According to widespread opinion, the meaning of body part terms is determined by salient discontinuities in the visual image; such that hands, feet, arms, and legs, are natural parts. If so, one would expect these parts to have distinct names which correspond in meaning across languages. To test this proposal, we compared three unrelated languages—Dutch, Japanese, and Indonesian—and found both naming systems and boundaries of even basic body part terms display variation across languages. Bottom‐up cues alone cannot explain natural language (...) semantic systems; there simply is not a one‐to‐one mapping of the body semantic system to the body structural description. Although body parts are flexibly construed across languages, body parts semantics are, nevertheless, constrained by non‐linguistic representations in the body structural description, suggesting these are necessary, although not sufficient, in accounting for aspects of the body lexicon. (shrink)

‘Type’ in biology is a polysemous term. In a landmark article, Paul Farber (Journal of the History of Biology 9(1): 93–119, 1976) argued that this deceptively plain term had acquired three different meanings in early nineteenth century natural history alone. ‘Type’ was used in relation to three distinct type concepts, each of them associated with a different set of practices. Important as Farber’s analysis has been for the historiography of natural history, his account conceals an important dimension of early nineteenth (...) century ‘type talk.’ Farber’s taxonomy of type concepts passes over the fact that certain uses of ‘type’ began to take on a new meaning in this period. At the closing of the eighteenth century, terms like ‘type specimen,’ ‘type species,’ and ‘type genus’ were universally recognized as referring to typical, model members of their encompassing taxa. But in the course of the nineteenth century, the same terms were co-opted for a different purpose. As part of an effort to drive out nomenclatural synonymy – the confusing state of a taxon being known to different people by different names – these terms started to signify the fixed and potentially atypical name-bearing elements of taxa. A new type concept was born: the nomenclatural type. In this article, I retrace this perplexing nineteenth century shift in meaning of ‘type.’ I uncover the nomenclatural disorder that the new nomenclatural type concept dissolved, and expose the conceptual confusion it left in its tracks. What emerges is an account of how synonymy was suppressed through the coinage of a homonym. (shrink)

According to widespread opinion, the meaning of body part terms is determined by salient discontinuities in the visual image; such that hands, feet, arms, and legs, are natural parts. If so, one would expect these parts to have distinct names which correspond in meaning across languages. To test this proposal, we compared three unrelated languages—Dutch, Japanese, and Indonesian—and found both naming systems and boundaries of even basic body part terms display variation across languages. Bottom-up cues alone cannot explain natural language (...) semantic systems; there simply is not a one-to-one mapping of the body semantic system to the body structural description. Although body parts are flexibly construed across languages, body parts semantics are, nevertheless, constrained by non-linguistic representations in the body structural description, suggesting these are necessary, although not sufficient, in accounting for aspects of the body lexicon. (shrink)

For most of its history, the psychology of reasoning was dominated by binary extensional logic. The so-called “new paradigm” instead puts subjective degrees of belief center stage, often represented as probabilities. We argue that the “new paradigm” is too vaguely defined and therefore does not allow a clear decision about what falls within its scope and what does not. We also show that there was not one settled theoretical “old” paradigm, before the new developments emerged, and that the alleged new (...) paradigm is less revolutionary as the term suggests. A more veridical view is that current progress is developing in continuities where rival research programs can thrive or fail in the face of new experimental findings. The article closes with some topics where more connections between competing research programs are likely to promote progress in our understanding of human reasoning. (shrink)

Implicit in the theoretical chemical writings of Antoine Laurent Lavoisier is a theory of language that is not in complete harmony with the philosopher of language whom he takes as his explicit authority, Condillac. Lavoisier's reform of the nomenclature of chemistry leads to his dividing scientific language into two sets with different properties: a denotative artificial nomenclature and connotative natural language. This division supposedly permits knowledge to be stored in the nomenclature while the natural language retains the (...) rhetorical tools necessary for creative thought and argument. The consequences of this reform of scientific language are, however, the opposite of what Lavoisier had intended. (shrink)

