My topic is a certain view about mental images: namely, the ‘Multiple Use Thesis’. On this view, at least some mental image-types, individuated in terms of the sum total of their representational content, are potentially multifunctional: a given mental image-type, individuated as indicated, can serve in a variety of imaginative-event-types. As such, the presence of an image is insufficient to individuate the content of those imagination-events in which it may feature. This picture is argued for, or (more usually) (...) just assumed to be true, by Christopher Peacocke, Michael Martin, Paul Noordhof, Bernard Williams, Alan White, and Tyler Burge. It is also presupposed by more recent authors on imagination such as Amy Kind, Peter Kung and Neil Van Leeuwen. I reject various arguments for the Multiple Use Thesis, and conclude that instead we should endorse SINGLE: a single image-type, individuated in terms of the sum total of its intrinsic representational content, can serve in only one imagination event-type, whose content coincides exactly with its own, and is wholly determined by it. Plausibility aside, the interest of this thesis is also in its iconoclasm, as well as the challenge it poses for the diverse theories that rest on the truth of the Multiple Use Thesis. (shrink)

In this essay I will defend the thesis that proper nouns are primarily used as proper names—as atomic singular referring expressions—and different possible predicative uses of proper nouns are derived from this primary use or an already derived secondary predicative use of proper nouns. There is a general linguistic phenomenon of the derivation of new meanings from already existing meanings of an expression. This phenomenon has different manifestations and different linguistic mechanisms can be used to establish derived meanings of (...) different kinds of expressions. One prominent variation of these mechanisms was dubbed in Nunberg. (Linguist Philos 3:143–184, 1979, J Semant 12:109–132, 1995, The handbook of pragmatics. Blackwell, Oxford, 2004 meaning transfer.) In the essay I will distinguish two different sub-varieties of this mechanism: occurrent and lexical meaning transfer. Nunberg conceives of meaning transfer as a mechanism that allows us to derive a new truth-conditional meaning of an expression from an already existing truth-conditional meaning of this expression. I will argue that most predicative uses of proper nouns can be captured by the mentioned two varieties of truth-conditional meaning transfer. But there are also important exceptions like the predicative use of the proper noun ‘Alfred’ in as sentence like ‘Every Alfred that I met was a nice guy’. I will try to show that we cannot make use of truth-conditional meaning transfer to account for such uses and I will argue for a the existence of second variant of meaning transfer that I will call use-conditional meaning transfer and that allows us also to capture these derived meanings of proper nouns. Furthermore, I will try to show that the proposed explanation of multiple uses of proper nouns is superior to the view supported by defenders of a predicative view on proper names. (shrink)

Recently, several critics of the multiple realizability thesis have argued that philosophers have tended to accept the thesis on too weak grounds. On the one hand, the analytic challenge has problematized how philosophers have treated the multiple realization relation itself, claiming that assessment of the sameness of function and the relevant difference of realizers has been uncritical. On the other hand, it is argued that the purported evidence of the thesis is often left empirically unverified. (...) This paper provides a novel strategy to answer these worries by introducing a role for multiple realizability in the context of biological engineering. In the field of synthetic biology, bioengineers redesign the evolutionary realizations of biological functions, even constructing artificial chemical surrogates in the laboratory. I show how in the rational design approach to biological engineering, multiple realizability can function as a design heuristic in which the sameness of function and difference of realizers can be controlled. Although practically motivated, this engineering approach has also a theoretical, exploratory component that can be used to study the empirical limitations of multiple realizability. Successful realization of the engineering designs would amount to a concrete demonstration of multiple realizability, taking evidence for MRT beyond what is readily found in nature. (shrink)

The thesis of the article is that processes of structural political change can be adequately understood only on the basis of a multi-dimensional concept of political legitimacy. It is argued that the most prominent account of the idea, namely Max Weber's typology of legitimate authority, is misleading because of both its incompleteness and its incoherence (II). Drawing on David Beetham, we instead propose to analytically differentiate between three universal, genetically linked dimensions of legitimacy: (1) a basically pragmatic one, (2) (...) a theoretically re flexive, and (3) a performatively expressive dimension (III). By means of this scheme it becomes possible to capture fundamental, regularly violent processes of legitimation, as well as historically different forms of legitimacy. Empirically, the usefulness of our proposal shall be shown by sketching, on the one hand, the formation of “early states”, and the emergence of modern revolutions on the other (IV). (shrink)

This article discusses relations among the multiple levels of analysis present in macro-sociological explanation—i.e., relations of individual, structural, and institutional processes. It also criticizes the doctrinal insistence upon single-level individualistic explanation found in some prominent contemporary sociological theory. For illustrative material the article returns to intellectual uses of Weber's "Protestant Ethic thesis," showing how an artificial version has been employed as a kind of proof text for the alleged scientific necessity of individualist explanation. Our alternative exposition renders the (...) discussion of Protestantism and capitalism in an explicitly multilevel way, distinguishing possible individual-level, social-organizational, and institutional linkages. The causal processes involved are distinct ones, with the more structural and institutional forms neither captured nor attainable by individual-level thinking. We argue more generally that "methodological individualisms" confuse issues of explanation with issues about microfoundations. This persistent intellectual conflation may be rooted in the broader folk models of liberal individualism. (shrink)

There are currently serious concerns that published scientific findings often fail to be reproducible, and that some solutions may be gleaned by attending the several methodological and sociological recommendations that could be found in the literature. However, researchers would also arrive at some answers by considering the advice of the philosophy of science, particularly semantics, about theses on truth related to scientific realism. Sometimes scientists understand the correspondence thesis of truth as asserting that the next unique empirical confirmation of (...) a hypothesis suffices to attribute truth to it provisionally. Such empiricist bias is not necessarily at the core of CTT, but Mario Bunge proposed the synthetic thesis of truth, based on CTT, to explicitly avoid the bias. STT requires considering a hypothesis corroborated, both by purely empirical confirmation and external consistency or compatibility with the bulk of existing background knowledge. While a capricious understanding of CTT could be rigged to recommend the “one shot game” in hypothesis testing, STT clearly demands the use of multiple approaches, empirical as well as theoretical, and it asserts that a scientific test is effective to the extent to which it is neither purely empirical, nor viewed in isolation. Pattern consistency together with an understanding of causal relations make confirmed hypotheses robust and more reliable. The militancy of the double mechanism of hypothesis control of STT can help mitigate the reproducibility crisis. Earl Werner’s research program in community ecology is an example of the use of STT criteria, which leads to the development of reliable, cross-checked, ecological results, with high predictive capacity. (shrink)

A central claim of Deleuze's reading of Bergson is that Bergson's distinction between space as an extensive multiplicity and duration as an intensive multiplicity is inspired by the distinction between discrete and continuous manifolds found in Bernhard Riemann's 1854 thesis on the foundations of geometry. Yet there is no evidence from Bergson that Riemann influences his division, and the distinction between the discrete and continuous is hardly a Riemannian invention. Claiming Riemann's influence, however, allows Deleuze to argue that quantity, (...) in the form of ‘virtual number’, still pertains to continuous multiplicities. This not only supports Deleuze's attempt to redeem Bergson's argument against Einstein in Duration and Simultaneity, but also allows Deleuze to position Bergson against Hegelian dialectics. The use of Riemann is thereby an important element of the incorporation of Bergson into Deleuze's larger early project of developing an anti-Hegelian philosophy of difference. This article first reviews the role of discrete and continuous multiplicities or manifolds in Riemann's Habilitationsschrift, and how Riemann uses them to establish the foundations of an intrinsic geometry. It then outlines how Deleuze reinterprets Riemann's thesis to make it a credible resource for Deleuze's Bergsonism. Finally, it explores the limits of this move, and how Deleuze's later move away from Bergson turns on the rejection of an assumption of Riemann's thesis, that of ‘flatness in smallest parts’, which Deleuze challenges with the idea, taken from Riemann's contemporary, Richard Dedekind, of the irrational cut. (shrink)

