal understands hardship and challenges on the sea of life as part of what makes us truly great and our lives intrinsically valuable. (shrink)

In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze effectively argues that two types of relation between events govern their ‘evental’ or ‘ideal play’, and ultimately underlie determined substances, that is, worldly individuals and persons. Leibniz calls these relations ‘compossibility’ and ‘incompossibility’. Deleuze calls them ‘convergence’ and ‘divergence’. This paper explores how Deleuze appropriates and extends a number of Leibnizian concepts in order to ground the idea that events have ontological priority over substances ‘all the way down’.

Summary This paper gives an account of the establishment and expansion of a Faculty of Science at the Calvinist ?Free University? in the Netherlands in the 1930s. It describes the efforts of a group of orthodox Christians to come to terms with the natural sciences in the early twentieth century. The statutes of the university, which had been founded in 1880, prescribed that all research and teaching should be based on Calvinist, biblical principles. This ideal was formulated in opposition (...) to the claim of nineteenth-century scientific naturalists that there was an inherent conflict between science and religion. However, despite their selection on the basis of their strict Calvinist beliefs, the first science professors attributed a certain independence to the domain of science. They agreed with the criticism of the conflict thesis, and tried to defuse the tensions between science and religion, although mainly at the level of philosophy and history, looking for example for harmony between science and religion in the past. Ironically, as a result of this approach, the Calvinist scientists mainly contributed to the acceptance of mainstream science in Dutch Calvinist circles, contrary to developments in other countries (notably the USA) where the conflict between science and orthodox Christianity has reasserted itself. (shrink)

This article develops an interpretation and defense of Husserl’s account of the omnitemporality of idealities. I first examine why Husserl rejects the atemporality and temporal individuation of idealities on phenomenological grounds, specifically that these attributions prove countersensical in how they relate idealities to consciousness. As an alternative to these conceptions, I develop a two-sided interpretation of omnitemporality expressed in modal terms of actuality and possibility, the actual referring to appearances in time and the possible, to reactivation at any time. In (...) defense of this interpretation of omnitemporality, I consider influential criticisms against Husserl’s account of idealities as they concern time, particularly whether the historical genesis of idealities compromises their omnitemporality by binding them to time. Ultimately, I argue that the transcendental historicity of idealities, despite being relevant to the question of validity and access, proves indifferent to their omnitemporality. (shrink)

Husserl’s conception of ideal objects convinced some of his early disciples that he was presenting a new form of realism. This impression arises, in my view, from a twofold misunderstanding. First, there was a misunderstanding of the limits of the phenomenological claims of Logical Investigations and, second, an erroneous belief that ideal objects are interpreted in a realist fashion therein. The ultimate source of the first phenomenological schism is not, therefore, so much a reaction to an alleged sudden (...) change in Husserl’s position, but rather a misunderstanding of the concept of ideality presented in Logical Investigations. Further, an alleged “compatibility” between the realist conception of ideality and the Husserlian conception is to be found in one of the ways that Husserl addresses the problem of constitution. However, the Spanish philosopher Antonio Millán-Puelles has shown that the use of terms such as “constitutive activity” or “genesis”—in a realist metaphysics, to designate the arising of ideal objects—should not be interpreted in a psychologistic way, as though these objects remained absorbed by the reality of the mental processes they are made present by. (shrink)

The notion of ideal is surely one of the most important legacies of Western philosophy, yet it has been much neglected by contemporary philosophy, probably because of the negative destiny it has suffered during the last century, by being firstly abused through forms of totalitarianism and secondly censured through forms of anarchism. But there are two interesting exceptions: two monographs written by two noteworthy philosophers, the first being Nicholas Rescher, who published in 1987 Ethical Idealism. An Inquiry into the (...) Nature and Function of Ideals, and the second being Dorothy Emmet, who published in 1994 The Role of the Unrealisable. A Study in Regulative Ideals. In this article I shall take into account their positions arguing that both Rescher and Emmet work on a very important topic, as they highlight the essential role the notion of ideal played, and still plays, in human life, yet, the role of the notion of ideal they highlight may be notably increased by more precisely understanding its own genesis and history. (shrink)