The status nomenclature of the Imperial slaves, as that of the Imperial freedmen, is important mainly for its bearing on the difficult problems of dating slave sepulchral inscriptions, but also as a means of determining who were Imperial slaves belonging to the Familia Caesaris with the significant social status this implied. Bang's careful but brief treatment of the subject, published in 1919, was not based on a complete collection of the material—admittedly difficult to obtain—and much has appeared in the (...) interval. Moreover, a deeper analysis of the evidence necessitates some revision of his conclusions. (shrink)

Ethnobotanical research provides ample justification for comparing diverse biological nomenclatures and exploring ways that retain alternative naming practices. However, how (and whether) comparison of nomenclatures is possible remains a subject of discussion. The comparison of diverse nomenclatural practices introduces a suite of epistemic and ontological difficulties and considerations. Different nomenclatures may depend on whether the communities using them rely on formalized naming conventions; cultural or spiritual valuations; or worldviews. Because of this, some argue that the different naming practices may not (...) be comparable if the ontological commitments employed differ. Comparisons between different nomenclatures cannot assume that either the naming practices or the object to which these names are intended to apply identifies some universally agreed upon object of interest. Investigating this suite of philosophical problems, I explore the role grey nomenclatures play in classification. ‘Grey nomenclatures’ are defined as those that employ names that are either intentionally or accidentally non-Linnaean. The classification of the lichen thallus (a symbiont) has been classified outside the Linnaean system by botanists relying on the International Code of Nomenclature for algae, fungi, and plants (ICN). But, I argue, the use of grey names is not isolated and does not occur exclusively within institutionalized naming practices. I suggest, ‘grey names’ also aptly describe nomenclatures employed by indigenous communities such as the Samí of Northern Finmark, the Sherpa of Nepal, and the Okanagan First Nations. I pay particular attention to how naming practices are employed in these communities; what ontological commitments they hold; for what purposes are these names used; and what anchors the community’s nomenclatural practices. Exploring the history of lichen naming and early ethnolichenological research, I then investigate the stakes that must be considered for any attempt to preserve, retain, integrate, or compare the knowledge contained in both academically formalized grey names and indigenous nomenclatures in a way that preserves their source-specific informational content. (shrink)

It must have been shortly after I entered college in my middle ̓teens that I first heard of the grammatical doctrine that psychological opposites take the same construction. As a mnemonic, alone, the doctrine is immensely worth while and practically helps with categories like —which rouses a literary interest by recalling Thackeray's use of different to as a counter term to equal to, similar to, like to. And, to get back to grammar, for English folk it clarifies prope ab to (...) counter it with procul ab. By the doctrine of opposites we clarify even so elusive a matter as the ‘subjunctive of repudiation’ which I once sought to explain by partial obliquity , not mistaking therein, I am fain to believe, the valuable stylistic note of echo. In this subjunctive I now see a clear opposite to the concessive. It is a survival, on the cold page, of a speech form that owed its meaning to the speaker's mood (xs22EF ψυχικxs22EF διxs22EFθεσις, the pitch of his voice, all the things that manifest and betray emotion, and so far forth is ‘polemic’ It is often introduced by ut, utne, egone ut, where ut is exclamatory and interrogative at once, and the tone converts the concessive to an anticoncessive, indicating repudiation, disavowal. (shrink)

