Nous proposons dans cet article un développement de l’idée proposée par F.A. Hayek selon laquelle l’ordre du droit coutumier est un ordre d’action, une coordination des plans individuels dans un système d’échange régi par ce droit. Cette conception s’oppose à l’idée suivant laquelle l’ordre légal doit être avant tout fondé sur la cohérence logique des concepts et doctrines de ce droit. Un exemple important de cette approche est celui de la structure de maximisation des richesses de William Landes et Richard (...) Posner. L’article montre que la cohérence logique n’est ni nécessaire ni suffisante pour un ordre de plans ou pour une “cohérence praxéologique”. Nous défendons la position du droit coutumier classique suivant laquelle le droit se développe en accord avec les anticipations marginales des parties en présence. Dans la mesure où le droit se développe dans ce sens, il est possible d’approcher des objectifs jumelés du droit coutumier : la certitude relative et l’adaptation aux circonstances particulières.This article is a development of the idea, proposed by F.A. Hayek, that the order of common law is an order of actions, that is, a coordination of the plans of individuals in a system of exchanges governed by that law. This is in contrast to the idea that legal order is primarily to be found in the logical coherence of the law’s doctrines and concepts. The article shows that logical coherence is neither necessary nor sufficient for an order of plans, or “praxeological coherence”. It argues for the classic common law position that the law develops in accordance with the marginal expectations of the relevant parties. To the extent that the law develops in this way, it is possible for the twin goals of the common law to be approximated: relative certainty and adaptation to novel circumstances. (shrink)

This study clarifies the confusion concerning the purpose of Husserl's last major phenomenological treatise, Experience and Judgment, and presents his theory of categorical judgment.

We study probabilistic logic under the viewpoint of the coherence principle of de Finetti. In detail, we explore how probabilistic reasoning under coherence is related to model- theoretic probabilistic reasoning and to default reasoning in System . In particular, we show that the notions of g-coherence and of g-coherent entailment can be expressed by combining notions in model-theoretic probabilistic logic with concepts from default reasoning. Moreover, we show that probabilistic reasoning under coherence is a generalization of (...) default reasoning in System . That is, we provide a new probabilistic semantics for System , which neither uses infinitesimal probabilities nor atomic bound (or big-stepped) probabilities. These results also provide new algorithms for probabilistic reasoning under coherence and for default reasoning in System , and they give new insight into default reasoning with conditional objects. (shrink)

We study the computational complexity of the model checking problem for quantifier-free dependence logic ${(\mathcal{D})}$ formulas. We characterize three thresholds in the complexity: logarithmic space (LOGSPACE), non-deterministic logarithmic space (NL) and non-deterministic polynomial time (NP).

We take coherence based probability logic as the basic reference theory to model human deductive reasoning. The conditional and probabilistic argument forms are explored. We give a brief overview of recent developments of combining logic and probability in psychology. A study on conditional inferences illustrates our approach. First steps towards a process model of conditional inferences conclude the paper.

We study probabilistically informative (weak) versions of transitivity by using suitable definitions of defaults and negated defaults in the setting of coherence and imprecise probabilities. We represent p-consistent sequences of defaults and/or negated defaults by g-coherent imprecise probability assessments on the respective sequences of conditional events. Moreover, we prove the coherent probability propagation rules for Weak Transitivity and the validity of selected inference patterns by proving p-entailment of the associated knowledge bases. Finally, we apply our results to study selected (...) probabilistic versions of classical categorical syllogisms and construct a new version of the square of opposition in terms of defaults and negated defaults. (shrink)

– Foundation: Probabilistic Confirmation (c) from a Logical POV ∗ cph, eq as a “relevant” quantitative generalization of pe  hq ∗ cph, eq, so understood, is not Prpe  hq or Prph | eq, etc. ∗ cph, eq is something akin (ordinally) to the likelihood ratio..