The presented papers are very interesting. They differ and complement one another… . Orlova's presentation is a model of structuralization, scientific rigor, extreme precision, and clarity. Shemanov's paper provides a philosophical basis for culturology. I asked what place culturology occupies in the field of knowledge. It turned out that to answer this question it is first necessary to present the system of manifestations of a society's life activity and only then, when we have the matrix, can we compare our idea (...) of culture with it in order to make it relevant to that matrix. This is to correlate the patrix and the matrix. But since there are no generally accepted schemata of society, no developed schemata of its cognitive activity, I had to work on my own. I offer two schemata but, in view of the time limit, I will only indicate certain items of this context so as to make it clear what I am talking about and from what premises I proceed. There are several premises. The first is the main problem that must be borne in mind in any theorizing. How is our material existence correlated with the realization of our creative potential, our subjectivity? This is the problem of man's spiritual development. It would appear to be a truism. But it is necessary to find a philosophical expression for this problem. This means to find a formula, because if a study is not summed up in a formula it has to be continued. The philosophical equivalent of the problem of existence is: existence determines consciousness, consciousness reflects existence. This is a contribution of Marxism. It would seem that those who theorized about the active nature of consciousness, thought, and the subjective factor have all the advantages, since that was all they worked on and spoke of the primacy of consciousness. Why, then, have they not discovered the formula of the correlation between material existence and creative subjectivity? Because then there is a clash of two paradigms, and formal logic comes into force, stating that it is necessary to make a choice, for there is no third way. We want to construct a philosophical equivalent of the activity of consciousness and say what role it plays. As long as we simply say that it plays a huge or important role, or that consciousness has a reverse effect, our research has not been completed. If existence determines consciousness, then thought, in turn, makes reality similar to itself. Consequently, I distinguish existence and reality. But whence this distinction? If we go back to the definition that matter is a philosophical category for denoting objective reality, then it becomes clear that objective reality is that which exists outside and independently of us. If we have different words-outside of us and independently of us-then this is a substantial difference. Even so perspicacious an analyst as Freud separated these concepts with a comma. So I tried to separate them vertically and horizontally. Vertically, we have that which is in reality and, horizontally, that which exists independently of us. We obtain a definite square. Existence-consciousness-activity-reality. Everything else is purely technical. Here is the genesis of the matrix. This leads to many consequences. Superimposing this schema on the matrix, I obtained a fairly clear picture. They turn out to be relevant to each another. We get varieties of knowledge such as intuitive or, if we think in binary oppositions, the instinctive is opposed to the distantive variety, and first of all science, because it knows not directly, but through mediation. Instinctive knowledge is instantaneous, one-time knowledge. Here the logic of common sense and other things operates. And then, when we correlate activity and reality, we have the objective and subjective varieties. Corresponding to these varieties, as a result of cognition we acquire knowledge: intuitive-direct, distantive-mediated, subjective-procedural, and objective-object-oriented. If we take such characteristics as the bases of cognitive varieties, the means of knowledge, the forms of knowledge, cognitive approaches, and objects of knowledge, we get a special table. Mendeleev had a table of chemical elements; I have a table of social elements consisting of twenty-eight squares. In a division into so many categories, if there is a logical mistake, there must be a flaw somewhere. I do not detect any flaws here, and this indicates that such a division is not fortuitous: the table reflects a law. There are also other premises such as "we are in the world, and the world is in us." We are in the world physically, while the world is in us mentally. We live surrounded by nature, but also at the price of nature. My schemata are based on these presuppositions. Consequently, one cannot counterpose the achievements of philosophical materialism and idealism. At this stage they must be not opposed, but synthesized, united. This is to dismiss the claim of every doctrine that it is absolute. If we see the relatively rational in each doctrine and join them together, we shall get a contemporary synthetic philosophy that works. I was able to show how this methodology works, in this case, with this example. In analyzing such an urgent social phenomenon as conflict, I found that conflict situations can be broken down into elements. Now I know how to order the sides in a conflictual situation, how they are correlated. And when there is a link with a schema of categories, then things work well. (shrink)

