Proponents of permitting living kidney sales often argue as follows. Many jobs involve significant risks; people are and should be free to take these risks in exchange for money; the risks involved in giving up a kidney are no greater than the risks involved in acceptable hazardous jobs; so people should be free to give up a kidney for money, too. This paper examines this frequently invoked but rarely analysed analogy. Two objections are raised. First, it (...) is far from clear that kidney sales and dangerous jobs involve comparable risks on an appropriately broad comparison. Second, and more importantly, even if they do involve comparable risks it does not follow that kidney sales must be permitted because dangerous jobs are. The analogy assumes that kidney sales are banned for paternalistic reasons. But there may be other, non-paternalistic reasons for the ban. And paternalists, too, can consistently defend the ban even if kidney sales are no riskier than occupations that they find acceptable. Soft paternalists may want to protect would-be vendors from harms that they have not voluntarily chosen. Egalitarian hard paternalists may want to protect already badly off vendors from further worsening their situation. For neither species of paternalist is the size of the risk prevented decisive. I conclude that the analogy with dangerous jobs, while rhetorically powerful, pulls little real argumentative weight. Future debates on living kidney sales should therefore proceed without it. (shrink)

This paper challenges the view that bans on kidney sales are unjustifiably paternalistic, that is, that they unduly deny people the freedom to make decisions about their own bodies in order to protect them from harm. I argue that not even principled anti-paternalists need to reject such bans. This is because their rationale is not hard paternalism, which anti-paternalists repudiate, but soft paternalism, which they in principle accept. More precisely, I suggest that their rationale is what Franklin Miller (...) and Alan Wertheimer call ‘group soft paternalism’. Group soft paternalistic policies restrict the freedom of autonomous individuals, not for their own good (hard paternalism), but as an unavoidable consequence of seeking to protect other, non-autonomous individuals from harms that they have not voluntarily chosen (soft paternalism). Group soft paternalism supports prohibiting kidney sales on three conditions: (1) that such sales are potentially harmful to vendors, (2) that many vendors would suffer impaired autonomy, and (3) that distinguishing between autonomous and non-autonomous vendors and interfering only with the latter is unfeasible. I provide reasons for thinking that these conditions will often hold. (shrink)

Simon Rippon, revising an earlier argument against kidney sales, now claims that offers involving the performance of invasive acts, when extended to people under pressure, constitute a kind of rights violation, Impermissibly Disrespectful Demands. Since offers involving kidney sales so qualify, Rippon finds prima facie reason to prohibit them. The present article levels four independent objections to Rippon’s argument: the account of Impermissibly Disrespectful Demands implausibly condemns kidney donation as much as kidney sales; (...) the normative importance of having autonomous veto control over bodily incursions does not plausibly underwrite a right to not be extended invasive offers under pressure; Impermissibly Disrespectful Demands can easily be transformed into innocuous offers; and the prohibition has greater welfare costs than Rippon acknowledges. (shrink)

Luke Semrau argues that the documented harms of existing organ markets do not undermine the case for establishing regulated systems of paid kidney donation. He offers two arguments in support of this conclusion. First, Semrau argues that the harms of kidney selling are straightforwardly amenable to regulatory solution. Second, Semrau argues that even in existing black markets, sellers would likely have experienced greater harm if the option of selling a kidney were not available. This commentary challenges both (...) of Semrau’s claims. I argue that there is no reason to believe that kidney sellers benefit from the current black market trade in organs, and highlight a number of potential issues regarding the effectiveness and feasibility of Semrau’s proposed market regulations. (shrink)

Janet Radcliffe Richards’ The Ethics of Transplants outlines a novel framework for moral inquiry in practical contexts and applies it to the topic of paid living kidney donation. In doing so, Radcliffe Richards makes two key claims: that opponents of organ markets bear the burden of proof, and that this burden has not yet been satisfied. This paper raises four related objections to Radcliffe Richards’ methodological framework, focusing largely on how Radcliffe Richards uses this framework in her discussion of (...) kidney sales. We conclude that Radcliffe Richards’ method of inquiry hinders our ability to answer the very question that it ought to help us resolve: What is there best reason to do, all things considered? (shrink)

