La philosophie hédoniste de Michel Onfray est en son fond une philosophie tragique dont l’horizon métaphysique ultime est le néant. Ce thème et ses multiples résonances dans l’œuvre d’Onfray sera étudié ici à trois niveaux : le néant individuel de la mort, le néant des civilisations disparues et enfin l’horizon cosmique du néant. Un jour tout disparaîtra, y compris la pensée humaine que tout disparaîtra. De même que notre vie est une parenthèse entre deux néants, de (...) même notre civilisation et de même l’espèce humaine et l’univers dans son ensemble. Être philosophe, c’est pour Onfray savoir regarder cette vérité en face. (shrink)

Heidegger, dans sa conférence « Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique? », a désigné le néant comme le voile de l’être. Indissociable de la question de l’être à travers l’histoire de la pensée occidentale, la question du non-être s’est révélée, aussitôt posée dans le Poème de Parménide, comme la non-pensée du non-être et sa non-diction. La conférence de 1929 prétendait au contraire desceller la présence cachée mais constante du néant, par son irruption intermittente manifestée dans l’angoisse du Dasein, où se (...) révèle le néantir du néant. Mais l’on peut dès le Sophiste de Platon desceller un tel néantir, à même le logos dans sa version rationnelle et logique, dès lors qu’on se ressaisit du sens authentique de l’aporie, dont Heidegger, bien qu’il en appelait la résurgence en ouverture d’Être et temps, n’a pas sondé toutes les paradoxales ressources. (shrink)

In their rare comments on Existentialism, contemporary British philosophers, with a few notable exceptions, frequently ridicule the use of “nothing” by such writers as Sartre and Heidegger. And when it is discovered that these writers maintain that the contemplation of nothingness gives rise to anguish, this ridicule is expressed even more strongly. What may be taken as a typical example of this tendency are Professor Ayer's remarks in his Horizon articles on Sartre. A characteristic quotation runs as follows: “In particular, (...) Sartre's reasoning on the subject of le néant seems to me exactly on a par with that of the King in Alice through the Looking-Glass … The point is that words like ‘nothing” and ‘nobody” are not used as the names of something insubstantial and mysterious; they are not used to name anything at all”;. (shrink)

With this significant work from 1932, The Self-Conscious Determination of Nothingness, we have the third important book of Nishida’s period of philosophical maturity. Here, Nishida has moved beyond the unconvincing essays of the previous periods, such as the ingenuous psychologism of A Study of Good or the epistemological theorization of the hesitant neo-Kantian period. Nishida is now developing the consequences of his major philosophical notion, the “logic of place”. Thanks to the translation work of Jacynthe Tremblay, the whole production of (...) this decisive period is now... (shrink)

Dans L’Évolution créatrice, Bergson a critiqué le problème qui consiste à se demander pourquoi il y a de l’être plutôt que rien, et l’a qualifié de pseu­do-problème. Environ un quart de siècle plus tard, il a brièvement récapitulé cette critique dans l’article « Le Possible et le réel ». Cette récapitulation n’est pas juste un résumé, et son examen nous révèlera les divers éléments difficiles à discerner dans L’Évolution créatrice: on peut citer entre autres, l’adoption par Bergson du principe d’inconcevabilité, (...) bien connu des philosophes du XVIIe siècle, et la vigilance dont il fait preuve vis-à-vis du fonctionnement trompeur du langage usuel, apparentée à celle de la philosophie du langage ordinaire. Je reconstruis et examine cette version récapitulative, et mets en lumière la nouvelle argumentation vis-à-vis du problème et le caractère aussi traditionnel que révolutionnaire de la philosophie de Bergson. Mot-clef : Bergson. Existence. Néant. Principe d’inconcevabilité. Philosophie du langage ordinaire. (shrink)

