Certain paradoxes set us reeling endlessly. In surprise examination paradoxes, pupils' reasonings lead them to reel between expecting an examination and expecting none. With Newcomb's puzzle, choosers reel between reasoning in favour of choosing just one box and choosing two. The paradoxes demand an answer to what it is rational to believe or do. Highlighting other reelings and puzzles, this paper shows that the paradoxes should come as no surprise. The paradoxes demand an end to our (...) reasoning when the conditions they set ensure no end. They equivocate between, so to speak, reasoning in heaven and reasoning on earth; and, on the conditions set, not even an infinite god could reach a conclusion. (shrink)

In this paper I consider the surprise examination paradox from a practical perspective, paying special attention to the communicative role of the teacher’s promise to the students. This perspective, which places the promise within a practice, rather than viewing it in the abstract, imposes constraints on adequate solutions to the paradox. In the light of these constraints, I examine various solutions which have been offered, and suggest two of my own.

Surprising people can provide an opening for influencing them. Surprises garner attention, are arousing, are memorable, and can prompt shifts in understanding. Less noted is that, as a result, surprises can serve to persuade others by leading them to shifts in attitudes. Furthermore, because stories, pictures, and music can generate surprises and those can be widely shared, surprise can have broad social influence. People also tend to share surprising items with others, as anyone on social media has discovered. This (...) means that in addition to broadcasting surprising information, surprising items can also spread through networks. The joint result is that surprise not only has individual effects on beliefs and attitudes but also collective effects on the content of culture. Items that generate surprise need not be random or accidental. There are predictable methods or recipes for generating surprise. One such recipe is discussed, the repetition-break plot structure, to explore the psychological and social possibilities of examining surprise. Recipes for surprise offer a useful means for understanding how surprise works and offer prospects for harnessing surprise to a wide array of ends. (shrink)

Some theorists are bewildered by the effectiveness of mathematical concepts. For example, Steiner attempts to show that there can be no rational explanation of mathematical applicability in physics. Others (notably Penrose) are concerned primarily with the unexpected effectiveness within mathematics. Both views consist of two parts: a puzzle and a positive solution. I defend their paradoxical parts against the sceptics who do not believe that the very problem of effectiveness is a genuine one. Utilising Horwich’s theory of surprise, I (...) argue that the central cases of effectiveness discussed by Steiner and Penrose are indeed surprising and call for an explanation. (shrink)

This volume offers perspectives on the theme of surprise crossing philosophical, phenomenological, scientific, psycho-physiology, psychiatric, and linguistic boundaries. The main question it examines is whether surprise is an emotion. It uses two main theoretical frameworks to do so: psychology, in which surprise is commonly considered a primary emotion, and philosophy, in which surprise is related to passions as opposed to reason. The book explores whether these views on surprise are satisfying or sufficient. It looks at (...) the extent to which surprise is also a cognitive phenomenon and primitively embedded in language, and the way in which surprise is connected to personhood, the interpersonal, and moral emotions. Many philosophers of different traditions, a number of experimental studies conducted over the last decades, recent works in linguistics, and ancestral wisdom testimonies refer to surprise as a crucial experience of both rupture and openness in bodily and inner life. However, surprise is a theme that has not been dealt with directly and systematically in philosophy, in the sciences, in linguistics, or in spiritual traditions. This volume accomplishes just that. (shrink)

A common intuition about evidence is that if data x have been used to construct a hypothesis H, then x should not be used again in support of H. It is no surprise that x fits H, if H was deliberately constructed to accord with x. The question of when and why we should avoid such “double-counting” continues to be debated in philosophy and statistics. It arises as a prohibition against data mining, hunting for significance, tuning on the signal, (...) and ad hoc hypotheses, and as a preference for predesignated hypotheses and “surprising” predictions. I have argued that it is the severity or probativeness of the test—or lack of it—that should determine whether a double-use of data is admissible. I examine a number of surprising ambiguities and unexpected facts that continue to bedevil this debate. (shrink)

This narrative symposium examines the relationship of bioethics practice to personal experiences of illness. A call for stories was developed by Tod Chambers, the symposium editor, and editorial staff and was sent to several commonly used bioethics listservs and posted on the Narrative Inquiry in Bioethics website. The call asked authors to relate a personal story of being ill or caring for a person who is ill, and to describe how this affected how they think about bioethical questions and the (...) practice of medicine. Eighteen individuals were invited to submit full stories based on review of their proposals. Twelve stories are published in this symposium, and six supplemental stories are published online only through Project MUSE. Authors explore themes of vulnerability, suffering, communication, voluntariness, cultural barriers, and flaws in local healthcare systems through stories about their own illnesses or about caring for children, partners, parents and grandparents. Commentary articles by Arthur Frank, Bradley Lewis, and Carol Taylor follow the collection of personal narratives. (shrink)

