In many species the mutation rate is higher in males than in females, a phenomenon denoted as male mutation bias. This is often observed in animals where males produce many more sperm than females produce eggs, and is thought to result from differences in the number of replication‐associated mutations accumulated in each sex. Thus, studies of male mutation bias have the capacity to reveal information about the replication‐dependent or replication‐independent nature of different mutations. The availability (...) of whole genome sequences for many species, as well as for multiple individuals within a species, has opened the door to studying factors, both sequence‐specific and those acting on the genome globally, that affect differences in mutation rates between males and females. Here, we assess the advantages that genomic sequences provide for studies of male mutation bias and general mutation mechanisms, discuss major challenges left unresolved, and speculate about the direction of future studies. (shrink)

The function of meiotic recombination has remained controversial, despite recent inroads into mechanisms. Ideas concerning a possible role of recombination in the elimination or efficient incorporation of mutations have been backed by theoretical studies but have lacked empirical support. Recent investigations into the basis for local variations in recombination frequency in yeast have uncovered a strong association between recombination initiation sites and transcriptional regulatory sequences. Other recent studies indicate a strong correlation between transcription and mutation rates in yeast genes. (...) Taken together, these data imply that distributions of recombination and mutation frequencies may be strongly correlated. This suggests that recombination may be targeted to genomic sites of high mutation frequency; such a ‘mutation‐tracking’ function would clearly aid in the shuffling of mutations to break up unfavorable and create favorable allelic combinations. Moreover, recent insights into the mechanism of gene conversion in yeast reveal a very strong inherent bias in favor of alleles on the non‐initiating homolog. Combined with mutation tracking, these findings suggest a novel and general mechanism by which allelic gene conversion may act to eliminate mutations. (shrink)

Theoretical minimal RNA rings are candidate primordial genes evolved for non‐redundant coding of the genetic code's 22 coding signals (one codon per biogenic amino acid, a start and a stop codon) over the shortest possible length: 29520 22‐nucleotide‐long RNA rings solve this min‐max constraint. Numerous RNA ring properties are reminiscent of natural genes. Here we present analyses showing that all RNA rings lack dinucleotide CG (a mutable, chemically instable dinucleotide coding for Arginine), bearing a resemblance to known CG‐depleted genomes. CG (...) in “incomplete” RNA rings (not coding for all coding signals, with only 3–12 nucleotides) gradually decreases towards CG absence in complete, 22‐nucleotide‐long RNA rings. Presumably, feedback loops during RNA ring growth during evolution (when amino acid assignment fixed the genetic code) assigned Arg to codons lacking CG (AGR) to avoid CG. Hence, as a chemical property of base pairs, CG mutability restructured the genetic code, thereby establishing itself as genetically encoded biological information. (shrink)

A growing number of linguistic attempts to explain how languages change use cultural-evolutionary models involving selection or drift. Developmental constraints and biases, which take center stage in evolutionary developmental biology or evo-devo, seem to be absent within this framework, even though linguistics is home to numerous notions of constraint. In this paper, we show how these evo-devo concepts could be applied to linguistic change and why they should. This requires some conceptual groundwork, due to important differences between linguistic and biotic (...) evolution. In biological evolution, development generates the organism's variable traits on which selection and drift act. In linguistic evolution by analogy, we say development generates the linguistic variants on which selection and drift can act. “Linguistic development” then picks out how individual speakers produce and comprehend language. It involves much more than just learning. Using this broad notion of development, we distinguish between different types of bias that could operate in the processes of linguistic innovation and transmission, which correspond to genetic mutation and biological reproduction, respectively. Having thus sharpened our conceptual toolbox, we then reanalyze two well-documented cases of linguistic change and show that, in both these cases, linguists have only considered Neo-Darwinian evolutionary explanations, falsely deploying an exclusive disjunction of selection and drift. We show that there is at least a third relevant alternative in these examples, namely developmental constraint or bias in the sense we explicate here. (shrink)