Empirical multiple determination (multiple determination, for short) is the epistemic strategy of establishing the same result by means of multiple and independent procedures. It is an important epistemic strategy praised by both philosophers of science and practicing scientists. Commentators from different contexts have referred to multiple determination as one of the main strategies that researchers use to establish the reliability of their results. Multiple determination has been used to address a variety of problems that arise (...) because of the fallibility of experimental procedures. It is generally believed that being able to establish the same result (or provide evidence for a hypothesis of interest) by means of different and independent procedures is somewhat ‘‘better’’ than doing the same by a single procedure. Despite the heavy appeal to the multiple determination strategy, however, not much philosophical analysis has been provided regarding the grounds on which its epistemic desirability and virtues rest. Not much has been said regarding the structure and rationale underlying arguments which rely on multiple determination, and there is no general agreement regarding the epistemological import of these arguments. In my dissertation, I address these issues. More specifically, my dissertation: a. Provides a conceptual clarification of the epistemic strategy of multiple determination by making evident its differences, in both structure and epistemic import, from other notions and epistemic strategies from which it is often not distinguished in the literature such as robustness, consilience of inductions, variety of evidence, etc. b. Traces the historical and philosophical roots of multiple determination in the 19th century philosophical discussions and scientific developments. Especially, it makes the claim that the emergence of empirical multiple determination as a distinctive epistemic strategy emerged as a response to the scientific and philosophical difficulties facing the atomic and molecular hypotheses of matter and, more generally, the study of unobservable entities, in the end of the 19th century. c. Provides a general conceptual framework for understanding the structure and epistemic import of arguments that rely on the application of the multiple determination strategy in actual scientific research. d. The distinctive feature of my dissertation is that it examines its subject matter from a temporal perspective, by paying close attention to the historical emergence and development of the multiple determination strategy. As such, it also considers the implications of the debates regarding the structure and epistemic import of multiple determination for the relationship between history of science and philosophy of science. (shrink)

Polger and Shapiro argue that their official recipe, a criterion for judging when the phenomenon of multiple realization exists, renders MR less widespread than its proponents have assumed. I argue that, although Polger and Shapiro’s criterion is a useful contribution, they arrive at their conclusion too hastily. Contrary to Polger and Shapiro, I claim that the phenomenon of multiple realization in the biological world, judged by their criterion, is not as scarce as they suggest. To show this, an (...) updated official recipe, namely a multiple mechanistic realization thesis, integrating Polger and Shapiro’s criterion with a compositional conception of realization, is developed. Then, three examples of varied kinds are examined, showing that cases of MR are not so hard to find in the biological world. (shrink)

Sensuous imaginative content presents a problem for unitary accounts of phenomenal character (or content) such as relationism, representationalism or qualia theory. Four features of imaginative content are at the heat of the issue: its perspectival nature, the similarity with corresponding perceptual experiences, the multiple use thesis, and its non-presentational character. I reject appeals to the dependency thesis to account for these features and explain how a representationalist approach can be developed to accommodate them. I defend the (...) class='Hi'>multiple use thesis against Kathleen Stock’s objections but separate the putative non-presentational character of imaginative content into two elements. Loss of presentation is accounted for by the reduced representations involved in imagination and lack of potential response-dependent representational properties. Absence of commitment to reality is accounted for by representational properties characterised in terms of the absence of a certain kind of aetiology. (shrink)

There are currently serious concerns that published scientific findings often fail to be reproducible, and that some solutions may be gleaned by attending the several methodological and sociological recommendations that could be found in the literature. However, researchers would also arrive at some answers by considering the advice of the philosophy of science, particularly semantics, about theses on truth related to scientific realism. Sometimes scientists understand the correspondence thesis of truth as asserting that the next unique empirical confirmation of (...) a hypothesis suffices to attribute truth to it provisionally. Such empiricist bias is not necessarily at the core of CTT, but Mario Bunge proposed the synthetic thesis of truth, based on CTT, to explicitly avoid the bias. STT requires considering a hypothesis corroborated, both by purely empirical confirmation and external consistency or compatibility with the bulk of existing background knowledge. While a capricious understanding of CTT could be rigged to recommend the “one shot game” in hypothesis testing, STT clearly demands the use of multiple approaches, empirical as well as theoretical, and it asserts that a scientific test is effective to the extent to which it is neither purely empirical, nor viewed in isolation. Pattern consistency together with an understanding of causal relations make confirmed hypotheses robust and more reliable. The militancy of the double mechanism of hypothesis control of STT can help mitigate the reproducibility crisis. Earl Werner’s research program in community ecology is an example of the use of STT criteria, which leads to the development of reliable, cross-checked, ecological results, with high predictive capacity. (shrink)

If you were Monica Lewinski's mother, how would you describe Linda Tripp? Remember that Linda Tripp is the woman who tapped her own phone conversations with Monica and then used them to incriminate President Clinton. Marcia Lewis, Monica's actual mother, chose the following expression: "She is like a meddlesome witch, a praying mantis." This expression conveys a multiple analogy, a comparison in which several sources are likened to a target. In this case, the first source tells us that Marcia (...) thinks of Linda as a disagreeable woman who entices youngsters into her confidence in order to ensnare them for her own purposes, much like the witch who trapped Hansel and Gretel. The second source tells us that Marcia thinks of Linda as a creature that ambushes others out of an inhuman lust for prey. ;This example shows the usefulness of multiple analogies in satisfying certain cognitive goals, such as constructing an adequate explanation of Linda Tripp and her behavior. Multiple analogies have also proven to be very useful in satisfying other kinds of cognitive goals, such as those of philosophers and scientists. However, no cognitive model of multiple analogies has yet been proposed or explored. This dissertation presents an exploration of multiple analogies as found in the literature of evolutionary biology, archaeology, and philosophy with the aim of proposing a cognitive model of this interesting mode of reasoning. This model is based upon the Multiconstraint theory of analogies, which is extended for the purpose, and also contrasted with previous theories of analogy. (shrink)

This investigation constitutes an attempt towards (1) understanding issues and problems relating to the notions of one, many, part and whole in Parmenides and Plato; (2) extracting conditions for a successful account of multiplicity and parthood; (3) surveying Deleuzian conceptions and uses of these notions; (4) appraising the extent to which Deleuze’s metaphysics can answer some of these ancient problems concerning the status of multiplicity and the nature of mereological composition, that is, of the relations that pertain between parts and (...) the wholes that they compose. (shrink)

