DeGrazia argues that post-persons have as much justification in believing that they have higher moral status than persons as persons have in believing that they have higher moral status than animals. DeGrazia's claim presupposes that what Buchanan calls the “moral equality assumption” is false. This article argues that DeGrazia has given us no reason to disbelieve the moral equality assumption. Further, even if DeGrazia's arguments about moral status were sound, it is unclear that his first-order normative claims about how we (...) should weigh human against animal interests would follow. (shrink)

Nicholas Agar argues that it is possible, and even likely, that radically enhanced human beings will turn out to be ‘post-persons’, that is, beings with a moral status higher than that of mere persons such as us.1 This would mean that they will be morally justified in sacrificing our lives and well-being not merely in cases of emergency, but also in cases of ‘supreme opportunities’ , that is, whenever such a sacrifice leads to ‘significant benefits for post-persons’. For this reason, (...) Agar believes, it would be morally wrong to allow any cognitive enhancement of people that might entail the risk of moral status enhancement.However, neither are there sufficient grounds to expect radically enhanced human beings to have a higher moral status than unenhanced human beings, nor would it, even if they did, be morally wrong to bring about their existence. We use moral status ascriptions mostly as a convenient shorthand to indicate a difference in capacities that strikes us as morally relevant. Rocks have zero moral status because they cannot feel or think, so we cannot hurt or kill them. Whatever we do to them, it does not affect them. Animals, on the other hand, …. (shrink)

The prospect of cognitive enhancement well beyond current human capacities raises worries that the fundamental equality in moral status of human beings could be undermined. Cognitive enhancement might create beings with moral status higher than persons. Yet, there is an expressibility problem of spelling out what the higher threshold in cognitive capacity would be like. Nicholas Agar has put forward the bold claim that we can show by means of inductive reasoning that indefinite cognitive enhancement will probably mark a difference (...) in moral status. The hope is that induction can determine the plausibility of post‐personhood existence in the absence of an account of what the higher status would be like. In this article, we argue that Agar's argument fails and, more generally, that inductive reasoning has little bearing on assessing the likelihood of post‐personhood in the absence of an account of higher status. We conclude that induction cannot bypass the expressibility problem about post‐persons. (shrink)

I want to thank all of those who have commented on my article in the Journal of Medical Ethics.1 The commentaries address a wide cross-section of the issues raised in my article. I have organised my responses thematically.The state of playAllen Buchanan's scepticism2 about moral statuses higher than personhood derives, in part, from our apparent inability to describe them. We seem to have little difficulty in imagining what it might be to have scientific understanding far beyond that of any human (...) scientist. By contrast, it is exceedingly difficult to describe moral statuses superior to that of any person. Boosting cognitive capacities seems to result in cognitively superior persons—not post-persons . I offer an explanation of our moral myopia.2 We are necessarily clueless in respect of moral statuses superior to our own. If mice understood practical reasons sufficiently well to truly understand why persons have a moral status superior to their own then they would be capable of the feats of practical reason constitutive of personhood—they would be persons. Our cluelessness about post-persons is compatible both with their possible existence and with their necessary non-existence. I propose an inductive argument for the existence of statuses superior to personhood. The observed existence of many moral statuses up to and including persons provides moderately strong inductive support for the possibility of post-persons.Who do we trust to make decisions about higher moral statuses?What precisely does the inductive argument predict? If my diagnosis of our moral myopia about post-personhood is correct, then mere persons cannot really understand what properties of post-persons give them a superior status. They will be able to infer their existence indirectly by an appeal to the predicted judgments of beings who lack our cognitive limitations. Wasserman3 questions my suggestion that we should defer to the sincere moral judgments of …. (shrink)