The reconstruction of bacterial evolutionary relationships has proven to be a daunting task because variable mutation rates and horizontal gene transfer (HGT) among species can cause grave incongruities between phylogenetic trees based on single genes. Recently, a highly robust phylogenetic tree was constructed for 13 γ‐proteobacteria using the combined alignments of 205 conserved orthologous proteins.1 Only two proteins had incongruent tree topologies, which were attributed to HGT between Pseudomonas species and Vibrio cholerae or enterics. While the evolutionary relationships among (...) these species appears to be resolved, further analysis suggests that HGT events with other bacterial partners likely occurred; this alters the implicit assumption of γ‐proteobacteria monophyly. Thus, any thorough reconstruction of bacterial evolution must not only choose a suitable set of molecular markers but also strive to reduce potential bias in the selection of species. BioEssays 26:463–468, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Grammatical Evolution (GE) has a long history in evolutionary computation. Central to the behaviour of GE is the use of a linear representation and grammar to map individuals from search spaces into problem spaces. This genotype to phenotype mapping is often argued as a distinguishing property of GE relative to other techniques, such as context-free grammar genetic programming (CFG-GP). Since its initial description, GE research has attempted to incorporate information from the grammar into crossover, mutation, and individual initialisation, blurring (...) the distinction between genotype and phenotype and creating GE variants closer to CFG-GP. This is argued to provide GE with the "best of both worlds", allowing degrees of grammatical bias to be introduced into operators to best suit the given problem. This paper examines the behaviour of three grammar-based search methods on several problems from previous GE research. It is shown that, unlike CFG-GP, the performance of "pure" GE on the examined problems closely resembles that of random search. The results suggest that further work is required to determine the cases where the "best of both worlds" of GE are required over a straight CFG-GP approach. (shrink)

Novel precision oncology trial designs, such as basket and umbrella trials, are designed to test new anticancer agents in more effective and affordable ways. However, they present some ethical concerns referred to scientific validity, risk-benefit balance and informed consent. Our aim is to discuss these issues in basket and umbrella trials, giving examples of two ongoing cancer trials: NCI-MATCH (National Cancer Institute – Molecular Analysis for Therapy Choice) and Lung-MAP (Lung Cancer Master Protocol) study. We discuss three ethical requirements for (...) clinical trials which may be challenged in basket and umbrella trial designs. Firstly, we consider scientific validity. Thanks to the new trial designs, patients with rare malignancies have the opportunity to be enrolled and benefit from the trial, but due to insufficient accrual, the trial may generate clinically insignificant findings. Inadequate sample size in study arms and the use of surrogate endpoints may result in a drug approval without confirmed efficacy. Moreover, complexity, limited quality and availability of tumor samples may not only introduce bias and result in unreliable and unrepresentative findings, but also can potentially harm patients and assign them to an inappropriate therapy arm. Secondly, we refer to benefits and risks. Novel clinical trials can gain important knowledge on the variety of tumors, which can be used in future trials to develop effective therapies. However, they offer limited direct benefits to patients. All potential participants must wait about 2 weeks for the results of the genetic screening, which may be stressful and produce anxiety. The enrollment of patients whose tumors harbor multiple mutations in treatments matching a single mutation may be controversial. As to informed consent – the third requirement we discuss, the excessive use of phrases like “personalized medicine”, “tailored therapy” or “precision oncology” might be misleading and cause personal convictions that the study protocol is designed to fulfill the individual health-related needs of participants. We suggest that further approaches should be implemented to enhance scientific validity, reduce misunderstandings and risks, thus maximizing the benefits to society and to trial participants. (shrink)

This paper describes a computational model of how ideas, or memes, evolve through the processes of variation, selection, and replication. Every iteration, each neural-network based agent in an artificial society has the opportunity to acquire a new meme, either through 1) INNOVATION, by mutating a previously-learned meme, or 2) IMITATION, by copying a meme performed by a neighbor. Imitation, mental simulation, and using past experience to bias mutation all increase the rate at which fitter memes evolve. Memes at (...) epistatic loci converged more slowly than memes at over- or underdominant loci. The higher the ratio of innovation to imitation, the greater the meme diversity, and the higher the fitness of the fittest meme. Optimization is fastest for the society as a whole with an innovation to imitation ratio of 2:1, but diversity is comprimized. (shrink)

