The dehumanisation of women has been recorded in world history. In religions one can easily find interpretations that tend to be discriminatory against women. This research aims to see the humanisation of women in the Tafsir Faidh Ar-Rahman by Kiai Sholeh Darat towards the position of women in Islam. This research is a library research. Data collection was done through documentation. Furthermore, the data were analysed qualitatively by a descriptive method. The results of the study showed that. The humanisation (...) of women in the Tafsir Faidh Ar-Rahmân by Kiai Sholeh Darat on the position of women in Islam is; he emphasised that women have an equal position with men. In terms of inheritance, Kyai Sholeh Darat wanted flexibility in understanding the verse regarding the portion of inheritance 2:1 so that the provisions can adapt according to the situation. In certain contexts, women may get the same share as men. Contribution: The thoughts of Kiai Sholeh Darat have contributed to being one of the references in looking at women’s issues in Islam objectively. (shrink)

Ṣūfī people, as well as the ulema (ʿulemā), discussed the issue of how God (Ḥaḳḳ) surrounds the universe (ʿālem) and where the ʿarş (arsh / the ninth heaven) in which God ensconces himself exists. The Ṣūfī people supporting the unity of existence (Wahdat al-wujud) concept claim that God surrounds the universe by his own being and so that the ʿarş (arsh) is all the creation / created beings by God moreover they argued that people who rejected this idea could attribute (...) weakness or impotence to the power of God. On the other hand, commentators and scholastic theologians acknowledge the idea that God surrounds the universe not by his own being as Ṣūfīs claimed but God surrounds the universe by his knowledge (ʿilm) and power (ḳudret). They claimed that there was no physical connection of God with the universe. There-fore, this article discusses a couplet (beyit) written by Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī from Bayramī-Melāmī group in light of four different tracts (risāle). One of the four tracts was written by the author of the couplet Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī himself. The title of his tract is Wahdat-nameh (Vaḥdet-nāme). The other tract was written by Munīrī-yi Belgradī and the title of it is Şarḥ-i Qaṣīda-i Suleymān. The other two tracts analyzed in this article were written by Ṣalāḥ al-dīn-i ʿUşşāḳī. These two tracts try to explain how God surrounds the universe from the unity of existence (Wahdat al-wujud) perspective. Therefore, they may help in understanding the men-tioned couplet written by Lāmekānī. The outline of the article is as follows: the introduction has the text of the ghazal including the mentioned couplet and discusses how the characteris-tics of Bayramī-Melāmī people were reflected in their poems. This part also tries to determine who wrote the mentioned ghazal as there were two different pen manes / pseudonyms (mah-las) for the same ghazal in various resources. To determine the original writer of the ghazal is crucial for proper interpretation of the texts. The next part of the article discusses the accusa-tion that Lāmekānī was an heretic in the Şarḥ-i Qaṣīda-i Suleymān tract by Munīrī-yi Belgradī. This part also tries to outline Munīrī-yi Belgradī’s mode of thought to discuss the background of his criticism about the couplets. According to his way of thinking, though Munīrī had some tolerance to Ṣūfī people believing fenā fillāh, he ironically harshly criticized the Ṣūfī group supporting Wahdat al-wujud entitled as Fuṣūṣī. In the second section, based on his work named Wahdat-nameh (Vaḥdet-nāme), it is aimed to create a general portrait of Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī. In this context, it discusses how Wahdat al-wujud and Hurufism, which are generally big issues for Bayramī-Melāmī, influenced Lāmekānī. Therefore, the comparison between Oglan Sheikh İsmāʿil-i Maʿşūḳī who was clearly influenced by Wahdat al-mavjud (vaḥdet-i mevcūd) and Hurufism, and Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī is realized in this part. It was figured out that adoration of Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikem (Fuṣūṣīlik) was more influential in Bayramī-Melāmī Sheikh’s mode of thinking through the analysis of the effect of Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikem in Wahdat-nameh (Vaḥdet-nāme). It was suggested that the reason behind the allocation of Munīrī-yi Belgradī for Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī was the effect of Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikem which was salient for Melāmī Sheikh Lāmekānī. The final part of the article is about two tracts Miftāḥ al-vucūd and Zayl al-kitāb written by Ṣalāḥ al-dīn-i ʿUşşāḳī. The criticized couplet was read under the light of these tracts. These two tracts are significant as they explain how God surrounds the universe and where the ʿarş (arsh) is located by referring to the verses of Quran al-Fussilet 41/54, al-Nisā 4/126 and el-Tāhā 20/5 mentio-ned in the couplet by Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī. Ṣalāḥ al-dīn-i ʿUşşāḳī proposed a new argument about how God surrounds the universe in Zayl al-kitāb. According to this argument, in Miftāḥ al-vucūd Ṣalāḥ al-dīn-i ʿUşşāḳī tries to explain God’s surrounding potent through the or-ders/grades of the existence. In Zayl al-kitāb, he claims that there must be a center for God’s surroundings of the universe and this center must be Ḥaḳīḳat al-Muḥammediyye. Ṣalāḥ al-dīn-i ʿUşşāḳī stated that he did not acknowledge this information by himself but he acquired it from Ibn Arabī when he had a dream. Lastly, this part of the article discusses what Rahman settles in ʿarş (arsh) means in terms of circle (devir) theory. It was suggested that according to Ṣūfī people believing Wahdat (vaḥdetçi) God’s ʿarş (arsh) is the human being himself by drawing on the Kasf al-Gıtā (Keşfu’l-Gıtā) qasida written by Sunʿullāh-ı Gaybī who was a successor of Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī from the second generation. (shrink)

the demise of the logical positivism programme. The answers given to these qu- tions have deepened the already existing gap between philosophy and the history and practice of science. While the positivists argued for a spontaneous, steady and continuous growth of scientific knowledge the post-positivists make a strong case for a fundamental discontinuity in the development of science which can only be explained by extrascientific factors. The political, social and cultural environment, the argument goes on, determine both the questions and (...) the terms in which they should be answered. Accordingly, the sociological and historical interpretation - volves in fact two kinds of discontinuity which are closely related: the discontinuity of science as such and the discontinuity of the more inclusive political and social context of its development. More precisely it explains the discontinuity of the former by the discontinuity of the latter subordinating in effect the history of science to the wider political and social history. The underlying idea is that each historical and - cial context generates scientific and philosophical questions of its own. From this point of view the question surrounding the nature of knowledge and its development are entirely new topics typical of the twentieth-century social context reflecting both the level and the scale of the development of science. (shrink)

The present paper aims to shed light on some post-oedipal moments of the Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis. Going beyond the stereotypical opposition between the oedipal psychoanalysis and the anti-oedipal schizoanalysis, it endeavors to reinvestigate the semiotic nature of theknotenpunktand thesinthomeby applying some Deleuzian and Bakhtinian concepts. Thus, theknotenpunktis described as a grotesque knot bringing together some heterogeneous elements. The involved disparate components establish a rhizomatic multiplicity irreducible to a common determiner. As far as thesinthomeis concerned, it is also illustrated as a grotesque (...) knot quilting the disseminated heterogeneous orders. In contrast to the dominant conception of the symptom with a complex mode of signifying (that is mainly bound to the oedipal topography), theknotenpunktand thesinthomehold a kind of hyper-formative mode of signifying. As a result, the latter may be regarded as pure formators irreducible to a meaning or a certain interpretation. Finally, the paper sets out to analyze and evaluate the relationship between thesinthomeand the foreclosure from a semiotic perspective. Accordingly, thesinthomeis explained as a reply to foreclosure which is specifically a perceptive-imperative (retroactive) contemplation (in the light of law according to the Peircean phaneroscopy) on the rhizomatic multiplicity of psychosis (the case of schizophrenia). (shrink)

Qiyās, or “correlational inference”, comprises a primary set of methodological tools recognized by a majority of premodern Sunnī jurists. Its elements, valid modes, and proper applications were the focus of continual argument and refinement. A particular area of debate was the methodology of determining or justifying the ʿilla: the legal cause giving rise to a ruling in God’s Law. This was most often discussed under the rubric of “the modes of causal justification”. Among these modes was the much debated test (...) of dawarān. In brief, proponents of dawarān employed it to justify claims that a property occasioned the ruling in an authoritative source-case. In concert with other considerations, the demonstrated co-presence and co-absence of property and ruling—that is, their concomitance “in existence” and “in nonexistence” — was taken as an indication that the property was the ruling’s ʿilla. Delving further into dawarān and causation, the current study interprets “in existence” and “in nonexistence” not as a kind of metaphor for true and false, but as an accurate terminology vis-à-vis the meaning of causality statements, fully compatible with dominant Islamicate views on causal agency. In brief, a deeper logical and linguistic analysis of the different existential modes of dawarān strongly suggests that we should distinguish property and ruling as types as opposed to tokens. Our reading of dawarān as shaped by a finer-grained structure not only allows us to identify the efficient occasioning process as a function which takes some particular token of the ʿilla and renders a token of the general ruling type, but it allows us to elucidate the role of taʿlīl in shaping an epistemological theory of argument to the best explanation: a sophisticated, premodern manifestation of abductive reasoning. (shrink)

