Results for 'participant reactive attitudes'

986 found
Order:
  1. Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):218-234.
    The debate surrounding the issue of collective moral responsibility is often steeped in metaphysical issues of agency and personhood. I suggest that we can approach the metaphysical problems surrounding the issue of collective responsibility in a roundabout manner. My approach is reminiscent of that taken by P.F. Strawson in "Freedom and Resentment" (1968). Strawson argues that the participant reactive attitudes - attitudes like resentment, gratitude, forgiveness and so on - provide the justification for holding individuals morally (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  2.  79
    Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility.Deborah Tollefsen - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):218-234.
    The debate surrounding the issue of collective moral responsibility is often steeped in metaphysical issues of agency and personhood. I suggest that we can approach the metaphysical problems surrounding the issue of collective responsibility in a roundabout manner. My approach is reminiscent of that taken by P.F. Strawson in “Freedom and Resentment” (1968). Strawson argues that the participant reactive attitudesattitudes like resentment, gratitude, forgiveness and so on – provide the justification for holding individuals morally (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  3.  29
    Participant Reactive Attitudes and the Puzzle of Free Will.Piers Benn - 2022 - The Philosophers' Magazine 97:66-73.
  4. Modification of the Reactive Attitudes.David Goldman - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):1-22.
    In ‘Freedom and Resentment’ P. F. Strawson argues that reactive attitudes like resentment and indignation cannot be eliminated altogether, because doing so would involve exiting interpersonal relationships altogether. I describe an alternative to resentment: a form of moral sadness about wrongdoing that, I argue, preserves our participation in interpersonal relationships. Substituting this moral sadness for resentment and indignation would amount to a deep and far‐reaching change in the way we relate to each other – while keeping in place (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  5. Reactive attitudes, relationships, and addiction.Jeanette Kennett, Doug McConnell & Anke Snoek - 2018 - In Hanna Pickard & Serge H. Ahmed (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of Addiction. Routledge.
    In this chapter we focus on the structure of close personal relations and diagnose how these relationships are disrupted by addiction. We draw upon Peter Strawson’s landmark paper ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (2008, first published 1962) to argue that loved ones of those with addiction veer between, (1) reactive attitudes of blame and resentment generated by disappointed expectations of goodwill and reciprocity, and (2) the detached objective stance from which the addicted person is seen as less blameworthy but also (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Rationality and the Reactive Attitudes.Angus Ross - 2008 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 4 (1):45-58.
    In Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment”, the idea of the reactive attitudes is used to provide a corrective for an over-intellectualised picture of moral responsibility and of the moral life generally. But Strawson also tells us that in reasoning with someone our attitude towards them must be reactive. Taking up that thought, I argue that Strawson has also provided us with a corrective for an over-intellectualised picture of rationality. Drawing on a Wittgensteinian conception of the relation between thought (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  80
    Reactive Attitudes and Volitional Necessity.Neal A. Tognazzini - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (4):677-689.
    In this paper I argue that Harry Frankfurt's work (both on volitional necessity and on Descartes) can help us to understand the argument that is at the heart of P. F. Strawson's classic article, "Freedom and Resentment". Strawson seems to say that it is both idle and irrelevant to ask whether the participant attitude (the framework within which we see others as morally responsible agents) is justified, but many have been puzzled by these remarks. In this paper I contend (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8. Reactionary attitudes: Strawson, Twitter, and the Black Lives Matter Movement.Anastasia Chan, Marinus Ferreira & Mark Alfano - forthcoming - In Fernando Aguiar-Gonzalez & Antonio Gaitan (eds.), Experimental Methods in Moral Philosophy. Routledge.
    On 25 May 2020, Officer Derek Chauvin asphyxiated George Floyd in Minneapolis — a murder that was captured in a confronting nine-minute bystander video that set off a firestorm of activity on online social networks, in the streets of the United States, and even worldwide. These protests captured the collective rage, dissatisfaction, and resentment personally and vicariously experienced towards the widespread systematic injustice and mistreatment of African Americans by police and vigilantes. The scale of these protests, both online and in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Moral difference between humans and robots: paternalism and human-relative reason.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2022 - AI and Society 37 (4):1533-1543.
    According to some philosophers, if moral agency is understood in behaviourist terms, robots could become moral agents that are as good as or even better than humans. Given the behaviourist conception, it is natural to think that there is no interesting moral difference between robots and humans in terms of moral agency (call it the _equivalence thesis_). However, such moral differences exist: based on Strawson’s account of participant reactive attitude and Scanlon’s relational account of blame, I argue that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Blame as participant anger: Extending moral claimant competence to young children and nonhuman animals.Dorna Behdadi - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology:1-24.