The article considers Max Weber’s model of plebiscitary leadership and historical examples of plebiscitary democracy. It is argued that there is no clear distinction between plebiscitary democracy and dictatorship inWeber’s writings. As Stefan Breuer demonstrates, such a distinction allows us to broaden the application of Weberian concepts. Plebiscitary elements can be seen in the political life of non-Western states, which have been discussed from the multiple modernities perspective. However, while that perspective develops the Weberian sociological tradition, its representatives mostly (...) do not use the concept of plebiscitary leadership. Thus, Shmuel Eisenstadt draws primarily on Weber’s sociology of religion in his analysis of different types of modernity. Specifically, Eisenstadt considers the impact of civilizational legacies on political processes in India and Latin America. Peter Wagner discusses the relevance of Weber’s rationalization thesis and theory of capitalism rather than the concepts of Weberian political sociology. In his study of democratization in Brazil and South Africa, Wagner emphasizes the progressive character of political changes but does not consider the possibility of a reversal of these processes. The article argues that the contemporary reconstruction of Weber’s model of plebiscitary leadership can complement the analyses of democratization in non-Western societies from the multiple modernities perspective. (shrink)

Throughout his career, Michael Bratman has developed a detailed model of individual ‘planning agency’, and, more recently, models of joint action and aspects of social life that he argues such planning agency helps support. How might we empirically investigate whether these models capture what is going on in actual human lives? In this article, we critically engage with this broad question by focusing on what Bratman calls the ‘core capacity thesis’, which is at the center of his most recent (...) discussions of how his work in the philosophy of action hangs together. In his own words, the core capacity thesis claims that ‘our capacity for planning agency plays basic roles in multiple, interrelated systems of human, mind-shaped practical organization, individual and social’. We explore how one might go about testing this thesis, focusing on Bratman's particular way of defending this thesis using the idea of ‘nested Cummins functions’. In so doing, we hope to contribute to a broader discussion about what the relationship is (or, perhaps more importantly, should be) between the kind of philosophy of action Bratman does and empirical work in fields such as psychology, cognitive science, and biology. (shrink)

The early Brentano identifies intentionality with intentional inexistence, i.e., with a kind of indwelling of the intentional object in the mind. The latter concept cannot be grasped apart from its scholastic background and the Aristotelian—Thomistic doctrine of the multiple use of being (to on legetai pollachos). The fact that Brentano abandoned the theory of the intentional inexistence in the course of time does not contradict the thesis that it is intentional inexistence and not the modern conception of reference (...) or directedness to something other which comprises the essence of intentionality for the early Brentano. (shrink)

According to Gibson's ecological theory of perception-action, the proper objects of perception are affordances. Affordances are directly perceivable, environmental opportunities for behavior. The current study assessed affordance judgments, and the confidence ratings corresponding to those judgments, of aperture pass-through-ability based on three modes of perceiving. The modes were vision and two blindfolded conditions involving haptic perception via technological aids: A cane and the Enactive Torch (ET). The first hypothesis, that vision would provide judgments of the critical boundary most similar to (...) the actual boundary, was not supported. The second hypothesis, that participants would perform better on pass-through-ability judgments using the ET than when using the cane, was supported. The third hypothesis, that across all three modalities participants’ ratings of confidence in the accuracy of their yes/no judgments would be lowest near the perceptual category boundary, was supported. Results suggest that in terms of making affordance judgments of aperture pass-through-ability, participants were more accurate with the haptic modalities than with vision. Results also suggest that participants were least confident with their more accurate modality, and most confident with their least accurate modality. (shrink)

It is often observed that images—including mental images—are in some sense representationally ambiguous. Some, including Jerry Fodor, have added that mental images only come to have determinate contents through the contribution of non-imagistic representations that accompany them. This paper agrees that a kind of ambiguity holds with respect to mental imagery, while arguing (pace Fodor) that this does not prevent imagery from having determinate contents in the absence of other, non-imagistic representations. Specifically, I argue that mental images can represent determinate (...) types of outlays of properties without help from any non-imagistic representations, yet can only become involved in the representation of particular objects through pairing with a non-imagistic representation of the right sort. These points are defended through reflection on the “Picture Principle,” the nature of depiction, and general principles for typing and individuating mental states. (shrink)

you use it. These two assumptions, which I believe to be false, are based on a more fundamental assumption, that the rule governing the reference of an indexical remains constant from use to use. Contemporary theories hold that the reference of an indexical varies from use to (relevantly different) use, but that the reference-fixing rule of use is You can search..

This thesis, which is based on six peer-reviewed publications, is a theoretical and qualitative treatment of the ways in which social and contextual factors serve as a resource for understanding the particularities of ‘cybercrime’ that emanates from Nigeria. The thesis illuminates how closer attention to Nigerian society aids the understanding of Nigerian cybercriminals (known as Yahoo Boys), their actions and what constitutes ‘cybercrime’ in a Nigerian context. ‘Cybercrime’ is used in everyday parlance as a simple acronym for all (...) forms of crimes on the internet, whereas ‘cybercrime’ in a Nigerian context is rooted in socioeconomics and determined by it. In particular, the defrauding of victims for monetary benefit is the most significant theme that emerged from the analysis of Yahoo Boys. While all six publications are situated at the intersections of multiple fields of study, they all share a common endorsement of the constructionist/interpretivist position. The six published works comprise: [a] three conceptual publications; and [b] three empirical publications. The conceptual publications deconstruct the meanings of multiple taken-for-granted concepts in cybercrime scholarship and develop more robust conceptual lenses, namely: (1) ‘Digital Spiritualization’; (2) ‘The Tripartite Cybercrime Framework – TCF’; and (3) ‘The Synergy between Feminist Criminology and the TCF’. These new conceptual lenses represent the candidate’s contribution to developing theory in the field. Alongside this, the empirical section includes three sets of qualitative data, which include: (1) interviews with seventeen Nigerian parents; (2) lyrics from eighteen Nigerian musicians; and (3) interviews with forty Nigerian law enforcement officers. These diverse sources of qualitative data provide a more fully-developed understanding of ‘cybercrime’ in the Nigerian context (and elsewhere). All six-published works, while individually contributing to knowledge, collectively shed clearer light on the centrality of cultural context in the explanation of ‘cybercrime’. (shrink)

My thesis is that perceptual awareness is richly multisensory. I argue for this conclusion on the grounds that certain forms of multisensory perceptual experience are incompatible with the claim that each aspect of a perceptual experience is associated with some specific sensory modality or another. First, I explicate what it is for some feature of a conscious perceptual episode to be modality specific. Then, I argue based on philosophical and experimental evidence that some novel intermodal features are perceptible only (...) through the coordinated use of multiple senses. I appeal to cases that involve consciously perceptible feature instances and feature types that could not be perceptually experienced through the use of individual sense modalities working on their own or simply in parallel and co-consciously. Finally, I offer an account of how to type perceptual experiences by modality that makes room for richly multisensory experiences. (shrink)

This thesis develops and defends epistemic fictionalism, according to which knowledge talk is metaphorical. One of the distinctive features of metaphor is that metaphorical sentences have multiple readings: a literal (or ‘face-value’) reading and at least one metaphorical (or ‘non-face-value’) reading. Typically, speakers who utter metaphorical sentences intend to communicate a content that corresponds to the metaphorical meaning. Epistemic fictionalism posits that, as is standard for metaphors, sentences of the form “S knows that P” admit of at least (...) two different readings: a face-value (literal) reading, and a different non-face-value metaphorical reading. A face-value reading of sentences of the form “S knows that P” is that S is infallible with regards to P, and as such are always (or almost always) false at face-value. However, such sentences are not typically used to communicate their typically false face-value content, but some other, typically true metaphorical content. The thesis applies the methods of function-first epistemology (Craig 1990, Hannon 2019a), taking as a starting point the question of what knowledge talk is used for. I argue that understanding knowledge talk as metaphorical coheres with the function that knowledge talk plays, in spite of all (or most) knowledge attributions being literally false: there are advantages to communicating the non-face-value, metaphorical content. Another key advantage of epistemic fictionalism is that it explains the intuitions surrounding sceptical arguments. On the one hand, sceptical infallibilism is compelling because it is the correct analysis of the face-value content of knowledge attributions. On the other hand, sceptical infallibilism is not threatening to everyday knowledge attributions because it does not threaten the truth of the metaphorical content that knowledge attributions are typically used to express. Overall, the main aim of the thesis is to motivate epistemic fictionalism as a serious contender worthy of further investigation and development. (shrink)