Why the DNA‐containing organelles, chloroplasts, and mitochondria, are inherited maternally is a long standing and unsolved question. However, recent years have seen a paradigm shift, in that the absoluteness of uniparental inheritance is increasingly questioned. Here, we review the field and propose a unifying model for organelle inheritance. We argue that the predominance of the maternal mode is a result of higher mutational load in the paternal gamete. Uniparental inheritance evolved from relaxed organelle inheritance patterns because it avoids the spread (...) of selfish cytoplasmic elements. However, on evolutionary timescales, uniparentally inherited organelles are susceptible to mutational meltdown (Muller's ratchet). To prevent this, fall‐back to relaxed inheritance patterns occurs, allowing low levels of sexual organelle recombination. Since sexual organelle recombination is insufficient to mitigate the effects of selfish cytoplasmic elements, various mechanisms for uniparental inheritance then evolve again independently. Organelle inheritance must therefore be seen as an evolutionary unstable trait, with a strong general bias to the uniparental, maternal, mode. (shrink)

An open question regarding how people develop their models of the world is how new candidates are generated for consideration out of infinitely many possibilities. We discuss the role that evolutionary mechanisms play in this process. Specifically, we argue that when it comes to developing a global world model, innovation is necessarily incremental, involving the generation and selection among random local mutations and recombinations of (parts of) one's current model. We argue that, by narrowing and guiding exploration, this feature of (...) cognitive search is what allows human learners to discover better theories, without ever grappling directly with the problem of finding a “global optimum,” or best possible world model. We suggest this aspect of cognitive processing works analogously to how blind variation and selection mechanisms drive biological evolution. We propose algorithms developed for program synthesis provide candidate mechanisms for how human minds might achieve this. We discuss objections and implications of this perspective, finally suggesting that a better process-level understanding of how humans incrementally explore compositional theory spaces can shed light on how we think, and provide explanatory traction on fundamental cognitive biases, including anchoring, probability matching, and confirmation bias. (shrink)

The permutation of basic atoms—nitrogen, hydrogen, oxygen, carbon and phosphorus―into the biomolecules DNA and RNA, subsequently evolved in cells and brains, defining the origin of life and intelligence, remains unexplained. Equally the origin of the genetic information and the intertwined nature of ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ involved in the evolution of bio-molecules and the cells are shrouded in mystery. This treatise aims at exploring individual and swarm behaviour patterns which potentially hint at as yet unknown biological principles. It reviews theories of (...) evolution with perspectives from the earth sciences, commencing with the earliest observed records of life. This is followed by reviews and discussion of the building blocks of life, marine and terrestrial communities, the arthropods, birds and finally humans. It is suggested that, further to the mutation/natural selection processes established by Darwin and Wallace, an understanding of the evolution of intelligence remains little understood. A directionality of evolutionary trajectories is evident, not least the purposeful thinking process of humans as well as animals. It is not clear how directional intelligence, manifested for example by the collective intelligence of arthropod colonies, has evolved from mutation/natural selection processes. Potential clues for the understanding of life and evolution are provided by Aristotle’s dictum of “the whole being greater than the sum of the parts”, Niels Bohr’s principle of quantum complementarity and George Ellis’ theory of top-down causality. Inherent in the question of the origin of life is an anthropocentric bias, related to the self-referential Anthropic Principle and theological paradigms of man’s supposed dominion over all other species. The Anthropic Principle, however, should be capable of being circumvented using the scientific falsification method, assuming universal verified constants of physics. The phenomenon of the human mastery of fire and the splitting of the atom, leading to the seventh major mass extinction of species, remains incomprehensible. (shrink)