This essay examines Paul Ricœur’s views on recognition in his book The Course of Recognition . It highlights those aspects that are in some sense surprising, in relation to his previous publications and the general debates on Hegelian Anerkennung and the politics of recognition. After an overview of Ricœur’s book, the paper examines the meaning of “recognition” in Ricœur’s own proposal, in the dictionaries Ricœur uses, and in the contemporary debates. Then it takes a closer look at the ideas of (...) recognition as identification and as “taking as true.” Then it turns to recognition (attestation) of oneself, in light of the distinction between human constants (and the question “What am I?”), and human variables (and the question “Who Am I?”). The last section concerns the dialectics of struggles for recognition and states of peace, and the internal relationship between the contents of a normative demand and what counts as satisfying the demand. . (shrink)

Purpose Based on the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) model, this study aims to explore the factors influencing educators’ acceptance and utilization of chat generative pretrained transformer (ChatGPT) in the context of higher educational institutions. This study additionally examines the moderating influence of trust on the association between intention and adoption of ChatGPT. Design/methodology/approach A structured questionnaire was disseminated to 1,214 educators following the purposive sampling method. The hypothesized relationships between the extended UTAUT model constructs and (...) ChatGPT adoption were examined using structural equation modeling. Findings The results of this study indicate positive impact of ChatGPT adoption and its use behavior (UB) among educators. Performance expectancy, effort expectancy, hedonic motivation, facilitating conditions and habit have a positive impact on behavior intention to use this tool among educators in higher education institutions, However, the educators intend to use ChatGPT in a personal capacity and are negatively influenced by the social groups. Moreover, behavior intention to adopt ChatGPT has a larger effect on the UB due to the higher involvement of trust. Practical implications This research adds to the literature on technology adoption by emphasizing the significance of trust in the adoption of emerging technologies, such as big language models. This study’s findings have implications for ChatGPT technology developers, legislators and academics considering the implementation of ChatGPT for teaching and research. Originality/value This research investigates ChatGPT adoption among higher education educators using the UTAUT model. It emphasizes the role of trust in adoption, highlights key adoption factors and reveals a paradox: educators are personally inclined to use ChatGPT but hesitant due to negative social influence. This study's novelty lies in its focus on trust and its implications for developers, legislators and educators, offering valuable insights for integrating ChatGPT in education. (shrink)

One of the major contemporary challenges to Thomistic moral psychology is that it is incompatible with the most up-to-date psychological science. Here Thomistic psychology is in good company, targeted along with most virtue-ethical views by philosophical situationism, which uses replicated psychological studies to suggest that our behaviors are best explained by situational pressures rather than by stable traits (like virtues and vices). In this essay we explain how this body of psychological research poses a much deeper threat to Thomistic moral (...) psychology in particular. For Thomistic moral psychology includes descriptive claims about causal connections between certain cognitive processes and behaviors, even independent of whether those processes emerge from habits like virtues. Psychological studies of correlations between these can provide evidence against those causal claims. We offer a new programmatic response to this deeper challenge: empirical studies are relevant only if they investigate behaviors under intentional descriptions, such that the correlations discovered are between cognition and what Aquinas calls human acts. Psychological research on aggression already emphasizes correlations between cognition and intentional behavior, or human acts, and so is positioned to shed light on how well Thomistic moral psychology fits with empirical data. Surprisingly, Aquinas’s views have quite a lot in common with a leading model of aggression, the social information processing (SIP) model. We close by suggesting how we might examine claims of Thomistic moral psychology from an empirical perspective further using research on social information processing and aggression. (shrink)

The Surprise Exam Paradox is well-known: a teacher announces that there will be a surprise exam the following week; the students argue by an intuitively sound reasoning that this is impossible; and yet they can be surprised by the teacher. We suggest that a solution can be found scattered in the literature, in part anticipated by Wright and Sudbury, informally developed by Sorensen, and more recently discussed, and dismissed, by Williamson. In a nutshell, the solution consists in (...) realising that the teacher's announcement is a blindspot that can only be known if the week is at least 2 days long. Along the way, we criticise Williamson's own treatment of the paradox. In Williamson's view, the Surprise is similar to the Paradox of the Glimpse and, because of their similarities, both these paradoxes ought to receive a uniform treatment-one that involves locating an illicit application of the KK Principle. We argue that there's no deep analogy between the Surprise and the Glimpse and that, even if there were, the Surprise reasoning reaches a paradoxical conclusion before the KK Principle is used. Rather, in both the Surprise and the Glimpse, the blame should be put on other epistemic principles-respectively, a knowledge retention and a margin for error principle. (shrink)