Considering efficiency, equality, and morality, this book argues for qualified market expansion, particularly in legalizing kidney sales and prostitution. Legalizing prostitution will benefit both men and women, as argued in a chapter jointly written with Yan Wang. Blood donation without monetary compensation can still result in adequate blood supply if schools educate children that blood donation can actually benefit a donor's health. As a society becomes more advanced, with higher incomes and a better educated populace, more activities can (...) be subject to market exchange, with gradual popular acceptance. Without serious misinformation and irrationality, inequality/fairness as such cannot be a valid reason for limiting the scope of the market. The book supports the use of markets to increase efficiency while also increasing the effort to promote equality, making all income groups better off. (shrink)

Simon Rippon has recently argued against kidney markets on the grounds that introducing the option to vend will result in many people, especially the poor, being subject to harmful pressure to vend. Though compelling, Rippon’s argument fails. What he takes to be a single phenomenon—social and legal pressure to vend—is actually two. Only one of these forms of pressure is, by Rippon’s own account, harmful. Further, an empirically informed view of the regulated market suggests that this harmful pressure is (...) easily avoided. Thus, the harm that is the lynchpin of Rippon’s opposition is neither a necessary feature of the market nor is it likely to play a signicant role in its operation. (shrink)

Erik Malmqvist defends the prohibition on kidney sales as a justifiable measure to protect individuals from harms they have not autonomously chosen. This appeal to ‘group soft paternalism’ requires that three conditions be met. It must be shown that some vendors will be harmed, that some will be subject to undue pressure to vend, and that we cannot feasibly distinguish between the autonomous and the non-autonomous. I argue that Malmqvist fails to demonstrate that any of these conditions are (...) likely to obtain. His argument involves two common errors. First, he, like many, proceeds on a mistaken understanding of how to assess harm. What matters is not the balance of costs and benefits of vending, but a comparison of potential vendors’ welfare across two possible courses of action. Second, Malmqvist's concerns about third-party pressure are predicated on an empirically unrealistic understanding of the operation of a regulated market. A widely underappreciated fact is that kidney sales will be relatively rare, and most who try to vend will be unable to. Because pressure on another to vend will not result in the desired outcome, few will exert it. (shrink)

From all points of the political compass, from widely different groups, have come indignant outcries against the trade in human organs from live vendors. Opponents contend that such practices constitute a morally outrageous and gross exploitation of the poor, inherently coercive and obviously intolerable in any civilized society. This article examines the arguments typically offered in defense of these claims, and finds serious problems with all of them. The prohibition of organ sales is derived not from the principles and (...) argument usually invoked in support of prohibition, but rather, from strong feelings of repugnance which exert an invisible but powerful influence on the debate, distorting the arguments [and working] to the detriment of the [very] people most in need of protection. (shrink)

In The Gift Relationship, Richard Titmuss argued that the practice of altruistic blood donation fosters social solidarity while markets in blood erode it. This paper considers the implications of this line of argument for the organ market debate. I defend Titmuss’ arguments against a number of criticisms and respond to claims that Titmuss’ work is not relevant to the context of live donor organ transplantation. I conclude that Titmuss’ arguments are more resilient than many advocates of organ markets suggest, and (...) more relevant to the debate than is commonly appreciated. (shrink)

The UCLA Medical Center has initiated a “voucher program” under which a person who donated a kidney would receive a voucher that she could provide to someone of her choosing who could then use it to move to the top of the renal transplantation waiting list. If the use of such vouchers as incentives for donors is morally permissible, then cash payments for kidneys are also morally permissible. But, that argument faces five objections. First, there are some goods whose (...) nature allows them to be exchanged for similar goods but renders them monetarily inalienable. Hence, kidneys might be exchanged for kidneys but not sold for cash. Second, voucher programs respect donor autonomy, whereas the offer of cash payments does not. Third, the burden of proof lies with the advocates of cash payments for kidneys to show that their benefits would outweigh the costs of their legalization. Fourth, allowing cash payments for kidneys would stifle medical innovation. Fifth, allowing cash payments for kidneys would result in these organs being used as collateral to secure loans—and that this would disadvantage potential borrowers who did not want to risk their kidneys in this way. This paper will rebut all these objections. (shrink)

Kidney markets are prohibited in principle because they are assumed to undermine the seller’s dignity. Considering the trade-off between saving more lives by introducing regulated kidney markets and preserving the seller’s dignity, we argue that it is advisable to demand that citizens restrain their own moral judgements and not interfere with the judgements of those who are willing to sell a kidney. We also argue that it is advisable not only to limit the political implications of the (...) moral argument of dignity concerns toward a market-based solution but also to re-evaluate the dignity argument itself. First, if the dignity argument is to be given normative force, it must also consider the dignity violation of the potential transplant recipient. Second, there seems to be no compelling notion of dignity that demonstrates why it is morally permissible to donate but not to sell a kidney. (shrink)

This paper is a commentary on Koplin’s “From Blood Donation to Kidney Sales”. While appreciative of his paper, it argues that an argument from social solidarity to a Titmussian donor system is problematic. It reviews weaknesses in Titmuss, discusses problems about Titmussian blood donation as a vehicle for solidarity, and explores problems about extending a Titmussian approach to organs.