Philosophers working on time-biases assume that people are hedonically biased toward the future. A hedonically future-biased agent prefers pleasurable experiences to be future instead of past, and painful experiences to be past instead of future. Philosophers further predict that this bias is strong enough to apply to unequal payoffs: people often prefer less pleasurable future experiences to more pleasurable past ones, and more painful past experiences to less painful future ones. In addition, philosophers have predicted that future-bias is (...) restricted to first-person preferences, and that people’s third-person preferences are time-neutral. Philosophers disagree vigorously about the normative status of these preferences—i.e., they disagree about whether first-person future-bias is rationally permissible. Time-neutralists, for example, have appealed to the predicted asymmetry between first- and third-person preferences to argue for the rational impermissibility of future-bias. We empirically tested these predictions, and found that while people do prefer more past pain to less future pain, they do not prefer less future pleasure to more past pleasure. This was so in both first and third-person conditions. This suggests that future-bias is typically non-absolute, and is more easily outweighed in the case of positive events. We connect this result to the normative debate over future-bias. (shrink)

The overwhelming majority of those who theorize about implicit biases posit that these biases are caused by some sort of association. However, what exactly this claim amounts to is rarely specified. In this paper, I distinguish between different understandings of association, and I argue that the crucial senses of association for elucidating implicit bias are the cognitive structure and mental process senses. A hypothesis is subsequently derived: if associations really underpin implicit biases, then implicit biases should be modulated by (...) counterconditioning or extinction but should not be modulated by rational argumentation or logical interventions. This hypothesis is false; implicit biases are not predicated on any associative structures or associative processes but instead arise because of unconscious propositionally structured beliefs. I conclude by discussing how the case study of implicit bias illuminates problems with popular dual-process models of cognitive architecture. (shrink)

People are ‘biased toward the future’: all else being equal, we typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. Several explanations have been suggested for this pattern of preferences. Adjudicating among these explanations can, among other things, shed light on the rationality of future-bias: For instance, if our preferences are explained by unjustified beliefs or an illusory phenomenology, we might conclude that they are irrational. This paper investigates one hypothesis, according to which (...) future-bias is explained by our having a phenomenology that we describe, or conceive of, as being as of time robustly passing. We empirically tested this hypothesis and found no evidence in its favour. Our results present a puzzle, however, when compared with the results of an earlier study. We conclude that although robust passage phenomenology on its own probably does not explain future-bias, having this phenomenology and taking it to be veridical may contribute to future-bias. (shrink)

This chapter is centered around an apparent tension that research on implicit bias raises between virtue and social knowledge. Research suggests that simply knowing what the prevalent stereotypes are leads individuals to act in prejudiced ways—biasing decisions about whom to trust and whom to ignore, whom to promote and whom to imprison—even if they reflectively reject those stereotypes. Because efforts to combat discrimination obviously depend on knowledge of stereotypes, a question arises about what to do next. This chapter argues (...) that the obstacle to virtue is not knowledge of stereotypes as such, but the “accessibility” of such knowledge to the agent who has it. “Accessibility” refers to how easily knowledge comes to mind. Social agents can acquire the requisite knowledge of stereotypes while resisting their pernicious influence, so long as that knowledge remains, in relevant contexts, relatively inaccessible. (shrink)

Many philosophers think that we should use a lottery to decide who gets a good to which two persons have an equal claim but which only one person can get. Some philosophers think that we should save identified persons from harm even at the expense of saving a somewhat greater number of statistical persons from the same harm. I defend a principled way of justifying both judgements, namely, by appealing to the decreasing marginal moral value of survival chances. I identify (...) four desiderata that, I contend, any such justification should satisfy, and explain how my account meets these desiderata, unlike some previous accounts. (shrink)

In a recent issue of this journal, Vandermassen suggested that feminists should include sexual selection theory and evolutionary psychology in a unifying theory of human nature. In response, this article aims to offer some insight into the development of sexual selection theory, to caution against Vandermassen's unreserved assimilation and to promote the opposite ongoing integration — an inclusion of gender perspectives into evolutionary biology. In society today, opinions about maintaining traditional sex roles are often put forward on the basis of (...) what is natural and how animals behave. However, the natural sciences have proved to be pervaded by gendered values and interests; Darwin's theory of sexual selection has been criticized for being male biased, and partly due to the unwillingness of Darwin's scientific contemporaries to accept female choice, research has been overwhelmingly focused on males. More recently, theory has become less gender biased and research has come to include a large variety of issues not present in the first version of the theory. However, there is a need to increase the awareness of gender bias in order to develop a gender-neutral evolutionary biology. (shrink)