One of the main controversies of the Logic Schools of the 12th century centered on the question: What follows from the impossible? In this paper arguments for two diametrically opposed positions are examined. The author of the ‘Avranches Text’ who probably belonged to the school of the Parvipontani defended the view that from an impossible proposition everything follows (‘Ex impossibili quodlibet’). In particular he developed a proof to show that by means of so-called ‘disjunctive syllogism’ any arbitrary proposition B can (...) be logically derived from a pair of contradictory propositions A and Not-A. The author of the Ars Meliduna instead argued that nothing follows from an impossible proposition (‘ex falso nihil sequitur’). This view is supported by various counterexamples which aimed to show that the admission of impossible premises would give rise to inconsistent conclusions. Upon closer analysis these inconsistencies do not, however, have the formal structure of a real contradiction like A and Not-A, but rather the structure of two rivalling conditionals like ‘If B then A’ and ‘If B then Not-A’. Hence these counterexamples rather have to be considered as refutations of the basic principles of ‘connexive logic’. (shrink)

Recent work on the development of a dialogical approach to the logic of fiction stresses the notion of existence as choice. Moreover, this approach to existence has been combined with the notion of ontological dependence as deployed by A. Thomasson’s artifactual theory of fiction. In order to implement such a combination within the dialogical frame several predicates of ontological dependence have been defined. However, the definition of such predicates seems to lean on a model-theoretic semantics for modal logic after all. (...) The main aim of the present paper is to set a dialogical frame for the study of fictions in the context of the dialogical approach of CTT recently developed by S. Rahman and N. Clerbout where a fully-interpreted language is unfolded. We will herewith develop the idea that in such a setting fictional entities are understood as hypothetical objects, that is, objects (functions) the existence of which is dependent upon one or more hypotheses that restrict the scope of choices available. We will finish the paper by suggesting that this provides both a natural and genuinely dialogical way to understand R. Frigg’s take on scientific models as fictions and a new perspective on Thomasson’s notion of generic ontological dependence. Keywords: fiction, dialogues, dialogical logic, hypothetical objects, scientific models. (shrink)

PREFACEProf. Göran Sundholm of Leiden University inspired the group of Logic at Lille and Valparaíso to start a fundamental review of the dialogical conception of logic by linking it to constructive type logic. One of Sundholm's insights was that inference can be seen as involving an implicit interlocutor. This led to several investigations aimed at exploring the consequences of joining winning strategies to the proof-theoretical conception of meaning. The leading idea is, roughly, that while introduction rules lay down the conditions (...) under which a winning strategy for the Proponent may be built, the elimination rules lay down those elements of the Opponent's assertions that the Proponent has the right to use for building winning strategy. It is the pragmatic and ethical features of obligations and rights that naturally lead to the dialogical interpretation of natural deduction.During the Visiting Professorship of Prof. Sundholm at Lille in (2012) the group of Lille started delving into the ways of implementing Per Martin-Löf's Constructive Type Theory with the dialogical perspective. In particular, Aarne Ranta's (1988) paper, the first publication on the subject, was read and discussed during Sundholm’s seminar. The discussions strongly suggested that the game-theoretical conception of quantifiers as deploying interdependent moves provide a natural link between CTT and dialogical logic. This idea triggered several publications by the group of Lille in collaboration with Nicolas Clerbout and Juan Redmond at the University of Valparaíso, including the publication of the book (2015) by Clerbout / Rahman that provides a systematic development of this way of linking CTT and the dialogical conception of logic. However the Clerbout / Rahman book was written from the CTT perspective on dialogical logic, rather than the other way round. The present book should provide the perspective from the other side of the dialogue between the Dialogical Framework and Constructive Type Theory. The main idea of our present study is that Sundholm's (1997) notion of epistemic assumption is closely linked to the Copy-Cat Rule or Socratic Rule that distinguishes the dialogical framework from other game-theoretical approaches. One way to read the present book is as a further development of Sundholm’s extension of Austin's (1946, p. 171) remark on acts of assertion to inference. Indeed, Sundholm (2013, p. 17) gave the following forceful formulation: When I say therefore, I give others my authority for asserting the conclusion, given theirs for asserting the premisses.Per Martin-Löf, in recent lectures, have utilized the dialogical perspective on epistemic assumptions to get out of a certain circle that threatens the explanation of the notions of inference and demonstration. A demonstration may be explained as a chain of (immediate) inferences starting from no premisses. That an inference J1... Jn—————Jis valid means that the conclusion J can be made evident on the assumption that J1, …, Jn are known. The notion of epistemic assumption thus enters in the explanation of valid inference. We cannot, however, in this explanation understand 'known' in the sense of demonstrated, for then we are explaining the notion of inference in terms of demonstration, whereas demonstration has been explained in terms of inference. Martin-Löf suggests that we here understand 'known' in the sense of asserted, so that epistemic assumptions are judgements others have made, judgements for which others have taken the responsibility; that the inference is valid then means that, given that others have taken responsbility for the premisses, I can take responsibility for the conclusion:The circularity problem is this: if you define a demonstration to be a chain of immediate inferences, then you are defining demonstration in terms of inference. Now we are considering an immediate inference and we are trying to give a proper explanation of that; but, if that begins by saying: Assume that J1, …, Jn have been demonstrated – then you are clearly in trouble, because you are about to explain demonstration in terms of the notion of immediate inference, hence when you are giving an account of the notion of immediate inference, the notion of demonstration is not yet at your disposal. So, to say: Assume that J1, …, Jn have already been demonstrated, makes you accusable of trying to explain things in a circle. The solution to this circularity problem, it seems to me now, comes naturally out of this dialogical analysis. […]The solution is that the premisses here should not be assumed to be known in the qualified sense, that is, to be demonstrated, but we should simply assume that they have been asserted, which is to say that others have taken responsibility for them, and then the question for me is whether I can take responsibility for the conclusion. So, the assumption is merely that they have been asserted, not that they have been demonstrated. That seems to me to be the appropriate definition of epistemic assumption in Sundholm's sense. One of the main tenets of the present study is that the further move of relating the Socratic Rule rule with judgemental equality provides both a simpler and more direct way to implement the constructive type theoretical approach within the dialogical framework. Such a reconsideration of the Socratic Rule, roughly speaking, amounts to the following. 1.A move from P that brings-forward a play-object in order to defend an elementary proposition A can be challenged by O. 2.The answer to such a challenge, involves P bringing forward a definitional equality that expresses the fact that the play-object chosen by P copies the one O has chosen while positing A. For short, the equality expresses at the object-languaje level that the defence of P relies on the authority given to O to be able to produce the play-objects she brings forward. More generally, according to this view, a definitional equality established by P and brought forward while defending the proposition A, expresses the equality between a play-object (introduced by O) and the instruction for building a play-object deployed by O while affirming A. So it can be read as a computation rule that indicates how to compute O's instructions. Let us recall that from the strategic point of view, O's moves correspond to elimination rules of demonstrations. Thus, the dialogical rules that prescribe how to introduce a definitional equality – correspond – at the strategic level – to the definitional equality rules for CTT as applied to the selector-functions involved in the elimination rules. So, what we are doing here is extending the dialogical interpretation of Sundholm's epistemic assumption to the rules that set up the definitional equality of a type.The present work is structured in the following way:•In the Introduction we state the main tenets that guide our book•Chapter II contains a brief overview of Constructive Type Theory penned by Ansten Klev with exercises and their solutions. •Chapter III offers a novel presentation of the dialogical conception of logic. In fact, the first two sections of the chapter provide an overview of standard dialogical logic – including solved exercises, slightly adapted to the content of the present volume. The rest of the sections develop a new dialogical approach to Constructive Type Theory. •Chapters IV and V contain the main body of our study, namely the relation between the Socratic Rule, epistemic assumptions, and equality. The chapter provides the reader with thoroughly worked out examples with comments. •After the Final Remarks the book containsa.An appendix containing a an overview of all the rules for the new formulation of dialogical approach to constructive type theory developed in the book; b.a brief outline of Per Martin-Löf's informal presentation of the demonstration of the axiom of choice.c.two examples of a tree-shaped graph of an extensive strategy. Acknowledgments: Many thanks to Mark van Atten (Paris1), Giuliano Bacigalupo (Zürich), Charles Zacharie Bowao (Univ. Ma Ngouabi de Brazzaville, Congo), Christian Berner (Lille3), Michel Crubellier (Lille3), Pierre Cardascia (Lille3), Oumar Dia (Dakar), Marcel Nguimbi ((Univ. Marien Ngouabi de Brazzaville, Congo), Adjoua Bernadette Dango (Lille3 / Alassane Ouattara de Bouaké, Côte d'Ivoire), Steephen Rossy Eckoubili (Lille3), Johan Georg Granström (Zürich), Gerhard Heinzmann (Nancy2), Muhammad Iqbal (Lille3), Matthieu Fontaine (Lille3), Radmila Jovanovic (Belgrad), Hanna Karpenko (Lille3), Laurent Keiff (Lille3), Sébastien Magnier (Saint Dennis, Réunion), Clément Lion (Lille3), Gildas Nzokou (Libreville), Fachrur Rozie (Lille3), Helge Rückert (Mannheim), Mohammad Shafiei (Paris1), and Hassan Tahiri (Lisbon), for rich interchanges, suggestions on the main claims of the present study and proof-reading of specific sections of the text. Special thanks to Gildas Nzokou (Libreville), Steephen Rossy Eckoubili (Lille3) and Clément Lion (Lille3), with whom a Pre-Graduate Textbook in French on dialogical logic and CTT is in the process of being worked out – during the visiting-professorship in 2016 of the former. Eckoubili is the author of the sections on exercises for dialogical logic, Nzokou cared of those involving the development of CTT-demonstrations out of winning-strategies. Special thanks also to Ansten Klev (Prague) for helping with technical details and conceptual issues on CTT, particularly so as author of the chapter introducing CTT. (shrink)