A given event may be a surprise to you, even if you know that it is going to occur. It may be a surprise to you, even if you know that it is going to occur and be a surprise to you. But what is not possible is that you should know a finite list of possible times at which it may possibly occur, and know that it will be a surprise to you. The article argues (...) that this is sufficient to dispense with the well-known paradox or antinomy, the 'Surprise Test'. (shrink)

Play is typically associated with carefree or frivolous activity, yet Nietzsche makes surprising claims about the nature of play. He insists that playfulness is the appropriate attitude for addressing the challenges of human life, and he describes maturity as the ability to play seriously like children. To understand Nietzsche’s serious play, some have emphasized the affinity between play and fiction. Notably, Nadeem Hussain has offered a fictionalist interpretation, according to which nothing has value in itself and valuing resembles make-believe. I (...) hold that illusions and fictions misconstrue Nietzsche’s play and values. In this paper I argue that Nietzsche embraces play in the context of nihilism, which he considers the fundamental problem of modernity. Play ultimately proves central to Nietzsche’s strategy to avert nihilism. I explicate his comments on play, and I use the features of play to illuminate Nietzsche’s response to nihilism found in his enigmatic project of value creation. (shrink)

In this paper, we provide a Bayesian analysis of the well-known surprise exam paradox. Central to our analysis is a probabilistic account of what it means for the student to accept the teacher's announcement that he will receive a surprise exam. According to this account, the student can be said to have accepted the teacher's announcement provided he adopts a subjective probability distribution relative to which he expects to receive the exam on a day on which he (...) expects not to receive it. We show that as long as expectation is not equated with subjective certainty there will be contexts in which it is possible for the student to accept the teacher's announcement, in this sense. In addition, we show how a Bayesian modeling of the scenario can yield plausible explanations of the following three intuitive claims: (1) the teacher's announcement becomes easier to accept the more days there are in class; (2) a strict interpretation of the teacher's announcement does not provide the student with any categorical information as to the date of the exam; and (3) the teacher's announcement contains less information about the date of the exam the more days there are in class. To conclude, we show how the surprise exam paradox can be seen as one among the larger class of paradoxes of doxastic fallibilism, foremost among which is the paradox of the preface. (shrink)

깨달음에 이른 경지에서의 삶은 일상적인 우리의 삶과 다르다. 무언가를 바라보고 대하는 마음이 달라졌기 때문이다. 우리의 존재방식이 달라졌기 때문이다. 마음이 달라진 깨달음에 이른 경지에서의 삶이란 ‘깨어있는 삶’이다. 존재하는 모든 것을 있는 그대로 보는 삶, 존재하는 모든 것을 있는 그대로 수용하는 삶이다. 그래서 이 삶은 존재하는 모든 것들을 존재하게 하는 ‘존재’에 대해 ‘열려있는 삶’이자, 인간과 사물에 대한 ‘사랑의 삶’이다. 다시 말해 이 삶은 인간과 사물이 자신의 고유함을 펼치는 ‘열린 장’인 ‘세계’에서 어깨동무하면서 사는 삶이다. 이때 세계는 어떤 것을 이용하고 사용하는 ‘수단의 세계’가 아니라 (...) 인간과 사물이 고유하게 존재하는 ‘근원적인 세계’로 드러난다. ‘깨어있는 삶’은 ‘경악’과 ‘경이’라는 근본기분을 통해서 이루어질 수 있다. 어떤 것에 대해 소스라치게 놀라는 기분인 ‘경악’과 존재하는 모든 것이 고유함을 간직하고 있고 성스럽다는 것을 느끼는 기분인 ‘경이’ 말이다. 이때 경악은 현대의 과학기술에 의한 세계의 황폐화, 일상적인 삶에서 우리가 신봉하는 세간적 가치의 허망함, 본래적인 자기가 아니라 세인-자기로 살아온 삶의 허무함에 대해 소스라치게 놀라는 것이다. 그리고 경이는 자신이 여태껏 살아왔던 일상적 세계와 과학기술이 지배하는 세계에 대한 ‘경악’을 통해 ‘뒤로 물러나’ ‘회심’ 내지는 근원적인 세계로의 ‘전향’과 함께 존재하는 모든 것을 새롭고 신기한 것으로 경험하는 것, 고유하고 성스러운 것으로 인정하는 것이다. 존재하는 모든 것을 존재하게 하는 ‘존재(존재의 진리)’를 받아들일 수 있는 열린 인간 말이다. 그렇다면 인간이 깨어있는 삶을 살기 위해서는 ‘경악’이라는 기분을 통해 ‘경이’라는 기분으로 나아가야 하리라. 사실 인간의 본래적인 존재방식이 그것이기 때문이다. (shrink)

