I offer a method for philosophical counseling that is contrasted with Marinoffs. This version of philosophical counseling is primarily epistemic and suggests therapy as the examination of the justification of a client's beliefs, with a goal of enabling the client to change belief systems if the client so chooses.

This paper completes an argument that the problem of moral distress offers philosophical counselors an opportunity to do work that is both socially useful and philosophically interesting in its own right. A previous Philosophical Practice article answered the question, What's Philosophical About Moral Distress? by conceptualizing it as a phenomenon that arises within a moral worldview (Matchett 2018). The present paper investigates ways in which a philosophical counseling response to moral distress might differ from the (...) strategies deployed by the nursing profession to date. Though they are often quite subtle, the presence of some differences opens the possibility that philosophical counseling might be more effective than those strategies; in addition to helping individual nurses feel better, this could strengthen the nursing profession's efforts to mitigate nursing shortages and enhance quality of patient care. Though case studies are necessary to support these claims, there are reasons to think they are warranted. (shrink)

Self-understanding is to a great extent defined by narrative: who we are as human beings is determined by the stories we, and others, tell about ourselves. Yet many are unable to compose coherent personal narratives, as their experiences do not fall within the scope of an accepted conceptual framework. Survivors of trauma are particularly apt to fall into this “narrative rift,” where there can be no words to describe, and hence can be no assimilation of, their experiences. Using the example (...) of child sexual abuse, and drawing on the work of Bass, Spence, Schafer, and Guignon, I propose an examination of the nature of narrative fragmentation itself. Philosophical counselling may succeed where psychoanalysis might not: for where the latter has theoretical commitments to specific narratives, the former, through its reluctance to force epistemological or metaphysical assumptions on the narrator, may well facilitate a more comprehensive self-understanding. (shrink)

Philosophical counselling is an approach that aims to assist people to deal with life events in an effective manner. As such, it is of interest to nurses who are concerned with helping clients who require assistance effectively to manage life events. The approach utilizes both ancient and contemporary philosophical promises and theories. On the promise side, it offers the belief that philosophy can be concerned with providing answers to the question of how people ought to live a good (...) or healthy life. On the theory side, it offers the belief that philosophical inquiry and theory can help people towards such answers. Thus the theory and practice of philosophical counselling is relevant to nurses whose practice aims to promote in their clients a good or healthy lifestyle. The practice of philosophical counselling, in a substance abuse centre, will be explored to demonstrate the theory and methods of the approach. (shrink)

Critiques existing theoretical approaches and practices of philosophical counseling and presents a new model.

One promising form of philosophical practice is to conduct workshops on philosophical counseling for counselors. Since licensed professionals, such as Marriage and Family Counselors and Licensed Clinical Social Workers sometimes confront situations that raise philosophical issues and usually have a philosophical perspective that informs their practice, they could profit from a workshop on philosophical counseling; the workshop also qualifies for continuing education units (CEUs) that are typically required to renew their licenses. This paper (...) describes the principal purposes of a workshop for counselors, the structure of two such workshops, and suggestions for improvement of future workshops. (shrink)

The practice of ‘Philosophical Counselling’ (henceforth ‘PC’) is growing. But what exactly is PC? The variety of attempts to define PC can be summarised in terms of three overlapping sets of opposites: practical versus theoretical definitions; monistic versus pluralistic definitions; and substantive versus antinomous definitions. ‘Practical’ definitions of PC include descriptive accounts of its actual practice. ‘Theoretical’ definitions exclude such accounts. ‘Monistic definitions’ refers to definitions of PC that define it in terms of the work of one specific philosopher (...) or approach in philosophy. ‘Pluralistic’ definitions draw on the work of a variety of philosophers or approaches. ‘Substantive’ definitions are definitions that purport to say what PC is, while ‘antinomous’ definitions of PC say what it is not . My aim is not to define PC definitively. The aim of this article is rather to: (i) provide an overview of the wide variety of efforts to define PC; and, (ii) briefly suggest a preliminary understanding of PC that seems to cover most of the other definitions thereof. For David Fourie (1946-2013). (shrink)