Recent work on the development of a dialogical approach to the logic of fiction stresses the notion of existence as choice. Moreover, this approach to existence has been combined with the notion of ontolog-ical dependence as deployed by A. Thomasson’s artifactual theory of fiction. In order to implement such a combination within the dialogical frame several predicates of ontological dependence have been de-fined. However, the definition of such predicates seems to lean on a model-theoretic semantics for mod-al logic after all. (...) The main aim of the present paper is to set a dialogical frame for the study of fictions in the context of the dialogical approach of CTT recently developed by S. Rahman and N. Clerbout where a fully-interpreted language is unfolded. We will herewith develop the idea that in such a setting fiction-al entities are understood as hypothetical objects, that is, objects (functions) the existence of which is dependent upon one or more hypotheses that restrict the scope of choices available. We will finish the paper by suggesting that this provides both a natural and genuinely dialogical way to understand R. Frigg’s take on scientific models as fictions and a new perspective on Thomasson’s notion of generic ontological dependence. Keywords: fiction, dialogues, dialogical logic, hypothetical objects, scientific models. (shrink)

The crux of the present paper is that Fiqh can be considered as a religious apparatus mediating between the spheres of divine addressivity and Sharia performativity. The former may manifest itself as the addressing of a spectral prophetic figure or the hidden Imām; however, the latter may emerge in the form of a responsive-performative discourse characterized paradoxically by the autonomy of ontology, heteronomy of force and pen-ultimacy of statements. By fabricating a sacred archive, establishing some hermeneutical devices (generative and interpretative), (...) and designating authentic archons, Fiqh as a mediating factor determines the ultimate form of the performative discourse of Sharia and renders the spectral addressing into a sonorous imperative tone. With regard to their various semiotic procedures, different Fiqh apparatuses, in Islamic worlds, lead to divergent and sometimes discordant binding discourses ranging from sovereign and generative Sharia laws to suspended divine rules. (shrink)

While discussing his notion of objective knowledge Popper introduces the idea of dispensability of knowing subjects, the autonomy of knowledge and the argumentative function of language. The main claim of our paper is that, on our view, objective knowledge produced by argumentative interaction is not achieved by dispensing knowing subjects but by differentiating between the play and the strategic levels of argumentation, where a distinction should be drawn between a particular concrete knowing subject engaged in that interaction, say Karl, and (...) an arbitrary one. Moreover, the theory of meaning deployed at the level of plays, the so-called local meaning, provides already some kind of objective knowledge, since it is player-independent and it does not reduce to the purely logical one of the strategy level. In fact, despite our criticism we think that Popper's discussion of the notion objective knowledge still deserves to be reflected on, particularly so in view of new results concerning the formalization of Brouwer’s Creating Subject and the dialogical interpretation of the notion of epistemic assumption. (shrink)

Qiyās, or “correlational inference” (often glossed as “analogy”), comprises a primary set of methodological tools recognized by a majority of premodern Sunnī jurists. Its elements, valid modes, and proper applications were the focus of continual argument and refinement. A particular area of debate was the methodology of determining or justifying the ʿilla: the legal cause (or occasioning factor, or ratio legis) giving rise to a ruling in God’s Law. This was most often discussed (and disputed) under the rubric of “the (...) modes of causal justification” (masālik al-taʿlīl). Among these modes was the much debated test of dawarān (concomitance of presumed cause and effect). In brief, proponents of dawarān employed it to justify claims that a property (waṣf) occasioned the ruling (ḥukm) in an authoritative source-case (aṣl). In concert with other considerations, the demonstrated co-presence (ṭard) and co-absence (ʿaks) of property and ruling—that is, their concomitance “in existence” (wujūdan) and “in nonexistence” (ʿadaman)— was taken as an indication that the property was the ruling’s ʿilla. Delving further into dawarān and causation (ʿilliyya), the current study interprets “in existence” and “in nonexistence” not as a kind of metaphor for true and false (within the framework of a classical truth-functional formal semantics), but as an accurate terminology vis-à-vis the meaning of causality statements, fully compatible with dominant Islamicate views on causal agency. In brief, a deeper logical and linguistic analysis of the different existential modes of dawarān strongly suggests that we should distinguish property (or phenomenon) and ruling (or effect) as types (concepts or propositions linguistically expressed by a sentence) as opposed to tokens (instantiations of the type; the real, ontological events that verify the proposition). Our reading of dawarān as shaped by a finer-grained structure not only allows us to identify the efficient occasioning process as a function which takes some particular token of the ʿilla (arguably, the property or properties which provide the ruling’s material cause) and renders a token of the general ruling type, but it allows us to elucidate the role of taʿlīl (causal justification) in shaping an epistemological theory of argument to the best explanation: a sophisticated, premodern manifestation of abductive reasoning. (shrink)

In her book Fiction and Metaphysics (1999) Amie Thomasson, influenced by the work of Roman Ingarden, develops a phenomenological approach to fictional entities in order to explain how non-fictional entities can be referred to intrafictionally and transfictionally, for example in the context of literary interpretation. As our starting point we take Thomasson’s realist theory of literary fictional objects, according to which such objects actually exist, albeit as abstract and artifactual entities. Thomasson’s approach relies heavily on the notion of ontological (...) dependence, but its precise semantics has not yet been developed. Moreover, the modal approach to the notion of ontological dependence underlying the Artifactual Theory has recently been contested by several scholars. The main aims of this paper are (i) to develop a semantic approach to the notion of ontological dependence in the context of the Artifactual Theory of fiction, and in so doing bridge a number of philosophical and logical gaps; (ii) to generalize Thomasson’s categorial theory of ontological dependence by reconstructing ontological categories of entities purely in terms of different structures of ontological dependence, rather than in terms of the basic kinds of entities the categorical entities depend on. (shrink)

La réflexion philosophique sur la non-existence est une thématique qui a été abordée au commencement même de la philosophie et qui suscite, depuis la publication en 1905 de « On Denoting » par Russell, les plus vifs débats en philosophie analytique. Cependant, le débat féroce sur la sémantique des noms propres et des descriptions définies qui surgirent suite à la publication du « On Referring » par Strawson en 1950 n’engagea pas d’étude systématique de la sémantique des fictions. En fait, (...) le développement systématique d’un lien qui articule approches logiques, philosophiques et littéraires de la fiction devait attendre les travaux de John Woods publiés en 1974 dans son livre The Logic of Fiction : A Philosophical Sounding of Deviant Logic. Un des enjeux les plus excitants du livre de Woods se situe au niveau de l’interaction entre les points de vue internalistes ou interne-à-l’histoire (principalement pragmatiques) et les points de vue externalistes ou externe-à-la-fiction (principalement sémantiques). Sur ce point, Woods fut le premier à formuler une sémantique pour l’opérateur de fiction à lire comme « selon l’histoire… » en relation à la notion logique de portée, ce qui permettait l’étude de l’internalisme et de l’externalisme. Suite au livre de Woods, loin de s’essouffler, les débats trouvaient une nouvelle impulsion. Le fait pertinent pour notre article est que la tradition phénoménologique également, l’étude de la fiction a joué un rôle central. En effet, l’une des problématiques les plus sujettes à controverses dans l’intentionnalité est celle de l’indépendance à l’existence, c’est-à-dire le fait que les actes intentionnels n’ont pas besoin d’être forcément dirigés vers un objet existant. Influencée par les travaux de Roman Ingarden (1893-1970), l’un des plus importants disciples de Husserl, Amie L. Thomasson développe le concept phénoménologique de dépendance ontologique en vue d’expliquer les processus de références inter- et transfictionnels – dans le contexte de l’interprétation littéraire par exemple. L’enjeu essentiel de cet article est de proposer une reconstruction multimodale bi-dimensionnelle de la théorie des personnages fictionnels de Ingarden-Thomasson. Cette théorie qui entend prendre au sérieux le fait que les fictions sont des créations montre la voie pour une articulation entre les approches internalistes et externalistes. Nous motivons certains changements quant à l’approche artéfactuelle - incluant une sémantique appropriée pour l’opérateur de fictionalité qui, nous l’espérons, éveillera l’intérêt des théoriciens de la littérature. L’article est à d’autres égards un panorama de la façon dont différents concepts d’intentionnalité pourraient fonder différentes sémantiques formelles pour la fictionalité. Nous proposerons enfin un cadre dialogique qui est une extension modale d’un certain système de preuve développé par Matthieu Fontaine et Juan Redmond. Le cadre dialogique développe la contrepartie inférentielle de la sémantique bi-dimensionnelle introduite par Shahid Rahman et Tero Tulenheimo dans un article récent. (shrink)