The Genesis of the Social and the Carnal Donation of the Non-Presentable. The Range of the Notion of Institution in Merleau-PontyThis article examines the range of the notion of institution that Merleau-Ponty proposes in his course at the Collège de France (1954-55), by notably insisting on the importance of the question of the genesis of the social for the deepening of his thought. By broadening his investigative domains in two complementary directions (that is, lateral passivity and socio-historical institution), (...) Merleau-Ponty aims in this course to grasp in a better way the lateral relations of our Urstiftung (originary institution) and the instituting subject who obliquely goes beyond the institution towards its sense. That leads him to introduce the perceptual field as being essentially lacunary, because it marks a place where the consciousness is present at the divergence in relation to consciousness. It is certain that the Phenomenology of Perception addressed this question by considering the social as a place where “I am given to myself”. However, the psychological starting point of this work, as well as the originary temporal and unilateral character of radical reflection, prevented one from really grasping the institutional junction of the concrete event and the symbolic matrix. One was not able to thematize an auto-articulation which appears suddenly between radical reflection and the unreflective. This is why Lévi-Strauss’ structuralist thought, by considering the social as symbolism, allows for a better understanding of this institutional nexus. But this idea does not lead to the dogmatic positing of the reality and the autonomy of the social. Instead, it encourages us to practice “the perception of history,” which consists in guessing, in the very process of sociological idealization, the carnal and wild donation of the non-presentable. Far from returning to psychologism, this perception aims at actively achieving the movement internal to the symbolic, that is, its incarnation.La genesi del sociale e la donazione carnale del non-presentabile. La portata della nozione di istituzione in Merleau-PontyQuesto articolo esamina la portata della nozione d’istituzione che Merleau-Ponty propone nel suo corso al Collège de France del 1954-1955, insistendo in particolare sull’importanza della questione della genesi del sociale per l’approfondimento del suo pensiero.Estendendo i propri domini di ricerca in due direzioni complementari (la passività laterale e l’istituzione socio-storica), Merleau-Ponty si propone in questo corso di cogliere meglio i rapporti laterali della nostra Urstiftung (l’istituzione originaria) e del soggetto istituente che la supera obliquamente in direzione del suo senso. Ciò induce a presentare il campo percettivo come essenzialmente lacunoso, poiché manca di un luogo dove la coscienza possa assistere allo scarto rispetto a se stessa.È certo che la Fenomenologia della percezione affrontava questa questione considerando il sociale come un luogo dove “io sono donato a me stesso”. I presupposti psicologici di quest’opera, così come il carattere originariamente temporale e unilaterale della riflessione radicale, impedivano tuttavia di cogliere in maniera adeguata il legame istituzionale dell’evento concreto e della matrice simbolica, e di tematizzare un’autoarticolazione che sorgesse tra la riflessione radicale e l’irriflesso.È per questo motivo che il pensiero strutturalista di Lévi-Strauss, che considerava il sociale come simbolismo, permette di comprendere meglio questo nesso istituzionale. Quest’idea non conduce però a porre dogmaticamente la realtà e l’autonomia del sociale, essa incita piuttosto a praticare “la percezione della storia” che consiste nell’individuare, nel processo stesso dell’idealizzazione sociologica, la donazione carnale e selvaggia del non-presentabile. Lungi dal rappresentare un ritorno allo psicologismo, questa nozione di percezione mira a completare attivamente il movimento interno al simbolico, ovvero la sua incarnazione. (shrink)

The genesis of space and time is investigated within the rotational-monadic paradigm. It is established that the essence of the phenomenon of space is revealed through the dialectical synthesis of its two aspects — ideal and material, where the material aspect is represented by the metaphysical construct of protomonad. It is shown that basic physical distinctions such as motion, mass, gravitation find a meaningful hermeneutic through the material aspect of space, which has a purely discrete structure, while the (...) contradiction about finitude — infinity is resolved by juxtaposing metaphysical and ontic spaces, where the Universe is represented as an “egg”. The analysis of temporality is preceded by remarks on the relational and substantive concepts of time, consideration of the discreteness-continuity dilemma, and criticism of the absolutization of discreteness in the temporality representation. It is argued that discreteness and continuity are combined dialectical oppositions through which the temporal reality is actualized, where continuity is hidden from observation in the metaphysical world and discreteness is manifested explicitly in the physical world. Three dimensions of time — Present, Past and Future — are discussed, as a result of which it is stated that in the primary way time is found as an attribute of consciousness and only in the secondary way it correlates with phenomenological reality. New differentiations of time are revealed: interval Present, embracing as a universum other moduses of the Present, and two- component time in the form of cyclic and linear components which allow us to make a justified positive conclusion about the existence of transcendental subjectivity, being the basis of absolute temporality. (shrink)