Notwithstanding recent successes of philosophical counseling, which appear to be leading to its legitimization as a professional practice in America and abroad, many forces concen to condition its emergent structure and function. This paper briefly elucidates some of the influences to which philosophical counseling is subject, that lie beyond its unilateral control. These include its portayal by the media to the public, its scope of practice, its relations with psychology and psychiatry, its foreseeable effects in particular (...) cases, and its perception by (and of) analytical philosophy. (shrink)

This essence is the philosophy of knowledge for personal and social well-being aspects of the contribution. In the Introduction to "What is philosophical counseling practice or philosophy?", I described the ancient philosophy has been caring for the soul and tradition of self, in the last twenty-five years has been the revitalization of philosophers and others up. "Philosophy of psychological analysis," "philosophical counseling hotline", and "personal well-being and Philosophy Cafe" is a contemporary German philosopher Gerd B. Achenbach, (...) British theologian Chad Varah, and the French philosopher Marc Sautet these ideas for specific application situation. In the "philosophy of charity", I argue, the possibility for all practical philosophy, the charity as a necessary test of suspicion. (shrink)

Outlined are several ways in which philosophical knowledge can contribute to personal and social well-being. In the introduction, "What is Philosophical Practice, Counseling, and Psychoanalysis" I describe how the ancient philosophical tradition of care for the soul or self has been revived among philosophers and others in the last twenty-five years. The sections "The Philosophical Counseling Hotline" and "Personal Well-being and the Philosophical Café '" are accounts of specific applications of ideas of the (...) contemporary German philosopher Gerd B. Achenbach, the founder of the international philosophical practice movement. In the conclusion "Philosophical Benevolence" I argue for benevolence as a skeptical touchstone for philosophy in practice. (shrink)

Various approaches and methods are used in philosophical counselling. Two main trends can be observed: the first is the use of contemplative methods and the second constitutes approaches based on dialogical critical thinking. The author defends the idea that developing philosophical counselling on the basis of critical thinking presupposes that it is possible for counsellor and client to hold a philosophical dialogue where the relationship is one of expert/lay person. J. Šulavík has described this relationship in greater (...) detail. In the Socratic model, the philosopher and the lay person hold a dialogue whereby they ascertain opinions via inductive comparison and by defining things, creating a shared concept. While the Platonic and Enlightenment models were grounded in the authority of the expert philosopher, in the Socratic and postmodern models, the expert philosopher loses the power to manipulate those who know “less”. Lay people are not passive consumers of a particular “optimal” philosophy but through their own “philosophising” create philosophy and tailor it for themselves. While philosophising, therefore, the philosopher does not take on the role of “producer” of philosophy but of “adviser” (consultant). It is therefore supposed that people have a general need for philosophy and that ultimately they should create and reflect upon their own philosophy. (shrink)

According to Kuhn a new scientific discipline comes into existence when a group of scientists adopt a common paradigm within which to conduct research. The adoption of this paradigm senes to focus the attention of the group’s members on a common explanatory task-at-hand and leads them to adopt similar methods and aims, thus making possible the standard puzzle solving activities that allow normal science to advance rapidly. However, Kuhn argues, in pre-paradigm periods and during revolutionary phases, scientists do not engage (...) in such singleminded, puzzle-solving behavior, as the paradigm itself is put into question. Instead, during these periods, they become at least partially self-reflective in that they become interested in understanding the nature of their discipline and its relationships to other disciplines. In this paper, I argue that Philosophical Counseling is in a pre-paradigm period and is in need of a paradigm centered definition if it is to develop an identity and advance rapidly. In an Aristotelian mood, I seek this definition though an examination of the related fiends of psychotherapy and pastoral counseling. (shrink)