Jean Piaget, connu comme créateur d'une théorie du développement de l'intelligence chez l'enfant, fut un naturaliste précoce. En 1912, à l'âge de seize ans, il prononça une conférence sur « La vanité de la nomenclature » dans le cadre des activités d'un club de jeunes naturalistes; le manuscrit de cette conférence a été retrouvé récemment. L'introduction à la présente édition du manuscrit essaie de montrer l'importance de ce dernier pour une biographie historique de Piaget. D'une part, « La vanité (...) » est à la fois l'expression la plus synthétique de l'intégration de son auteur au champ de l'histoire naturelle, et le premier signal de sa réorientation vers la biologie philosophique qui jouerait un rôle crucial dans son oeuvre ultérieure. D'autre part, le texte du jeune Piaget illustre la persistance du nominalisme dans la problématique post-darwinienne de l'espèce, et certaines relations entre cette problématique et la philosophie de Henri Bergson. Long before becoming the well-known creator of a theory of the development of intelligence in children, Jean Piaget was a naturalist. In 1912, at the age of sixteen, and as member of a young naturalists' club, he gave a talk called « The Vanity of Nomenclature », the manuscript of which was recently discovered. The introduction to the present edition of that manuscript aims at suggesting its significance for a historical biography of Piaget. On the one hand, Piaget's text is the best exponent of his integration into the field of natural history; however, it is also the first sign of his reorientation towards the philosophical biology that would play a fundamental role in his later work. On the other hand, « The Vanity » illustrates the persistence of nominalism in post-Darwinian thinking about the species, and reveals certain relations between Henry Bergson's philosophy and the history of biology. (shrink)

Lily Ross Taylor in an interesting recent article on the proportion of freedmen to freeborn in the sepulchral inscriptions of Imperial Rome discusses the increasing omission of status nomenclature by freedmen in the first and second centuries A.D. and the consequent difficulty of determining the status of persons whose names appear in the epitaphs. One contributory factor to this decline in the traditional nomenclature which she mentions is the growing numbers and importance of the freedmen of the emperor, (...) the Augusti liberti. While non-imperial freedmen were anxious to record their acquisition of citizenship, but not their inferior status in the citizen body, the emperor's freedmen, on the other hand, increasingly formalized their status nomenclature so that the formula ‘Aug. lib.’ proclaimed not only the fact of their manumission within the Familia Caesaris but also the higher social status which they enjoyed. An examination of the nomenclature of the Imperial freedmen might help to throw some light on this process, particularly on the problem of dating. (shrink)

This article attempts to point out the main problem in research on workaholism, namely over-use of the term workaholism when describing symptoms or constructs which are not related to work addiction. Workaholism has one, negative pathological/dysfunctional form and can be differentiated from the healthy forms of over-engagement. Based on the analysis of one example of research results, this article explains that the nomenclature of „workaholic“ is not applicable to the case of over-engaged employees with healthy symptoms. The second aim (...) of the article is to argue that the invalid conceptualisation and measurement of workaholism can result in conclusions which do not really regard work addiction. (shrink)

Contrary to the traditional claim that needs for unambiguous communication about animal and plant species are best served by a single set of names ruled by international Codes, I suggest that a more diversified system is required, especially to cope with problems emerging from aggregation of biodiversity data in large databases. Departures from Linnaean nomenclature are sometimes intentional, but there are also other, less obvious but widespread forms of not Code-compliant grey nomenclature. A first problem is due to (...) the circumstance that the Codes are intended to rule over the way names are applied to species and other taxonomic units, whereas users of taxonomy need names to be applied to specimens. For different reasons, it is often impossible to refer a specimen with certainty to a named species, and in those cases an open nomenclature is employed. Second, molecular taxonomy leads to the discovery of clusters of gene sequence diversity not necessarily equivalent to the species recognized and named by taxonomists. Those clusters are mostly indicated with informal names or formulas that challenge comparison between different publications or databases. In several instances, it is not even clear if a formula refers to an individual voucher specimen, or is a provisional species name. The use of non-Linnaean names and formulas must be revised and strengthened by fixing standard formats for the different kinds of objects or hypotheses and providing permanent association of ‘grey names’ with standardized source information such as author and year. In the context of a broad-scope revisitation of aims and scope of scientific nomenclature, it may be worth rethinking if natural objects like plant galls and lichens, although other than the ‘single-entity’ objects traditionally covered by biological classifications, may nevertheless deserve taxonomic names. (shrink)