The article analyses opinion of I. Franko on sociocultural genesis from the perspective of anthropologism, in particular, on a human as a source of social development. The core of the issue of sociocultural determination of human is a "human - society" system. Interpretation of the issue of sociocultural determination in Ukraine had its own specific character as demands of sociocultural content meant, primarily, human's striving to self-healing, self-improvement, self-realisation, liberty, etc. Special attention is paid to consideration of the issues (...) of public ideal, ideology, and above all - liberty as an essential component of socialisation and art as well as a necessary condition for existence of culture, self-healing, self-improvement, self-realisation of human. Furthermore, liberty, equality and fraternity are not only requirements of genesis of human and all nations, but requirements that have their specific peculiarities of realisation in the historical fate of one or another nation and, in particular, personality. (shrink)

This article explores the ongoing obsession with the thigh gap ideal in certain pockets of Western societies. A thigh gap is the space some women have between their inner thighs when they stand with their feet together. The thigh gap ideal is flaunted on “thinspo” websites, which compile diet and exercise tips and display pictures of fashion models and “real women” in their efforts to inspire women to become thinner. I aim to identify what is wrong with the (...) thigh gap obsession and to suggest a way to overcome it. I begin by describing the genesis of the obsession. I then argue that the relation women in the grip of this preoccupation have to their bodies is an instance of what I call bodily alienation. Next, I consider responses to the thigh gap phenomenon. I claim that a viable response, besides broadening standards of beauty, lies in pursuing bodily activities for their own sake. I call the view I articulate “sensualism.” I conclude by discussing the merits of an individual response of the type I advocate, in light of the structural character of women’s oppression through standards of beauty. (shrink)

In Systematicity, Paul Hoyningen-Huene answers the question "What is science?" by proposing that scientific knowledge is primarily distinguished from other forms of knowledge, especially everyday knowledge, by being more systematic. "Science" is here understood in the broadest possible sense, encompassing not only the natural sciences but also mathematics, the social sciences, and the humanities. The author develops his thesis in nine dimensions in which it is claimed that science is more systematic than other forms of knowledge: regarding descriptions, explanations, predictions, (...) the defense of knowledge claims, critical discourse, epistemic connectedness, an ideal of completeness, knowledge generation, and the representation of knowledge. He compares his view with positions on the question held by philosophers from Aristotle to Nicholas Rescher. The book concludes with an exploration of some consequences of Hoyningen-Huene's view concerning the genesis and dynamics of science, the relationship of science and common sense, normative implications of the thesis, and the demarcation criterion between science and pseudo-science. (shrink)

We consider the evolutionary scheme of morality proposed by Tomasello to defend the idea that the ability to orient the learning of offspring using signs of approval/disapproval could be a decisive and necessary step in the evolution of human morality. Those basic forms of intentional evaluative feedback, something we have called assessor teaching, allow parents to transmit their accumulated experience to their children, both about the behaviors that should be learned as well as how they should be copied. The rationale (...) underlying this process is as follows: if a behavior is approved, then it is good; if it is disapproved, then it is bad. The evaluative guidance on how to behave most probably spread among peers in situations of mutual benefit, such as cooperative child rearing. We argue that our hominin ancestors provided with this capacity for assessor teaching were ideally positioned to develop the two specifically human levels of morality proposed by Tomasello: the morality of fairness and the morality of justice. Assessor teaching could have facilitated the genesis of rudimentary codes of behavior tied with the need to agree about how to behave to succeed in joint cooperative activities. Moreover, learning through assessor teaching provides a plausible explanation for the origin of the objectivist and prescriptive dimensions of human morality. First, we emphasize that individuals feel that they evaluate the behavior of others objectively to guide their learning, and, second, we underline the imperative intention that any moral manifestation possesses. (shrink)