Philosophical counseling is an educational activity in which philosophers engage in dialogue with clients who wish to address questions or manage problems that arise during the course of everyday life. This chapter offers three contrasting perspectives on the question of what philosophical counselors do: first, an institutional scope of practice for philosophical counseling; second, an anecdotal list of common issues for which clients seek philosophical counseling; and third, a heterogeneous set of views by (...) several pioneers of philosophical counseling. From what we have seen thus far, it may already be clear that there exist both parallels and anti‐parallels between philosophical counseling and psychotherapy. First and foremost, anyone who wants to become a philosophical counselor should earn an accredited graduate degree in philosophy in whichever area of specialization captures their interest. (shrink)

In this paper I will move away from what has become the "traditional" approach to writing and thinking about philosophical counseling - I will not compare and contrast the virtues of the philosophical and psychological paradigms, nor will I attempt to defend philosophical counseling against its critics. Instead, I will use the methods and practices employed by philosophical counselors as a paradigm to inform and govern another philosophical practice, that is, clinical medical ethics. (...) I will show that clinical ethics and philosophical counseling share many common attributes, and argue that each discipline has much to offer to the other. (shrink)

In “A General Framework for Philosophical Counseling,” Hakam AI-Shawi argues that “philosophical counseling must... avoid relyingon any first-order philosophical assumptions.” In this light, I explore whether and to what extent an applied Heideggerian approach to the amelioration of human life - in this case, Daseinsanalysis - satisfies this criterion. I focus on the orienting reality of a mortal, interpreting questioner dwelling in particular circumstances. Such an approach, as I construe it here, seems largely compatible with (...) AI-Shawi’s understanding of what can properly count as philosophical counselling. (shrink)

The recent literature, conference and internet discussions about philosophical counseling (PC) show that it is in a state of confusion as to its definition, area of expertise and purpose. The present paper analyzes these definitions showing their limitations as well as their strong points. A proposal for a more adequate definition is then given which recommends changing the name of “Philosophical Counseling” to “Philosophy Educator and Advisor.” It is also shown that humanism contains many of the (...) elements of the definitions of PC. An analysis of emotion, and specifically anger, is then given to show its implications for PC and to exemplify the definition of PC here proposed. (shrink)

There is currently a movement advocating “philosophical counseling.” My own development as a philosopher, then a human services professional, then a psychoanalyst, charts how I came to believe that philosophical training was underrated, and training in psychology was overrated, as an appropriate intellectual foundation for psychotherapy. However, these fields are not distinct. Laws governing the practice of psychology are arrogant in their scope, and make virtually everything out to be the practice of psychology. The scope and nature (...) of philosophy isn’t any clearer. The kind of thinking encouraged in psychology is liable to be exactly the wrong sort of thing for training therapists. Unfortunately, philosophers are liable to not be good therapists either. The lack of neat distinctions between philosophical counseling and psychotherapy provides an argument against a monopoly on therapy-like activities by psychologists. On the liberal side this is an argument in favor of freedom of speech, of belief, and trade, for the applied philosopher. On the conservative side, it may also be an argument for certification (as opposed to licensure) for both psychologists and philosophers, in the interest of protecting the vulnerable by promoting truthful self-representation. (shrink)

Many philosophical counselors seem to be counselors who use or point to phil­osophical texts or use abstract indeed logical or rational methods when working with a client. I want to introduce the idea of a counseling philosopher, who uses the client’s own concrete experiences as the basis for philosophizing with the client about the nature of the client’s dilemma - using ‘the between’ (Buber) as that special creative space where one em­ploys the art of philosophizing to the unique (...) situation. Otherwise, the particularity of that client gets subsumed under theory or methods, much like what has happened in psychology and which gave rise to Achenbach’s criticisms of psychology/psychiatry. The dialogical of which Buber and Friedman speak is the give and take between client and counseling philosopher of understanding and expanding perceptions confirmed through the actual relationship. Philosophy as an art (and not a method) helps us restore the trust Buber talks about which allows us to engage the world directly and not through categories of thought grounded in psychological or philosophical texts and theories. (shrink)