Pretendemos analisar neste artigo o fundamento ontofenomenológico do conhecimento em L’être et le néant. Como veremos, o conhecimento será concebido a partir de uma negação de tipo interna definida como relação ontológica fundamental entre ser-para-si e ser-em-si. Todavia, caso almejemos compreender o estatuto profundo de uma tal relação, teremos que escrutinar as definições sartreanas de ser do fenômeno e fenômeno de ser, ser transfenomenal, ser-em-si, ser-para-si e estrutura reflexo-refletidora do cogito. Recuperando tais definições, mostraremos que a identidade do ser (...) do para-si e do conhecimento, antes de sinalizar que o conhecimento seja a medida do ser, desponta de um registro ontofenomenológico no qual o para-si, enquanto nada de ser, anuncia a si mesmo a partir do em-si. (shrink)

Dans une lettre adressée aux Pères de l’Oratoire dans les jours qui suivirent son élévation au cardinalat, le 30 août 1627, Bérulle écrit : Nous sommes un néant qui tend au néant, qui cherche le néant, qui s’occupe du néant, qui se contente du néant, qui se remplit du néant et qui enfin se ruine et se détruit soi-même pour un néant, au lieu que nous devons être un néant, à la vérité (...) (car cela nous convient par nature), mais un néant en l... (shrink)

L’importance des sources néoplatoniciennes de la philosophie première de Jankélévitch s’inscrit dans la lignée de l’enseignement de Bréhier qui le met sur la voie d’une « négation libératrice ». La fidélité à Bergson et la lecture de Schelling ne pouvaient néanmoins que reconduire la tentative de dépassement de la logique qui en résulte à une forme d’expérience pure qui recherche la plénitude dans une adéquation à la vie. Ainsi, « l’évanouissante entrevision » à laquelle Jankélévitch nous condamne à tendre sans (...) jamais l’atteindre, rivés que nous sommes à notre finitude, marque-t‑elle tout autant une forme de distance vis-à-vis de la philosophie de Plotin. La compréhension de cet héritage critique pourra ainsi nous permettre de mieux cerner ce qui sépare le vitalisme de Jankélévitch de l’idéalisme néoplatonicien, c’est-à-dire ce qui demeure incompatible entre la logique de la vie et la dialectique de la pensée. (shrink)

Resumo: A partir da caracterização sumária das figuras da liberdade, da angústia e da responsabilidade, expostas em L'être et le néant de Jean-Paul Sartre, o artigo pretende lançar luzes sobre a afirmação da falta de fundamento dos valores adotados em nossa moralidade cotidiana - o que implica em explicitar uma certa ressonância ética da negação na filosofia sartreana, bem como a conseqüente tentação do humano à falsificação existencial, que se manifesta em sua tentativa de elidir a angústia proveniente da (...) liberdade absoluta da realidade humana.Palavras-chave: liberdade - angústia - responsabilidade - valores.: From the brief characterization of the figures of freedom, anguish and responsability, exposed in Jean Paul Sartre's L'être et le néant, this article aims to shed lights over the statement of the lack of foundation of the values adopted in our quotidian morality - that demans an explication of a certain ethical ressonance of the negation on the sartrean philosophy, as well the consequential human temptation to the existencial forgery, which manifests in its attempt to elide the anguish coming from the absolut freedom of the human reality.Key-words: freedom - anguish - responsability - values. (shrink)

Inspiré par des analyses décisives de penseurs aussi dissemblables que Nietzsche, Heidegger, Althusser et Foucault, nous avons tenté d’esquisser un cadre théorique réaliste dans lequel le phénomène mal compris de l’intégrisme contemporain puisse être interprété comme un phénomène au sens existentiel de ce terme. C’est-à-dire, comme une réalité phénoménale qui affecte l’existence de l’individu moderne dans sa contingence historique. Laquelle présuppose et met en relief l’incontournable fragilité métaphysique de l’homme en tant qu’être mortel. Un être («Dasein») dont l’existence se laisse (...) souvent restreindre et appauvrir par la fuite permanente de la mort. Une fuite dont le questionnement critique lui ouvre («Erschliessen» au célèbre sens heideggérien dans Sein und Zeit) l’horizon de sa singularité finie. La fonction de l’idéologie intégriste est conçue, suivant la critique d’Althusser, comme l’assignation de l’homme à une «résidence fixe». Autrement dit, un cadre conceptuel rigide dans lequel une «onto-idéologie» intégriste persécute «l’Être» mortel qui se laisse persécuter («Sich Nachstellen des Seins») comme le souligne Heidegger dans sa Conférence de Brême «Le Danger» («Die Gefahr»). Sauvegarder notre monde de l’intégrisme présuppose donc un nouvel «art». Un «art» dont la pratique reflète un mouvement de liberté d’être dont la valorisation universelle est la principale tâche de la philosophie contemporaine. (shrink)