Irrigation systems are recognized as common pool resources supplying water for agricultural production, but their role in supplying water for other uses is often overlooked. The importance of non-agricultural uses of irrigation water in livelihood strategies has implications for irrigation management and water rights, especially as increasing scarcity challenges existing water allocation mechanisms. This paper examines the multiple uses of water in the Kirindi Oya irrigation system in Sri Lanka, who the users are, and implications for water rights and (...) management policies. There are important residential, gender, and class differences among the water users. People use irrigation system water not only for field crops, but also for fishing, homestead gardens, and livestock. Even within irrigated farming households, men have more control over paddy crops in the main fields, whereas homestead gardens are women's domain. Because the irrigation system provides water for birds and animals, even wildlife and non-resident environmental groups can be considered stakeholders. Current policies emphasize user involvement in both irrigation and domestic water supply. While government agencies have had primary responsibility, institutions such as Farmers' Organizations are being promoted. These have the potential to serve as user platforms for negotiating water allocation among irrigated farmers. However, the user organizations reflect the sectoral responsibility of the government agencies. Their membership and structure do not take into account the multiple uses or users of water. Developing platforms that accommodate different user groups remains a major challenge for improving the overall productivity, as well as equity, of water use. (shrink)

This thesis is concerned with the expansions of algebraic structures and their fit in Shelah’s classification landscape.The first part deals with the expansion of a theory by a random predicate for a substructure model of a reduct of the theory. Let T be a theory in a language $\mathcal {L}$. Let $T_0$ be a reduct of T. Let $\mathcal {L}_S = \mathcal {L}\cup \{S\}$, for S a new unary predicate symbol, and $T_S$ be the $\mathcal {L}_S$ -theory that axiomatises (...) the following structures: $$ consist of a model $\mathscr {M}$ of T and S is a predicate for a model $\mathscr {M}_0$ of $T_0$ which is a substructure of $\mathscr {M}$. We present a setting for the existence of a model-companion $TS$ of $T_S$. As a consequence, we obtain the existence of the model-companion of the following theories, for $p>0$ a prime number: • $\mathrm {ACF}_p$, $\mathrm {SCF}_{e,p}$, $\mathrm {Psf}_p$, $\mathrm {ACFA}_p$, $\mathrm {ACVF}_{p,p}$ in appropriate languages expanded by arbitrarily many predicates for additive subgroups;• $\mathrm {ACF}_p$, $\mathrm {ACF}_0$ in the language of rings expanded by a single predicate for a multiplicative subgroup;• $\mathrm {PAC}_p$ -fields, in an appropriate language expanded by arbitrarily many predicates for additive subgroups.From an independence relation in T, we define independence relations in $TS$ and identify which properties of are transferred to those new independence relations in $TS$, and under which conditions. This allows us to exhibit hypotheses under which the expansion from T to $TS$ preserves $\mathrm {NSOP}_{1}$, simplicity, or stability. In particular, under some technical hypothesis on T, we may draw the following picture : Configuration $T_0\subseteq T$ Generic expansion $TS$ $T_0 = T$ Preserves stability $T_0\subseteq T$ Preserves $\mathrm {NSOP}_{1}$ $T_0 = \emptyset $ Preserves simplicityIn particular, this construction produces new examples of $\mathrm {NSOP}_{1}$ not simple theories, and we study in depth a particular example: the expansion of an algebraically closed field of positive characteristic by a generic additive subgroup. We give a full description of imaginaries, forking, and Kim-forking in this example.The second part studies expansions of the group of integers by p-adic valuations. We prove quantifier elimination in a natural language and compute the dp-rank of these expansions: it equals the number of independent p-adic valuations considered. Thus, the expansion of the integers by one p-adic valuation is a new dp-minimal expansion of the group of integers. Finally, we prove that the latter expansion does not admit intermediate structures: any definable set in the expansion is either definable in the group structure or is able to “reconstruct” the valuation using only the group operation.prepared by Christian d’Elbée.E-mail: [email protected]: https://choum.net/~chris/page_perso. (shrink)

The contingency of biological regularities—and its implications for the existence of biological laws—has long puzzled biologists and philosophers. The best argument for the contingency of biological regularities is John Beatty’s evolutionary contingency thesis, which will be re-analyzed here. First, I argue that in Beatty’s thesis there are two versions of strong contingency used as arguments against biological laws that have gone unnoticed by his commentators. Second, Beatty’s two different versions of strong contingency are analyzed in terms of two (...) different stabilities of regularities. Third, I argue that Beatty and his commentators have focused on the more ineffective trajectory stability version of the argument, whereas the constancy stability version provides a more substantial and applicable argument against the existence of biological laws. Fourth, I develop a counterexample to Beatty’s thesis. Finally, I discuss the possibility of evolution producing repeatable and general non-lawlike regularities and patterns by utilizing the notion of generative entrenchment and by criticizing the thesis of multiple realizability of biological properties. (shrink)

The thesis proposes, defends, and applies a new model of inter-theoretic reduction, called "Neo-Nagelian" reduction. There are numerous accounts of inter-theoretic reduction in the philosophy of science literature but the most well-known and widely-discussed is the Nagelian one. In the thesis I identify various kinds of problems which the Nagelian model faces. Whilst some of these can be resolved, pressing ones remain. In lieu of the Nagelian model, other models of inter-theoretic reduction have been proposed, chief amongst which (...) are so-called "New Wave" models. I show these to be no more adequate than the original Nagelian model. I propose a new model of inter-theoretic reduction, Neo-Nagelian reduction. This model is structurally similar to the Nagelian one, but differs in substantive ways. In particular I argue that it avoids the problems pertaining to both the Nagelian and New Wave models. Multiple realizability looms large in discussions about reduction: it is claimed that multiply realizable properties frustrate the reduction of one theory to another in various ways. I consider these arguments and show that they do not undermine the Neo-Nagelian of reduction of one theory to another. Finally, I apply the model to statistical mechanics. Statistical mechanics is taken to be a reductionist enterprise: one of the aims of statistical mechanics is to reduce thermodynamics. Without an adequate model of inter-theoretic reduction one cannot assess whether it succeeds; I use the Neo-Nagelian model to critically discuss whether it does. Specifically, I consider two very recent derivations of the Second Law of thermodynamics, one from Boltzmannian classical statistical mechanics and another from quantum statistical mechanics. I argue that they are partially successful, and that each makes for a promising line of future research. (shrink)

Two important thought-experiments are associated with the work of Hilary Putnam, one designed to establish multiple realizability for mental kinds, the other designed to establish essentialism for natural kinds. Comparing the thought-experiments with each other reveals that the scenarios in both are structurally analogous to each other, though his intuitions in both are greatly at variance, intuitions that have been simultaneously well received. The intuition in the former implies a thesis that prioritizes pre-scientific over scientific indicators for identifying (...) mental kinds in certain circumstances, while his intuition in the latter implies a converse thesis, prioritizing scientific over pre-scientific indicators for identifying natural kinds in analogous circumstances. In this paper I question whether we can consistently endorse both of these intuitions. A consideration is presented to attempt to justify the common intuition found in the multiple realization thought-experiment. Then it is argued that this same consideration has application in the structurally analogous Twin-Earth thought-experiment. This recommends a kind of multiple realization thesis for natural kinds, in opposition to a scientific essentialist approach. The various respects in which mental kinds like pain and natural kinds like water are similar to each other, such that similar philosophical treatments are warranted for both, are enumerated. (shrink)

