Animals, Mind, and Matter challenges the current ascription of object status to animals in the law, commerce, and science, where they are conceived as property and commodities. Instead, Donovan establishes that animals are living subjects, have minds and opinions, and care about what happens to them.

This essay critically examines the evolving relationship between chemistry and ecology, challenging the historical view of chemistry as purely mechanistic. It argues for a new perspective that recognises the dynamic and agentised qualities of matter. Drawing from diverse scientific and philosophical sources, it is argued that modern chemical theories can reshape how we understand life, agency, and intelligence within the material world. These insights are explored in the context of future technological innovations and ecological sustainability, emphasising the potential of (...) ‘agentised chemistry’ as a strategy for creating circular impacts. By viewing chemistry as an active agent in shaping the world, rather than a passive tool for innovation, this approach offers a more symbiotic and negotiated relationship between human development and nature, supporting a transition towards a more ecologically sustainable future. (shrink)

In this book, Jiri Benovsky takes a stand for a variant of panpsychism as being the best solution available to the mind-body problem. More exactly, he defends a view that can be labelled 'dual-aspect-pan-proto-psychism'. Panpsychism claims that mentality is ubiquitous to reality, and in combination with dual-aspect monism it claims that anything, from fundamental particles to rocks, trees, and human animals, has two aspects: a physical aspect and a mental aspect. In short, the view is that the nature of (...) reality is 'phental' (physical-mental). But this does not mean, according to the author, that rocks and photons think or have conscious experiences, in the sense in which human animals have experiences. This is where pan-proto-psychism enters the picture as being a better theoretical option, where the mental aspects of fundamental particles, rocks, and trees are not experiential. Many hard questions arise here. In this book, Benovsky focuses on the combination problem: in short, how do tiny mental aspects of fundamental particles combine to yield macro-phenomenal conscious experiences, such as your complex experience when you enjoy a great gastronomic meal? What makes the question even harder is that the combination problem is not just one problem, but rather a family of various combination issues and worries. Benovsky offers a general strategy to deal with these combination problems and focuses on one in particular – namely, the worry concerning the existence of subjects of experience. Indeed, if standard panpsychism were true, we would need an explanation of how tiny micro-subjects combine into a macro-subject like a human person. And if panprotopsychism is true, it has to explain how a subject of experience can arise from proto-micro-mental aspects of reality. Benovsky shows that understanding the nature of subjectivity in terms of the growingly familiar notion of mineness in combination with a reductionist/eliminativist view of the self, allows us to have a coherent picture, where this type of combination problem is avoided, without throwing the baby out with the bathwater. (shrink)

Nobel laureate Erwin Schrödinger's What is Life?, one of the great science classics of the twentieth century appears here together with Mind and Matter.

This chapter explores several episodes in the eighteenth-century discussion of the metaphysics of mind. It begins with Locke’s suggestion that it would not be impossible for God to “superadd” the power of thought to matter. It then describes the debate about Locke’s suggestion between Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins, and considers Hume’s discussion of the immateriality of the soul in relation to that debate. Next it presents Berkeley’s philosophy of immaterialism as a way of protecting the mental from (...) reduction to the physical. Then it gives an account of the materialist arguments of Hartley and Priestley, and concludes with a summary of Reid’s criticisms of those arguments. (shrink)

"The relationship between mind and matter has eluded and puzzled philosophers and scientists since the earliest times. In this book, a distinguished scientist reminds his readers of some of the paradoxes of this relationship, and offers his own suggestions towards a solution of the problem"--.

In this book, the world-famous theoretical physicist, Professor Erwin Schrödinger treats of the physical basis of consciousness, and of the relationship between mind and matter in the act of knowing.

This contribution explores Wolfgang Pauli's idea that mind and matter are complementary aspects of the same reality. We adopt the working hypothesis that there is an undivided timeless primordial reality (the primordial 'one world'). Breaking its symmetry, we obtain a contextual description of the holistic reality in terms of two categorically different domains, one tensed and the other tenseless. The tensed domain includes, in addition to tensed time, nonmaterial processes and mental events. The tenseless domain refers to (...) class='Hi'>matter and physical energy. This concept implies that mind cannot be reduced to matter, and that matter cannot be reduced to mind. The non-Boolean logical framework of modern quantum theory is general enough to implement this idea. Time is not taken to be an a priori concept, but an archetypal acausal order is assumed which can be represented by a one-parameter group of automorphisms, generating a time operator which parametrizes all processes, whether material or nonmaterial. The time-reversal symmetry is broken in the nonmaterial domain, resulting in a universal direction of time for the material domain as well. (shrink)

Many philosophical and scientific discussions of topics of mind-matter research make implicit assumptions, in various guises, about the distinction between mind and matter. Currently predominant positions are based on either reduction or emergence, providing either monistic or dualistic scenarios. A more-involved framework of thinking, which can be traced back to Spinoza and Leibniz, combines the two scenarios, dualistic (with mind and matter separated) and monistic (with mind and matter unseparated), in one single (...) picture. Based on such a picture, the transition from a domain with mind and matter unseparated to separate mental and material domains can be viewed as a result of a general kind of symmetry breaking, which can be described formally in terms of inequivalent representations. The possibility of whether this symmetry breaking might be connected to the emergence of temporal directions from temporally non-directed or even non-temporal levels of reality will be discussed. Correlations between mental and material aspects of reality could then be imagined as remnants of such primordial levels. Different conceivable types of inequivalent representations would lead to correlations with different characteristics. (shrink)