Nowadays, there is a quite considerable amount of literature on the use of analogy or more generally of inferences by parallel reasoning in contemporary legal reasoning, and particularly so within Common Law. These studies are often motivated by researches in artificial intelligence seeking to develop suitable software-support for legal reasoning. Recently; Rahman/Iqbal/Soufi (2020) developed a dialogical approach in the framework of Constructive Type Theory to what in Islamic Jurisprudence was called qiyās or correlational inferences. In their last chapter the authors (...) suggested that such an approach contributes to the study of patterns of reasoning by precedent cases within contemporary common Law. In the present paper we will further motivate the deployment within Civil and Common Law of the dialogical framework developed in Rahman/Iqbal/Soufi (2020). After a presentation of Scott Brewer's take on analogy within Common Law, that has striking structural similarities to reasoning by precedent case rooted in ratio legis (known in Islamic Jurisprudence as qiyās al-'illa or correlational inference by the occasioning factor), we will illustrate the implementation of the framework with a brief discussion of some cases of legal reasoning based in Spanish Civil Law but where the accent is put in the emerging ruling rather than in the existing of a case as in Common Law. Moreover; quite surprisingly, the case under study suggests that even cases of Law-interpretation fit the argumentation pattern of qiyās al-'illa. A caveat: in the present paper we will focus mainly in discussing the dynamics of the meaning constitution involved rather than in setting the rules of the underlying dialogical framework, the latter is the subject of a follow-up paper. (shrink)

Knowledge was a major issue in science and philosophy in the twentieth century. Its first irruption was in the heated controversy concerning the foundations of mathematics. To justify his rejection of the use of the actual infinite in mathematical reasoning, Brouwer has made the construction of mathematical objects dependent on the knowing subject. This approach was rejected by the mainstream of analytical philosophers who feared a fall into pyschologism. Several years later, the question of the progress of scientific knowledge was (...) put forward in the thirties by the post-positivist philosophers to fill the vacuum in the philosophy of science following the demise of the logical positivism programme. The answers given to these questions have deepened the already existing gap between philosophy and the history and practice of science. While the positivists argued for a spontaneous, steady and continuous growth of scientific knowledge the post-positivists make a strong case for a fundamental discontinuity in the development of science which can only be explained by extrascientific factors. The political, social and cultural environment, the argument goes on, determine both the questions and the terms in which they should be answered. Accordingly, the sociological and historical interpretation involves in fact two kinds of discontinuity which are closely related: the discontinuity of science as such and the discontinuity of the more inclusive political and social context of its development. More precisely it explains the discontinuity of the former by the discontinuity of the latter subordinating in effect the history of science to the wider political and social history. The underlying idea is that each historical and social context generates scientific and philosophical questions of its own. From this point of view the question surrounding the nature of knowledge and its development are entirely new topics typical of the twentieth century social context reflecting both the level and the scale of the development of science. To the surprise of modern historians of science and philosophy, the same kind of questions, which would allegedly be new topics specific to the twentieth century concerning the nature of knowledge and its progress, were already raised more than eleven centuries earlier in the context of the Arabic tradition which, as we discuss further on, developed a trans-cultural and trans-national concept of the unity of science (see the contributions of Deborah Black and Jon McGinnis which tackle the issue of the nature of knowledge). The neglect of the Arabic tradition in philosophy of science is a major a gap not only in the development of science but a fundamental flaw in the writing of its history and philosophy caused by the total reduction of epistemology to political and social history of science. How has this period of the history of science and philosophy come to be ignored? In what circumstances were the questions akin to the nature of knowledge raised in the first place? What is the relation between on the one hand the questions of knowledge and its growth and on the other hand the unity of science in the Arabic tradition? The answers to some of these questions are the aim of the present volume, the first of the series Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science to be devoted to a so-called non-western tradition. Let us first highlight in a kind of overview some landmarks concerning the timing of the emergence of the Arabic tradition and its significance for the history of science. (shrink)

Humor has been praised by philosophers and poets as a balm to soothe the sorrows that outrageous fortune’s slings and arrows cause inevitably, if not incessantly, to each and every one of us. In mundane life, having a sense of humor is seen not only as a positive trait of character, but as a social prerequisite, without which a person’s career and mating prospects are severely diminished, if not annihilated. However, humor is much more than this, and so much else. (...) In particular, humor can accompany cruelty, inform it, sustain it, and exemplify it. Therefore, in this book, we provide a comprehensive, reasoned exploration of the vast literature on the concepts of humor and cruelty, as these have been tackled in Western philosophy, humanities, and social sciences, especially psychology. Also, the apparent cacophony of extant interpretations of these two concepts is explained as the inevitable and even useful result of the polysemy inherent to all common-sense concepts, in line with the understanding of concepts developed by M. Polanyi in the 20th century. Thus, a thorough, nuanced grasp of their complex mutual relationship is established, and many platitudes affecting today's received views, and scholarship, are cast aside. (shrink)

David Chalmers (2022) argues that reality as we encounter it in virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) is just as real as the everyday physical world. We may not agree with Chalmers’s prop...

Carnap in the 1930s discovered that there were non-normal interpretations of classical logic - ones for which negation and conjunction are not truth-functional so that a statement and its negation could have the same truth value, and a disjunction of two false sentences could be true. Church ar-gued that this did not call for a revision of classical logic. More recent writers seem to disa-gree. We provide a definition of "non-normal interpretation" and argue that Church was right, and in (...) fact, the existence of non-normal interpretations tells us something important about the condi-tions of extensionality of the classical logical operators. (shrink)

During my (Hafiz) childhood in Bangladesh, I experienced the negative impact of the educational system. My experiences initiated a process of conscientization leading to values-driven activism through the establishment of Education for Development and Sustainability (EDS), a child-friendly community of practice, with Trine and Alamin. In encounters with Erling and Sigrid, we became aware that our activities were in accordance with action research based on cooperative inquiry (Heron & Reason, 2008). From that point of departure, we developed our own collaborative (...) living theory. In this paper, we explore the research question “How did we become action researchers and what is our driving force?” by using Stoller’s (1989) autobiographical narrative method to analyse selected, lived experiences. Sharing lived experiences and engaging in activism with each other and the EDS children became the base for our conscientization, radical empiricism and contemplating involvement in EDS. Value based activism can create empathic relations and emotions through shared engagement for social justice and the realization that we create a shared reality. Hence, conducting action research with children/youth is in our experience a key to sustainable development. However, to increase the transparency and validity of our research, we needed to explore how our experiences and actions have influenced our values, emotions and decisions to conduct research, our research topic and the research in itself. Therefore, we have engaged co-researchers and participants to critically question the research practice and made it open for discussion and comments in order to see alternative ways of interpreting situations and processes. (shrink)

Quranic recitations have attracted great attention from scholars throughout the ages. The recording of Quranic recitations, whether in special works, tafsir or hadith works, began in the early periods of Islamic history. This study aims to introduce Ibn al-Yazidi, Abu Abdurrahman al-Yazidi (d. 237 AH) and to examine his approach to presenting and guiding Quranic recitations in his book “Gharib Al-Qur’an and Tafsir”. The Yazidi family is famous in the field of Quranic recitations. At the forefront comes Abu Muhammad Yahya (...) bin al-Mubarak (d. 202 AH), the father of Abu Abdul Rahman Abdullah bin Yahya, the author of the book under study. Abu Muhammad has a special narration and interpretations in Quranic recitations. Abu Abdul Rahman narrated the recitation of Abu Amr bin Al-Ala (d. 145 AH) from his father Yahya and acquired Arabic knowledge from Farra (d. 207 AH). Ibn al-Yazidi wrote the book “Gharib Al-Qur’an and tefsir”, which is in the middle ranks among its peers, including the gharibul-Qur'an and the languages of the Quran. He revealed his preferences in recitations and explained their meanings and the differences between them. Ibn al-Yazidi also wrote his book before many of the famous books in Bayan al-Gharib and al-Kira'at. Ibn al-Yazidi, who acquired the recitation from his Yazidi father Yahya bin al-Mubarak (d. 202 AH), the owner of the famous recitation, did not stick to a single recitation in his book. Since the readings he confirmed or selected in his book are a mixture of mutawatir, famous and shaz readings, as we will see throughout our study, he did not mention this classification, which came late for his time. Similarly, regarding the strange words in Ibn al-Yazidi's book Gharib Al-Qur’an and tefsir, we see that sometimes he mentions some words in a different order in the verse or verses. Sometimes he presented the Qur'anic recitation with a verse that is not in place in the Qur'an. Because while explaining the strange words, he relied on interpreting the Qur'an with the Qur'an, so he mentioned another verse by saying "from him" or "from that" and presented the recitation in the verse. Ibn al-Yazidi was also interested in the languages mentioned in the Qur'an and their status in explaining, defining and guiding the Qur'anic recitations. Thus, Ibn al-Yazidi presented various readings in many places of the book, and became a reference that was used by Mekki ibn Abi Talib (d. 437 AH), Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 597 AH) and other writers in tafsir, garib al-Qur'an and readings. In the study, a scanning approach was followed to list the words mentioned by Ibn al-Yazidi in one or more of his readings, and a historical descriptive approach was followed to mention the life of Abu Abdul Rahman and to explain the importance of his book and its scientific value in the field of garib al-Qur'an and Qur'an readings. Later, in his work titled "Gharib Al-Qur’an and its Tafsir", an analytical approach was followed to explain Ibn al-Yazidi's sources and his approach to presenting and directing the readings. The study consists of an introduction, two sections, a conclusion and a bibliography. The introduction section includes the importance and methodology of the study. In the first part, Ibn al-Yazidi's introduction and the introduction of his book called Gharib Al-Qur’an and its Tafsir are given. In the second part, Ibn al-Yazidi's approach to presenting and guiding the recitations is presented. Then, the conclusion and sources. (shrink)