We present probabilistic approaches to check the validity of selected connexive principles within the setting of coherence. Connexive logics emerged from the intuition that conditionals of the form If ∼A, then A, should not hold, since the conditional’s antecedent ∼A contradicts its consequent A. Our approach covers this intuition by observing that for an event A the only coherent probability assessment on the conditional event A|~A is p(A|~A)=0 . Moreover, connexive logics aim to capture the intuition that conditionals should (...) express some “connection” between the antecedent and the consequent or, in terms of inferences, validity should require some connection between the premise set and the conclusion. This intuition is covered by a number of principles, a selection of which we analyze in our contribution. We present two approaches to connexivity within coherence-based probability logic. Specifically, we analyze connections between antecedents and consequents firstly, in terms of probabilistic constraints on conditional events (in the sense of defaults, or negated defaults) and secondly, in terms of constraints on compounds of conditionals and iterated conditionals. After developing different notions of negations and notions of validity, we analyze the following connexive principles within both approaches: Aristotle’s Theses, Aristotle’s Second Thesis, Abelard’s First Principle and selected versions of Boethius’ Theses. We conclude by remarking that coherence-based probability logic offers a rich language to investigate the validity of various connexive principles. (shrink)

Coherence with respect to Kelly–Mac Lane graphs is proved for categories that correspond to the multiplicative fragment without constant propositions of classical linear first-order predicate logic without or with mix. To obtain this result, coherence is first established for categories that correspond to the multiplicative conjunction–disjunction fragment with first-order quantifiers of classical linear logic, a fragment lacking negation. These results extend results of [K. Došen, Z. Petrić, Proof-Theoretical Coherence, KCL Publications , London, 2004 ; K. Došen, Z. (...) Petrić, Proof-Net Categories, Polimetrica, Monza, 2007 ], where coherence was established for categories of the corresponding fragments of propositional classical linear logic, which are related to proof nets, and which could be described as star-autonomous categories without unit objects. (shrink)

Most foundationalists allow that relations of coherence among antecedently justified beliefs can enhance their overall level of justification or warrant. In light of this, some coherentists ask the following question: if coherence can elevate the epistemic status of a set of beliefs, what prevents it from generating warrant entirely on its own? Why do we need the foundationalist’s basic beliefs? I address that question here, drawing lessons from an instructive series of attempts to reconstruct within the probability calculus (...) the classical problem of independent witnesses who corroborate each other’s testimony. Starred section headings indicate sections omitted here, but available on the author’s USC website. (shrink)

To remedy the lack of precision attached to the concept of coherence, a plethora of probabilistic measures has been developed. To broaden the perspective, we do not focus on the differences between these quantitative but the differences between qualitative approaches to coherence by comparing three probabilistic definitions for the relation denoted by ‘coheres with’. To reveal the different logics underlying these relations, we introduce a considerable number of formal properties and examine whether the given coherence relations possess (...) them. Among these properties are not only the classics reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity, but also a variety of features that concern propositions containing negation, conjunction and disjunction, as well as features that concern inconsistency, entailment and equivalence. (shrink)

In this paper I consider whether there is a measure of coherence that could be rightly claimed to generalize the notion of logical equivalence. I show that Fitelson’s (2003) proposal to that effect encounters some serious difficulties. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that no mutual-support measure could ever be suitable for the formalization of coherence as generalized logical equivalence. Instead, it appears that the only plausible candidate for such a measure is one of relative overlap. (...) The measure I propose in this paper is quite similar to Olsson’s (2002) proposal but differs from it by not being susceptible to the type of counterexample that Bovens and Hartmann (2003) have devised against it. (shrink)

We study a probabilistic logic based on the coherence principle of de Finetti and a related notion of generalized coherence (g-coherence). We examine probabilistic conditional knowledge bases associated with imprecise probability assessments defined on arbitrary families of conditional events. We introduce a notion of conditional interpretation defined directly in terms of precise probability assessments. We also examine a property of strong satisfiability which is related to the notion of toleration well known in default reasoning. In our framework (...) we give more general definitions of the notions of probabilistic consistency and probabilistic entailment of Adams. We also recall a notion of strict p-consistency and some related results. Moreover, we give new proofs of some results obtained in probabilistic default reasoning. Finally, we examine the relationships between conditional probability rankings and the notions of g-coherence and g-coherent entailment. (shrink)