RESUMO O presente artigo pretende restituir o exame ontofenomenológico da ipseidade e da temporalidade em “L’être et le néant” a partir de dois momentos, quais sejam: fenomenologia das três dimensões temporais e ontologia da temporalidade. Este duplo exame não poderá ser pensado sem uma definição prévia do para-si como ipse temporal que falta de... para..., isto é, como ser que, enquanto nada de ser, é uma falta de ser que busca, em vão, preenchê-la. A impossibilidade deste preenchimento, como buscaremos (...) evidenciar, é ontologicamente necessária para que a temporalização do serpara-si não se deixe infestar com a inércia típica do ser-em-si. ABSTRACT The present article intends to restore, from the Sartrean work L'être et le néant, the ontophenomenological examination of ipseity and temporality, understanding this examination in two moments: phenomenology of the three temporal dimensions and ontology of temporality. This double exam could not be thought without a previous definition of for-itself’s as temporal ipseas lack of from… to…, that is, as a for-itself which, while nothingness of being, is a lack of being that constantly seeks to fill it. The impossibility of this fill-up, as we shall see, is ontologically necessary so that the temporality of the being-for-itself does not let itself infest with the typical inertia of the being-in-itself. (shrink)

Philosophical translation between "linguistic violence" and translative hermeneutics. Translational considerations from the perspective of the translation of Jean-Paul Sartre's L'être et le néant The establishment of translatology as a scientific discipline is a late phenomenon to which not only linguistics but also the philosophy of language has contributed significantly. Although the considerations of Schleiermacher, Ricoeur, Derrida, Balibar, Cassin and other philosophers are very stimulating for the examination of the translation problematics, they do not offer a particular translation theory of (...) philosophical texts. Most of their works are of little help in practice when it comes to translating a complicated philosophical text. That is why I will take in this paper the opposite path and start from my own experience as a translator of philosophical literature into Bulgarian and, more concretely, from my translation of Jean-Paul Sartre's L'être et le néant. On the base of this key work of contemporary philosophy and its translations into different languages, I will address the difficulties and the specifics of philosophical translation, discuss various translation methods, and argue several theses, which could serve as impulses for a further development of translation theory and translation practice in the field of philosophy. (shrink)

This article surveys most of the recent reviews of Sarah Richmond’s excellent new translation of L’Être et le néant. It offers some close textual comparisons between Richmond’s translation, Hazel Barnes’ translation, and the Checklist of Errors of Hazel Barnes’ Translation of L’Être et le néant. This article concludes that Richmond delivers a higher semantic resolution translation that overcomes nearly all the liabilities found in Barnes and does so without sacrificing much by way of readability.

Against the “universal consent of the people” and “the crowd of philosophers”, Pascal proves the existence of the void, thus re-establishing the truth where only the force and falsity of opinions had prevailed. Nature “has no repugnance for the void”, it “makes no effort to avoid it” but “admits it without difficulty or resistance”. Pascal defines the void as neither matter nor nothingness. Can this definition be found in Philosophy, in the Anthropology of the Pensées? We would like to show (...) the importance of the notion of the capacity of empty nature, which is decisive when it comes to describing the condition of man, troubled by a desire for truth and happiness that he cannot satisfy. Nature is thus, for him, what is “most contrary” to him, depriving him of what is rightfully his. The void has a cardinal function in Physics, but also in Philosophy. (shrink)