    Following the social conception of moral agency, this paper claims that many beings commonly exempted from moral responsibility, like young children, adults with late-stage dementia, and nonhuman animals, may nevertheless qualify as participants in moral responsibility practices. Blame and other moral responsibility responses are understood according to the communicative emotion account of the reactive attitudes. To blame someone means having an emotion episode that acts as a vehicle for conveying a particular moral content. Therefore, moral agency is argued (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Education and Resentment.Susan T. Gardner & Daniel J. Anderson - 2021 - Open Journal for Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):19-32.
    That the world is awash with resentment poses a genuine question for educators. Here, we will suggest that resentment can be better harnessed for good if we stop focusing on people and tribes and, instead, focus on systems: those invisible norms that often produce locked-in structures of social interaction. A “systems lens” is vast, so fixes will have to be an iterative process of reflection, and revision toward a more just system. Nonetheless, resentment toward the status quo may be an (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Hatred as an Attitude.Thomas Brudholm - 2010 - Philosophical Papers 39 (3):289-313.
    Although sometimes forgotten in current uses of the term, ?hatred? is a notoriously complex and ambiguous phenomenon. Analyzing and identifying what characterizes hatred and articulating a concept that helps us think more clearly about hatred is difficult. It is not even clear whether hatred is an emotion, an attitude, a sentiment or a passion. This essay departs from the idea that perhaps hatred is analyzable as a retributive reactive attitude. More precisely, it presents a philosophical exploration of what happens (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  13.  12
    The resentful and the indignant.David Botting - 2016 - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 15 (1):36-49.
    In “Freedom and Resentment” P.F. Strawson distinguishes between the participant reactive attitudes like resentment and the moral reactive attitudes like indignation described by Strawson as their “vicarious analogues,” where we are not the injured party and it is not our own personal relationships at stake. Through naturalistic description of the participant reactive attitudes a set of conditions for moral responsibility can be discovered that, moreover, are held to be immune to any external (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Social media, interpersonal relations and the objective attitude.Michael-John Turp - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 22 (3):269-279.
    How do social media affect interpersonal relationships? Adopting a Strawsonian framework, I argue that social media make us more likely to adopt the objective attitude towards persons. Technologically mediated communication tends to inhibit interpersonal emotions and other reactive attitudes. This is due to a relative lack of the social cues that typically enable us to read minds and react to them. Adopting the objective attitude can be harmful for two reasons. First, it tends to undermine the basis of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15.  37
    The Collectivity of Blaming.David Botting - 2016 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1-39.
    In this paper I want to argue that acts of blame are performed by collectives, and not by any collective but only by collectives that satisfy certain conditions { broadly those that, by collectivizing reason, can be held to be autonomous subjects to which it makes sense to attribute attitudes, including participant reactive attitudes such as resentment. The actors involved must also be related to the collective in particular ways in order to hold and be held (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16.  48
    Forgiveness and Loyalty.Piers Benn - 1996 - Philosophy 71 (277):369 - 383.
    Contemporary moral philosophy rightly gives an important place not only to theories of right action, but to the nature and value of our interpersonal moral attitudes, including such reactions as resentment, admiration and forgiveness. Whilst these concerns have always been of interest to theologians and psychologists, their philosophical importance partly derives from wider concerns about the nature of persons. The recent resurgence, for instance, of retributivist theories of punishment, which are finding favour among many philosophical writers, largely bases itself (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  17.  92
    Coaches’ Emotional Intelligence and Reactive Behaviors in Soccer Matches: Mediating Effects of Coach Efficacy Beliefs.Pedro Teques, Daniel Duarte & João Viana - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10:448586.
    In the last 10 years, emotional intelligence has become a current issue of research in psychology, and there are indicators to consider that emotional intelligence should be analyzed to help the coach to behave effectively during competitions. According to Boardley’s (2018) revised model of coaching efficacy, coaches’ emotional intelligence is predictive of their efficacy beliefs, which, in turn, is predictive of coaching behavior. However, little is known about the mediating effects of coaching efficacy dimensions on the relationships between coach’s emotional (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  36
    Virtuous Avengers in Commonplace Cases.Peter A. French - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):381-393.