This thesis is an attempt to provide an account of gender. In particular, it is an attempt to develop an ameliorative approach to gender that satisfies a number of transfeminist political goals. That is, following Sally Haslanger, I ask what do we want gender to be? In order to answer the question, I develop a novel Neurathian methodology for conceptual engineering, and a distinctively ‘activist’ take on that project. From there I criticise a number of theories of gender and (...) suggest that we should instead adopt a position I call Ameliorative Semantic Pluralism. That is, a position that endorses multiple meanings for gender terms. I develop this position in conversation with those traditions that arose from the anti-essentialism debates of the 1990s – family resemblance theories, Butlerian performativity, deflationism, scepticism, and nihilism about gender. I provide novel critiques of each position but take seriously the concerns that each position had. I end the thesis by drawing on Audre Lorde to engineer one of the senses of the term ‘agender’ that speaks to my phenomenology, before using that account to critique some further recent attempts to theorise nonbinary gender identities. (shrink)

This thesis consists in six articles and a comprehensive summary. • The pourpose of the summary is to introduce the AGM theory of belief change and to exemplify the diversity and significance of the research that has been inspired by the AGM article in the last 25 years. The research areas associated with AGM was divided in three parts: criticisms, where we discussed some of the more common criticisms of AGM. Extensions where the most common extensions and variations of (...) AGM are presented and applications where we provided an overview of applications and connections with other areas of research. • Article I elaborates on the connection between partial meet contractions [AGM85] and kernel contractions [Han94a] in belief change theory. Also both functions are equivalent in belief sets, there are notequivalent in belief bases. A way to define incision functions from selection functions and vice versa is presented. It is explained under which conditions there are exact correspondences between selection and incision functions so that the same contraction operations can be obtained by using either of them. • Article II proposes an axiomatic characterization for ensconcement-based contraction functions, belief base functions proposed byWilliams and relates this function with other kinds of base contraction functions. • Article III adapts the Fermé and Hansson model of Shielded Contraction [FH01] as well as Hansson et all Credibility-Limited Revision [HFCF01] for belief bases, to join two of the many variations of the AGM model [AGM85], i.e. those in which knowledge is represented through belief bases instead of logic theories, and those in which the object of the epistemic change does not get the priority over the existing information as it is the case in the AGM model. • Article IV introduces revision by comparison a refined method for changing beliefs by specifying constraints on the relative plausibility of propositions. Like the earlier belief revision models, the method proposed is a qualitative one, in the sense that no numbers are needed in order to specify the posterior plausibility of the new information. The method uses reference beliefs in order to determine the degree of entrenchment of the newly accepted piece of information. Two kinds of semantics for this idea are proposed and a logical characterization of the new model is given. • Article V focuses on the extension of AGM that allows change for a belief base by a set of sentences instead of a single sentence. In [FH94], Fuhrmann and Hansson presented an axiomatic for Multiple Contraction and a construction based on the AGM Partial Meet Contraction. This essay proposes for their model another way to construct functions: Multiple Kernel Contraction, that is a modification of Kernel Contraction,proposed by Hansson [Han94a] to construct classical AGM contractions and belief base contractions. • Article VI relates AGM model with the DFT model proposed by Carlos Alchourrón [Alc93]. Alchourrón devoted his last years to the analysis of the notion of defeasible conditionalization. His definition of the defeasible conditional is given in terms of strict implication operator and a modal operator f which is interpreted as a revision function at the language level. This essay points out that this underlying revision function is more general than AGM revision. In addition, a complete characterization of that more general kind of revision that permits to unify models of revision given by other authors is given. (shrink)

By tradition, Byzantine dance is linked with both classical antiquity and today’s folk dances of the southern Balkans. Turkish influence on the latter seems limited primarily to musical instruments and melody but does not appear to include rhythm. In antiquity, and in Byzantine times, the simple rhythmic foot was divided into arsis and thesis, the ‘up’ and ‘down’ of a step, and the ratio of their lengths determined the rhythmic genus, 1:1 dactylic, 2:1 iambic, 3:2 paeonic and 4:3 epitrite. (...) This implies measures of 2, 3, 4, 5 or 7 units and certain multiples. In addition, there were also composite rhythmic feet which combined simple feet of different genera. In early Byzantium, for example, measures of 11 and probably of 9 units were used. These seem to correspond to the forms 3+3+2+3, 2+3+2+2+2 and 2+2+3+2. This would suggest that the asymmetric rhythms of Greek, Bulgarian and Macedonian folk dances derive from ancient and Byzantine predecessors. (shrink)

What thesis is Hume trying to establish in his essay “On Miracles” and does he succeed? John Earman’s answer to the latter question is clearly conveyed by the title of his new book. Earman uses a Bayesian representation of the problem to make his case. For Earman, this mode of analysis is both perspicuous and nonanachronistic, in that probability reasoning was central to the 18th century debate about miracles in particular and testimony in general. Indeed, one of Hume’s most (...) interesting antagonists, Richard Price, was the person to whom Thomas Bayes entrusted his now-famous essay for posthumous publication. For Earman, Price is the proper Bayesian, while Hume’s essay provides only “rhetoric and schein geld”. Earman’s tone is consistently prosecutorial and sometimes snide; he says that his animus is not so much against Hume himself as against those who smugly invoke Hume’s essay as definitively settling the matter. This tone should not deter potential readers who are convinced that Hume’s essay contains something of value. Earman’s book is interesting and provocative in multiple ways—it places Hume’s essay in its historical setting, it offers an insightful close reading of the text, and it shows how the resources of Bayesianism can be powerfully put to work. Besides Earman’s own essay, the volume also contains Hume’s essay and relevant work by others, including Locke, Spinoza, Samuel Clarke, Price, Laplace, and Babbage. The book would be an excellent choice for an advanced undergraduate or graduate seminar. (shrink)

Equilibrium explanations use an equilibrium to represent and explain a system’s dynamic behavior. They provide a system with the property of global stability: a system will converge towards and remain in equilibrium regardless of its initial conditions and dynamic process. Thus, equilibrium explanations are generally treated as non-causal explanations. There are two claims subsumed under that comprehensive thesis. The first claim is that equilibrium explanations do not identify any causes because a system with global stability resists manipulation. The second (...) claim is that even if equilibrium explanations do identify causes by manipulation, those causes are embedded in a system’s deeper, underlying structural relationships, and those causes are irrelevant to explaining a system’s behavior. Only the system’s structural relationships are relevant. But equilibrium explanations are not monolithic. I compare dynamic systems with multiple, competing equilibria to systems with a globally stable equilibrium. Equilibrium explanations of the former use intervention on a system’s initial conditions and dynamic process to manipulate equilibria, which identifies causes. Furthermore, a system’s initial conditions and dynamic process are relevant to explaining why one equilibrium is selected instead of another. I then apply these lessons to systems with a globally stable equilibrium and discuss when their corresponding equilibrium explanations have a proper role in the parent sciences. (shrink)