This sub Introduction, Theory, points on the four parts and conclusions. In the "Introduction", the author first introduces the history of philosophy of Kant and Hegel's views, but the authors believe that two views have a certain problem is that Kant's philosophy of history to look too lightly, and Hegel the history of philosophy was too close. In the "General Theory", in order to explore the significance of the history of philosophy essays for the fundamental, the author lists a number (...) is supplied, as a reflection of the base, including: Kant on the "School of the meaning of philosophy" and "philosophy of world significance," the difference between philosophy and activities of the "situation" question, the history of philosophy essays for the situation involving the gap between philosophy and history of past and future-oriented philosophy, history and progress of the initiative problems, history of philosophy and the various phases and the mark of the complexity of the philosophical history and context of development issues, and so on. In the "sub-theory", in order to illustrate the history of the Yao Mu essays on philosophy and understanding for the profound impact, the authors cited the history of Western philosophy, the most representative of the various phases and standard names to show which may involve the all the complexity and make the initial critical reflection. In the "conclusion", the authors bring out the "real" and "Spirit of the Void" two essays for the history of philosophy the difference between style , and that must be further developed in the former over the latter , historian of philosophy to the essays in the history of philosophy as a method to obtain the initiative and make sense of the history of philosophy to open up space to be creative. This paper consists of four sections. In section one, it starts with a criticism of the Kantian and Hegelian views of the history of philosophy, which the author considers both problematic, as they render the historiography of philosophy an intellectual undertaking which is either too trivial or too rigid. in section two, in order to secure for the historiography of philosophy a more meaningful basis, a number of features pertinent to the issue were outlined, such as: Kant's own distinction between philosophy in scholastic sense and in cosmic sense, the problem of "situation", the discrepancies of situations in the historiography of philosophy, past and future orientations, the question of activeness and progress, simplicity and complexity in periodization and nomenclature, the notion of development and of context, etc. In the third section , to exemplify how these features merit our serious attention, the various phases or periods of the history of Western philosophy are discussed so that the complexities of their possible reinterpretation are exposed for critical reflection. In the last section, the paper concludes with a brief demarcation between the historiography of facts and the historiography of meaning, and suggests that only by developing the latter on top of and beyond the former can a more comprehensive programme be attempted, so that historiography of philosophy can become methodologically active on the one hand and thematically open to innovative reflections and reinterpretations on the other. (shrink)

Saunders & van Brakel prematurely reject the idea of nontrivial constraints in color nomenclature. Their claim that the universality of color naming is caused by Western contact and cultural dominance is inadequate because of the great variety of terminology systems still found in the world. The complex interactions of hue, brightness, and saturation can be studied rigorously. If we discard the standard models of color nomenclature because of some discrepancies and anomalies, we will not be able to explain (...) the vast array of remaining data that is consistent with current theories. (shrink)

Julia Knopes’s study (2025) provides a constructive contribution to neuroethics, demonstrating that individuals in peer support networks understand their mental health conditions in terms that draw...

Medical expert systems (MES) are knowledge-based computer programs that are designed for advising physicians on diagnostical and therapeutical decision-making. They use heuristic methods developed by Artificial Intelligence researchers in order to retrieve from large knowledge-bases information needed in the situation. Constructing the knowledge-base of a MES embraces the problem of explicating and fixing the conceptual, causal and epistemic relations between a lot of medical objects. There is a number of preconditions which any adequate representation of such knowledge must fulfil, among (...) them the conditions of consistency, of completeness, of unequivocality, etc. Existing systems for classification and coding, like ICD and SNOMED, are not designed for the needs of constructing expert systems or, more generally, of knowledge processing and knowledge engineering. Their syntax is not sufficiently rich for expressing the more complex structures of (medical) knowledge. What is needed, is a language that can be used for expressing logical and descriptive relations between medical objects and facts, approximately at the level of the language of second order predicate logic. Simultaneously, it must be possible to process this language at the machine level. This can be achieved by using some dialects of the programming language LISP or, particularly, by using the programming language PROLOG. Thus, in order to achieve a suitable classification system, it is necessary to develop a system of medical data structures and predicates expressed in LISP or PROLOG. (shrink)

In the course of discussing Kleisthenes' reforms, the author of theAthenaion Politeiamakes the following statement:And he made those who were currently living in each of the demes demesmen of one another, so that they would not examine the new citizens by calling out their patronymic, rather they would announce them by demes; and from this practice, the Athenians call themselves after their demes.