The article explores the phenomenon of the nomenklatura as a unique socio-political institution in the context of democratic transformations within post-Soviet societies. An analysis of Mikhail Voslensky’s works reveals the mechanisms of nomenklatura functioning and aids in understanding the structural challenges of overcoming the totalitarian legacy. The core of the article focuses on a comparative analysis of Voslensky’s concept. Born in Ukraine, Voslensky had a successful career within the Soviet system before emigrating to West Germany in 1972. His seminal work, (...) «Nomenklatura» (1980), presents a critical analysis of the revolutionary movement’s transformation into a new ruling class. Voslensky identifies the nomenklatura as a distinct class that uses a system of privileges to maintain its dominance and exert social control. He meticulously documents the institutional mechanisms of nomenklatura domination, uncovering the interplay between party hierarchy and material privileges. Particular attention is paid to the subordination of the security forces to party control through mechanisms of the Central Committee, which minimized risks to the nomenklatura system. The article includes a comparative analysis of Voslensky’s and Milovan Djilas’s approaches to the «new class» of socialist societies. Unlike Djilas, who believed in the potential of «true» communism, Voslensky fully breaks away from the system. He refutes the thesis about the nomenklatura’s modernizing role, pointing instead to the robust developmental dynamics of pre-revolutionary Russia. The study identifies limitations and shortcomings in Voslensky’s concept. Despite his profound analysis of the Soviet nomenklatura, Voslensky failed to recognize similar mechanisms of social stratification within Western democracies. His excessive idealization of the West hindered the application of his theory to a broader context of elite formation in various state systems. Additionally, Voslensky’s research, rooted primarily in personal experience, does not adequately explore the historical and cultural nature of the nomenklatura, its genesis, or potential analogs in other systems. Nonetheless, his theoretical contributions provide a valuable foundation for developing new models of democratic governance. (shrink)

During the twentieth century statistical methods have transformed research in the experimental and social sciences. Qualitative evidence has largely been replaced by quantitative results and the tools of statistical inference have helped foster a new ideal of objectivity in scientific knowledge. The paper will investigate this transformation by considering the genesis of analysis of variance and experimental design, statistical methods nowadays taught in every elementary course of statistics for the experimental and social sciences. These methods were developed by (...) the mathematician and geneticist R. A. Fisher during the 1920s, while he was working at Rothamsted Experimental Station, where agricultural research was in turn reshaped by Fisher’s methods. Analysis of variance and experimental design required new practices and instruments in field and laboratory research, and imposed a redistribution of expertise among statisticians, experimental scientists and the farm staff. On the other hand the use of statistical methods in agricultural science called for a systematization of information management and made computing an activity integral to the experimental research done at Rothamsted, permanently integrating the statisticians’ tools and expertise into the station research programme. Fisher’s statistical methods did not remain confined within agricultural research and by the end of the 1950s they had come to stay in psychology, sociology, education, chemistry, medicine, engineering, economics, quality control, just to mention a few of the disciplines which adopted them. (shrink)

In the book Science Studies as Naturalized Philosophy, Finn Collin deals with a long-term tendency toward conflict between, on the one hand, a philosophical understanding of scientific cognition and, on the other hand, the empirical science studies that include the cognitive content of sciences as an explanandum. Collin singles out Robert Merton as an advocate of a division of labor that avoids this conflict by delimiting the sociology of science to deal only with the social framework and genesis of (...) science, leaving it to philosophy and epistemology to investigate the justification of truth value and demarcation criteria. In this article, I will focus on Merton’s cudos norms and illuminate their meta-theoretical basis through the inclusion of Habermas’s ideas about rationality, the ‘ideal speech situation,’ his formal pragmatics, and his use of rational reconstruction. I discuss whether this can be considered ‘naturalized philosophy.’. (shrink)