    Despite the bad press that revenge has received from moral philosophers and legal theorists, it can be a legitimate way to forge a link between wrongful behavior and penalties that karmic moral theories can only postulate. It can be especially effectual in commonplace cases that are under the radar of formal systems of justice. In such cases it can play a positive role in strengthening the moral foundations of a community. In those cases acts of revenge can provide a morally (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. Forgiveness and the Significance of Wrongs.Stefan Riedener - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (1).
    According to the standard account of forgiveness, you forgive your wrongdoer by overcoming your resentment towards them. But how exactly must you do so? And when is such overcoming fitting? The aim of this paper is to introduce a novel version of the standard account to answer these questions. Its core idea is that the reactive attitudes are a fitting response not just to someone’s blameworthiness, but to their blameworthiness being significant for you, or worthy of your caring, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  20.  93
    Freedom, resentment, and the psychopath.Piers Benn - 1999 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):29-39.
    This paper discusses the moral responsibility of psychopaths for their anti-social actions. Starting from P. F. Strawson's discussion of our participant reactive attitudes, which stresses their indispensability for meaningful human relations, the paper contrasts a variety of "normal" wrongdoers with psychopaths. It suggests that the latter are often seriously deficient in their capacity to entertain these attitudes, and that their resulting lack of proper self-evaluation may explain both their callousness and their imprudence. It is then argued (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  21.  68
    Avoiding Strawson’s Crude Opposition: How to Straddle the Participant and Objective Stances.Neil Campbell & Alexander Carty - 2023 - Acta Analytica 39 (1):117-141.
    Commentators on P.F. Strawson’s reactive attitudes emphasize the opposition between the participant and objective attitudes. This tendency overlooks Strawson’s attempt to mitigate what he saw as “a crude opposition” between these two perspectives. Strawson called attention to phenomena involving the “half-suspension” of reactive attitudes, or the “straddling” of the objective and participant stances in order to diminish this crudity. This has been largely ignored in the literature, and as a result, the phenomena that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  42
    Nurses’ attitudes toward ethical issues in psychiatric inpatient settings.Nurhan Eren - 2014 - Nursing Ethics 21 (3):359-373.
    Background: Nursing is an occupation that deals with humans and relies upon human relationships. Nursing care, which is an important component of these relationships, involves protection, forbearance, attention, and worry. Objectives: The aim of this study is to evaluate the ethical beliefs of psychiatric nurses and ethical problems encountered. Research Design: The study design was descriptive and cross-sectional. Research context: Methods comprised of a questionnaire administered to psychiatric nurses (n = 202) from five psychiatric hospitals in Istanbul, Turkey, instruction in (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23.  72
    The Responsibility of the Psychiatric Offender: Commentary on Ciocchetti.Piers Benn - 2003 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):189-192.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.2 (2003) 189-192 [Access article in PDF] The Responsibility of the Psychopathic Offender:Commentary on Ciocchetti Piers Benn Christopher Ciocchetti has valuable things to say in his article. He takes as his starting point some common ground between his views and my own, especially about the importance of Strawsonian participant reactive attitudes to our understanding of psychopathy. But he proceeds to claim that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. The effects of intranasal oxytocin on black participants’ responses to outgroup acceptance and rejection.Jiyoung Park, Joshua Woolley & Wendy Berry Mendes - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    Social acceptance is assumed to have widespread positive effects on the recipient; however, ethnic/racial minorities often react negatively to social acceptance by White individuals. One possibility for such reactions might be their lack of trust in the genuineness of White individuals’ positive evaluations. Here, we examined the role that oxytocin—a neuropeptide putatively linked to social processes—plays in modulating reactions to acceptance or rejection during interracial interactions. Black participants received intranasal oxytocin or placebo and interacted with a White, same-sex stranger who (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. The Responsibility of the Psychopathic Offender.Christopher Ciocchetti - 2003 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):175-183.