How does deductive logic constrain probability? This question is difficult for subjectivistic approaches, according to which probability is just strength of (prudent) partial belief, for this presumes logical omniscience. This paper proposes that the way in which probability lies always between possibility and necessity can be made precise by exploiting a minor theorem of de Finetti: In any finite set of propositions the expected number of truths is the sum of the probabilities over the set. This is generalized to (...) apply to denumerable languages. It entails that the sum of probabilities can neither exceed nor be exceeded by the cardinalities of all consistent and closed (within the set) subsets. In general any numerical function on sentences is said to be logically coherent if it satisfies this condition. Logical coherence allows the relativization of necessity: A function p on a language is coherent with respect to the concept T of necessity iff there is no set of sentences on which the sum of p exceeds or is exceeded by the cardinality of every T-consistent and T-closed (within the set) subset of the set. Coherence is easily applied as well to sets on which the sum of p does not converge. Probability should also be relativized by necessity: A T-probability assigns one to every T-necessary sentence and is additive over disjunctions of pairwise T-incompatible sentences. Logical T-coherence is then equivalent to T-probability: All and only T-coherent functions are T-probabilities. (shrink)

∗ C pp, qq as a “mutual confirmation” generalization of pp & qq Prpe  hq won’t work Prpp & qq won’t work ∗ C pp, qq, so understood, is not Prpp & qq or Prpq | pq, etc.

Logicians generally employ coherence and consistency as synonyms naming the absence of contradictions in a group of SENTENCES, propositions, or beliefs, where a contradiction is the conjunction of a proposition and its negation. In metaphysical terms, logical incoherence or contradiction is the impossible instantiation of a property and some other, incompatible property, as in "the circle was square." Epistemically, a contradiction is an irrational belief in both a proposition and its denial.

Traditionally, pronouns are treated as ambiguous between bound and demonstrative uses. Bound uses are non-referential and function as bound variables, and demonstrative uses are referential and take as a semantic value their referent, an object picked out jointly by linguistic meaning and a further cue—an accompanying demonstration, an appropriate and adequately transparent speaker’s intention, or both. In this paper, we challenge tradition and argue that both demonstrative and bound pronouns are dependent on, and co-vary with, antecedent expressions. Moreover, the semantic (...) value of a pronoun is never determined, even partly, by extra-linguistic cues; it is fixed, invariably and unambiguously, by features of its context of use governed entirely by linguistic rules. We exploit the mechanisms of Centering and Coherence theories to develop a precise and general meta-semantics for pronouns, according to which the semantic value of a pronoun is determined by what is at the center of attention in a coherent discourse. Since the notions of attention and coherence are, we argue, governed by linguistic rules, we can give a uniform analysis of pronoun resolution that covers bound, demonstrative, and even discourse bound readings. Just as the semantic value of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ is conventionally set by a particular feature of its context of use—namely, the speaker—so too, we will argue, the semantic values of other pronouns, including ‘he’, are conventionally set by particular features of the context of use. (shrink)

It is argued that suitably trained neural language models exhibit key properties of epistemic agency: they hold probabilistically coherent and logically consistent degrees of belief, which they can rationally revise in the face of novel evidence. To this purpose, we conduct computational experiments with rankers: T5 models [Raffel et al. 2020] that are pretrained on carefully designed synthetic corpora. Moreover, we introduce a procedure for eliciting a model’s degrees of belief, and define numerical metrics that measure the extent to which (...) given degrees of belief violate (probabilistic, logical, and Bayesian) rationality constraints. While pretrained rankers are found to suffer from global inconsistency (in agreement with, e.g., [Jang et al. 2021]), we observe that subsequent self-training on auto-generated texts allows rankers to gradually obtain a probabilistically coherent belief system that is aligned with logical constraints. In addition, such self-training is found to have a pivotal role in rational evidential learning, too, for it seems to enable rankers to propagate a novel evidence item through their belief systems, successively re-adjusting individual degrees of belief. All this, we conclude, confirms the Rationality Hypothesis, i.e., the claim that suitable trained NLMs may exhibit advanced rational skills. We suggest that this hypothesis has empirical, yet also normative and conceptual ramifications far beyond the practical linguistic problems NLMs have originally been designed to solve. (shrink)