The rule against bias is a central tenet of English law and it also impacts on collegiate courts which typically exercise appellate/review jurisdictions over their professional or student members. This is true of the Bar Standards Board which has established the adjudicatory bodies to enforce its regulatory framework and has vested the procedure of fair trials upon the Council of the Inns of Court which is responsible for appointing the Disciplinary Tribunal panels that conduct hearings for professional misconduct. The (...) COIC has been exposed for ‘irregularities’ in the findings of guilt against barristers who have been adjudged by non-qualified judges. In R v Visitors to the Inns of Court and Ors [2014] EWCA Civ 1630, the Court of Appeal ruled that a disciplinary tribunal or a panel of visitors appointed from barristers or lay representatives outside its pool of enrolled judges would still ensure independence and guarantee freedom from outside pressure. The impugned tribunal members who were not entitled to sit nevertheless had authority to act as de facto judges. This part of the ruling reinforces the regulatory bodies inherent power to appoint its own tribunal to adjudicate and it needs a more rigorous application of natural justice principle on the part of the BSB. (shrink)

BackgroundHealth data holds great potential for improved treatments. Big data research and machine learning models have been shown to hold great promise for improved diagnostics and treatment planning. The potential is tied, however, to the availability of personal health data. In recent years, it has been argued that data from health records should be available for health research, and that individuals have a duty to make the data available for such research. A central point of debate is whether such secondary (...) use of health data requires informed consent.Main bodyIn response to recent writings this paper argues that a requirement of informed consent for health record research must be upheld. It does so by exploring different contrasting notions of the duty of easy rescue and arguing that none of them entail aperfectduty to participate in health record research. In part because the costs of participation cannot be limited to 1) the threat of privacy breaches, but includes 2) the risk of reduced trust and 3) suboptimal treatment, 4) stigmatization and 5) medicalisation, 6) further stratification of solidarity and 7) increased inequality in access to treatment and medicine. And finally, it defends the requirement of informed consent by arguing that the mere possibility of consent bias provides a rather weak reason for making research participation mandatory, and that there are strong, independent reasons for making.ConclusionArguments from the duty of easy rescue in combination with claims about little risk of harm and potential consent bias fail to establish not only aperfectduty to participate in health record research, but also that participation in such research should be mandatory. On the contrary, an analysis of these arguments indicates that the duty to participate in research is most adequately construed as animperfectduty, and reveals a number of strong reasons for insisting that participation in health records research is based on informed consent. (shrink)

While rapid advances in artificial intelligence hiring tools promise to transform the workplace, these algorithms risk exacerbating existing biases against marginalized groups. In light of these ethical issues, AI vendors have sought to translate normative concepts such as fairness into measurable, mathematical criteria that can be optimized for. However, questions of disability and access often are omitted from these ongoing discussions about algorithmic bias. In this paper, I argue that the multiplicity of different kinds and intensities of people’s disabilities (...) and the fluid, contextual ways in which they manifest point to the limits of algorithmic fairness initiatives. In particular, existing de-biasing measures tend to flatten variance within and among disabled people and abstract away information in ways that reinforce pathologization. While fair machine learning methods can help mitigate certain disparities, I argue that fairness alone is insufficient to secure accessible, inclusive AI. I then outline a disability justice approach, which provides a framework for centering disabled people’s experiences and attending to the structures and norms that underpin algorithmic bias. (shrink)