According to the nineteenth-century polymath William Stanley Jevons, natural phenomena were a series of combinations and permutations. The similarity between Jevons’s account and other instances of ars combinatoria has already been noticed, although this topic has never been extensively addressed in the literature. In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation of Jevons’s logic and philosophy of science as an art of combinations. Jevons’s position shall be compared with other theorizers in the ars combinatoria tradition. This study will show (...) that Jevons’s art of combinations differed from some of the examples here investigated because he did not believe that language could refer to the primal constituents of reality. Rather, his art of combinations relied on the order of combinations, displaying a syntactical nature. Consequently, I will argue that Jevons’s logic presents some relevant similarities to Leibniz’s characteristica. Moreover, this analysis offers a contribution to the study of Jevons’s logic, highlighting the ontological implications embedded in his logical thought. (shrink)

The science of Kalâm, expressed as Uṣûlü'd-dîn in Islamic thought, is a constructional science. This means that the science of Kalâm has a dynamic structure in social life as well as a theoretical beginning. Kalâm has played an important role in the implementation of the idea of tawhid and the justice-based life that will accompany it by taking into account the historical and geographical heritage of Muslim communities on how to understand the hopes of religion. It is known that the (...) political and social events that took place in Muslim society also took place in the history of Islamic thought as a theological sect in the later historical process. Muslims, part of a geography that has historically been the source of ancient cultures and thoughts, tried to protect the basic hopes of the religion they belonged to while also responding to the accusations of members of different faiths against Islam. Like other Islamic sciences, the science of Kalâm was formed later as a discipline. Depending on the method followed in understanding religious thought, theological sects were formed. Two basic approaches are dominant in the historical process and the general practice of the Muslim society. There is a rational trend that tends to use ta'wil to understand the verse based on nass and those qualified as Ahl-i hadith that do not accept ta'wil except for narration. The supporters of this method will later be described as Mu'tazila. There are dozens of theological sects shaped around these two basic ideas. This historical use of kalâm is rife with contradictions. They take a serious attitude towards those who use the kalâm method of the Ahl-i hadith. Although this is the case, the science of Kalâm as a discipline has played a very fundamental role in the Muslim society from the very beginning to the present. Unfortunately, the constructive function of the Science of Kalâm historically has not been continuous. As in other Islamic sciences, the Science of Kalâm became after a certain time a form of repetition or interpretation of what was written in the past, with commentaries and annotations instead of original copyright works. This naturally caused the Muslim community to imitate the past in every aspect of life and thus not be able to build a future. Muslim scholars have tried to address this over time and across geographies. A part of this early effort was the necessity of reinterpreting Islamic sciences. In the modern period (19th-20th century), a search for innovation has been made in all Islamic sciences. The main purpose of these efforts was the re-evaluation of Islamic sciences in accordance with the conditions of the age. One of those who was a part of this important and meaningful struggle is Fazlur Rahman (d.1988). He criticizes the science of Kalâm as well as other Islamic sciences and make suggestions to make Kalâm gain a dynamic structure. While Fazlur Rahman's criticism of Kalâm is included, the early period criticism of Kalâm will also be briefly mentioned in order to provide a better understanding of the subject. A comparison will be made between the thoughts of those who criticized Kalâm in the early period and those of Fazlur Rahman in the modern period. While there is an opposition to Kalâm in the form of the rejection of the science of Kalâm as a discipline, especially in the thought of Ahl al-Hadith, the science of Kalâm was considered as a constructional science in Fazlur Rahman. In addition to arguing that the Science of Kalâm should be reorganized as a discipline in terms of the method and content, Fazlur Rahman emphasizes the necessity of considering the past as an experience that must be understood according to the conditions of the day. For Fazlur Rahman, one of the reasons made Muslim thought inert is because the discipline of Kalâm does not consider present social life. In the 20th century, with modernism, theological debates gained a new dimension, and developments in all areas of social life gave birth to a brand new culture very different from the past. As a result of this, new value judgments have been formed to revisit and criticize the culture and values of the past. (shrink)

The concluding five books (33-37) of Pliny the Elder’s Naturalis Historia enumerate various types of metals and minerals together with how these materials can be used. This utilization especially in fine arts gives Pliny a chance to survey the history of art. The peculiar feature of this historical narrative can be spotted in the author’s strongly anecdotic presentation. The first part of “Natura, Ars, Historia” is devoted to a specification, an analysis and an interpretation of the anecdotic narratives found (...) in the Naturalis Historia’s art history. The essay highlights how the anecdotes become parables illustrating certain virtues Pliny highly esteemed. (shrink)

L’herméneutique coranique de Fazlur Rahman (1919-1988) repose sur la recherche méthodique du sens objectif du texte. Inspiré par l’herméneutique romantique, telle qu’on peut la trouver chez E. Betti et qui nécessite pour le lecteur d’établir un lien intérieur avec l’esprit de l’auteur, Rahman considère que c’est l’intention divine qui est garante de l’objectivité du sens du Coran. L’empathie avec l’auteur est rendue possible par une conception historique de la révélation, selon laquelle la parole, qui est amenée par un Esprit intérieur (...) et immatériel, passe par le filtre de la conscience prophétique. La méthode historiciste d’interprétation de Rahman, qu’il appelle herméneutique du « double mouvement », repose sur les deux critères d’objectivité que sont le contexte historique de la révélation et la prise en compte de la totalité du livre sacré. Ainsi, l’interprète doit, dans un premier temps, aller à la période de révélation pour, à partir des circonstances particulières, comprendre les finalités objectives du texte, identifiées à l’intention divine. Puis, il doit appliquer ces principes, qui sont moraux et non juridiques, au présent en s’éloignant du sens littéral. Rahman illustre son propos en essayant de montrer que le souci de l’intention divine permet de voir que le Coran s’oppose à la polygamie et à l’esclavage, qui vont contre le principe moral d’une société juste et égalitaire. (shrink)

Focusing on some contemporary Islamic reformers’ solutions, in particular, Abolkarim Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, and Fazlur Rahman, to concrete issues in Muslim societies, this article examines two different methodological strategies of alternative readings of the Sunna: an archeological one and a genealogical one. In the archeological perspective, the holy text has been considered as a repository of answers to all sorts of questions. Through a pathological analysis, this view suggests solutions to correct distortions and looks for new windows seeking an original (...) interpretation of the Qur’an. The genealogical view, on the other hand, puts aside this pathology and instead insists on the idea of the contingency of any interpretation. Regardless of accuracy and validity, according to the genealogical view, all interpretations have addressed temporal and contextual questions. What is important in this perspective is not returning to an original source for finding the exact message of Allah, or correcting previous interpretations, but recurrently referring to an open-ended text in order to explore the futures of the Qur’an. (shrink)

The hermeneutic path involved in the interpretation of law as well as in the interpretation of sacred texts, though peculiar, seems - as Emilio Betti pointed out - to share several things, most importantly the "normative" nature of interpretation. The 1999 issue of the Yearbook "Ars Interpretandi" accounts for the several and disparate relationships between these two important "regional hermeneutics".