Though there has been interest in philosophical counselling in South Africa since at least the 1990s little has been accomplished by way of formalizing and developing the practice into a profession. We ask what would be required for it to become a fully-fledged profession? We argue that in order to count as a profession, a practice must meet certain normative, cognitive, and organizational criteria, but that philosophical counselling in South Africa falls short both cognitively and organizationally. This has (...) implications for individual philosophical practitioners, it would seem, who cannot any longer consider themselves professionals. We argue that being a professional is not contingent on belonging to an established profession, but rather that to claim to be a professional is to claim that one can be trusted because one has the client’s good at heart. Exploring the idea of trust highlights again, though this time from an ethical rather than from a sociological perspective, that there is an urgent need to fill the cognitive and organizational gap that exists in South Africa. We propose that in order to facilitate the professionalization of philosophical counselling in South Africa, we should adopt an approach that focuses on the training of philosophical counsellors in the hopes that an organizational component will grow out of this rather than following previous attempts to put organizations first. (shrink)

In this paper, we deal with the issue of contradictory beliefs, particularly with regard to Philosophical Counseling: both voices from the philosophical tradition (with no claim of being exhaustive!) and concepts developed by philosophical practitioners will be considered, in order to make clear what a wide range of resources for dealing with contradictions is available to the philosopher who may wish to engage in Philosophical Counseling. Among the philosophical practitioners, we devote special consideration (...) to Ben Mijuskovic and Gerd Achenbach, and this for two main reasons: first, because the issue of contradiction plays a central role in their concept of Philosophical Counseling and, accordingly, it is given special consideration in their writings; second, because their approaches to Philosophical Counseling are so different that by looking at them one can get an impression of the variety of the positions one can adopt in Philosophical Counseling with respect to the issue of contradiction. (shrink)

Philosophical counselling, Ran Lahav and others claim, helps clients deepen their philosophical self‐understanding. The counsellor's role is the minimalist one of providing the client with the philosophical tools needed for reflective self‐evaluation. Respect for the client's autonomy entails refraining from intervening with substantive moral criticism, theories, and methods; the client's ways of working out fundamental questions like ‘Who am I and what do I really want?’cannot be assessed by the counsellor in terms of their truth‐value, but only (...) in terms of whether they reflect the client's autonomous choice to express him/herself in a certain way. I argue that this view, which is informed by an anti‐realist account of self and life‐history, undermines the distinction between self‐knowledge and self‐deception. Once interpretive and criteriological free rein is given to the client, and once personal, pragmatic and aesthetic considerations take precedence over truth‐value, then the way is left open to clients to generate the most morally convenient self‐interpretation to suit their current needs. I defend the view that truth matters in philosophical counselling; more specifically, that there is a basic distinction between true and false forms of self‐understanding. To do this, I offer a broadly realist account of self and reflective self‐evaluation. If this is right, then philosophical counsellors shoulder a significant burden of responsibility in helping their clients achieve an accurate, defensible, action‐guiding and truth‐oriented self‐understanding. (shrink)

This paper approaches philosophical counseling practice from the idea that philosophy itself is primarily a way of living and only secondarily a subject matter to be grasped and comprehended. Three things are shown to follow from this view: first, charging a fee for access to this practice is inimical to the practice itself; secondly, contrary to scientific ‘objectivity’ as the means to truthspeaking, this view of philosophy calls for a consciously articulated autobiographical expression or personal admission on the (...) part of the philosophical practitioner; and, finally, an understanding of philosophical counseling practice emerges from this view of philosophy that is depicted as naturally occurring therapeutic interacting. (shrink)

This multi-faceted collection of women's perspectives on the renaissance in philosophical practices provides an international overview on the professional practice of philosophical counseling as rooted in the ancient philosophical discipline of life and its essential difference from modern mainstream philosophy.