Purpose The online economy has not resolved the issue of racial bias in its applications. While algorithms are procedures that facilitate automated decision-making, or a sequence of unambiguous instructions, bias is a byproduct of these computations, bringing harm to historically disadvantaged populations. This paper argues that algorithmic biases explicitly and implicitly harm racial groups and lead to forms of discrimination. Relying upon sociological and technical research, the paper offers commentary on the need for more workplace diversity within high-tech (...) industries and public policies that can detect or reduce the likelihood of racial bias in algorithmic design and execution. Design/methodology/approach The paper shares examples in the US where algorithmic biases have been reported and the strategies for explaining and addressing them. Findings The findings of the paper suggest that explicit racial bias in algorithms can be mitigated by existing laws, including those governing housing, employment, and the extension of credit. Implicit, or unconscious, biases are harder to redress without more diverse workplaces and public policies that have an approach to bias detection and mitigation. Research limitations/implications The major implication of this research is that further research needs to be done. Increasing the scholarly research in this area will be a major contribution in understanding how emerging technologies are creating disparate and unfair treatment for certain populations. Practical implications The practical implications of the work point to areas within industries and the government that can tackle the question of algorithmic bias, fairness and accountability, especially African-Americans. Social implications The social implications are that emerging technologies are not devoid of societal influences that constantly define positions of power, values, and norms. Originality/value The paper joins a scarcity of existing research, especially in the area that intersects race and algorithmic development. (shrink)

What is the wrong behind the widely criticized presentist bias of democracies? In this paper I argue that it is not that future generations are excluded from present-day democratic decision-making quite generally. Rather, I claim that due to the unique risks associated with representing future generations and the limitations on affecting future generations both institutionally and causally, the focus ought to be on including them on a more specific, narrower, set of issues, namely only those that threaten to lead (...) to their domination. I identify such issues as those that may end up being purpose-determining: that may subject future generations to previous generations’ will by forcing them to exert a substantial amount of their energies on dealing with problems caused by their predecessors. I conclude by reflecting on the extent to which political representation together with providing avenues of contestation can minimize the risk of intergenerational domination. (shrink)

The fallacies approach to argument evaluation can exacerbate problems it aims to address when it comes to social bias, perpetuating social injustice. A diagnosis that an argument commits a fallacy may flag the irrelevance of stereotypical characterizations to the line of reasoning without directly challenging the stereotypes. This becomes most apparent when personal bias is part of the subject matter under discussion, in ethotic argument, including ad hominem and ad verecundiam, which may be recognized as fallacious without addressing (...) whether the ethotic presumptions are true. Yap (2013; 2015) makes this case for ad hominem and the pragma-dialectical understanding of fallacies, expanded here to show related patterns in some other fallacies, and employing the argument schemes understanding of fallacies. Adding critical questions increases the ways reasoners can dismiss arguments as fallacious, and could include directly addressing bias, but if an argument fails on a different critical question, that may yet allow the bias to pass. The fallacies approach is a form of meta-debate and techniques of meta-debate need to address the ubiquity of social bias, not convey them as specialized problems. The view that the fallacies approach to argument evaluation can provide neutrality is dangerously false. Arguers thus should avoid using fallacies for argument evaluation where social stereotypes or schemas might be involved, especially when the subject matter relates closely to social justice. (shrink)

This paper examines the associations among social desirability response bias, cultural constructs and gender. The study includes the responses of 1537 students from 12 countries including Australia, Canada, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, Nepal, South Africa, Spain, and the United States. The results of the analysis indicate that, on average, social desirability response bias decreases as a country's Individualism increases. The analysis also indicates that women scored significantly higher on Paulhus' Image Management Subscale on an overall (...) basis and for seven of the 12 country comparisons. This research serves as a caution when considering the research findings of prior international survey-based ethics research that do not include a direct measure of social desirability response bias. For example, the finding that women score higher on Paulhus' measure of social desirability response bias calls into question prior research that does not control for social desirability response bias indicating women are more ethically sensitive than men. (shrink)

This paper assesses the extent to which enhancing a penalty for hate crimes is a necessity. It conducts its analysis by looking at the theoretical justifications for and against such enhancement and also the impact of hate crimes on their victims, their groups and society, in comparison to non-bias crimes. It recognizes the particularly damaging effect of hate crimes on these three levels but argues that care must be taken to ensure a high threshold framework and a clear vision (...) in terms of protected characteristics. It argues that if penalty enhancements are to be any use, victims should be empowered to access the criminal justice system whilst the right to freedom of expression must be preserved. The paper commences with a definitional and conceptual framework of hate crimes, proceeds with the theoretical argumentations for and against hate crime legislation, conducts a legislative analysis of hate crimes, using examples from around the world as well as an assessment of the approach of the European Court of Human Rights to hate crime. (shrink)