I shall discuss only one of Nicholas Agar's main claims,1 namely ‘that the bad consequences/of moral status enhancement/are, in moral terms, so bad that a moderate probability of their occurrence makes it wrong not to seek to prevent them’. His other main claim, which I grant, is that moral status enhancement to the effect of creating beings with a moral status higher than that of persons—post-persons—is possible. My chief objection to Agar's argument is that it is biased in favour of (...) persons. This comes out when he sums it up: ‘the creation of post-persons would be a morally bad thing. It is likely to impose significant penalties on mere persons’. Suppose it is true that the creation of post-persons will impose such significant penalties on mere persons that they are worse off than they were before the creation of post-persons. Then it follows that the creation of post-persons is bad for mere persons, but it does not follow that it is bad overall. This follows only if it is not the case that post-persons receive benefits to an extent that morally outweighs the burdens to mere persons. As far as I can see, Agar does not show this—that is why I think he is biased towards mere persons, and simply assumes that what is bad for them is bad overall.I have, in fact, been too concessive to Agar …. (shrink)

Many prominent bioethicists have recently raised the question of the possibility of moral status enhancement. In this paper I discuss the arguments advanced by Nicholas Agar for the possible existence of the postpersons. I argue that in spite of the many limitations and shortcomings of Agar’s account, there are no conclusive reasons to rule out the possibility of moral status enhancement. However, if post-persons are as they are described by Agar, the fact of their possibility is less interesting and ethically (...) relevant than it might seem. Most importantly, the account of post-persons given by Agar is rather an outcome of some implausible assumptions. I propose that Agar conflates the ethical with the scientific and dismisses the importance of phenomenology in framing our ethical outlook. Also, he seems to follow the assumption made by many utilitarian ethicists that such features as sentience and cognitive capacities have some universal relevance. This accounts for the delusion that we can view our moral attitudes from the point of view of the Universe. (shrink)

Responding to several leading ideas from a paper by Allen Buchanan, the present essay explores the implications of genetic enhancement for moral status. Contrary to doubts expressed by Buchanan, I argue that genetic enhancement could lead to the existence of beings so superior to contemporary human beings that we might aptly describe them as post-persons. If such post-persons emerged, how should we understand their moral status in relation to ours? The answer depends in part on which of two general models (...) of moral status—one based on respect and one based on interests—is more adequate. Buchanan tentatively argues that a respect-based model is preferable. I challenge Buchanan's view, along these lines: If we embrace a respect-based model of moral status featuring a threshold that divides persons, who are thought to have full and equal moral status, from sentient nonpersons, thought to have less moral status, then we should acknowledge a second threshold and a level of moral status higher than ours. A better option, I tentatively suggest, is to drop the idea of levels of moral status, accept that all sentient beings have moral status, and allow that some differences in interests and capacities justify some significant differences in how we should treat beings of different kinds. (shrink)

Humans are morally deficient in a variety of ways. Some of these deficiencies threaten the continued existence of our species. For example, we appear to be incapable of responding to climate change in ways that are likely to prevent the consequent suffering. Some people are morally better than others, but we could all be better. The price of not becoming morally better is that when those events that threaten us occur, we will suffer from them. If we can prevent this (...) suffering from occurring, then we ought to do so. That we ought to make ourselves morally better in order to prevent very bad things from happening justifies, according to some, the development and administration of moral enhancement. I address in this paper the idea that moral enhancement could give rise to moral transhumans, or moral post-persons. Contrary to recent arguments that we shouldn’t engender moral post-persons, I argue that we should. Roughly, the reasons for this conclusion are that we can expect moral post-persons to resemble the morally best of us, our moral exemplars. Since moral exemplars promote their interests by promoting the interests of others (or they promote others’ interests at the expense of their own) we can expect moral post-persons to pursue our interests. Since we should also pursue our own interests, we should bring about moral post-persons. (shrink)

This article presents a set of moral arguments regarding the selective abortion of fetuses on the basis of prenatal screening for late onset genetic diseases only, and for Huntington's Disease* in particular. After discussion of human suffering, human perfection and the distinctive features of the lives of people confronting late onset genetic disease, the author concludes that selective abortion is difficult to justify ethically, although it must remain a matter of personal choice.