The article poses three questions relating to the self-definition of philosophical counselling: 1. Is it an alternative to psychological and psychotherapeutic approaches? 2. What is the therapeutic nature of philosophical counselling? 3. Is it contemplation or critical reasoning? The first part introduces some examples of the concepts that sharply distinguish philosophical counselling from psychological and psychotherapeutic approaches. It also considers those that mix these different approaches. The second part deals with the question of whether or not (...) class='Hi'>philosophical counselling can be considered to be a therapy. Some philosophical counsellors work on the belief that there is a synchrony between modern philosophical counselling and the classical conception of philosophy as therapy. Many, however, are of the opinion that it is not possible to speak of it in terms of therapy. The third part gives examples of the way in which philosophical counselling is understood to be contemplation and on the other hand of those who employ approaches based on critical thinking in philosophical counselling. (shrink)

A detailed discussion of issues in philosophical counseling for the practitioner and general public.

This commentary shows how philosophical counseling offers an alternative way for consultants to facilitate "closure" in bioethical disputes.

The last two and a half decades has seen the emergence of philosophical counseling. While it is practiced in many countries comparatively little has been said on its general character. In this paper I will seek to understand philosophical counseling by exploring its points of convergence to and deviation from its complimentary parts – philosophy and counseling. The practical and applied orientation of philosophical counseling seems worlds apart from what many consider to exemplify (...) philosophy – theoretical, intellectual and abstract concern with foundational questions. Given this it is worth exploring how philosophical counseling coincides with what is understood in academic circles as philosophy. On the other hand, the field of counseling has largely been the domain of psychology. Given the influence and orientation of the practice it would seem likely that philosophical counseling would be significantly different from the common conception of psychological counseling, but in what ways? Understanding how the practice lies in relation to the discipline of philosophy and psychological counseling will go some way to grasping its nature. (shrink)

이 논문에서 필자는 감정의 지향적 내용에 대한 여성주의적 해석을 통하여 여성의 분노와 우울에 대한 여성주의 철학상담의 가능성을 논의하고자 한다. 구체적으로, 가부장제 문화에서 여성 감정의 지향적 내용은 문화적 가치와 연루되어있다는 것을 보이고 그러한 구조와 맥락을 이해함으로써 올바른 치유의 방향을 모색할 수 있다는 것을 논의한다. 이 목적을 위하여, 필자는 한편으로 감정의 지향성논제에서 출발하여 여성의 분노와 우울의 감정이 사고나 행위와 마찬가지로 어떻게 철학적 논의의 대상이 되는지 보인다. 다른 한편으로 지향성 논제만으로는 여성주의 상담이 되기에 불충분하며 그 논제를 여성주의적으로 재해석하는 것이 필요하다는 것을 논의한다. 또한 (...) 감정의 지향적 내용에 대한 여성주의적 해석을 위해,스토아 철학이나 인지치료의 역할을 살펴보는 동시에 그것이 갖는 감정치료의 한계를 비판적으로 검토한다. 이 글에서 필자는 특히 여성의 분노와 우울의 감정에 초점을 두어 논의한다. 분노는 대표적인 지향적 감정이다. 가부장제 문화에서 많은 여성들은 어느 정도 분노와 화를 쌓고 살아가거나 우울감에 빠지는 경향이 있다. 필자는 이와 연관된 상담사례를 통하여 사회 문화적으로 요구되거나 내담자 스스로 내재화한 가부장제 가치가 어떻게 내담자의 분노에 대한 정당화나 올바른 명명과 표현을 가로막는지, 그리하여 정당한 분노를 왜곡하거나 억압함으로써 여성의 분노가 화(화병)와 우울감으로 전환되는지 논의한다. 이런 논의를 통하여, 감정의 지향적 내용에 대한 여성주의적 시각을 포괄하는 넓은 맥락에서 감정을 재기술하거나 내담자의 감정과 연루된 가치체계를 반성적으로 검토함으로써 자신의 분노와 우울을 올바로 이해하고 치유할 수 있는 여성주의 철학상담의 가능성을 탐색하고자 한다. (shrink)