Afshar et al. claim that their experiment shows a violation of the complementarity inequality. In this work, we study their claim using a modified Mach-Zehnder setup that represents a simpler version of the Afshar experiment. We find that our results are consistent with Afshar et al. experimental findings. However, we show that within standard quantum mechanics the results of the Afshar experiment do not lead to a violation of the complementarity inequality. We show that their claim originates from a particular (...) technique they use to analyze their results. In their analysis, they assume a classical concept, that particles have a definite trajectory before detection, thus, they obtain which-way information by particle detection plus path extrapolation by applying momentum conservation. This analysis technique is standard in experimental particle physics. Important discoveries such as the detection of vector bosons have been made through the application of this technique. We note that particle detection plus path extrapolation is a suitable technique within de Broglie-Bohm theory of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

This article problematizes claims of women’s empowerment in “masculine” sports through an exploration of women’s participation in mixed martial arts —a combat sport colloquially referred to as “cage fighting.” MMA, perhaps more than any other sport, allows women athletes to challenge patriarchal beliefs about gender by demonstrating women’s capacity for physical violence and domination. But whereas investigations into MMA have produced important findings for studies of men and masculinities, there has been surprisingly little attention paid to women’s participation in this (...) hypermasculine world. This article begins to fill this gap through an ethnographic account of this growing sport. Drawing from more than four years of ethnographic fieldwork and 40 semi-structured interviews with professional women’s MMA athletes, I show how the neoliberal–postfeminist culture of MMA undermines its empowerment potential by shaping gendered subjecthood in ways that are conducive to the maintenance of gender inequality. I conclude by discussing the implications of my findings for women’s empowerment in sport. (shrink)

The standard models for what doctors must tell their patients are based on the idea of informed consent: physicians must provide the information that patients need to make treatment decisions. In fact, though, they usually provide considerably more information than this model requires. And rightly so: patients should receive enough information that they will not be surprised by whatever happens—unless the physician is also surprised.

We synthesize literature from organization theory and political sociology to develop a conceptual lens from which organizing can be examined as a process whereby institutional structures are changed in ways similar to how social movements change entire societies. Implied is that hegemonic power structures maintain existing institutional structures by either resisting insurgencies or by making them seem senseless in the first place.

This paper starts by looking at the coincidence of surprising behavior on the nanolevel in both matter and simulation. It uses this coincidence to argue that the simulation approach opens up a pragmatic mode of understanding oriented toward design rules and based on a new instrumental access to complex models. Calculations, and their variation by means of explorative numerical experimentation and visualization, can give a feeling for a model's behavior and the ability to control phenomena, even if the model itself (...) remains epistemically opaque. Thus, the investigation of simulation in nanoscience provides a good example of how science is adapting to a new instrument: computer simulation. (shrink)

This paper discusses a dilemma that’s arises for a surprising number of ethical views and that's generated by a thesis they share: they all hold that it's a necessary condition for a thing to have an ethical property like rightness or goodness that it be accompanied by the belief that it has that property (see e.g. Kant (on one reading), Dworkin, Kymlicka, Sidgwick, Sumner, Dorsey). If the required belief is read one way, these views make it necessary, for a thing (...) to be right or good, that it be accompanied a false belief about its rightness or goodness. If it’s read another way, it generates an infinite regress. (shrink)

It was a happy surprise when, overcoming partisan divisions and interest‐group lobbying, Congress enacted the No Surprises Act, which bans unfair out‐of‐network “balance billing.” Although this is only a modest legislative victory, key efforts by the health policy community made a real difference in a time of legislative gridlock.

There is considerable confusion about the role of p-values in statistical model checking. To clarify that point, I introduce the distinction between measures of surprise and measures of evidence which come with different epistemological functions. I argue that p-values, often understood as measures of evidence against a null model, do not count as proper measures of evidence and are closer to measures of surprise. Finally, I sketch how the problem of old evidence may be tackled by acknowledging the (...) epistemic role of surprise indices. (shrink)