Our emotional lives are full of temporal asymmetries. Salient among these is that we tend to feel differently about painful or unpleasant events depending on their temporal location: we feel anxiety or trepidation about painful events we anticipate in the future, and relief when they are over. One question, then, is whether temporally asymmetric emotions such as relief have any ramifications for the metaphysics of time. On what has become the standard way of finessing this question, the asymmetry of relief (...) is an instance of the phenomenon of future-bias, a tendency to prefer painful events to be located in the past than in the future. The main question then posed is whether this pattern of preferences can be justified in the light of different metaphysical theories of time. In this paper I argue that this whole dialectic is misconceived. While many people may have future-biased preferences and these are a legitimate object of psychological study, this should be distinguished from the more basic phenomenon of relief that an unpleasant experience is over. Acknowledging the distinctness of these phenomena has two main consequences. First, if relief is not a manifestation of a time-biased preference, it is unclear what it would be for it to be justified or unjustified. This, in turn, should lead us to reassess how the psychology of relief bears on our metaphysical commitments. As I shall suggest, the real significance of the temporally asymmetric emotions for the metaphysics of time is that they manifest, and so reflection on them serves to draw our attention to, a structural feature of our awareness of the passage of time that resists re-articulation in other terms. (shrink)

This article questions the widespread use of experimental social psychology to understand real-world group disparities. Standard experimental practice is to design studies in which participants make judgments of targets who vary only on the social categories to which they belong. This is typically done under simplified decision landscapes and with untrained decision-makers. For example, to understand racial disparities in police shootings, researchers show pictures of armed and unarmed Black and White men to undergraduates and have them press “shoot” and “don't (...) shoot” buttons. Having demonstrated categorical bias under these conditions, researchers then use such findings to claim that real-world disparities are also due to decision-maker bias. I describe three flaws inherent in this approach, flaws which undermine any direct contribution of experimental studies to explaining group disparities. First, the decision landscapes used in experimental studies lack crucial components present in actual decisions. Second, categorical effects in experimental studies are not interpreted in light of other effects on outcomes, including behavioral differences across groups. Third, there is no systematic testing of whether the contingencies required to produce experimental effects are present in real-world decisions. I apply this analysis to three research topics to illustrate the scope of the problem. I discuss how this research tradition has skewed our understanding of the human mind within and beyond the discipline and how results from experimental studies of bias are generally misunderstood. I conclude by arguing that the current research tradition should be abandoned. (shrink)

The whole drug industry campaign for mood drugs in the 1950s was to broaden to absurd limits the definition of illness.... If the facts in these ads were not untruths, then their implications often were.1Sponsorship bias occurs when a funder of scientific research has a vested interest in what claims the research supports, which consequently shapes the research or the reporting of its results to align with that interest. This article examines the relationship between sponsorship bias and misleading (...) claims, understood as claims that are not necessarily false but which encourage those exposed to them to infer false conclusions. Such claims are important insofar as being common in examples of alleged sponsorship... (shrink)

Building on past constructive criticism, the present study provides further methodological development focused on the elimination of bias that may occur during first-person observation. First, various sources of errors that may accompany introspection are distinguished based on previous critical literature. Four main errors are classified, namely attentional, attributional, conceptual, and expressional error. Furthermore, methodological recommendations for the possible elimination of these errors have been determined based on the analysis and focused excerpting of introspective scientific literature. The following groups of (...) methodological recommendations were determined: 1) a better focusing of the subject’s attention to their mental processes, 2) providing suitable stimuli, and 3) the sharing of introspective experience between subjects. Furthermore, the potential of adjustments in introspective research designs for eliminating attentional, attributional, conceptual, and expressional error is discussed. (shrink)

David DeGrazia tentatively defends what he calls the Interests Model of moral status (see page 135).1 On this model all sentient beings have the same moral status, though some are owed more than others in virtue of having more or stronger interests. The proponent of this model can accept, say, that one should normally save the life of a human in preference to that of a dog. But she denies that we should save the human because he has higher moral (...) status. Instead, the human should be saved because he has more at stake—he may, for example, have a stronger interest in continued existence. In defending the Interests Model, DeGrazia cuts against the grain of recent theorising on moral status, which has instead favoured what he calls the Respect Model. (shrink)