Natural languages are riddled with context-sensitivity. One and the same string of words can express many different meanings on occasion of use, and yet we understand one another effortlessly, on the fly. How do we do so? What fixes the meaning of context-sensitive expressions, and how are we able to recover the meaning so effortlessly? -/- This book offers a novel response: we can do so because we draw on a broad array of subtle linguistic conventions that determine the interpretation (...) of context-sensitive items. Contrary to the dominant tradition, which maintains that the meaning of context-sensitive language is underspecified by grammar and that interpretation relies on non-linguistic cues and speakers' intentions, this book argues that meaning is determined entirely by discourse conventions, rules of language that have largely been missed and the effects of which have been mistaken for extra-linguistic effects of an utterance situation on meaning. The linguistic account of context developed here sheds new light on the nature of linguistic content and the interaction between content and context. At the same time, it provides a novel model of context that should constrain and help evaluate debates across many subfields of philosophy where appeal to context has been common, often leading to surprising conclusions such as epistemology, ethics, value theory, metaphysics, metaethics, and logic. (shrink)

De Finetti gave a natural definition of “coherent probability assessment” β:E→[0,1] of a set E={X1,…,Xm} of “events” occurring in an arbitrary set of “possible worlds”. In the particular case of yes–no events, , Kolmogorov axioms can be derived from his criterion. While De Finetti’s approach to probability was logic-free, we construct a theory Θ in infinite-valued Łukasiewicz propositional logic, and show: a possible world of is a valuation satisfying Θ, β is coherent iff it is a convex combination of valuations (...) satisfying Θ, iff β agrees on E with a state of the Lindenbaum MV-algebra of Θ, iff for some Borel probability measure μ on . Thus Łukasiewicz semantics, MV-algebraic states, and Borel probability measures provide a universal representation of coherent assessments of events occurring in any conceivable set of possible worlds. (shrink)

Just as physics determines physically viable movements, the spatial distribution of input excitations allows the cerebellum to choose physiologically viable beams. Cerebellar–motor coherence implies that the ordering and modes of combination of cerebellar beams reflect (1) the way movement invariants are ordered and combined in movement and (2) the way physical principles are integrated in learning to move.

The logical consistency of a collection of assertions about events can be viewed as a special case of coherent probability assessments in the sense of de Finetti.

In this paper we investigate the problem of testing the coherence of an assessment of conditional probability following a purely logical setting. In particular we will prove that the coherence of an assessment of conditional probability χ can be characterized by means of the logical consistency of a suitable theory T χ defined on the modal-fuzzy logic FP k (RŁΔ) built up over the many-valued logic RŁΔ. Such modal-fuzzy logic was previously introduced in Flaminio (Lecture Notes (...) in Computer Science, vol. 3571, 2005) in order to treat conditional probability by means of a list of simple probabilities following the well known (smart) ideas exposed by Halpern (Proceedings of the eighth conference on theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge, pp 17–30, 2001) and by Coletti and Scozzafava (Trends Logic 15, 2002). Roughly speaking, such logic is obtained by adding to the language of RŁΔ a list of k modalities for “probably” and axioms reflecting the properties of simple probability measures. Moreover we prove that the satisfiability problem for modal formulas of FP k (RŁΔ) is NP-complete. Finally, as main result of this paper, we prove FP k (RŁΔ) in order to prove that the problem of establishing the coherence of rational assessments of conditional probability is NP-complete. (shrink)

In this paper I present a new way of understanding Dutch Book Arguments: the idea is that an agent is shown to be incoherent iff he would accept as fair a set of bets that would result in a loss under any interpretation of the claims involved. This draws on a standard definition of logical inconsistency. On this new understanding, the Dutch Book Arguments for the probability axioms go through, but the Dutch Book Argument for Reflection fails. The question (...) of whether we have a Dutch Book Argument for Conditionalization is left open. (shrink)

According to long-standing orthodoxy in contemporary analytic philosophy of language, the content of a sentence (that is, the information it encodes and what on.