    In this paper, I argue that the responsibility-affecting defect of psychopaths is their incapacity for responding to acts within relationships. I begin with Piers Benn's account of psychopaths as incapable of forming participant reactive attitudes. Benn argues that participant reactive attitudes are essentially communicative and the ability to form and understand participant reactive attitudes is crucial to being a member of the moral community. Against Benn, I argue, though participant (...) attitudes can be communicative, they are not essentially communicative. Instead, they can be simply expressive. Therefore, we must consider psychopaths members of the moral community, in Benn’s sense; however, psychopaths fail to interpret their actions as part of relationships. This inability renders punishment, as an attempt to rectify wrong relationships, inappropriate for psychopaths. Psychopaths have diminished responsibility, insofar as they have forfeited some rights by committing an offense, but are not appropriate candidates for punishment because they cannot understand its significance. (shrink)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26.  36
    Role of emotion in moral agency: some meta-ethical issues in the moral psychology of emotion.Sophie Rietti - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    This thesis aims to elucidate an apparent paradox about the role of emotion in moral agency. A number of lines of concern suggest emotion may have serious negative impact on moral agency. On the other hand, there are considerations that suggest emotion also plays a crucial role in motivating, informing and even constituting moral agency. Significantly, there is a strong connection between participant reactive attitudes and ascription of moral status as agent or subject. Nonemotional agents could not (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Reactive attitudes and personal relationships.Per-Erik Milam - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):102-122.
    Abolitionism is the view that if no one is responsible, we ought to abandon the reactive attitudes. This paper defends abolitionism against the claim, made by P.F. Strawson and others, that abandoning these attitudes precludes the formation and maintenance of valuable personal relationships. These anti-abolitionists claim that one who abandons the reactive attitudes is unable to take personally others’ attitudes and actions regarding her, and that taking personally is necessary for certain valuable relationships. I (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  28. Responsibility gaps and the reactive attitudes.Fabio Tollon - 2022 - AI and Ethics 1 (1).
    Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are ubiquitous. From social media timelines, video recommendations on YouTube, and the kinds of adverts we see online, AI, in a very real sense, filters the world we see. More than that, AI is being embedded in agent-like systems, which might prompt certain reactions from users. Specifically, we might find ourselves feeling frustrated if these systems do not meet our expectations. In normal situations, this might be fine, but with the ever increasing sophistication of AI-systems, this (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  29. Personal Reactive Attitudes and Partial Responses to Others: A Partiality-Based Approach to Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes.Rosalind Chaplin - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 25 (2):323-345.
    This paper argues for a new understanding of Strawson’s distinction between personal, impersonal, and self-reactive attitudes. Many Strawsonians take these basic reactive attitude types to be distinguished by two factors. Is it the self or another who is treated with good- or ill-will? And is it the self or another who displays good- or ill-will? On this picture, when someone else wrongs me, my reactive attitude is personal; when someone else wrongs someone else, my reactive (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  30. Sinful AI?Michael Wilby - 2023 - In Critical Muslim, 47. London: Hurst Publishers. pp. 91-108.
    Could the concept of 'evil' apply to AI? Drawing on PF Strawson's framework of reactive attitudes, this paper argues that we can understand evil as involving agents who are neither fully inside nor fully outside our moral practices. It involves agents whose abilities and capacities are enough to make them morally responsible for their actions, but whose behaviour is far enough outside of the norms of our moral practices to be labelled 'evil'. Understood as such, the paper argues (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31.  2
    Sympathy and resentment.Alejandro Rosas - 2016 - Filosofia Unisinos 17 (2).
    I defend resentment as a legitimate and necessary moral attitude by neutralizing an objection that points to its hostile and morally repugnant character. The argument proceeds by embedding resentment in a view of morality as a social and communicative practice, supported by a common knowledge of apparently inborn moral expectations. In virtue of these natural expectations, every person is pre-institutionally entitled to goodwill and to the pleasure that arises from showing and receiving goodwill from others. Resentment arises naturally when these (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Reactive Attitudes and Second-Personal Address.Michelle Mason - 2017 - In Karsten Stueber & Remy Debes (eds.), Ethical Sentimentalism: New Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.
    The attitudes P. F. Strawson dubs reactive are felt toward another (or oneself). They are thus at least in part affective reactions to what Strawson describes as qualities of will that people manifest toward others and themselves. The reactive attitudes are also interpersonal, relating persons to persons. But how do they relate persons? On the deontic, imperative view, they relate persons in second-personal authority and accountability relations. After addressing how best to understand the reactive (...) as sentiments, I evaluate the deontic imperative view. I argue that the modality of reactive attitudes is not invariably deontic nor is their mood invariably imperative. Certain reactive attitudes are aretaic, appellative sentiments that prescribe non-jural ideals of conduct or character. Although expansive, my resulting conception of the reactive attitudes escapes the charge of failing to distinguish reactive sentiments from “disengaged aesthetic reactions” to the beautiful and ugly in human action and character. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  33.  60
    Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Very General Facts of Human Nature.Audun Benjamin Bengtson - 2019 - Philosophical Investigations 42 (3):281-304.