Physics explores a universe of wonderful order, expressed in terms of beautiful mathematical equations. Mathematics itself is understood to be the exploration of a realm of noetic reality. Science describes matter in terms of concepts with mind-like qualities. The psychosomatic nature of human persons is best understood in terms of a dual-aspect monism, in which matter and mind are complementary aspects of a unitary being. The new science of complexity theory, with its dualities of parts/whole and (...) energy/information, offers modest resources for the speculative exploration of this idea. The intrinsic unpredictabilities present in nature afford the metaphysical opportunity to consider dissipative systems as exhibiting top–down causality. (shrink)

The ancient problem of mind-matter relationship still has traction. Cartesian dualism created a seemingly impossible divide here. But with the decline of mechanism on the matter sides the issue of trans-categorical causality no larger secured insurmountable. However, with a more open concept of causality in view, there is no reason to think that the causality at issue here is a one way street from matter to mind. The mind-brain can be seen as a unified (...) hermeneutical engine that permits of two-way operation. Mark Twain asked “When the body is drunk, does the mind stay sober?” But one may just as well ask “When the mind says ‘Write!,’ does the hand remain immobile?”. (shrink)

Idealism in the 'social' sense in which i accept it is defended against the three writers mentioned. topics dealt with include mind as spatial, sensation as species of feeling, 'direct intuition', singulars vs. crowds, the body as society, participation as universal principle. it is held that ryle, ayer, and lewis overlook the direct participations which alone give experience access to a world and indeed alone enable it to be experience at all.

body. While the latter areas are discussed mainly in fields such as the philosophy of mind, cognitive Many philosophical and scientific discussions of top-.

In biology, man is an object of research; therefore the question might be asked whether inspirations can go from biological data to the reflections on the mind-matter relation in man. The social aspect of man, as treated by sociobiology, is left out of consideration. The knowledge that man is mind, or has a mind, is no result of biological research. It is a datum from philosophy. The biologist, however, is living in a culture which knows about (...) the mental character of man, and this is incorporated in his investigations. He knows that mental activities are connected with processes in the central nervous system and that, especially in the brain, localizations of mental activities are found. As a result of the split-brain experiments with patients and animals, some have arrived at the conclusion that there is a double consciousness.An approach from biology can lead to statements of a philosophical character, as, for example, statements about the unity, or even identity, of mind and matter. The theories of identity meet with great interest in scientific circles, and the truth value of identity statements is investigated. The system theory is taken into consideration. On a philosophical level a revaluation of the concept of matter can lead to a different sort of identity theory. (shrink)

Originally published in 1931, this book forms the first of two volumes based on the Gifford Lectures delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1919 and 1921. The second volume, God and Nature, was originally published in 1952. The text provides a philosophical discussion of the nature of experience, examining the fundamental principles of knowledge regarding the physical world, the self and minds other than our own. Throughout this discussion, a carefully defined 'common sense' position is put forward as the (...) mediating factor in the relationship between the mind and the material world. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in philosophy, psychology and theories of knowledge. (shrink)

One of the most deeply engrained habits of the modern world is the habit of thinking in terms of a contrast, and indeed of an opposition, between something we call Mind and something we call Matter. This habit is obviously not confined to philosophy. It is built into the structure of our languages and of our ways of behaviour. It conditions our religious and moral attitudes, as well as our reflective thought in science and philosophy. It is not (...) surprising, therefore, that much of modern European Philosophy has consisted in an effort to overcome the dualism to which this habit gives rise when we try to clarify and systematize our knowledge of Reality. This essay on the subject is an essay in scepticism. (shrink)

This volume is concerned with the philosophical foundations of Psychical Research. Traditional metaphysical theories have led to apparently insoluble problems concerning the nature of mind, of matter and the relation between the two. The author holds that these theories arise from misconception about the way in which words acquire meaning. His aim is to show that once the relation between words and the experienceable entities which they mean is clearly understood, these seemingly insoluble problems disappear, and the metaphysical (...) theories which give rise to them are seen to be literally nonsensical. The philosophy which results is a radically empirical one, a form of Neutral Monism. The book intended to ‘clear the decks’ for Psychical Research by removing certain traditional pseudo-problems, but it will be of interest to all who followed the revival of Empiricist Philosophy, whether they are students of Psychical Research or not. It is written in a pithy and sparkling style, with a minimum of technical terms, and serves as an introduction to Empiricist Philosophy. Originally published 1949. (shrink)

Professor Wisdom gives an elementary introduction to the applications in philosophy of the analytical method. He believes that the aim of analysis is clarity, whereas the aim of speculative philosophy is truth. After a brief introduction on what analysis is, he discusses the relation of body and mind and seeks for causal relations between mental and material events. He concludes this section with a chapter on Free will, before turning to perception and the external world.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-2, Ahead of Print.

Experiments with remote perception and Random Event Generators (REG) performed over the last decades show small but significant anomalous effects. Since these effects seem to be independent of spatial and temporal distance, they appear to be in disagreement with the standard scientific worldview. A very simple explanation of quantum mechanics is pre- sented, rejecting all unjustified claims about the world. A view of mind in agreement with cognitive neuroscience is introduced. It is argued that mind and consciousness are (...) emer- gent properties of the brain and are understandable without any nonphysical assumptions. A plausible explanation of the results of anomalous experiments, based on the concept of synchronicity, introduced by C.G. Jung and advocated by W. Pauli, is offered. A proof is given that strong correlations should exist between any systems that once interacted. Synchronicity events between parts of the brain and physical objects may be sufficient to explain the results of anomalous experiments. Standard physics is sufficient to understand these phenomena. Motto. (shrink)

Ernie Lepore and Barry Loewer present a series of papers on three key ideas of contemporary philosophy: that a theory of meaning for a language is best understood as a theory of truth for that language; that thought and language are best understood together via a theory of interpretation; and that the mental is irreducible to the physical.