In a recent article, Albertsen both elaborates the best option argument for regulated markets and levels a justice-based objection to kidney sales. In the present article, I show that Albertsen has crucially misunderstood the best option argument. It is not a defence of kidney sales, as Albertsen claims. It is a reply to an objection. The objection, perennial in the debate, opposes kidney sales on the grounds that sellers would be harmed. The best option (...) argument—proving that prohibitions tend to set back the interests of those denied their preferred option—shows this thinking to be confused. If sound, the best option argument dramatically undercuts any attempt to oppose a market citing would-be sellers’ interests. (shrink)

An increasingly common objection to kidney sales holds that the introduction of monetary incentives may undermine potential donors’ altruism, discourage donation, and possibly result in a net reduction in the supply of kidneys. To explain why incentives might be counterproductive in this way market opponents marshal evidence from behavioral economics. In particular, they claim that the context of kidney sales is ripe for motivational crowding. This reasoning, if sound, would have a profound influence on the debate (...) over kidney sales. What’s perhaps the principal reason to favor a market – the increase in supply it would bring – would be called into doubt. However, on inspection it becomes apparent that the evidence touted by market opponents not only lends no credence to their claims, but also provides some positive reason to doubt them. The near-ubiquitous references to motivational crowding in the literature on kidney sales are fundamentally misplaced. (shrink)

Several commentators have tried to ground legal prohibitions of kidney sales in some form of Kant’s moral arguments against such sales. This paper reconsiders this approach to justifying laws and policies in light of Kant’s approach to law in his political philosophy. The author argues that Kant’s political philosophy requires that kidney sales be legally permitted, although contracts for such sales must remain unenforceable. The author further argues that Kant’s approach to laws, such as (...) those governing kidney distribution, was formed in part by considering and rejecting an assumption frequently employed in the bioethics literature, namely, that legal duties can be grounded directly in moral duties. The author explains some of Kant’s reasons for rejecting this assumption and concludes that arguments pertaining to the legality of kidney sales developed on the basis of Kant’s moral philosophy should no longer be considered tenable. (shrink)

This paper canvasses recent arguments in favor of commercial markets in human transplant kidneys, raising objections to those arguments on grounds of the role of injustice, exploitation, and coercion in compromising the autonomy of those most likely to sell a kidney, namely, the least well off members of society.

From all points of the political compass, from widely different groups, have come indignant outcries against the trade in human organs from live vendors. Opponents contend that such practices constitute a morally outrageous and gross exploitation of the poor, inherently coercive and obviously intolerable in any civilized society. This article examines the arguments typically offered in defense of these claims and finds serious problems with all of them. The prohibition of organ sales is derived not from the principles and (...) argument usually invoked in support of prohibition, but rather, from strong feelings of repugnance which exert an invisible but powerful influence on the debate, distorting the arguments [and working] to the detriment of the [very] people most in need of protection. (shrink)

I shall argue, first, that potential kidney donors may be subject to harmful pressure to donate. This pressure may take almost any form; people have diverse interests, and anything that could set them back may qualify as pressure. Given features of the context—the high stakes, the involvement of family, and the social meaning of donation—such pressure may be especially harmful. This problem is less tractable than the more familiar worry that pressure may compromise consent. Screening may ensure donors validly (...) consent, but it provides no protection against harmful pressure. I shall argue, second, that the use of such pressure is the predictable consequence of the prohibition on kidney sales. Potential donors have something—a transplantable kidney—that is both valuable and scarce. Many of them, informed about donation, decide against it. Those in need of a transplant may seek to persuade the unwilling. Given the prohibition, the donation cannot be made more attractive in absolute terms by, say, the addition of money. However, it can be made more attractive in relative terms. If declining the option is made worse, then, by comparison, accepting it is made better. The application of harmful pressure has the desired effect. With so much at stake, and no good alternatives, its use is predictable. I conclude that potential donors' interests should figure more prominently in the discussion of transplant policy. Those who defend the prohibition have made virtually no attempt to account for its impact on that group. (shrink)