    This paper defends P.F. Strawson's controversial ‘reversal move’, the view that the reactive attitudes determine what it means to be responsible. Many are critical of this account, arguing that it leads to the result that if we were to start to hold very young children responsible, they would be responsible. I argue that it is possible to read Strawson as providing a grammatical analysis of our moral responsibility language‐game by drawing two parallels between Strawson and Wittgenstein. This interpretation (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  34. Desert, fairness, and resentment.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):117-132.
    Responsibility, blameworthiness in particular, has been characterized in a number of ways in a literature in which participants appear to be talking about the same thing much of the time. More specifically, blameworthiness has been characterized in terms of what sorts of responses are fair, appropriate, and deserved in a basic way, where the responses in question range over blame, sanctions, alterations to interpersonal relationships, and the reactive attitudes, such as resentment and indignation. In this paper, I explore (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  35.  49
    Vasubandhu, reactive attitudes, and attentional freedom.Aaron Schultz - 2021 - Asian Philosophy 31 (2):178-194.
    This article aims to draw attention to the way in which a subset of reactive attitudes make us less free. Vasubandhu’s explanation of reactive attitudes shows us how they make us less free...
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Reactive Attitudes and the Hare–Williams Debate: Towards a New Consequentialist Moral Psychology.D. E. Miller - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):39-59.
    Bernard Williams charges that the moral psychology built into R. M. Hare’s utilitarianism is incoherent in virtue of demanding a bifurcated kind of moral thinking that is possible only for agents who fail to reflect properly on their own practical decision making. I mount a qualified defence of Hare’s view by drawing on the account of the ‘reactive attitudes’ found in P. F. Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’. Against Williams, I argue that the ‘resilience’ of the reactive (...) ensures that our taking an instrumental view of our dispositions to experience guilt and compunction, as Hare calls for us to do while engaged in ‘critical’ moral thinking, will not prevent us from experiencing these feelings as people ordinarily do while we are thinking ‘intuitively’. I also consider the implications of my argument for consequentialism more generally and (briefly) Kantianism. (shrink)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  37. Reactive Attitudes, Forgiveness, and the Second-Person Standpoint.Alexandra Couto - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1309-1323.
    Philosophers discussing forgiveness have usually been split between those who think that forgiveness is typically virtuous, even when the wrongdoer doesn’t repent, and those who think that, for forgiveness to be virtuous, certain pre-conditions must be satisfied. I argue that Darwall’s second-personal account of morality offers significant theoretical support for the latter view. I argue that if, as Darwall claims, reactive attitudes issue a demand, this demand needs to be adequately answered for forgiveness to be warranted. It follows (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  38. Reactive Attitudes as Communicative Entities.Coleen Macnamara - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):546-569.
    Many theorists claim that the reactive emotions, even in their private form, are communicative entities. But as widely endorsed as this claim is, it has not been redeemed: the literature lacks a clear and compelling account of the sense in which reactive attitudes qua private mental states are essentially communicative. In this paper, I fill this gap. I propose that it is apt to characterize privately held reactive attitudes as communicative in nature because they, like (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  39. Selective hard compatibilism.Paul Russell - 2010 - In J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 7. MIT Press. pp. 149-73.
    .... The strategy I have defended involves drawing a distinction between those who can and cannot legitimately hold an agent responsible in circumstances when the agent is being covertly controlled (e.g. through implantation processes). What is intuitively unacceptable, I maintain, is that an agent should be held responsible or subject to reactive attitudes that come from another agent who is covertly controlling or manipulating him. This places some limits on who is entitled to take up the participant (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  40. One Reactive Attitude to Rule Them All.Nicholas Sars - 2019 - In Bradford Cokelet & Corey J. Maley (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Guilt. Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 171-191.
    P. F. Strawson famously gives pride of place to the reactive attitudes in his account of moral responsibility, though he says little about guilt or any other self-reactive attitudes. This inattention is curious, given that on his view lacking capacity for self-reactive attitudes is grounds for exemption from the moral community. Perhaps because of Strawson’s limited remarks regarding them, the self-reactive attitudes have not received much attention in commentaries on his view. In (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  41. Moral Diversity and Moral Responsibility.Brian Kogelmann & Robert H. Wallace - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (3):371-389.
    In large, impersonal moral orders many of us wish to maintain good will toward our fellow citizens only if we are reasonably sure they will maintain good will toward us. The mutual maintaining of good will, then, requires that we somehow communicate our intentions to one another. But how do we actually do this? The current paper argues that when we engage in moral responsibility practices—that is, when we express our reactive attitudes by blaming, praising, and resenting—we communicate (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  42. Moral Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Freedom of Will.Robert Kane - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):229-246.