This paper explores Nietzsche's account of the free spirit's genesis, as primarily given in the 1886 prefaces written for the works of his ?free spirit trilogy?. In particular, it will focus on how what will be argued is the free spirit's distinguishing capacity for radical questioning is created out of the process described there. That is, it will examine how what Nietzsche calls, ?the experience of sickness?, in enabling the free spirit's liberation, helps forge a mode of philosophical awareness (...) which is not otherwise attainable. However, the second half of this paper goes on to explore how the success of this process is endangered by a certain psychological tendency to which free spirits are susceptible. In other words, the free spirit's chance of enduring those painful depths of sickness necessary for liberation is threatened by the appeal of ?romantic pessimism?; a perspective which offers consolation by idealizing the sufferer's state. As such, then, in our final section, we will examine Nietzsche's efforts to combat this phenomenon. In particular, we will look at his advocacy of a specific kind of asceticism for this purpose, and with it his attempt to show how a true liberation of the spirit can be achieved. (shrink)

On a postcard to Franz Overbeck from January 4, 1888, Nietzsche makes some illuminating remarks with respect to the three treatises in his book On the Genealogy of Morality.2 Nietzsche says that, ‘for the sake of clarity, it was necessary artificially to isolate the different roots of that complex structure that is called morality. Each of these three treatises expresses a single primum mobile; a fourth and fifth are missing, as is even the most essential (‘the herd instinct’) – for (...) the time being, the latter had to be ignored, as too comprehensive, and the same holds for the ultimate summation of all those different elements and thus a final account of morality.’ Nietzsche also points out that each treatise makes a contribution to the genesis of Christianity and rejects an explanation of Christianity in terms of only one psychological category. The topics of the treatises are ‘good’ and ‘evil’ (first treatise), the ‘bad conscience’ (second), and the ‘ascetic ideal’ (third). The postcard suggests that Nietzsche discusses these topics separately because a joint treatment is too complicated, but that in reality, these ideas are inextricably intertwined, both with each other and with others that Nietzsche omits. Therefore, the three treatises should be regarded as parts of a unified theory and critique of morality. Nietzsche’s remarks on that postcard are important because in the Genealogy itself, he makes little effort to show the unity among the treatises. We shall return to this postcard repeatedly.3 The first treatise has attracted most scholarly attention, but much less work has been done on the second treatise, ‘ “Debts”, “Bad Conscience”, and Related Matters’. This is unfortunate, since it seems that, in Nietzsche’s own view, the central notion of the second treatise, namely, the bad conscience as a feeling of guilt, is a key element of Christian morality. Therefore, understanding Nietzsche’s treatment of this notion is essential to understanding his views on Christianity and the impact of the Christian heritage on non-religious moral philosophy.. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present an in-depth inquiry into one of the most disregarded dimensions of Fichte’s philosophy, i.e., the systematic place of embodiment in his transcendental epistemology. Highlighting the necessarily embodied nature of the constitution of the notion of thinghood or being in Fichte’s philosophy could not only help pave the way for a more elegant understanding of the relation between idealism’s and phenomenology’s subject views, it likewise enables a more comprehensive insight into Fichte’s much debated (...) theory of subjectivity. Furthermore, Fichte’s transcendental account of the body provides one with a new vantage point from which to consider some classical interpretive issues, most notably those pertaining to Fichte’s peculiar methodology, his Ideal-Realism, and his take on the problem of explanatory circularity in trying to tackle the problem of the genesis of (bodily) self-consciousness. (shrink)

For most of its career philosophy of religion has been a controversial dis cipline: it has usually ended up becoming a substitute for what it set out to explain. Born out of the religious scepticism of the late seventeenth century it remained for many years what it was to Hume and Lessing: an instrument for criticizing rather than for interpreting faith. Gradually the hostility subsided, but not the tendency to reduce. Nearly each one of the great names in this area (...) represents a theory that goes "beyond" faith. Phenomenology changed that situation. Conceived for accurate under standing of acts and meanings rather than for the building of vast synthe ses, its method was more apt to yield understanding than criticism. Moreover, by distinguishing the ideal meanings from the psychic realities of the act, it chased its followers from the quagmire of psychic genesis, causal justification and rational "proof" of the religious object, and forced them to concentrate on the intentional terminus of the experience. (shrink)