This paper defends an in principle understanding of the authority of persons over themselves and, in consequence, argues for significant limits on morally permissible state authority. It also defends an account of the limits of permissible state action that distinguishes between the ability of persons to convey authority to common projects and what may be judged virtuous, good, safe, or proper to do. In terms of organ transplantation policy, it concludes that it is morally acceptable, and should be legally permissible, (...) for individuals to sell one of their kidneys while living, pocketing the cash to use as that person sees fit to advance their own understanding of their own best interests. Morally objectionable policy proposals, I argue, are not those that encourage individuals to sell a redundant kidney while living or families to sell the organs of a recently deceased loved one, but those that seek coercively to confiscate the organs of the recently deceased. Recognizing the authority of persons over themselves, and their ability to convey moral authority to common projects, including the sale of human organs for transplantation, would shed light on the medical marketplace and clarify public policy, while increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of procuring human organs for transplantation. (shrink)

Background Advocates for a regulated system to facilitate kidney donation between unrelated donor-recipient pairs argue that monetary compensation encourages people to donate vital organs that save the lives of patients with end-stage organ failure. Scholars support compensating donors as a form of reciprocity. This study aims to assess the compensation system for the unrelated kidney donation program in the Islamic Republic of Iran, with a particular focus on the implications of Islam on organ donation and organ sales. (...) Methods This study reviews secondary documents for philosophical argumentation and ethical analysis of human organ donation and sale for transplantation. Results and discussion According to Islamic law, organ donation is an act of _sadaqatul jariyah,_ and individuals are permitted to donate organs with the intention of saving lives. The commercialization of humans as organ sellers and buyers is contrary to the Islamic legal maxim _eethaar_, undermining donors of ‘selfless’ or ‘altruistic’ motivations. Such an act should be considered immoral, and the practice should not be introduced into other countries for the sake of protecting human dignity, integrity, solidarity, and respect. I, therefore, argue that Iran’s unrelated kidney donation program not only disregards the position of the Islamic religion with respect to the provision or receipt of monetary benefits for human kidneys for transplantation but that it also misinterprets the Islamic legal proscription of the sale of human organs. I also argue that the implementation of Iran’s unrelated kidney donor transplantation program is unethical and immoral in that potential donors and recipients engage in a bargaining process akin to that which sellers and buyers regularly face in regulated commodity exchange markets. Conversely, I suggest that a modest fixed monetary remuneration as a gift be provided to a donor as a reward for their altruistic organ donation, which is permissible by Islamic scholars. This may remove the need to bargain for increased or decreased values of payment in exchange for the organ, as well as the transactional nature of ‘buyer and seller’, ensuring the philosophy of ‘donor and recipient’ is maintained. Conclusions Offering a fixed modest monetary incentive to organ donors would serve to increase organ supply while protecting donors’ health and reducing human suffering without legalizing the human organ trade. (shrink)

Recent scholarship suggests that the practices of selling sex and selling kidneys can be understood as examples of serious harms that are sometimes chosen by autonomous individuals who find themselves in difficult straits. This analogy between kidney sales by live suppliers and prostitution deserves careful, rigorous consideration. Ideas about autonomy, paternalism, systemic oppression, commodification, and the human body are at the core of each controversy. This paper seeks to use the well-developed, radical feminist literature opposing prostitution and critiquing (...) the liberal tradition’s account of autonomy to explain why the sale of kidneys by live suppliers should continue to be prohibited in the United States. (shrink)

We conducted a survey of attitudes towards the sale of kidneys for transplantation within and without the medical community. Half of those polled received a case of a young man in India whose only chance for survival was to purchase a kidney, the other half a case of a Canadian man who was suffering side-effects from dialysis and had been on the transplant waiting list for three years. We found the percentage of responses allowing the patients to purchase a (...) kidney was similar for the two cases (40 per cent in the Canadian case and 49 per cent in the Indian case). The medical groups had much lower rates of approval of this practice than the public. In all groups those allowing the practice showed similar concerns about regulation. This survey indicates public opinion to be contrary to public policy. (shrink)