This paper introduces and examines the concept of permitted suicide in the context of philosophical counseling. It argues that clients suffering from serious, irremediable physical illnesses, such as Lou Gehrigs, multiple sclerosis, cancer, and HIV, should be free to philosophically explore the option of suicide with their philosophical counselors without undue fear of paternalistic intervention to thwart a rational suicide decision. Legal liability, professional duties, and qualifications of philosophical counselors who counsel such clients are explored. It (...) is argued that, within certain professional and legal limits, philosophical counselors are uniquely qualified to take on this professional challenge. (shrink)

오늘날 현대인은 만성 피로로 지쳐 있다. 한병철은 이러한 현대사회의 모습을 피로사회로 규정하고, 그 원인이 과도한 자기 긍정의 성과 주체에서 비롯된다고 진단한다. 과도한 피로로 인한 소진증후군과 같은 정신적 질병은 일 중독의 도핑 사회에서 성과 주체가 보여주는 필연적 현상이다. 그러나 현대사회에서 피로의 탓을 오로지 성과 주체의 내적 원인으로만 돌리는 것은 정당하지 않다. 왜냐하면, 성과 주체 자체가 이미 자기 성취와 자기 발견과 전혀 무관한 노동만을 암암리에 강요하는 사회의 외적 지배구조 아래 놓여 있기 때문이다. 이 글은 오늘날 질병으로서 인식되는 현대인의 만성적 피로가 근본적으로 어디에 (...) 기인하고 있는지를 특히 노동(일)과 관련하여 다시 검토하고, 철학상담의 치유의 관점에서 피로사회를 극복하는 대안으로서 삶의 태도와 방식의 변화인 ‘성과 주체’의 삶에서 ‘열매 주체’의 삶으로의 변화를 제안한다. 이때 생존과 가치 실현의 목적 외에 우리가 가진 노동에 대한 잘못된 관념과 개념을 교정하고, 노동의 세계관에 대한 새로운 해석을 통해서 자기변형을 꾀하는 것이 무엇보다도 중요하다. 오늘날 현대인은 바쁜 일상 안에서 온전히 자기 존재로서 주체적 삶을 살지 못한다. 성과를 부추기는 사회에 매몰된 채 병적인 과잉 긍정의 모습을 보이는 성과 주체의 삶이 결코 주체성 있는 삶이라 할 수는 없다. 현대인의 삶에서 주체성 있는 삶은 가능한 한 성과를 내는 데 있지 않고 오히려 자기를 돌아보고 자기를 해방하는 ‘여유’에 있다. 이런 여유로움 속에서 우리는 비로소 진정한 자기를 발견할 수 있기 때문이다. 결코 충족될 수 없는 성과 욕망에 무방비적으로 노출된 사회에서 성과 주체가 자기 착취의 가학적 모습을 띤다면, 열매 주체는 성과에 집착하지 않는 여유로움을 통해서 해방과 자유를 얻는다. (shrink)

본 논문은 인성교육의 한 방법으로서 철학상담의 가능성을 모색하였다. 흔히 철학상담은 그 자체로 인성교육을 포함하고 있다고 생각하지만, 인성의 개념과 인성교육의 방향에 대한 분명한 이해가 선행되지 않는다면 철학상담을 인성교육의 한 방법으로 구체화하기 어렵다. 이에 필자는 종래의 인성교육의 문제점과 새로운 인성교육의 방향을 선행 연구를 통해서 논의하였다. 그 결과 종래의 인성교육은 인성의 개념을 전체적인 관점에서 이해하지 못하고 있다는 점과 새로운 인성교육은 방향만을 제시할 뿐 구체적인 방법에 관한 논의가 부재하다는 점, 그리고 철학상담의 한 부분인 윤리상담은 개인의 세계관을 구성하는 다양한 측면을 모두 포괄하지 못하므로 새로운 인성교육의 (...) 방향과 목적에는 다소 한계가 있다는 점을 확인 할 수 있었다.BR 이에 필자는 시대적 요구를 반영하는 새로운 인성교육의 한 방법으로서 철학상담의 가능을 모색하였다. 철학상담은 철학함의 주요 주제인 세계관 해석을 중심에 놓고 있다. 철학상담은 개인의 인성을 반영하는 세계관을 비판적으로 검토하고 재정립할 수 있도록 도와주는 철학함의 본질적 활동이다. 그리고 이러한 활동 자체가 철학상담과 인성교육의 목표와 요소들이 맞닿아 있는 지점이다. 오늘 날 새로운 인성교육이 요구하는 합리적 사고와 창의적 문제해결 능력은 대부분 대학의 인문교양 교육이 추구하는 핵심 역량들이다. 이러한 핵심 역량에는 철학상담의 한 접근법으로 비판적 사고가 기초해 있다. 자신의 세계관을 비판적으로 검토해서 재정립하는 철학상담의 활동은 그 자체로 인성교육의 한 방법으로 적절하게 적용될 수 있다. (shrink)