This essay is devoted to the study of proper names. Although the view that sees proper names as referential singular terms is widely considered orthodoxy, there is a growing popularity to the view that proper names are predicates. This is partly because the orthodoxy faces two anomalies that Predicativism can solve: on the one hand, proper names can have multiple bearers. But multiple bearerhood is prima facie a problem to the idea that proper names have just one individual (...) as referent. On the other hand, proper names can have predicative uses. But the view that proper names are singular terms arguably does not have the resources to deal with these uses. In this dissertation I argue that the Predicate View of proper names is mistaken. In the first part of the thesis, I analyse this view in its main contentions and offer several arguments to reject it. This critical exercise provides useful insight into the life of proper names that I incorporate in my own view as follows: I argue that the behaviour of proper names should be understood in light of the wider phenomenon I call category change. Thus, I maintain, with orthodoxy, that proper names are fundamentally referential terms, but I also argue that they also have other uses, including the predicative uses highlighted by the predicativist. I also offer a semantic theory according to which proper names are polyreferential, that is, they are terms that can have more than one referent in a way that is distinct from both plural terms and general terms. This theory resolves the problem of multiple bearerhood and provides a base to account for all other uses of proper names that are not referential, i.e., common noun, adjectival and verbal uses, as semantically derived from the more fundamental referential meaning. (shrink)

The aim of the thesis is to provide the foundations for a representation-based theory of meaning, i.e. a theory of meaning that encompasses the psychological level of cognitive representations. This is in opposition to the antipsychologist goals of the Fregean philosophy of language and represents the results of a joint analysis of multiple philosophical problems in contemporary philosophy of language, which, as argued in the tesis, stem from the lack of recognition of a cognitive level in language. In (...) the thesis, I first provide and argue a definition of cognitive/mental representations based on results in developmental psychology as well as theoretical considerations. Then, I use the definition to build upon it a richer theory of concepts and apply it to various philosophical conundra. The problems tackled include the problem of proper names (for which a solution is proposed that respects the post-Kripkean criticism), a unified meaning postulate for modalities and the epistemology and ontology of mathematical terms. The thesis concludes with a proposed application of the newly acquired framework to select social aspects of language use. (shrink)

This thesis justifies the need for and develops a new integrated model of practical reasoning and argumentation. After framing the work in terms of what is reasonable rather than what is rational (chapter 1), I apply the model for practical argumentation analysis and evaluation provided by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) to a paradigm case of unreasonable individual practical argumentation provided by mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik (chapter 2). The application shows that by following the model, Breivik is relatively easily (...) able to conclude that his reasoning to mass murder is reasonable – which is understood to be an unacceptable result. Causes for the model to allow such a conclusion are identified as conceptual confusions ingrained in the model, a tension in how values function within the model, and a lack of creativity from Breivik. Distinguishing between dialectical and dialogical, reasoning and argumentation, for individual and multiple participants, chapter 3 addresses these conceptual confusions and helps lay the foundation for the design of a new integrated model for practical reasoning and argumentation (chapter 4). After laying out the theoretical aspects of the new model, it is then used to re-test Breivik’s reasoning in light of a developed discussion regarding the motivation for the new place and role of moral considerations (chapter 5). The application of the new model shows ways that Breivik could have been able to conclude that his practical argumentation was unreasonable and is thus argued to have improved upon the Fairclough and Fairclough model. It is acknowledged, however, that since the model cannot guarantee a reasonable conclusion, improving the critical creative capacity of the individual using it is also of paramount importance (chapter 6). The thesis concludes by discussing the contemporary importance of improving practical reasoning and by pointing to areas for further research (chapter 7). (shrink)

Collective action processes in complex, multiple-use common-pool resources (CPRs) have only recently become a focus of study. When CPRs evolve into more complex systems, resource use by separate user groups becomes increasingly interdependent. This implies, amongst others, that the institutional framework governing resource use has to be re-negotiated to avoid adverse impacts associated with the increased access of any new stakeholders, such as overexploitation, alienation of traditional users, and inter-user conflicts. The establishment of “platforms for resource use negotiation” is (...) a way of dealing with complex natural resource management problems. Platforms arise when stakeholders perceive the same resource management problem, realize their interdependence in solving it, and come together to agree on action strategies for solving the problem (Röling, 1994). This article sets the scene for a discussion in this Special Issue about the potential of nested platforms for resource use negotiation in facilitating collective action in the management of complex, multiple-use CPRs. The article has five objectives. First, we define “collective action” in the context of this paper. Second, we discuss the importance of collective action in multiple-use CPRs. Third, we introduce the concept of platforms to coordinate collective action by multiple users. Fourth, we address some issues that emerge from evidence in the field regarding the role and potential of nested platforms for managing complex CPRs. Finally, we raise five discussion statements. These will form the basis for the collection of articles in this special issue. (shrink)

The idea of agent causation—that a system such as a living organism can be a cause of things in the world—is often seen as mysterious and deemed to be at odds with the physicalist thesis that is now commonly embraced in science and philosophy. Instead, the causal power of organisms is attributed to mechanistic components within the system or derived from the causal activity at the lowest level of physical description. In either case, the ‘agent’ itself (i.e., the system (...) as a whole) is left out of the picture entirely, and agent causation is explained away. We argue that this is not the right way to think about causation in biology or in systems more generally. We present a framework of eight criteria that we argue, collectively, describe a system that overcomes the challenges concerning agent causality in an entirely naturalistic and non-mysterious way. They are: (1) thermodynamic autonomy, (2) persistence, (3) endogenous activity, (4) holistic integration, (5) low-level indeterminacy, (6) multiple realisability, (7) historicity, (8) agent-level normativity. Each criterion is taken to be dimensional rather than categorical, and thus we conclude with a short discussion on how researchers working on quantifying agency may use this multidimensional framework to situate and guide their research. (shrink)

In this special issue, Steins and Edwards introduced the notion of nested platforms for resource use negotiation as a tool to facilitate collective action amongst multiple-users in complex common-pool resource management scenarios. Five discussion statements were put forward to aid the debate on multi-use platforms. This paper is a synthesis of the responses to these statements by the other contributors to this special issue. It aims to further stimulate the debate on the management of complex, multiple-use common-pool management (...) scenarios. (shrink)

This thesis has the following aims. First, to show that Deleuze can be situated clearly within the post-Kantian tradition. This is achieved through an analysis of the relations between Kant's transcendental idealism and Deleuze's transcendental empiricism. Second, to explore the criticisms of representational theories of difference which can be found in the work of Deleuze and Hegel. Representational theories are best understood as theories which rely on a logic which is governed by relations between entities which pre-exist those relations. (...) Deleuze argues that these logics presuppose the formal equivalent of a homogeneous space within which these relations can be construed. Hegel similarly understands representation as the utilisation of finite categories which rely on the fixity of the subject of predication. The third aim is to provide a rigorous explication of some of the key themes of Deleuzian ontology, particularly in relation to the problem of representation. This will involve looking at the logic of multiplicities, which attempts to provide a theory of difference that is non-oppositional. This logic will be clarified through a discussion of Deleuze's use of modern geometry, and his analysis of the foundations of the calculus. The fourth aim will be to contrast Deleuze's solution with that of Hegel, particularly with respect to their relationships to Kant and the calculus. This is achieved through the Deleuzian distinction between finite and infinite representation, the latter in Deleuze's view characterising the Hegelian attempt to bring the idea of transition into representation itself. Finally, having shown where Deleuze and Hegel differ in their respective projects, the thesis will explore whether either of these philosophies has the resources to provide a refutation of the other with reference to the dialectic of force and the understanding in the henomenology of Spirit, and the problem of the one and the many. (shrink)