A well-established phenomenon in reasoning research is matching bias : a tendency to select information that matches the lexical content of propositional statements, regardless of the logically critical presence of negations. Previous research suggested, however, that the effect might be restricted to reasoning with conditional statements. This paper reports two experiments in which participants were required to construct or identify true and false cases of propositional rules of several kinds, including universal statements, disjunctions, and negated conjunctions. Matching bias (...) was observed across all rule types but largely restricted to problems where participants were required to falsify rather than to verify the rules. A third experiment showed a similar generalization across linguistic forms in the Wason selection task with only if conditionals substituted for universals. The results are discussed with reference to contemporary theories of propositional reasoning. (shrink)

Le but de cette étude est de faire apparaître le rôle éminent que joua le copernicianisme dans le remplacement, en un siècle et demi à peine (1543-1687), de la philosophie naturelle traditionnelle par la science moderne. Son idée directrice est qu’en dépit de ses implications théoriquement incompatibles avec la philosophie naturelle traditionnelle, le copernicianisme n’exerça pleinement son pouvoir rénovateur que grâce à un afflux de données inédites, inassimilables par l’ancien système, ou encore d’initiatives théoriques dont le développement n’eût pas été (...) possible sans les modifications conceptuelles qu’il entraînait. Volontairement limitée aux travaux principaux de Kepler et de Galilée, l’étude montre comment de ces données et de ces initiatives combinées avec l’héliocentrisme naquirent des idées et des procédures radicalement nouvelles qui disloquèrent de façon irréversible l’ancienne philosophie naturelle. (shrink)

Implicit bias training (IBT) is now frequently provided by employers, in order to raise awareness of the problems related to implicit biases, and of how to safeguard against discrimination that may result. However, as Atewologun et al (2018) have noted, there is very little systematicity in IBT, and there are many unknowns about what constitutes good IBT. One important issue concerns the tone of information provided regarding implicit bias. This paper engages this question, focusing in particular on the (...) observation that much bias training is delivered in exculpatory tone, emphasising that individuals are not to blame for possessing implicit biases. Normative guidance around IBT exhorts practitioners to adopt this strategy (Moss-Racusin et al 2014). However, existing evidence about the effects of moralized feedback about implicit bias is equivocal (Legault et al 2011; Czopp et al 2006). Through a series of studies, culminating in an experiment with a pre-registered analysis plan, we develop a paradigm for evaluating the impact of moralized feedback on participants’ implicit racial bias scores. We also conducted exploratory analyses of the impact on their moods, and behavioural intentions. Our results indicated that an exculpatory tone, rather than a blaming or neutral tone, did not make participants less resistant to changing their attitudes and behaviours. In fact, participants in the blame condition had significantly stronger explicit intentions to change future behaviour than those in the ‘no feedback’ condition (see experiment 3). These results indicate that considerations of efficacy do not support the need for implicit bias feedback to be exculpatory. We tease out the implications of these findings, and directions for future research. (shrink)

‘Unconscious bias happens by our brains making incredibly quick judgements and assessments without us realising. Biases are influenced by background, cultural environment and experiences and we may not be aware of these views and opinions, or of their full impact and implications. This article opposes this point of view by arguing that bias is not unconscious but is conscious and linked to Charles Mills’ ‘Racial Contract’ and its ‘epistemologies of ignorance’. These epistemologies emerge from what the Equality Challenge (...) Unit calls ‘our background, cultural environment and personal experience’. Asserting that racism stems from ‘unconscious bias’ diminishes white supremacy and maintains white innocence as a ‘will to forget’ institutional racism. In equality and diversity training ‘unconscious bias’ has become a performative act to move beyond racism through training to participate in a constructed ‘post-racial’ reality. The article argues that through decolonizing ‘unconscious bias’, ‘white fragility’ and ‘self-forgiveness’ we can begin to see hidden institutional whiteliness at the base of conscious bias. (shrink)