본 논문은 보살(菩薩) 사상을 통한 철학실천 방법론을 고찰한 것이다. 보살 사상은 중 생을 구제하고 타인의 고통을 덜어주는 실천적 철학으로, 그 방법론은 자비(慈悲)와 공감 에 근거한 실천적 접근을 중요시한다. 보살의 핵심적인 실천 방식은 타자와의 상호작용을 통해 자기 초월적인 자비와 무조건적인 봉사로 나타난다. 보살은 자신과 타자의 경계를 허 물고, 모든 존재를 아우르는 보편적 자비심을 실천하는 데 그 목적이 있다. 이러한 보살 사상의 실천적 방법론은 일종의 ‘삶의 기술로서 철학’을 제시하는데, 이는 인간 존재의 근 본적인 고통을 이해하고 그것을 해결하기 위한 구체적인 실천적 방법을 제공한다. (...) 보살 사상의 실천 방법론은 ‘자비’와 ‘공감’을 중심으로 한 상호작용을 강조하며, 타자 와의 관계에서 자아를 넘어서는 경험을 추구한다. 이는 내담자가 자신의 고통을 인식하고, 이를 극복할 수 있는 지혜를 자발적으로 발견하도록 돕는 철학적 상담 기법과도 연결된다. 보살의 자비적 실천은 내담자에게 공감적 사고와 자각을 일깨우며, 이 과정을 통해 내담자 는 스스로의 고통을 이해하고 그것을 극복할 수 있는 실천적 방법을 체득하게 된다. 이때 자비와 공감은 단순한 감정적 동조가 아니라, 내담자가 자신의 문제를 직시하고 그것을 해 결하기 위한 능동적이고 자발적인 태도를 형성하는 중요한 동기가 된다. 보살 사상의 방법론에서 중요한 점은, 고통의 본질을 이해하고 그것을 해결하는 과정에 서 내담자가 스스로의 내면을 돌아보며, 삶의 실천적 지혜를 습득할 수 있다는 것이다. 이 는 상담자가 내담자에게 필요한 지식을 전달하는 것이 아니라, 내담자가 스스로 고통을 극 복할 수 있도록 돕는 과정으로, 철학적 상담에서의 ‘능동적 자각’과 ‘실천적 지혜’의 중요성을 강조한다. 또한, 보살사상은 그 자체로 철학적 방법론을 제시하며, 이 방법론은 단지 이론적이고 추상적인 것이 아니라 실제 삶에서 적용 가능한 구체적인 실천적 방법으로 구현된다. 보살 사상은 현대 철학상담에서 중요한 이론적 기초를 제공하며, 내담자에게 삶의 깊은 의미와 실천적 지혜를 깨닫게 할 수 있는 방법론적 가능성을 제시한다. (shrink)

This paper suggests that a basic distinction between philosophical counselling and psychotherapy is to be found in the conception of ‘the person’that is inherent in each of the fields. Understanding this distinction allows not only for a more profound recognition of what is unique to philosophical counselling but also for a better view of possibilities of interchange between the fields. [1].