Probabilistic coherence is not an absolute requirement of rationality; nevertheless, it is an ideal of rationality with substantive normative import. An idealized rational agent who avoided making implicit logical errors in forming his preferences would be coherent. In response to the challenge, recently made by epistemologists such as Foley and Plantinga, that appeals to ideal rationality render probabilism either irrelevant or implausible, I argue that idealized requirements can be normatively relevant even when the ideals are unattainable, so long (...) as they define a structure that links imperfect and perfect rationality in a way that enables us to make sense of the notion of better approximations to the ideal. I then analyze the notion of approximation to the ideal of coherence by developing a generalized theory of belief functions that allows for incoherence, and showing how such belief functions can be ordered with regard to greater or lesser coherence. (shrink)

Let E be a set of n propositions E1, ..., En. We seek a probabilistic measure C(E) of the ‘degree of coherence’ of E. Intuitively, we want C to be a quantitative, probabilistic generalization of the (deductive) logical coherence of E. So, in particular, we require C to satisfy the following..

Samir Okasha argues that clade selection is an incoherent concept, because the relation that constitutes clades is such that it renders parent-offspring (reproduction) relations between clades impossible. He reasons that since clades cannot reproduce, it is not coherent to speak of natural selection operating at the clade level. We argue, however, that when species-level lineages and clade-level lineages are treated consistently according to standard cladist commitments, clade reproduction is indeed possible and clade selection is coherent if certain conditions obtain. Despite (...) clade selection's logical coherence, however, we share some of Okasha's pessimism. Whether or not clades are a unit of selection is ultimately a question of empirical support and theoretical import. (shrink)

Coherence is demonstrated for categories with binary products and sums, but without the terminal and the initial object, and without distribution. This coherence amounts to the existence of a faithful functor from a free category with binary products and sums to the category of relations on finite ordinals. This result is obtained with the help of proof-theoretic normalizing techniques. When the terminal object is present, coherence may still be proved if of binary sums we keep just their (...) bifunctorial properties. It is found that with the simplest understanding of coherence this is the best one can hope for in bicartesian categories. The coherence for categories with binary products and sums provides an easy decision procedure for equality of arrows. It is also used to demonstrate that the categories in question are maximal, in the sense that in any such category that is not a preorder all the equations between arrows involving only binary products and sums are the same. This shows that the usual notion of equivalence of proofs in nondistributive conjunctive-disjunctive logic is optimally defined: further assumptions would make this notion collapse into triviality. (shrink)

This paper studies the idea of conservatism with respect to belief change strategies in the setting of unary, iterated belief revision functions (based on the conclusions of Rott, ‘Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief, Part I: Finding the Right Framework’, Erkenntnis 50, 1999, 387–412). Special attention is paid to the case of ‘basic belief change’ where neither the (weak) AGM postulates concerning conservatism with respect to beliefs nor the (stong) supplementary AGM postulates concerning dispositional coherence need (...) to be satisfied. One‐step belief change generated by ‘basic entrenchment’ is combined with a natural conservative method of revising entrenchment relations. A logical characterization of this method is presented, and it is compared with three other methods known from the literature which I call ‘external’, ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ belief revision. While conservative belief change turns out to be incoherent in its treatment of the recency of information, moderate belief change is more satisfactory in this respect. (shrink)

We study the coherence, that is the equality of canonical natural transformations in non-free symmetric monoidal closed categories . To this aim, we use proof theory for intuitionistic multiplicative linear logic with unit. The study of coherence in non-free smccs is reduced to the study of equivalences on terms in the free category, which include the equivalences induced by the smcc structure. The free category is reformulated as the sequent calculus for imll with unit so that only equivalences (...) on derivations in this system are to be considered. We establish that any equivalence induced by the equality of canonical natural transformations over a model can be axiomatized by some set of “critical” pairs of derivations. From this, we derive certain sufficient conditions for full coherence, and establish that the system of identities defining smccs is not Post-complete: extending this system with an identity that does not hold in the free smcc does not in general cause the free smcc to collapse into a preorder. In order to give a larger context to these results, we study the equality of canonical morphisms in non-free symmetric monoidal categories, and establish that w.r.t. a broad subclass of smccs, the equivalences induced by the equality of canonical natural transformations over a model coincide with the equivalences induced by the equality of canonical morphisms for all interpretations in that model. (shrink)