Canada has a marked shortfall between the supply and demand for kidneys for transplantation. Median wait times for deceased donor kidney transplantation vary from 5.8 years in British Columbia, 5.2 years in Manitoba and 4.5 years in Ontario to a little over 2 years in Quebec and Nova Scotia. Living donation provides a viable option for some, but not all people. Consequently, a small number of people travel abroad to undergo kidney transplantation by commercial means. The extent to (...) which they are aware of the potential risks to their health and the health of the kidney vendors is unclear. Travel abroad to obtain a kidney commercially i.e. transplant tourism (TT), raises ethical issues which include the exploitation of the poor, uncertainty of donor informed consent to nephrectomy, poor clinical care and lack of follow up for the donor, commodification of the body and inequity of access to medical care for donors. Also, TT widens socioeconomic disparities in access to transplantation, differing from the Canadian system of universal coverage for healthcare. The Canadian transplant community has discussed how to respond to patients who plan to travel abroad for TT or return with a purchased kidney. Unease rests in the tension between the duty to care for legitimate Canadian residents and the unwillingness to enable TT. This paper discusses three anonymized cases and the Canadian responses to TT as recorded in academic literature and a formal statement by relevant professional bodies. (shrink)

: We argue that healthy people should be allowed to sell one of their kidneys while they are alive—that the current prohibition on payment for kidneys ought to be overturned. Our argument has three parts. First, we argue that the moral basis for the current policy on live kidney donations and on the sale of other kinds of tissue implies that we ought to legalize the sale of kidneys. Second, we address the objection that the sale of kidneys is (...) intrinsically wrong because it violates the Kantian duty of respect for humanity. Third, we address a range of consequentialist objections based on the idea that kidney sales will be exploitative. Throughout the paper, we argue only that it ought to be legal for an individual to receive payment for a kidney. We do not argue that it ought to be legal for an individual to buy a kidney. (shrink)

Much of the opinion scandalized by recent reports of kidneys being sold for transplant is significantly inconsistent. The sale of kidneys is not substantially different from practices espoused, and indeed endorsed, by many of those who condemn the former. Our moral concern, I suggest, needs to focus on the customer's actions rather than the seller's; and on the implications for larger questions of the considerations to which this gives rise.

Many studies have shown that women are more likely than men to be living kidney donors, and the discrepancy is particularly marked in heterosexual couples: wives are more likely than husbands to donate a kidney to their spouse. This ‘ Gender Kidney Donation Gap’ can be understood in terms of Carol Gilligan’s claims about gender differences in ethical decision-making style, making it appropriate to analyse responses to this imbalance using an ethic of care. This article centres the (...) vast majority of living donors, those who donate in the context of a significant pre-existing relationship. A cost-neutral approach is unfair on donors who make society richer and healthier by helping a loved one. However, models of kidney sale fail to offer an acceptable alternative, either (a) compelling donors to sell into a pool where they do not know the recipient or (b) allowing affluent individuals unfair access to kidneys. Drawing on surrogacy law in England and Wales, a model of compensation is proposed that includes a range of non-financial benefits. This option celebrates donation and expresses gratitude to all donors while avoiding the pitfalls of the marketplace, with an emphasis on fair treatment of donors. Nevertheless, if more generous treatment led to a 10% increase in directed donation, then it would be equivalent to doubling ‘altruistic’ stranger donations. As long as the Gender Kidney Donation Gap persists, the best response is to minimise the discomfort and disruption caused to donors by their profound act of kindness. (shrink)

Kidney for Sale by Owner discusses a range of different arguments that can be offered in defence of live donor kidney markets. Although Cherry’s case for establishing such markets does not rest on consequentialist considerations, Cherry nonetheless suggests that allowing the sale of organs would have net positive consequences. He argues that both renal failure patients and people living in poverty could benefit from participating in the market, and further claims that a legal trade in organs would not (...) shape society in harmful ways. This paper argues that the likely consequences of establishing an open market in kidneys are less benign than Cherry suggests. Specifically, I argue that a live donor kidney market could plausibly harm sellers, give rise to harmful pressures to participate in the market, and reinforce unjust political and social structures. I conclude by considering the implications of these arguments for the organ market debate. (shrink)

I argue that women in traditional marriages are a vulnerable source for kidneys and this vulnerability gives rise to exploitative donation arrangements made within families. In so doing, I critique Alan Wertheimer’s account of the impact that emotional closeness between participants in an agreement has on the wrongfulness of exploitation. I propose a regulated market scheme that is not only less exploitative than our current donation scheme, but also resolves a variety of other moral problems that typically arise in real (...) and imagined kidney sale scenarios, problems that render markets “noxious,” according to Debra Satz. (shrink)