Far more than the dialectic philosophy of Socrates, the rhetorical humanist tradition avoids objectivist epistemology, charts a traversable path to practical wisdom, and aptly highlights the importance of aesthetic style. In those and other ways, we argue, it offers a preferable historical basis for today’s philosophical counseling. Advocates of that contemporary practice tend to cite Socrates as its historical progenitor and favor the narrow propositional logic that is ascribed to him. Some practitioners, though, have also grown more attuned (...) to metaphorical and narrative elements in a client’s worldview. We aim to supplement their claims by drawing from principles of classical rhetorical theory, showing a way to rethink the practice of philosophical counseling today. (shrink)

Wittgenstein conceived of philosophy as an activity rather than a subject. Thus, his work is highly relevant to the contemporary philosophical counseling movement. This paper explores the ways in which his views on how to do philosophy shed light on how we can approach philosophical counseling. First, Witgenstein's anti-theoretical approach to conceptual analysis highlights the dangers of interpreting clients? symptoms in light of theory. Second, his notion that "pictures hold us captive" underscores the need to help (...) clients recognize unfounded assumptions underlying their apparent dilemmas. Finally, Wittgenstein's Socratic conception of philosophy as a means to lead an authentic life shows the value of philosophizing beyond the confines of the academy. (shrink)

This paper articulates a dilemma posed by philosophical counseling literature that presupposes diagnostic recognition. In addition, guests often bring self-ascribed mental health diagnoses from their previous experience, and requests the philosophical counselor to de-diagnose or otherwise reinterpret their problems. Although philosophical counselors can do this, we cannot skirt philosophical diagnosis. The paper’s thesis is that it behooves philosophical counselors to differentiate these types of diagnosis and to know when we are doing one or the (...) other, including the utilization of diagnostic recognition. Anecdotes from the author’s philosophical counseling sessions are included to illustrate the discussion. The paper concludes that the space of philosophical diagnosis is neither incommensurate with, nor incompatible with clinical diagnosis. On the contrary, the space of philosophical diagnosis ought to harbor the possibility of clinical diagnostic recognition. The philosophical counselor’s repertoire of diagnostic intuitions should cultivate the intuitive recognition of clinical prototypes. (shrink)

현대 사회에서 일중독 증세가 있는 사회 구성원들이 많아지고 있다. 이것은 성과주의라는 가치가 시대적인 삶의 흐름이 되어가고 있음을 의미할 수 있다. 인간이 자유롭고 독립적인 주체로 살아가는 데 일은 하나의 중요한 요소이지만, 지나치게 성과주의에 집착하여 일이 자신의 존재를 구속하게 된다면 인간은 자유로운 주체로 살아가기가 힘들 것이다. 마르틴 하이데거(M. Heidegger)는 그의 주저인 『존재와 시간』에서 인간 실존이 ‘비본래성’(Uneigentlichkeit)으로부터 ‘본래성’(Eigentlichkeit)을 찾을 방법을 제시한 바 있다. 누군가가 “무엇을 찾고 있다.”라는 것은 찾고 있는 대상을 잃어버렸다는 것을 의미한다. 즉 본래적 자기를 찾는다는 것은 본래의 자기를 잃어버렸음을 말한다. 이 (...) 논문에서 필자는 일중독을 본래적 자기 존재를 스스로 상실한 채 살아가고 있는 현대인의 비본래적인 모습 중에 하나로 파악할 것이다. 또한 필자는 일중독 증세를 가진 내담자가 처해있는 세계를 분석하고, 철학상담을 통해 내담자가 스스로 본래적 자기를 찾아갈 수 있는지를 살펴보고자 한다. (shrink)

This article aims at developing a phronesis-oriented philosophical counselling, with a focus on the idea of semantic sentiment. In Section 1, we elucidate the characteristics of phronesis-oriented approach to philosophical counselling and state our reason for adopting this approach. In Section 2, we consider three visions of phronesis-oriented philosophical counselling, i.e., the Socratic vision, the Platonic vision, and the skill-based vision, and argue for the third vision. In Sections 3 and 4, we show how to practice such (...) phronesis-oriented philosophical counselling by introducing, exploring, and applying the idea of semantic sentiment. (shrink)