A picture has indeed held modern Western philosophy captive, that of the universe as a vast machine whose iron laws are best understood as exceptionless empirical regularities which, as it were, determine the future before it happens. This fantastic conception commands the assent, not just of positivistically-minded naturalists but of all the great anti-naturalists who champion a very different view of human action as a domain of freedom ¿that somehow cheats science¿. The most fundamental move in Roy Bhaskar¿s system of (...) philosophy, the germ of everything that followed, was to reconceptualise the natural world in transcendental realist terms, ¿turning Kant around using his own method¿. On this account, the universe is characterized by deep structures, mechanisms and fields that generate the flux of phenomena, and is in open, creative and emergent process. This completely recasts the terms of the debate between naturalism and anti-naturalism by remedying its false grounds and shows how philosophy can be liberated from its anthropocentric/anthropomorphic prison and rendered consistent with the best insights of modern natural science. There is necessity in nature quite independent of humans, but in an open world causation is multiple and conjunctural, the actual course of the unfolding of being is highly contingent and the bases of human freedom can be understood scientifically. Written as a DPhil thesis when Bhaskar was in his mid-twenties, Empiricism and the Metatheory of the Social Sciences brilliantly launches this reconceptualisation and explores its implications for social science in the course of carrying through the metatheoretical destruction of empiricism. It will be indispensable reading for anyone interested in the development of Bhaskar¿s thought, in transcendental realism, and in the critique of empiricism, more generally of the philosophical discourse of Western modernity. (shrink)

In recent years, there have been multiple instances of misconduct in science, yet no coherent framework exists for characterizing this phenomenon. The thesis of this article is that economic analysis can provide such a framework. Economic analysis leads to two categories of misconduct: replication failure and fraud. Replication failure can be understood as the scientist making optimal use of time in a professional environment where innovation is emphasized rather than replication. Fraud can be depicted as a deliberate gamble (...) under conditions of uncertainty: The scientist takes advantage of the complexity of science and undermines the integrity of science for personal gain or advancement. (shrink)

Shapiro has argued that the multiple realizability thesis for psychology, despite its broad acceptance, is far from being a well-established thesis. He suggests that not only do many of the standard examples of multiple realizability fail to be clearly examples but a competing thesis (“the mental constraint thesis”) that human-like minds are severely constrained in their physical realization is the more likely thesis. I will argue, however, that Shapiro’s mental constraint thesis is (...) not a competing thesis with the multiple realizability thesis. Once it is understood how these theses are compatible, the widespread acceptance of multiple realizability looks entirely reasonable. (shrink)

This article defends the thesis that there are multiple points of exchange between the categories of “word” and “image” in Walter Benjamin’s Arcades Project. Benjamin describes the truth of the articulate wish of the past as “graphically perceptible” and the image as “readable.” In this respect the vocabulary of “word” and “image” that Benjamin’s early work had opposed are not just deployed in concert, but specific features of the vocabulary of “word” and “image” become exchangeable. The distinctive features (...) of this exchange can be used to expound on Benjamin’s peculiar understanding of revolutionary experience and the significance of the break that it marks with his early way of opposing the word and the image. In particular, the exchange of features between word and image can explain the mechanics and intended effect of his idea that the meaning of history can be perceived in an image. The study of this exchange also shows that although the framework of “graphic perception” entails an experience of motivating meaning that is epistemologically grounded, the citation model of history is unable to secure the extension of the sought after legibility of the nineteenth century to a recipient. (shrink)

This volume opens a set of reviews written by Bueno published by the Institute of Philosophy "Luis Vives" of the CSIC. The first of these reviews also constitute the first texts of Bueno of which we have news and are part of their stage as a CSIC fellow in Madrid, a period in which he develops his doctoral thesis on the philosophy of religion. Formal and material foundation of the modern philosophy of religion, which is dated April 7, 1947. (...) Despite being short texts, small of them small philosophical notes that should not be overlooked: the role of Cartesianism in the History of modern philosophy, the relations between philosophy and literature, the scope of the theory of tomista knowledge, the problem of the logical foundation of mathematics, & c. In any case, the main value of these reviews is to offer a sample of the type of readings that its author made in those years. Therefore it is interesting to verify the use that makes Bueno in his youth works of some of the texts he had previously reviewed. Thus, for example, in the doctoral thesis it is cited, to illustrate some aspects of its "historical" part, Paul Hazard's work on European thought in the 18th century to which a year earlier (1946) dedicated the most extensive review and detailed how many wrote. However, it is in the unpublished book on the picnological processes, dated in 1953 and already written in Salamanca, where we will find the works of logic that Bueno had read and reviewed in the previous years. Here Manuel Granell's logic manual will be quoted, but Hönen's monograph on the Theorie du Jugement d'Arès St. Thomas d'Aquin and Beth's books, Becker and Curry will also be referenced in the numerous examples extracted of the logic that jalonan the work. From the book of Dockx, Vers UNE Synthèse Moderne du Savoir, it extracts good the formulation of one of its favorite examples of the picnological process: that of the polygon inscribed in a circumference with which it ends up identifying, by one step to the limit, after the indefinite multiplication of its sides. This group of writings can also be ascribed in some ways the most extensive work about "a new exhibition of the syllogistic", appeared in the aforementioned Philosophy magazine in 1951. (shrink)