Shadmehr and Ahmed cogently argue that vigor of appetitive movements is positively correlated with their value, and that value can therefore be inferred by measuring vigor. Here, we highlight three points to consider when interpreting this account: (1) The correlation between vigor and value is not obligatory, (2) the vigor effect also arises in frameworks other than optimal foraging, and (3) the term vigor can be misinterpreted, thereby affecting rigor.

Attempts to conduct systematic reviews of ethical arguments in bioethics are fundamentally misguided. All areas of enquiry need thorough and informative literature reviews, and efforts to bring transparency and systematic methods to bioethics are to be welcomed. Nevertheless, the raw materials of bioethical articles are not suited to methods of systematic review. The eclecticism of philosophy may lead to suspicion of philosophical methods in bioethics. Because bioethics aims to influence medical and scientific practice it is tempting to adopt scientific language (...) and methods. One manifestation is the increasing innovation in, and use of, systematic reviews of ethical arguments in bioethics. Yet bioethics, as a broadly philosophical area of enquiry, is unsuited to systematic review. Bioethical arguments are evaluative, so notions of quality and bias are inapplicable. Bioethical argument is conceptual rather than numerical, and the classification of concepts is itself a process of argument that cannot aspire to neutrality. Any ‘systematic review’ of ethical arguments in bioethics thus falls short of that name. Furthermore, labels matter. Although the bioethics research community may find that adopting the language and the outward methods of clinical science offers apparent prospects of credibility, policy influence and funding, we argue that such misdirection carries risks and is unlikely to pay dividends in the long term. Bioethical sources are amenable to the review methods of the social sciences, and it is on these methods that specific methods of bioethics literature review should be built. (shrink)

Determination of the structure of the nucleic acids involved inter alia identification of the ring atom of the purines to which ribose or deoxyribose was attached. This in turn depended on knowledge of the ring atoms that could be so substituted and hence that were bonded to replaceable hydrogens. In 1897 E. Fischer adopted a convention of depicting this hydrogen at position 7 of the purine ring, although he was aware that it was equally correct to depict it at position (...) 9. Many later workers apparently came to believe that the 7H structure was more than just a convention, and considered that the sugar was attached solely at position 7 and could not be attached to position 9. When evidence was presented in 1933 that the sugar was in fact attached to position 9, the force of this convention apparently was so strong that many were reluctant to accept this evidence. More than 20 years was required for complete acceptance of the new view, and Fischer's convention was still being used in other contexts until at least 1967. (shrink)

The colonial narrative in Africa is replete with instances and processes of naming that were used not only to construct social realities and produce power and privilege, but also to inscribe, reify or denigrate African cultures. This work examines how the discourse of naming, specifically terms selected, stipulatively defined and applied by Western colonialists and early Western anthropologists, continue to sustain ambivalent attitudes towards the African heritage. It analyses the way in which the popular term and prefix ‘traditional’ is used (...) in Africa, and argues that it can be pejorative, as it is associated with the well-established colonial custom of thinking of Africa as a continent stuck in the past. Thus the term predisposes scholars to making certain assumptions that perpetuate cultural stereotypes about African reality and experiences. The need for an analysis of the mentality that popularised its usage therefore remains pertinent. The work also attempts to address the challenge of how postcolonial Africa can engage with its past, and talk about it in terms that do not perpetuate colonial derogation, stereotypes, assumptions, attitudes and misrepresentations of indigenous African thought and culture. (shrink)