Sartre’s thinking in L’être et le néant is driven by a conceptual choice that radically breaks with the philosophical spirit of Sein und Zeit and, in the same gesture, problematizes it. This rupture involves three moments. The first moment appears when Sartre transforms Heidegger’s emphasis on ‘being and time’ into ‘being and nothingness’. The second moment occurs when that transformation effectuates a conceptual shift which results in the inversion of the relationship that Heidegger establishes between anxiety and freedom: whereas (...) in Sein und Zeit anxiety is the precondition of freedom, in Sartre freedom becomes the precondition of anxiety. Finally, in the third moment, the absolute primacy of spontaneity in L’être et le néant ultimately serves as the cornerstone for Sartre’s reevaluation of truth, challenging the fundamental concept of ‘Geworfenheit’ in Sein und Zeit. Unlike Heidegger’s view where truth (alètheia) coincides with existence, in L’être et le néant, truth is portrayed as an ongoing struggle: consciousness must consistently fight against it in bad faith or forcefully liberate it from bad faith. Together, these three moments constitute the primary components of Sartre’s originality in relation to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. (shrink)

This paper intends to give a critical reading of Jean-Paul Sartre’s treatment of inter-consciousness relationship as presented in his work L'être et le néant, namely in the chapter L'existence d'autrui. Our main objective is to understand the treatment Sartre gave the referred issue in that particular work, but also to show that his theoretical standpoint falls short on a true determination of the meaning of the experience of Otherness for consciousness. Our method for approaching Sartre’s views stands on a (...) detailed reading of the author’s own analyses, trying to show their limited scope and providing a different, less conflictual treatment and interpretation for the presented data. In Sartre’s view, consciousness is not inhabited by an ego, that is, it doesn’t have an ego until one becomes an object to it, similar to the remaining objects of the world, which occurs with the Other’s entry in the world. That being, Sartre’s fundamental problem is to know how is it possible for consciousness to constitute an ego as an object - as an object among other objects, but whose experience is, for consciousness, different from the one it makes of all other objects -, and, on a second step, to state its identity with that ego, i.e., to be that ego, without loosing, in the process, its subjective spontaneity and freedom. Taken as a subject/object kind of relation, as Sartre affirms it, the inter-consciousness relationship is condemned to failure, doomed to be a permanent struggle for domination of one over an other. Our analysis of the sartrian data as put forward in L'Être et le néant will show that Sartre’s thesis about inter-consciousness relationship is one-sided and that a more comprehensive interpretation of the above-mentioned relationship is possible, an interpretation based in the view that envisaging the Other as an object is founded on an anticipation of its subjectivity and of consciousness’ own subjectivity, that is, on a founding intersubjective relationship. According to our viewpoint, if it is true that an ego can be an object, it is already as a degraded ego and not as the ego properly said, born out of a relationship between subjects. The experience of Othemess shows consciousness, originally and immediately, what it can and should be, and that being has a positivity that remains an other for a concrete, knowable ego. That founding experience, which takes place at an affective level, has the meaning of an experience of the limits which, when surpassed, will allow consciousness to reach a higher dignity of being. Therefore it is as anticipation and project, as desire, as afectivity, that the relationship to an other takes place, as a pure relationality without masks, and not as a dialectical conflict, as Sartre intends to show with his occasionally convincing arguments. (shrink)

Rétrospectivement, il est difficile de ne pas s’étonner de la facilité avec laquelle des esprits ‘’éclairés’’ du vingtième siècle, en Europe comme en dehors de l’Europe, se sont convaincus de la vérité du marxisme et, plus particulièrement, du matérialisme historique. Que l’histoire de toute société jusqu’à nos jours soit l’histoire de la lutte des classes passe alors pour une évidente et donc incontestable vérité historique. Mais ce qui est tout aussi étonnant, c’est la rapidité avec laquell...

"Join up, they said! It’s a man’s life, they said!"Cartesian Lineage and Tradition in Being and Nothingness While Descartes is literally present in 27 of 722 pages that Being and Nothingness counts, Hegel appears in 43, Husserl in 46 and Heidegger in 47 of them. Without asserting, and thus without infirming the obvious influence of these three German thinkers on it, one year after his essay of phenomenological ontology, it is nevertheless the filiation and the manner of only the French (...) philosopher that Sartre claims in front of Pierre Lorquet. So, which relative and which model is Descartes for him? And what relationship does Sartre exactly maintain with him? Following the track of the latter in the 1943 treatise, I want to ensure that “the individual of existentialism is Descartes’s true heir”. (shrink)