The market for kidneys offers a case study of Baptists and Bootleggers. In almost every country, sales are currently illegal and donated organs are allocated by a central planner. Thousands of people die every year, because of the shortage caused by the absence of markets. This paper starts by examining the free-market alternative, and shows that a market would solve the shortage. It then uses gains-from-trade analysis to explain why current vested interests oppose a move to a market, despite (...) the immense potential for saved lives. In a shift to a market, gains from trade would be distributed away from lucky patients and various industries that benefit from the shortage ; these “Bootleggers” form an alliance with “Baptists”. (shrink)

Much of the opinion scandalized by recent reports of kidneys being sold for transplant is significantly inconsistent. The sale of kidneys is not substantially different from practices espoused, and indeed endorsed, by many of those who condemn the former. Our moral concern, I suggest, needs to focus on the customer's actions rather than the seller's; and on the implications for larger questions of the considerations to which this gives rise.

In late August 2002, a general practitioner in London, Dr Bhagat Singh Makkar, 62, was struck off the medical register after he was discovered to have bragged to an undercover journalist about being able to obtain a kidney from a live donor in exchange for a fee. He told the journalist, who posed as the son of a patient with renal failure: “No problem, I can fix that for you. Do you want it done here, do you want it (...) done in Germany or do you want it done in India?” The price he quoted included payment to the donor and “my administration costs”. Dr Makkar said he regretted giving “stupid answers” to the journalist. He had been “tired, confused, and upset after a long day dealing with emotional patients”.1Deliberation about ethics is often muddied by the personalities involved in a particular issue. Many people are uninspired by Richard Seed or Jack Kevorkian. This contaminates their view about the much broader and important issues such as cloning or euthanasia that Seed and Kevorkian, whom some people might describe as mavericks, have shoved their finger in.Discussion of the sale of organs is …. (shrink)

The target article challenges the increasingly popular portrayal of living kidney sale as potentially a mutually beneficial arrangement, capable not only of saving or improving the lives of patients in need of transplants but also of significantly benefiting poor vendors. Carefully reviewing the literature on harms to vendors in illegal kidney markets and in Iran’s legal market, Koplin argues that many of these harms would persist in the sort of legal regulated system that kidney sale advocates envision. (...) This is an important argument. The kidney sales debate has been skewed in favor of permitting sales by a simplified view of the potential harms involved and excessive optimism about the capacity of regulation to prevent these harms. The article counterbalances these tendencies and thus considerably weakens the case for allowing sales. Nonetheless, some market proponents might remain unconvinced. I shall suggest that in addition to the lessons that Koplin draws from existing kidney markets, there is yet another one, which casts further doubt on the advisability of allowing kidney sales. (shrink)

In this paper, I present two types of arguments against the prohibition as they apply to a regulated market in kidneys from living suppliers: the utilitarian argument and the argument from non-uniqueness. The utilitarian argument shows a regulated market is likely to result in a significant increase in overall well-being. The international guidelines and treaties supporting the prohibition invariably quote the harm associated with the illegal organ trade; yet, a regulated market does not share the characteristics of the illegal trade (...) that gives rise to such harm. I argue that objections to such a market claiming that it would result in poor health outcomes, lead to crowding-out, and harm the global poor are unfounded. The argument from non-uniqueness, on the other hand, focuses on three objections to the market following the pattern of widely quoted principles of bioethics: objections from autonomy, “do no harm”, and justice. I argue that these objections, if taken seriously, apply equally to the sale and donation of kidneys, the latter of which is unanimously endorsed in all international guidelines and treaties. Unable to identify any relevant unique aspect of a market, these objections fail to justify an exclusive prohibition of a market in kidneys. (shrink)

: Gill and Sade, in the preceding article in this issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, argue that living individuals should be free from legal constraints against selling their organs. The present commentary responds to several of their claims. It explains why an analogy between kidneys and blood fails; why, as a matter of public policy, we prohibit the sale of human solid organs, yet allow the sale of blood; and why their attack on Kant's putative argument against (...) the sale of human body parts is misplaced. Finally, it rejects the claim that the state is entitled to interfere with the actions of individuals only if such actions would harm others. We draw certain lines grounded in what Rawls has termed "public reason" beyond which we do not give effect to the autonomous self-regarding decisions of individuals. Public resistance to the sale of human body parts, no matter how voluntary or well informed, is grounded in the conviction that such a practice would diminish human dignity and our sense of solidarity. A system of organ donation, in contrast, conveys our respect for persons and honors our common humanity. (shrink)