Coherentism in epistemology has long suffered from lack of formal and quantitative explication of the notion of coherence. One might hope that probabilistic accounts of coherence such as those proposed by Lewis, Shogenji, Olsson, Fitelson, and Bovens and Hartmann will finally help solve this problem. This paper shows, however, that those accounts have a serious common problem: the problem of belief individuation. The coherence degree that each of the accounts assigns to an information set (or the verdict (...) it gives as to whether the set is coherent tout court) depends on how beliefs (or propositions) that represent the set are individuated. Indeed, logically equivalent belief sets that represent the same information set can be given drastically different degrees of coherence. This feature clashes with our natural and reasonable expectation that the coherence degree of a belief set does not change unless the believer adds essentially new information to the set or drops old information from it; or, to put it simply, that the believer cannot raise or lower the degree of coherence by purely logical reasoning. None of the accounts in question can adequately deal with coherence once logical inferences get into the picture. Toward the end of the paper, another notion of coherence that takes into account not only the contents but also the origins (or sources) of the relevant beliefs is considered. It is argued that this notion of coherence is of dubious significance, and that it does not help solve the problem of belief individuation. (shrink)

Nonmonotonic reasoning is often claimed to mimic human common sense reasoning. Only a few studies, though, have investigated this claim empirically. We report four experiments which investigate three rules of SYSTEMP, namely the AND, the LEFT LOGICAL EQUIVALENCE, and the OR rule. The actual inferences of the subjects are compared with the coherent normative upper and lower probability bounds derived from a non-infinitesimal probability semantics of SYSTEM P. We found a relatively good agreement of human reasoning and principles of (...) nonmonotonic reasoning. Contrary to the results reported in the ‘heuristics and biases’ tradition, the subjects committed relatively few upper bound violations (conjunction fallacies). (shrink)

This paper introduces a technique for measuring the degree of (in)coherence of inconsistent sets of propositional formulas. The coherence of these sets of formulas is calculated using the minimal models of those sets in G. Priest's Logic of Paradox. The compatibility of the information expressed by a set of formulas with the background or domain knowledge can also be measured with this technique. In this way, Hunter's objections to many-valued paraconsistent logics as instruments for measuring (in)coherence are (...) addressed. (shrink)

In philosophy, old theories never die, they just hibernate. For many years, no philosophical approach could have been more out of date than that of the British Hegelians: Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet. No theory has been “refuted” more often than their coherence account of truth, both as a definition of truth and as a criterion of truth. Coherence did enjoy a brief renaissance during the early days of logical positivism. Neurath put forth such an account. Carnap, during (...) one of his many periods, came under the influence of Neurath’s brand of physicalism and Carl Hempel defended the coherence view against the criticisms of Schlick, among others. (shrink)

I re-examine Coherence Arguments (Dutch Book Arguments, No Arbitrage Arguments) for diachronic constraints on Bayesian reasoning. I suggest to replace the usual game–theoretic coherence condition with a new decision–theoretic condition ('Diachronic Sure Thing Principle'). The new condition meets a large part of the standard objections against the Coherence Argument and frees it, in particular, from a commitment to additive utilities. It also facilitates the proof of the Converse Dutch Book Theorem. I first apply the improved Coherence (...) Argument to van Fraassen's (1984) Reflection principle. I then point out the failure of a Coherence Argument that is intended to support Conditionalization as a naive, universal, update rule. I also point out that Reflection is incompatible with the universal use of Conditionalization thus interpreted. The Coherence Argument therefore defeats the naive view on Bayesian learning that it was originally designed to justify. (shrink)