In this work, we will try to outline the position of desire and representation in the constitution of the capture apparatus of the imperial machine. For this, we will try to represent the way in which the libido itself is represented both in the primitive socius and in the barbarian socius. To carry out this path, we will start from two base texts: the first will be The Anti-Oedipus, where we trace the genesis of production, registration and consumption; together (...) with the text by Thousand Plateaus entitled The Capturing Apparatus, where we highlight the movement of the State's genesis and how, its conception is indifferent to the notion of the modern subject, as it is based on the flows of desire and on its ideal and concrete representations. In addition to this outline, we will seek to establish the influences of Marx and Engels on the conceptions of Deleuze and Guattari, in spite of the process of reflection about the genesis of the State. For this, we take the bibliographies of Marx and Engels indicated by the French authors – referenced in the two texts cited above – in their description of the genesis of the capture apparatus that is the State. Such works are specifically: A Contribution to the Critique of the Political Economy, The German Ideology and the Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts. (shrink)

A pesar de los matices y variaciones de significado, el concepto husserliano de intencionalidad no deja de estar al servicio de la idea clásica de la verdad como adaequatio, finalmente adaptada al orden monádico de la conciencia trascendental. Veremos, sin embargo, que en los análisis de Husserl sobre la conciencia interna del tiempo se manifiesta toda la dificultad para interpretar intencionalmente la esfera pasiva de la conciencia, peligrando la peculiar vocación a la verdad de la misma intencionalidad. Intentaremos, mediante las (...) últimas ideas husserlianas sobre la constitución eidética, encontrar una génesis pasiva del sentido ideal intencional sin perder su referencia egológica. Abstract: Despite the nuances and differences of meaning, the husserlian’s concept of intentionality supplies coherently that of classic true as adaequatio, even if adapted to the monadic order of transcendental conscience. We will show how Husserl’s analysis of inner time consciousness shows all the difficulties for an intentional interpretation of the passive sphere of consciousness, altering the peculiar vocation of intentionality to truth. Through the latest husserlian ideas on constitution, we will try to find a passive genesis to the ideal meaning of intentionality without losing its egologic reference. -/- . (shrink)

The article: 1. analyzes the Anglo-American philosophical works which, in the last thirty years, focus on the notion of beauty by making reference to Kant’s work ; 2. argues that choosing Kant’s work means choosing a strategy which opens to a notion of beauty which is relative, but not relativistic, subjective, but not anarchic, that is, universal, but not absolute; 3. argues that the most powerful tool Kant introduces to make it possible relativizing the way not to relativize the aim (...) may be his notion of ideal, since it includes, and does not exclude, the most relative, particular and variable cases in its very genesis. (shrink)

It is contended that one of the promising directions for brooding over the problem of incommensurability of paradigms, coined by T. Kuhn and P. Feyerabend, may be associated with the trend of neo-Kantian epistemology, embodied by the writings of Ernst Cassirer. According to Cassirer, the statements fixing connections and relationships between mathematical ideal constructs render a reliable ‘neutral language’ that can serve as a firm ground for comparing the ‘old’ and ‘new’ paradigms. The aim of the paper is to (...) offer Maxwell’s work as a test case against the incommensurability thesis. A case study of the genesis and functioning of a neutral mathematical language related to the Maxwellian solid synthesis of optics and electromagnetism is provided. It is elicited that its basis is constituted by stodgy language of continuum mechanics. The main function of the neutral language was to project the consequences of all the unified partial theoretical schemes (‘old’ rival paradigms) of Ampѐre, Faraday, Biot, Savar et al. onto the grand mathematical model, ‘rewrite’ all known laws in this pervasive mathematical language, compare their conclusions with each other to eliminate contradictions. Eventually the stuff was generalized in a self-consistent system of Maxwell’s equations. (shrink)