    In his influential paper, “Freedom and Resentment,” P. F. Strawson argued that our ordinary practices of holding persons morally responsible and related reactive attitudes were wholly “internal” to the practices themselves and could be insulated from traditional philosophical and metaphysical concerns, including concerns about free will and determinism. This “insulation thesis” is a controversial feature of Strawson’s influential paper; and it has had numerous critics. The first purpose of this paper is to explain my own reasons for thinking (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43. Reactive Attitudes.Michelle Mason - 2021 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
  44. In defense of non-reactive attitudes.Per-Erik Milam - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (3):294-307.
    Abolitionism is the view that if no one is responsible, then we ought to abandon the reactive attitudes. Proponents suggest that reactive attitudes can be replaced in our emotional repertoire by non-reactive analogues. In this paper, I dispute and reject a common challenge to abolitionism according to which the reactive attitudes are necessary for protesting unfairness and maintaining social harmony. While other abolitionists dispute the empirical basis of this objection, I focus on its (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  45.  30
    Intentions, Impartiality, and the Fairness of Lotteries.Xueshi Wang - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):1795-1810.
    Why should a lottery be used in the allocation of an indivisible good to which participants in the lottery have an equally strong claim? Stone argues that when indeterminacy arises, in which it is impossible to satisfy the equality condition requiring like cases to be treated alike, the impartiality principle suggests that the agent responsible for the allocation task should not intend to favor one over another on the basis of invalid reasons. In this article, I argue that the impartiality (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46.  47
    The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays.Randolph K. Clarke, Michael McKenna & Angela M. Smith - 2015 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    What is it to be morally responsible for something? Recent philosophical work reveals considerable disagreement on the question. Indeed, some theorists claim to distinguish several varieties of moral responsibility, with different conditions that must be satisfied if one is to bear responsibility of one or another of these kinds. -/- Debate on this point turns partly on disagreement about the kinds of responses made appropriate when one is blameworthy or praiseworthy. It is generally agreed that these include "reactive (...)" such as resentment and gratitude, but theorists disagree about the nature of these attitudes. They dispute the connections between moral responsibility, desert, and the justification of punishment as well. -/- Many theorists take it that, whatever the appropriate responses are, they are responses to an agent's "quality of will," but there is no consensus on what this comes to. Are the agent's beliefs about the moral status of her behavior what matter, or is it what she cares about, or what she judges important? -/- This volume presents twelve original essays from participants in these debates. The contributors include prominent established figures as well as influential younger philosophers. A substantive introduction by the editors surveys recent debates and situates the contributions within it. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  47. Epistemic Reactive Attitudes.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):353-366.
    Although there have been a number of recent discussions about the emotions that we bring with us to our epistemic endeavors, there has been little, if any, discussion of the emotions we bring with us to epistemic appraisal. This paper focuses on a particular set of emotions, the reactive attitudes. As Peter F. Strawson and others have argued, our reactive attitudes reveal something deep about our moral commitments. A similar argument can be made within the domain (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  48. Dissolving reactive attitudes: Forgiving and Understanding.Lucy Allais - 2008 - South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):197-201.
    In ‘Freedom and Resentment,' Strawson argues that we cannot separate holding people morally responsible for their actions from specific emotional responses, which he calls reactive attitudes, which we are disposed towards in response to people's actions. Strawson's view might pose problems for forgiveness, in which we choose to overcome reactive attitudes like resentment without altering the judgments that make them appropriate. I present a detailed analysis of reactive attitudes, which I use both to defend (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  49. Reactive Attitudes, Disdain and the Second-Person Standpoint.Alexandra Couto - unknown
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Responsibility: Expected, Taken, Recognized.Gunnar Björnsson - 2024 - In Miguel Egler & Alfred Archer (eds.), A Social Practice Account of Responsible Persons. Tilburg, The Netherlands: Open Press Tilburg University. pp. 129-147.
    In her Descartes Lectures, Cheshire Calhoun argues that “responsible person” is a valuable cross-temporal status assigned by default to fellow social participants. Responsible persons, on Calhoun’s proposal, are (i) accountable, (ii) compliant with at least basic normative expectations, and (iii) disposed to take responsibility—to promote good ends in ways that are not normatively expected. The third component in particular goes beyond what is standardly discussed in debates about moral responsibility, where the relation to what is normatively expected is central. In (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 986