The aim of this thesis is to defend a presentist metaphysics. I respond to a series of objections against presentism, including some that draw on our best physics. I also explore ways in which presentism might play an active role in interpreting and constraining physical theory, beyond merely being consistent with it. -/- A unifying theme of this thesis is that I advocate for a reduction of presentism to its bare essentials. Within the proposed ontology, reality is three-dimensional. (...) Time only exists in the sense that three-dimensional reality primitively changes. I reject any temporal dimension, extension, or direction. I reject any primitively tensed facts or nonpresent-tensed truths. I also reject any notion of simultaneity, beyond the mere fact that multiple entities exist in the three-dimensional world. I accept and embrace that if ontology is ‘stripped back’ to the present, then other features of metaphysics that depend on ontology should be stripped back too. -/- The world, under this view, is a forgetful one. What we call the ‘past’ has been utterly lost from existence: there are not even any absolute facts or truths about how things once were. All that remain are records, memories, and the like, but there are no objective underlying truths to which those records correspond. This has implications for physics. In a forgetful world particles have positions, but no entire trajectories. The present may be certain and determinate, but the past and future are at best modelled using probabilistic mathematics. -/- I believe that the world is likely to be as I describe. I will not attempt to argue, however, that this view is intuitive. Instead I will argue that it can account for our experiences and observations, including those from physics, in a simple and effective way. Most importantly, I argue that this view succeeds in the face of challenges where other versions of presentism fail. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy in Islam by Frank GriffelRosabel AnsariFrank Griffel. The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy in Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. x + 651. Hardback, $135.00.In this monumental work, Frank Griffel provides a wide-ranging and methodologically diverse investigation into the nature and formation of philosophy in the Eastern Islamic world in the twelfth century. Griffel explores institutionally, biographically, and [End Page 502] textually how (...) philosophy continued to be practiced in the century following the death of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), a time previously associated with the decline of philosophy in the Islamic world. The astonishing breadth of content is organized with great clarity into three principal sections: (1) “Post-classical philosophy in its Islamic context,” itself divided into three chapters covering the historical context, the meanings and conceptual frameworks of the two Arabic words for ‘philosophy’ (falsafa and ḥikma), and the relation of religious law to philosophy; (2) “Philosophers and philosophies: a biographical history of philosophy in the sixth/twelfth century Islamic East”; and (3) “The formation of ḥikma as a new philosophical genre,” which is subdivided into multiple chapters and subsections to examine key questions and methods of philosophy during this period. The book is encyclopedic in its scope. Researched over a ten-year period, it offers contributions to a vast array of issues, themes, and problematics that have been raised by modern and recent scholarship, both historical and philosophical. Instead of covering the book’s vast content in detail, this review will focus on one aspect of its argumentation.For this reviewer, the book’s most significant and exciting aspect is its metalevel discussions concerning the falsafa tradition (classical Arabic Aristotelianism) and its fate. From the outset, Griffel is careful to argue that philosophy in the Islamic world is much more than falsafa (10), and the reduction of the former to the latter is why Western scholars for so long thought philosophy found its demise after the fateful blow Ghazālī leveled against the practitioners of falsafa. The conflict was not, however, one of faith versus reason. Rather, Griffel surmises, it was a question of two competing perspectives concerning God’s relation to the world: an impersonal deity, or a creator-God. Both positions were philosophical, and both sides understood themselves to be grounded in an interpretation of the Quran (10–13).Moreover, Griffel goes on to demonstrate that falsafa would be conceptualized and discussed as a quasireligion with its own set of doctrines (80–94). It was not, therefore, synonymous with what we today call “philosophy,” but had the limited sense of one school of philosophy associated with Avicenna (d. 1037). The demise of self-identified practitioners of falsafa was not the demise of philosophers; it was the demise of a term that was associated with a particular school that had been discredited for its slavish imitation, as well as the moral shortcomings and impiety of its principal exponent, Avicenna.Yet Griffel’s principal thesis is that irrespective of the decline in use of the term ‘falsafa’ as a self-description, its approach to the nature of God and the relation of God to the world remained and continued to be discussed in the rebranded discipline of ḥikma (“philosophy,” or more broadly, “wisdom”). In fact, Griffel shows that numerous theologians and philosophers wrote and discussed contradictory positions under the guise of different disciplines, composing texts in both kalām (rational theology) and ḥikma, chief among whom was Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210). A large portion of the book is devoted to documenting and unpacking this phenomenon. The value of this investigation lies not only in uncovering the ḥikma tradition and its continuity with falsafa, but in Griffel’s insistence on presenting the two textual traditions of ḥikma and kalām side-by-side as counterparts to philosophical questions, such as the principle of sufficient reason (524–41). The approach is rich in its demonstration of the philosophical stakes in both positions concerning, for example, the status of God’s will.In its conclusion, the book returns to the question of what counts as philosophy. Griffel argues that while... (shrink)

In this chapter, important transcultural and multi-civilizational foundations for a comprehensive philosophy of cosmic life are presented from a systematic and at the same time historical perspective. An “anacrusis” regarding the origin of the philosophical term ‘cosmic life’ is followed by systematic groundwork in relation to Gotthard Günther’s concepts of poly-contexturality and trans-classical science. These are extended and complemented by the views of other thinkers. Against this background, the new term ‘panenbiotism’ (“all-in-life-doctrine”) is introduced. Like ‘cosmic life,’ this term is (...) then used as the basis for a transcultural comparative discussion of positions from ancient Hellenic and Chinese contexts, from South and West Asia, and from Europe. This discussion is organized in the form of three main sections which correspond to three basic themes concerning ‘cosmic life.’ Each of these is developed along the trajectories of related subtopics. In this sense, the first main section presents several views from various times and places in the context of which (cosmic) life is seen as an expressed principle of incessant self-(re)creation through metabolism and partial self-consumption. In the second main section, the transcultural comparative angle is applied to multiple perspectives and variations on the theme of cosmic life as an integral feature of a vast or infinite universe. Finally, the third main section presents family-resemblant views of cosmic life as an integral aspect of cosmic ‘light.’ This last section also links the discussion with some unorthodox and very innovative hypotheses of our time. The main thesis of this chapter is that a future philosophy of cosmic life must draw on a variety of philosophical traditions from different civilizations and, in a spirit of unrestricted openness, translate the ultimate inexhaustibility of all scientific endeavors into a more productive intellectual reality within the expanded scope of a new kind of trans-classical concept of science. (shrink)

The article is written on the basis of author’s paper at the panel discussion “How we un­derstand Russian philosophy” hold in the Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences. The article presents contemporary look on the problem based on the thesis of diversity as the central fundamental characteristic of the Russian philosophy. The di­versity must be acknowledged as the expression of it’s sovereignty opposed to the sole normative approach. Such kind of approach based on dogmatic Marxism had been spread (...) during Soviet period by authoritarian measures. The conception of diversity instead of Marxist oriented unification proposes variety of cognitive and hermeneutic means for knowing the treasury of Russian intellectual history. Another aspect of diversity includes multiplicity of languages used in philosophical texts besides proper Russian during the various periods. There are: Church Slavonic, Greek, Latin (XI–XVII centuries), French, English, German (XVIII–XX centuries) and various Slavic languages (XIX–XX centuries). Multiplicity of languages in Russian philosophical space could be explained mostly by political and censorial reasons. That multiplicity incorporates also high assortment of eth­nic groups that took part in the elaboration of various philosophical texts. It included Greeks, Ukrainians, Moldavians, Serbs etc. Many Russian thinkers had been exiled abroad or ought to leave home country to avoid political repressions: A.I. Herzen, M.A. Bakunin, P.A. Kropotkin, N.A. Berdyaev, S.L. Frank, S.L. Karsavin, S.N. Bulgakov and others. Therefore they created their writings in abroad. Needless to mark also that some Russian thinkers born in Russia, such as A. Koyre, A. Kozhev, I. Berlin, P. Sorokin, became famous Western philosophers in emigration. (shrink)

One of the conceptual limitations of the orthodox game theory is its inability to offer definitive theoretical predictions concerning the outcomes of noncooperative games with multiple rationalizable outcomes. This prompted the emergence of goal-directed theories of reasoning – the team reasoning theory and the theory of hypothetical bargaining. Both theories suggest that people resolve non-cooperative games by using a reasoning algorithm which allows them to identify mutually advantageous solutions of non-cooperative games. The primary aim of this thesis is (...) to enrich the current debate on goaldirected reasoning theories by studying the extent to which the principles of the bargaining theory can be used to formally characterize the concept of mutual advantage in a way which is compatible with some of the conceptually compelling principles of orthodox game theory, such as individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and non-comparability of decision-makers’ personal payoffs. I discuss two formal characterizations of the concept of mutual advantage derived from the aforementioned goal-directed reasoning theories: A measure of mutual advantage developed in collaboration with Jurgis Karpus, which is broadly in line with the notion of mutual advantage suggested by Sugden, and the benefit-equilibrating bargaining solution function, which is broadly in line with the principles underlying Conley and Wilkie’s solution for Pareto optimal point selection problems with finite choice sets. I discuss the formal properties of each solution, as well as its theoretical predictions in a number of games. I also explore each solution concept’s compatibility with orthodox game theory. I also discuss the limitations of the aforementioned goal-directed reasoning theories. I argue that each theory offers a compelling explanation of how a certain type of decision-maker identifies the mutually advantageous solutions of non-cooperative games, but neither of them offers a definitive answer to the question of how people coordinate their actions in non-cooperative social interactions. (shrink)