Cet article vise à montrer que, malgré le peu d'importance que les études récentes de la philosophie hégélienne de la religion accordent aux écrits antérieurs à la Phénoménologie, l'analyse des Jugensdschriften reste indispensable : a) pour comprendre la genèse de la thèse, centrale dans la Religionsphilosophie, sur la différence entre la raison et l'entendement, b) pour reconnaître que la logique de l'absolu employée par la théologie hégélienne fut davantage le résultat de l'attachement de Hegel à son idéal de raison et (...) de sa critique du Kantisme, que le fruit de sa méditation du christianisme ; c) pour découvrir l'unité du développement de la pensée hégélienne.The aim of this paper is to show that, even though recent studies of Hegel's Philosophy of Religion do not consider important the analysis of his early writings for the reconstruction of his mature thought, the exegesis of the Jugendschriften remains indispensable : a) for understanding the genesis of a position which is central in Hegel's Religionsphilosophie, namely his thesis on the difference between intellect and reason ; b) for acknowledging that the logic of the absolute, used by Hegel's theology, was more the result of his attachement to an ideal of reason and of his critique of Kant, than the fruit of his meditation of Christianity ; c) for discovering the unity in the development of Hegel's thought. (shrink)

In Ennead III.7.11--13, Plotinus describes the genesis of time, and time's nature as the life of soul, and the moving image of eternity. In this dissertation, Ennead III.7.11--13 was read, using an exegetical method, which comprised, raising questions, and answering them, in strictly Plotinian terms, by contemplating the pieces that best fit into these puzzles. Some answers discovered were as follows. ;Before its appearance, time exists as the seed of time in Intellect. This is a state of rest because (...) of its relative unity, its participation in the genus rest, and its absence of tolma. Time's genesis comprises an eternal manifestation of a change of identity from seed to actualization. Time is generated in four logical steps. Soul becomes diluted upon its generative acts, mainly because of tolma. Soul has a far richer contemplation of Intellect underlying its genesis of the sensibles, than that underlying its genesis of time. ;Soul undergoes ontological loss in its generation of time and the sensible universe. Beginning with tolma, and the desires for autonomy unleashed by tolma, soul's multiplicity is enhanced. Yet this multiplicity is also tempered by soul's unquiet power's glance of aspiration towards Intellect. This glance is the contemplation, which fecundates soul's generation of time. Soul's power is its strength, but the unquietness of this power can indicate ontological loss. Tolma in soul incurs evil, because tolma thwarts soul from contemplating Intellect. ;The genus-species structure of soul is involved in the generation and omnipresence of time, through the actualization of the genus in its species. Time is ideally omnipresent when time is kairos. Soul is immortal and impassible, and it is only soul's activity and progeny, which are temporal. Time is the life of soul, insofar as movement is predicated of this life at three levels: the logical, the perceptible, and the spatial. Time itself is a poorer life than eternity, time itself is not alive, and yet, time is not unreal. Time is a moving image of eternity through the common predicates applied to both, which are their shared characteristics, defining the essence of the image that time constitutes. (shrink)

The article is devoted to a comparative analysis of the political views of the philosophers of Montaigne circle. The ideas put forward by Charron and La Boétie were important not only for the period of religious wars of the 16th century, but also for various aspects of the genesis of modern philosophy. If autocracy is unacceptable in principle for La Boétie, then Charron is a supporter of a monarchical state structure, although he condemns tyrannical rule. La Boétie justifies his (...) position with references to the need to protect political free­dom. Autocracy, he believes, is inseparable from arbitrariness, illegal and gross violation of the interests of the country’s residents. People can refuse freedom only voluntarily, from force of habit of obeying tyrannical power, once established by deception or violence. He considers it possible to end religious strife by a revival of the Church and a moral re­newal. La Boétie’s political ideal is a republic. Charron, by contrast, considers the king a true sovereign. But rulers often have both shortcomings and vices, sometimes giving rise to tyranny, expressed in disregard for the laws and traditions of the country. Charron, like La Boétie, sees the reason for the religious wars in the damage of morals. He also sees a compromise as the best solution; to withdraw compatriots from the state of civil con­frontation is possible peacefully. For Charron, as for La Boétie, social inequality, class hi­erarchy seems to be an invariable condition of social existence. For both, violence is an unacceptable form of implementing social improvements. Both see religion as an im­portant pillar of social life. In the coordinate system of the two thinkers of the Montaigne circle, religious considerations are not taken beyond the general contours of their political reflections. It is noteworthy that for the philosophical landscape of the late Renaissance, the problem of religious confrontation turns out to be closely associated with the question of the best form of social structure. Discussions about it continue in our time. (shrink)