The title of my thesis may lead the reader to expect to find in it rather more and different things than there actually are. Because of this I think it advisable to outline some of the restrictions which have been imposed upon it and some of the reasons which explain these. The first and most important restriction lies in the fact that it is mainly confined to the exposition and elucidation of Vico's theories. There is little philosophical discussion of the (...) tenability and value of his ideas and such as I have been able to include i3 largely to be found in the brief concluding section. I have found it necessary to omit altogether any comparisons of Vico with latter-day thinkers of his type, e.g. Hegel, Spengler and Toynbee. A variety of reasons have contributed towards this. Hie first is the obscure, diffuse and often muddled nature of "Hie New Science", which is notoriously difficult to understand. In part this problem arises not so much from the difficulty of the ideas as from the fact that there are so many of them. But this alone would not be a reason for puzzlement. It becomes so when allied to a second factor: the difficulty of understanding the meaning of some of Vico's principal pronouncements about the nature of the enterprise carried out in "The New Science" and about the relationships between at least some of its main theories. It is admitted on all hands that Vico's language is obscure. I should not want to dispute this and, indeed, have had to go to some lengths to try to clear up a few of these obscurities. It is also alleged sometimes that some of the difficulties of understanding 'The Now Science" arise from philosophical confusions. This is a much more disputable claim, it will become clear in the following work that I hold that Vico was by no means so confused in his grasp of his own doctrines as the general obscurity of "The New Science" might suggest. Certainly I do not think that he was guilty of one or two basic philosophical confusions which, if located, would provide the clue to the unravelling of most of the difficulties of his work. Nor do I think that those mistakes which he does make are so fundamental that he is left with nothing of importance to say once they have been rectified. (shrink)

Philosophy means ‘love of wisdom,’ but author Edmond Holmes fears the encroaching dominance of intellect over feeling. In this title, Holmes argues that metaphysics’ reliance on intellect and pure reason undermines the study of philosophy. Rather, Holmes suggests a return to intuitional philosophy, combining thought and feeling. First published in 1930, this title will be ideal for students interested in Philosophy and Western Civilisation.

Philosophy lost its traditional subject-matter when other disciplines became socio-culturally and epistemologically differentiated. It does not have its unique methods as doing philosophy resembles the features, stages and steps of theorizing and will be present in any significant research, the writing of articles, books, dissertations, etc. Attempts to usurp philosophy and philosophical methods by the new science of Habermas and followers of Critical Theory and other Continental approaches attempt to do philosphy by using terms and ideas from philosophy (eg ontology, (...) epistemology, methodology, transcendentals, pre-suppostions, assumptions etc). These are not uniquely philosophical terms but nowadays they are employed by all disciplines, articles, books etc (all these things have ontologies, epistemologies, do theorizing, etc). (shrink)

Returning to the famous prologue to the book Difference and Repetition, in which Gilles Deleuze points out that the time is approaching when it would not be possible to write a philosophy book as before, we will try to think about the deleuzian evocation of the need to adopt a new tone and new rules for the exercise philosophical. We believe that resuming this philosopher's appeal would launch us into the heart of deleuzian and deleuze-guattarian conception of philosophy as experimentation. (...) The author suggesting that a philosophical treatise should sound as much like a kind of detective novel as it does like science fiction. This excursion, we argue, would not only help us in the deleuzian and deleuzo-guattarian understanding of philosophy as experimentation, but would also make it possible to outline some clues about the role of the history of philosophy at the heart of this conception. (shrink)

Green and Shapiro's tour de force fails as a convincing critique of rational choice applications in political science because it locks itself into a statistical form of assessment. Rather than seeing the constructive side of rational choice theory, both as an engine of theoretical development and as a source of non?obvious empirical insights about politics, Green and Shapiro depart from the procedure in most sciences, comparing rational choice against an ideal rather than some concrete alternative. Finally, they fail to note (...) the recent emphasis on sophisticated empirical testing of rational choice hypotheses. (shrink)

Johann Gottfried Herder: Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit Edition Holzinger. Taschenbuch Berliner Ausgabe, 2013 Vollständiger, durchgesehener Neusatz mit einer Biographie des Autors bearbeitet und eingerichtet von Michael Holzinger Erstdruck: Erstdruck: o.O. 1774 (anonym). Textgrundlage ist die Ausgabe: Sturm und Drang. Weltanschauliche und ästhetische Schriften. Herausgegeben von Peter Müller, Band 1-2, Berlin und Weimar: Aufbau, 1978. Herausgeber der Reihe: Michael Holzinger Reihengestaltung: Viktor Harvion Umschlaggestaltung unter Verwendung des Bildes: Johann Gottfried Herder (Gemälde von Anton Graff, 1785).

Frohlich and Oppenheimer's works aim to study empirically Rawls' philosophy. They replicate the original position, using a veil of ignorance covering the subjects' deliberations. This should provide empirical data usable by philosophers, a claim discussed here: Rawls' foundationalism precludes a genuine opening of his philosophy to empirical data. On the other hand, Rawls' distinction between natural and moral justice attitudes sheds light on the deterministic metaphysics indirectly required by the Rawlsian sense of justice. This leads to the question of the (...) empirical feasibility of the theory: is doing without preinstitutional meritocratic attitudes humanly possible? Studies investigating the influence of socialization on causal attribution suggest that the feeling of free will is not a fundamental need of the human mind. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

This book contributes to the 'rehabilitation' of Plutarch as a philosopher by focusing on an important aspect of his philosophical self: his work as a teacher, interpreter, and, eventually, historian of philosophy.

A study is made of the general principles and theories pertaining to evolution, among which the definition, the evidences, the philosophical roots (the origin of life, the scale of nature, the morphogenetic potentialities), the three models (the Lamarckian, the Darwinistic and an alterative), and a further development of the last-mentioned model.