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Art of Interpreting Art PAUL BAROLSKY “The quality of the prose is just as important in nonfiction as in fiction.” —Robert Caro If as Horace famously wrote in the Ars poetica the aim of poetry is to instruct and delight, why shouldn’t the goal of all writing be the same? Why should all readers not enjoy as well as learn from what they read? In the realm of (...) academe, however, although much writing instructs, far too little delights. This is so because the goal of academic writing is primarily that of conveying information and knowledge or of developing new ideas. Delight or pleasure are not of primary academic concern. Too few scholars care sufficiently about how they write. Too many academics write in unreadable prose. Often their writing is ponderous, indeed pompous, because they are insecure in the face of theoretical, philosophical or scientific writing. The outcome can be quite hideous. Sometimes, dare I say often, their writing is dreadfully dry and dull. In the Humanities, the arts, by which I mean those that have been called the spatial arts, that is, architecture, sculpture, and painting, can be studied from a wide variety of perspectives. As some observers have noted, however, frequently in the academic study of art and its history, art as such recedes from view and drops out of the discussion. Art becomes primarily the illustration of something else, something other than itself. It comes to be the illustration of the global, colonial, sexual, political, theological, social, economic, religious, anthropological, philosophical, technological, scientific, or theoretical. It is too often not sufficiently appreciated for its own sake as art. Do I sound as if I am writing about the much-scorned notion of “art for art’s sake?” Yes, but not exactly. Since the arion 28.1 spring/summer 2020 102 the art of interpreting art nineteenth century, when Gautier wrote, l’art pour l’art meant just that, the celebration of art for its own sake. Eventually, however, that notion came to be disparaged as too limited, since it supposedly failed to address the various kinds of associations between art and the other phenomena listed above. The notion of art for its own sake unfortunately came to be seen as a manifestation of aestheticism or formalism— both often regrettably terms of opprobrium. Not long ago a graduate teaching fellow in a prestigious art history program had her students read my essay on the role of writing about art which was published in the spring/ summer 2018 issue of this journal. The first part of that essay concerned atrocious writing, which, our teaching fellow said, made her students laugh—yes, laugh! They presumably laughed because the prose of scholars was so very bad—ridiculous in the root sense of the word, laughable. One example of pompous diction that I have cited often because it is so laughably absurd, is the definition one art historical scholar has given of sex as “inter-corporeal relationality.” No wonder the students laughed! With considerable amusement, the graduate teaching fellow to whom I have just referred told me that she rather doubted her students bothered to read the second part of the essay she assigned, even though it included some exemplary writing about art. Why should they have bothered to read examples of excellent writing? After all, their teachers, who too often do not themselves write well, do not encourage students to think sufficiently about their prose. Let me add to the cluster of grotesque writing illustrated in the Arion article to which I have referred one more example of how bad academic writing about art can be in order to remind the reader of the kind of absurd nonsense or blather that one encounters throughout the Humanities. It comes from a highly esteemed author who “describes influence as a notion which provides a support—of too magical a kind to be very amenable to analysis—for the facts of transmission and com- Paul Barolsky 103 munication; which refers to an apparently causal process (but with neither rigorous delineation nor theoretical definition) the phenomena of resemblance or repetition; which links, at a distance and through time—as if through the mediation of... (shrink)

This study deals with a linguistic phenomenon that has not been fully researched. This phenomenon was mentioned in some of the works of the bedî scholars who called it ittisâ (statements that can be interpreted in more than one meaning – provided that the vocabularies can express these interpretations – without any presence of any presumption in favour of any meaning, often out of the intention of the speaker. -/- Multiples interpretations used for many reasons, may be grammatical, word’s structure, (...) phonetic or written, this linguistic phenomenon deserves in-depth survey. -/- This research examines the phenomenon of ittisâ on two sides: -/- 1- The techniques used by the speaker to produce statements with multiple meanings -/- 2- How the recipient interpret these statements. -/- This research will be a guide showing us the rhetorical art in ittisâ. it will introduce examples of the ittisâ science from the Holly Quraan, the prophet’s Hadith, the words of the companions, and the poems of the Arabs and their proverbs. (shrink)

This study seeks to investigate the treatise of Abū al-Hasan b. Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad al-Khatīb al-Shirbīnī al- Shāfiʻī (d. after 1028/1619) entitled Fatḥ al-Raḥīm al-Raḥmān fī tafsīr Āyat "inna Allāha yaʼmuru bi al-ʻadl wa al-iḥsān" based on the manuscript of the author. Shedding light on the translation of this unknown scholar, as it is evident from the title of the treatise that it contains the interpretation of this verse, which is well known among scholars and commentators as the (...) most comprehensive verse in the Qur’ān. In this tafsīr, Shirbīnī used many exegetical methods such as exegesis of the Qur'ān with the Qur'ān, exegesis of the Qur'ān with the Sunnah, exegesis of the Qur'ān with the sayings of the Companions, and al-tafsīr bi-al-raʼy, as well as tafsīr approaches such as linguistic tafsīr, the science of munāsabāt, and causality of nuzūl to analyze the meanings of the verse in depth. Another feature that increases the importance of this treatise is that al-Shirbīnī refers to the primary source tafsīr books together with their glosses, sometimes quoting from the commentators verbatim, and sometimes making meaning-based quotations from them, which is the most obvious indication of his exegetical ability and scholarly competence. In this work, he adopted a syncretic approach while emphasizing the meanings of the verse and followed an analytical-critical method while examining the subject. For this reason, he analyzed all the words in the verse one by one, dwelt on the meanings and interpretation of the words, and criticized their views after including the views of the commentators. Therefore, he applied the analytical exegesis method very successfully in this work. Accordingly, he analyzed the narrations related to tafsīr and mentioned the Companions' names during the narration. In particular, he analyzed the narrations from Ibn 'Abbas (d. 68/687-88) about the words al-ʻAdl and al-iḥsān, and stated that there was a dispute between the narrations about the phrase al-iḥsān. He took a scientific stance on the derivation of the word "Allah,” debated between those who accepted it and those who rejected it. He stated that the derivation of the word was not satisfactory and reliable. In the tafsīr of the words al-ʻAdl and al-iḥsān, he discussed the isnāds in Muqātil b. Sulayman’s (d.150/767) tafsīr emphasizing that he received the tafsīr of al-ʻAdl from Ibn 'Abbas and the tafsīr of al-iḥsān from 'Ali b. Abī Tālib. This approach is an important example for the isnād analyses of Muqātil b. Sulayman who was criticized for neglecting isnād chains in his tafsīr. He also criticized al-Baydāwī for being influenced by some of Zamakhsharī's sectarian and theological views. He classified the issue of kinship according to usūl, furū', and hawāshī, expanded the meaning of the verse, and insisted that the message of this verse encompasses all relatives, regardless of the degree of kinship. He was influenced by Latāʾif al-Ishārāt, al-Kashshāf, Mafātīhu al-ghayb, al-Baydawī, Hāshiya al-Jurjānī ala al-Kashshāf, and his grandfather al-Khatīb al-Shirbīnī’s (d.977/1570) al-Sirāj al-munīr. (shrink)

Religion -- Philosophy. ; Bible -- Islamic interpretations. ; Knowledge, Theory of (Religion).

The problems recently detected in the famous words ars adeo latet arte sua (Ov. Met. 10.252) can be resolved if the line is repunctuated on the basis of an unjustly neglected interpretation put forward by Byzantine and Renaissance scholars.

The relationship of tradition towards Bruno is twofold, and the analysis of this relationship will show that Bruno is interpreted either as a pioneer of new science or as a mystic, mage, and follower of hermetic tradition. Following these two viewpoints, Bruno’s ars memoriae will be interpreted either as a mere memory technique in the service of empirical science or as an occult, magical art. This paper aims to open up and analyse the ways by which we can approach and (...) understand Bruno and his method, that goes beyond the mentioned strict division. In the period of Renaissance, which represents an incredible combination of tradition and the new, magic and science do not exclude one another; in search for knowledge, each method finds its proper place. Ars memoriae is precisely that: a universal method that allows knowledge to be understood in its multiplicity. In this paper, we will present some of the key elements of Bruno’s philosophy, by exploring different interpretations and perspectives, and show why Bruno was understood and interpreted in the way in which he was and why is it necessary to access the ars memoriae by striving to unite scientific and magical elements. In Bruno’s thought there are many places where scientific and magical are not only not opposed to each other, but are complementary, and represent an inseparable whole within which knowledge is commonplace both to former and latter. The task, therefore, is not to analyse ars memoriae in detail, but to examine possible approaches to that method. Understanding of Bruno depends upon understanding his method of ars memoriae. (shrink)

North Atlantic culture lacks a commonly shared view on dying well that helps the dying, their social environment and caregivers to determine their place and role, interpret death and deal with the process of ethical deliberation. What is lacking nowadays, however, has been part of Western culture in medieval times and was known as the ars moriendi (art of dying well) tradition. In this paper an updated version of this tradition is presented that meets the demands of present day secularized (...) and multiform society. Five themes are central to the new art of dying: autonomy and the self, pain control and medical intervention, attachment and relations, life balance and guilt, death and afterlife. The importance of retrieving the ancient ars moriendi outreaches the boundaries of palliative medicine, since it deals with issues that play a central role in every context of medical intervention and treatment. (shrink)