Recent philosophical arguments in favor of legal markets in human organs such as kidneys claim that respect for autonomy justifies such markets. I argue that these arguments fail to establish the moral permissibility of commercialized organ sales because they do not show that those most likely to serve as vendors would choose to sell autonomously. Pro-market views utilize hierarchical theories of autonomy to demonstrate that potential organ vendors may autonomously consent to selling their organs even in the absence of (...) any practical alternative to doing so. But central to hierarchical accounts of autonomy is the idea that persons my experience volitional ambivalence, a condition in which the will is irreconcilably conflicted. Because commercialized organ sales would create volitional ambivalence in many of those who opt to sell an organ, the choice to sell an organ would not be an autonomous one. (shrink)

In Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale, philosopher Debra Satz takes a penetrating look at those commodity exchanges that strike most of us as problematic. What considerations, she asks, ought to guide the debates about such markets? What is it about a market involving prostitution or the sale of kidneys that makes it morally objectionable? How is a market in weapons or pollution different than a market in soybeans or automobiles? Are laws and social policies banning the more (...) noxious markets necessarily the best responses to them? Satz contends that categories previously used by philosophers and economists are of limited utility in addressing such questions because they have assumed markets to be homogenous. Accordingly, she offers a broader and more nuanced view of markets--one that goes beyond the usual discussions of efficiency and distributional equality--to show how markets shape our culture, foster or thwart human development, and create and support structures of power. (shrink)

An important argument against prohibiting organ sales is that it removes the best option available to individuals in dire circumstances. However, this line of reasoning fails to recognise that selling a kidney on a regulated market is only the best option in a very narrow comparison, where a regulated organ market is compared with banning organ sales. Once we acknowledge this narrowness, selling a kidney is not the best option. This paves the way for a distributive (...) justice-based critique of the ‘best option’ argument for organ markets, which illuminates that organ markets should be compared with a broader set of alternatives. If providing the option of selling a kidney is not the best option, but rather the best option we are willing to provide, and one which means that many people will remain in poverty and unjust circumstances, then this reflects poorly on those societies willing to offer only this option and not a better one. (shrink)

Material property has traditionally been conceived of as separable from its owner and thus alienable in an exchange. So it seems that you could sell your watch or even your kidney because it can be removed from your wrist or abdomen and transferred to another. However, if we are each identical to a living human animal, self‐ownership is impossible for self‐separation is impossible. We thus cannot sell our parts if we don't own the whole that they compose. It would (...) be incoherent to own all of your body's parts but not the whole body; and it would be arbitrary to own some but not all of your removable parts. These metaphysical obstacles to organ sales do not apply to the selling of the organs of the deceased. The human being goes out of existence at death and is not identical to the body's remains. Any objections to selling the organs of the deceased must instead be due to dignity rather than metaphysical or conceptual considerations. But the remains lack the intrinsic dignity of the human being, instead possessing, at best, relational dignity. Relational dignity would not provide sufficient reason to prohibit life‐saving sales. (shrink)

One of the most widespread objections to legalizing a market in human organs is that such legalization would stimulate the black market in human organs. Unfortunately, the proponents of this argument fail to explain how such stimulation will occur. To remedy thus, two accounts of how legalizing markets in human organs could stimulate the black market in them are developed in this paper. Yet although these accounts remedy the lacuna in the anti-market argument from the black market neither of them (...) provide reason to believe that legalizing an organ markets would stimulate the black market in organs. Despite its prevalence, then, the argument from the black market should be rejected. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 18 There are two ways to transfer a bodily right. One might transfer a bodily right in a detaching way – that is, without transferring jurisdiction over one’s future bodily choices. Alternately, one might transfer a bodily right in an attaching way – that is, in a way that transfers such jurisdiction. For instance, A might sell his kidney to B for money paid at the time of the transplant. Alternately, A might accept money now, (...) agreeing to give up his kidney some time down the road. In the latter case and not the former, B acquires normative jurisdiction over A’s future bodily choices. In this paper I will argue that the distinction between attaching and detaching transfers of bodily rights has implications regarding whether certain contracts and agreements should be legally enforced – and whether problems arise when the moral and legal transferability of these rights comes apart. (shrink)