Utusan Melayu Company, Qalam Press Company and the Department of Islamic Affairs, Prime Minister’s Department are the main contributors to the translation discipline of religious texts in Malaysia. Abdullah Basmeih has worked with these institutions as a translator. His purpose is to assist the translation of religious writings from Al-Muṣawwar magazine and multi-disciplinary religious texts, among them sīrah, stories of the Prophet’s companions, ʿaqīdah, ‘Ibādah, social and politics. Sheikh Abdullah Basmeih migrated to Singapore in 1939 and worked with Qalam Press (...) Company from 1950 to 1962 as assistant author for monthly magazines published by Qalam Press. Within the 12-year period he worked in Qalam Press, he had successfully translated more than 30 books on the life of Prophet Muhammad, his wives, children and companions. Abdullah Basmeih then returned to Malaysia. During that time, his great work was produced, which is Tafsir Pimpinan Ar-Rahman Kepada Pengertian Al-Quran in 1968 in Jawi edition, and a Roman edition was published in 1980 by the Department of Islamic Affairs, Prime Minister’s Department. Another great work by him was Mastika Hadis, which is a translation of ḥadīth collection, produced in three volumes, also published by Prime Minister’s Department on 1973. Both works become important materials to enhance the quality of lives of Muslims in Malaysia. Therefore, this study looks at his service and contributions with Utusan Melayu Company, Qalam Press Company and Prime Minister’s Department in producing translations of academic texts. This literary study is conducted to investigate and analyse the translated texts by him in knowledge hub in reality and virtual. (shrink)

In the first half of the 15ᵗʰ century there was a coherent philosophical system of teaching at the Jagiellonian university, so-called ars vetus, concerning the interpretation of three treatises: Aristotle’s Categories and Hermeneutics and Porphyry’s Isagoge. The question-commentaries on the Categories that have been preserved in several manuscripts show astonishing similarity in solving individual problems – there are three copies of Benedict Hesse’s commentary and one copy of Paul of Pyskowice’s work, moreover, in BJ 1941 there is an anonymous (...) commentary on the Categories that is also very close to the ones mentioned before, to prove that fact. This paper, discussing the four-fold division of opposition in those Polish commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories, is part of the studies on the manuscript material that has not been critically edited yet. The main goal is to show the philosophical views on contraries, contradictories, relatives and possession and privation in a wider perspective, comparing the Polish commentaries’ doctrine with the authoritative text itself. (shrink)

This paper analyses different retrospective links between the scientia generalis by Leibniz and the three key traditions of the Renaissance and Early Modern Europe – the philosophical, the rhetorical and the encyclopaedic one. The issue demonstrates the insufficient charachter of the two influential interpretations of the idea of scientia generalis by Leibniz – as a project of elaborating a a method of mathematical calculations for non-mathematical subjects (L. Couturat, J. Mittelstraß, V. Peckhaus etc.) and as a project of an encyclopaedic (...) synthesis combining ideas of the Lull’s Ars magna and humanistic rhetoric by M. Nizolius with the philosophical-theological encyclopaedism of J. Alsted and B. Keckermann (P. Rossi, W. Schmidt-Biggemann, T. Leinkauf etc.). The author presents the thesis that the formation of Leibniz’s idea of scientia generalis as well as some other concepts of the universal science in 17th century philosophy are the result of rethinking and expanding of the concept of the “first philosophy” delivered by Aristotle in his “Metaphysics”. (shrink)

From their founding to their collapse, the Andalusian Umayyads have been struggling with the Christian states which established in the north following Umayyads conquests of the region. During this long struggle period, the first name that ceased their progress and had authority over these states was Hakam II’s father Abd ar-Rahman III (300-350/912-961). The power provided by him continued in the periods of Hakam II (350-366/961-976) and Amirids (366-398/976-1008). In this process, Hakam II period was important because the obedience of (...) the states in question had been maintained, new conquests were achieved, and an uninterrupted eight-year peace was established. In this article, the sixteen-year long struggle process, including war and peace periods, of Hakam II against these states in the North of Andalusia has been discussed. The article consists of four chapters. In the first part, the Muslim control on the Kingdom of Leon, which attacked the Andalusian Umayyad lands at the beginning of this period, has been examined. In the second part, the battles with the Christian states in the north and the conquests carried out in this period have been discussed. In the third part, the peace process between the two sides, which had been continuing for eight years, has been examined. In the fourth part, the Christian states' attempt to recapture the Gormaz (Gurmâc) castle has been mentioned. The main purpose of the article is to contribute to the debate in modern western literature about the Umayyads' domination of these states, recorded by Muslim historians as well. (shrink)

Although Sibawayh dealt with it in a scattered manner under different headings there have been different views on na't (adjective), which is gene-rally included in the tawabi group in Arabic syntax, and there have been debates around these views. Na't, which is categorized as a proper adjective and qualifies the meaning of man'ut (mawsuf), has different characteristics from the sentence elements that indicate the subject. Nahiv scholars have mostly divided na't into two parts: real and causal na't, and they have (...) formulated certain rules for these two parts in accordance with the structure of the Arabic language. Since na't and man'ut are accepted as nouns, the i'rab of na't is subject to men'ut. However, some examples in the Qur'an and some expressions used by the Arabs caused objections to the i'rab of na't being the same as men'ut. It is observed that these objected examples are the cases where men'ut is known and the exceptional cases of madih, zam and jarri jivar. It is also obligatory for the na't to conform to the man'ut in terms of ma'rifiyyah, nekiriyyah, custom and gender. While Sibawayh (d. 180/796) considered it qabh (ugly) for non-propositional words to be na't, scholars such as Ibn Hisham (d. 218/833), Ibn al-Ḥajib (d. 646/1249), and Abd ar-Rahman Jami (d. 898/1492) accepted that na't could be either propositional or non-propositional and cited many examples of na't in the case of non-propositional words. Scholars such as Ibn Jinni (d. 392/1002) and Ibn al-Hajib gave an explanation of the causative na't without naming it, scholars such as Ebu’l-Bekā al-Ukbari (d. 616/1219) analyzed the subject under the title of causative adjective or causative na't, and Halid b. Abdullah al-Azhari discussed it under the title of al-wasf al-majazi. The subject of our study is to examine the handling of na't, which is one of the sentence elements in the Arabic language, in the works written on the field, its parts, the dimension that affects the meaning and the controversial aspects. The aim of the research is to examine the rules that Sibawayh deals with in his al-Kitâb on na'ta and the objections of later Arab linguists to these rules, and to contribute to the field by revealing different views on the subject. (shrink)

Šios analizės tikslas yra trilypis. Visų pirma, bandoma nustatyti pagrindinius Nietzsche’s subjekto kritikos aspektus. Visų antra, bandoma identifikuoti centrinę šios kritikos funkciją. Visų trečia, bandoma interpretuoti Nietzsche’s ginamą subjektą kaip kūnišką stimulų, instinktų, ir reikmių daugialypumą. Esėje parodoma, kad standartinis subjekto problematikos Nietzsche‘s kūriniuose svarstymas nėra adekvatus. Pasak tokio svarstymo, Nietzsche atsisako subjektyvistinių mąstymo kontūrų ir pakeičia juos radikaliai nauja paaiškinamąja schema. Esėje taip pat parodoma, kad Nietzsche niekad nesiekė pateisinti atomistinės ar anarchiškos subjekto sampratos. Nietzsche siekė suprasti subjektyvybę dvigubo (...) patvirtinimo būdu – kaip valdančio stimulo ir subjekto tapsmo patvirtinimą. Tokio dvigubo patvirtinimo dėka, savastis atsiskleidžia kaip tekstas ir jo interpretacija.Esminiai žodžiai: ego, kūnas, Nietzsche, savastis, subjektas.The following analysis has a threefold task. First, it aims to identify the central aspects of Nietzsche’s critique of the subject. Secondly, it aims to identify the main function that this critique serves. And thirdly, it aims to interpret the subject Nietzsche defends and endorses in terms of a bodily multiplicity of drives, instincts and needs. The paper argues against the standard interpretation of the problematic of the subject in Nietzsche, according to which Nietzsche abandons the subjectivistic approach in favor of an entirely different explanatory framework. The paper shows that far from supporting an atomistic or an anarchic view of the subject, Nietzsche’s narrative endorses a notion of subjectivity that entails a double affirmation: the affirmation of the ruling drive of the body and of the style of the subject’s becoming. In virtue of such a double affirmation, the self discloses itself as both the text and its interpretation.Key words: body, ego, Nietzsche, multiplicity, self, subject. (shrink)

In the House of Fame, Chaucer takes up the problem of the nature of traditional texts and suggests, with humor and skepticism, that literary discourse is reducible to a form of speech, spoken sounds inscribed in texts as a form of written memory perpetuated by the arbitrary institution of tradition. Lady Fame personifies this institution. Although many critics have considered the House of Fame to be a poem about poetry and the burden of the past, the key assumptions of medieval (...) literary theory upon which the poem depends have not yet been discussed. Chaucer exploits some common topics of medieval ars grammatica, the discipline directly concerned with language, writing, and the texts of the auctores, and the literary problems developed throughout the poem are to be understood in the light of medieval grammatical theory. Chaucer interpreted Ovid's description of the Hall of Fama in Metamorphoses 12 with the conceptual framework of grammatical theory, giving Ovid's account of repeated spoken utterances a literary significance, and the Eagle's lecture on speech follows the topics of exposition found in the commentaries, on Priscian's Institutiones grammaticae 1, De voce. Drawing from well-known treatises, commentaries, and encyclopedias of the medieval grammatical tradition, I will demonstrate that Chaucer relies upon, and assumes his reader's acquaintance with, some commonplaces of grammatica on the topics of speech, writing, texts, and history. (shrink)

According to the consencus of Muslim world, al-Aqsā Mosque is located in the land of al-Quds (Jerusalem). In this matter, especially the old Sunnite sources are in agreement with each other. However, there are recently some different views regarding the location of al-Aqsā Mosque. It has been argued that al-Aqsā Mosque most likley was built in a location differnet from Jerusalem. One of the defenders of this opinion is Muhammad Hamīdullah, who is a prominent scholar of Islamic studies and considered (...) to be a reliable authority among contemporary Islāmic historians. He claims that al-Aqsā Mosque, which was also mentioned in the Qur’ān, cannot be the Mosque that is present in Jerusalem. Rather, it must be searched in heavens. If this claim is accepted, then numerous reports informing that the mosque is located in Jerusalem and many interpretations based on these reports, will become problematic and controversial. Therefore, it is necessary to examine those claims and the relevant evidence in detail. Following this pueporse, we aim to examine and evaluate those views with a critical approach in this study. In this regard, we will argue that the comments and approaches that have been argued so far, are not consistent. Rather, relevant claims do not rely on strong evidence but only unsatisfactory interpretations. Summary: Muhammad Hamīdullah who is a prominent researcher and well-known for his studies on History of Islām, has individual opinions on some issues, different from classical scholars of Ahlu’s-Sunnah (branch of Islām that accepts the first four caliphs as rightful successors to Muhammad). One of his distinctive views is the original place of Masjid al-Aqsā (al-Aqsā Mosque). He claims that al-Aqsā Mosque was likely located, not in al-Quds (Jerusalem), but in heavens. In this article, our purpose is to examine this matter by evaluating his arguments regarding the place of al-Aqsā Mosque. Hamīdullah’s argument is based on several reasons which are as follows:Miʻrāc (The Ascension) is a journey from the earth to beyond the heavens. According to Hamīdullah, it is illogical to say that, in relation to such a magnificient occurrence, the Holy Qur’ān only mentions the journey from Mecca to Bayt al-Maqdis/al-Quds.Hamīdullah maintains that the expression “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” in the first verse of Sūrah al-Isrā means “the remotest Mosque.” However, the Palestinian lands are described as “Adna’l-Arḍ/Nearest Country” in the third verse of Sūrah ar-Rūm. Thus, “the remotest Mosque” should not be “the nearest country”; rather it should be a Mosque in heavens.He also argues that in some Hadith texts, the mosque in question is mentioned as “Masjid al-Aqsā”, but there is a grammatical difference between the phrases of “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” and “Masjid al-Aqsā”, which means that the mosque mentioned as “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” in the Qur’ānic verse does not have a connection with al-Quds (Jerusalem). In his opinion, the expression of “Masjid al-Aqsā” which appears in some Hadith texts is in the form of a noun clause, while the quranic expression “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” is in the form of an adjective clause. Accordingly, “Masjid al-Aqsā” and “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” refer to different places. The noun clause -as in the Hadith texts- of “Masjid al-Aqsā” must be in al-Quds, whereas the Qur’ānic expression in the form of an adjective clause of “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” must be a mosque in the heavens.According to his other claim, Abu’l-Yemān, the teacher of the teacher of Bukhārī, when narrating the hadith about mosques, he mentions this mosque, not as “al-Masjid al-Aqsā”, but as Īliyā’. That is, according to him, early sources of hadith do not mention the phrase of “al-Masjid al-Aqsā”, but instead, the phrase of Īliyā’ was used. Hamīdullah also states “... while narrating this hadith, Muslim does not use the phrases “Masjid al-Aqsā” or “al-Masjid al-Aqsā.” Instead, he uses the phrase Īliyā’.”He also states that the term al-masjid (the mosque) which appears in the seventh verse of Sūrah al-Isrā, was used to refer to that Īliyā’, not to refer to “al-Masjid al-Aqsā”. Likewise, the Umayyad Caliph Abdulmelik (26-86 h.c./646-705 g.c.) built the Dome of the Rock (Masjid al-Saḥra) in al-Quds and named it “Masjid al-Aqsā”. This name became so widespread at the times of Imam al-Bukhārī (194-256 h.c./810/870 g.c.) so that the old name Īliyā’ had been totally forgotten. Because of this reason, some hadith narrators were using this more common name “Masjid al-Aqsā” to express and describe this forgotten name.When we critically evaluate the information and approaches explained above, we come to the conclusion that they are not consistent. First of all, the claim that Masjid al-Aqsā is in the heavens, is in disagreement with the Qur’ānic verses implying that “Masjid al-Aqsā” is in al-Quds, and with many authentic hadith texts that indicate its existence on those lands. Also, the sources of Qur’ānic interpretations (exegeses) and historical narrations refute this claim. On the other hand, there is no Qur’ānic verse or tradition (hadith) that state that Masjid al-Aqsā is in the heavens.We argue that Hamīdullah’s claim “...It is illogical to say that, in relation to such a magnificient occurrence, the Holy Qur’ān only mentions the journey from Mecca to al-Aqsā Mosque in al-Quds” is not very appropriate. Because, it is beyond the human judgment to decide which part of this magnificient journey is more important or which part of it should take place in the Holy Qur’ān. Only Allah has the authority to decide for this. Moreover, we should remember that-as mentioned in the conveyed knowledge- the incident mentioned in the first verse of Sūrah al-Isrā is merely the magnificient journey from Mecca to Masjid al-Aqsā, which was clearly stated in the authentic hadith sources. As for the third verse of Sūrah al-Rūm, it is not correct to claim that Masjid al-Aqsā is not in al-Quds but in the heavens, by reading the text of the verse. Because, the phrase al-arḍ (the earth) has several meanings. Moreover, the phrase al-aqsā (the remotest) in the first verse of Sūrah al-Isrā, refers to distance between the two mosques, not between two countries.In some hadith texts, Masjid al-Aqsā was mentioned as “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” in the form of a noun clause, but this does not require that the masjid in question should be in the heavens. Because, many hadith texts mention it in the form of an adjective clause. Besides, some hadith texts mention Masjid al-Harām (Great Mosque of Mecca) in the form of a noun clause (Masjid al-Harām), not in the form of an adjective clause (al-Masjid al-Harām). If we consider Hamīdullah’s claim, we should look for the Masjid al-Harām in the heavens, but not on earth. So far, neither he nor anybody else made such a claim.Hamīdullah argues that Abu’l Yemān mentioned this mosque as Īliyā’, but not as al-Masjid al-Aqsā, and claimed that early religious sources do not use the term al-Masjid al-Aqsā. However, this is not a sound argument. Because, the authorities of hadith and history, who lived both before Abu’l Yemān and also at the same era, used the term “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” in their works and narrated that this term refers to al-Quds or Bayt al-Maqdis (Masjid al-Aqsā). Moreover, Hamīdullah’s claim that Muslim (a senior hadith scholar) did not use the terms “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” or “Masjid al-Aqsā” but instead he used the name “Īliyā’” is incorrect. Because, while narrating this hadith, the hadith scholar (Muslim) used all three names. As for the term “al-Masjid (the Mosque)” mentioned in Q 17.7, it is a groundless comment to claim that it does not refer to “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” in Q 17.1. Because the context of the verses and grammatical rules of Arabic language explicitly prove that the mosque mentioned in the seventh verse refers to “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” which is also mentioned in the first verse.His claim that “the Umayyads named the temple that they built in Jerusalem as “Masjid al-Aqsā” and following the era of Umayyads, in the period of Bukhārī, this naming became widespread” is highly vulnerable and disputable. Because in those times, the temple used to be named as “al-Masjid al-Jami (the Gathering Mosque)”, not as “al-Masjid al-Aqsā”. Nearly three centuries after the Umayyads reign, the naming of the said temple was first introduced to be as “al-Masjid al-Aqsā”. As for the expression of “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” appearing in the early sources of hadith, it was not used for the mosque built by the Umayyads, but was used to mean the entire haram (sacred, respected) region taking place in the south east corner of Jerusalem. In the light of arguments and explanations critically analysed above, we are in a position to argue that Muhammad Hamīdullah’s argument that “Masjid al-Aqsā is in the heavens”, does not rely on sound evidence, but rather, they are only some unsatisfactory interpretations. (shrink)

At the end of the 20 century, after a few decades of oblivion, the thought of George Santayana (1863–1952), a major figure of the so-called Golden Age of American Philosophy, reappeared as subject of academic interest. It is believed that Santayana’s originality within the intellectual milieu of the dominant at that time in Anglo-Saxon context pragmatist and analytical thought contributed to this delayed reception. This text, being part of a broader project, looks at the concept of „the self” emerging from (...) Santayana’s work, with particular emphasis on its temporal intricacies. Interpretative movement, which according to my thesis is a requirement posited by life itself, provides for subjective unity and is expressed by the recurrent term of „mask” as a trace of human existence. The idea of playing out one’s facticity implies the question „how?”, which in turn justifies the use of an aesthetic concept of „grace” which may be linked with the idea of authentic existence. The juxtaposition with elements of Heidegger’s philosophy, which is a novelty in research, throws some light on Santayana’s fascination with German thinker and allows to highlight the hermeneutic-existential side of his thought, which has been underestimated by scholarship so far. (shrink)