The willingness of some scientists, futurists … and now philosophers to contemplate—or even actively pursue—their own obsolescence is a source of genuine wonder. Writers such as Hans Moravec,1 Ray Kurzweil2 and Nick Bostrom3 blithely maintain that we will soon be outclassed by our own cybernetic creations as though this were a prospect that could only be celebrated and not feared. In this context, one can only applaud Agar's clearheaded investigation4 of the prospects for creating ‘post-persons’ and his eminently sensible conclusion (...) that there might be good reasons to avoid doing so. His discussion of the significance of the difference between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ thresholds in moral status and his inductive argument to the existence of higher levels of moral status than humans currently possess constitute significant advances in the philosophical literature on this topic. In these largely sympathetic remarks I will, however, argue both that post-persons are more easily conceived of than Agar suggests and that the threat posed by post-persons, should they eventuate, is greater than Agar allows.Agar's paper needs to be read in the context of Buchanan's discussion5 of the implications of post-personhood to which it is a response. Buchanan's discussion proceeds, for the most part, with reference to an essentially Kantian account of moral status as founded in the ability to engage in practical reasoning or practices of mutual accountability. Talk of ‘animals’, ‘persons’ …. (shrink)

Neuroenhancements have the potential to dramatically increase our intelligence, memory, motivation, and attention, to name a few ways such technology can benefit us. But can neuroenhancements increase our moral status as well? I argue in the affirmative. A higher moral status than personhood is both possible and likely given advancements in neuroenhancements. Some have argued that personhood is the highest moral status possible, so the notion of a post-person is conceptually confused. I respond by presenting an inductive argument with the (...) conclusion that a higher moral status than personhood is both possible and likely, given the potential of neuroenhancements. While making my argument I confront the inexpressibility problem, the claim that we cannot give an account of what a higher moral status than personhood would be like. I conclude the paper with an answer to the inexpressibility challenge, by suggesting an account of a higher moral status than personhood. (shrink)

Burnout among physicians, nurses, and students is a serious problem in U.S. healthcare that reflects inattentive management practices, outmoded images of the “good” provider as selflessly ignoring the care of the self, and an overarching rubric of Patient Centered Care that leaves professional self-care out of the equation. We ask herein if expanding PCC to Patient and Professional Centered Care would be a useful idea to make provider self-care an explicit part of mission statements, a major part of management strategies (...) and institutional goal setting, and of educational programs. We offer several practical suggestions for PPCC implementation, including structuring healthcare systems so as to nurture professional meaning, integrity, and inter-personal reflective emotional processing as a buffer against burnout and as a key to better patient care. It should not bring into question the primacy of practitioner commitment to the good of patients, nor should it be taken to suggest in any way a shift in focus away from patients’ values and respect for patient autonomy. PPCC asserts that the respect for patient’s values and autonomous choices properly remains the ethical benchmark of modern healthcare systems, along with altruistic professional commitment to the optimal care of patients. However, it enunciates an explicit commitment to structuring systems that allow for and actively encourage the professional well-being and wellness upon which good patient care depends. (shrink)

As medical technology becomes more sophisticate the ability to manipulate nature and manage disease forces the dilemma of when can becomes ought. Indeed, most bioethical discourse is framed in terms of balancing the values and interests and the benefits and burdens that inform principled decisions about how, when, and whether interventions should occur. Yet, despite advances in science and technology, one caregiver mandate remains as constant and compelling as it was for the earliest shaman—the relief of pain. Even when cure (...) is impossible, the physician's duty of care includes palliation. Moreover, the centrality of this obligation is both unquestioned and universal, transcending time and cultural boundaries.Although universally acknowledged, pain is a complex phenomenon for both the patient and the caregiver, influenced as much by personal values and cultural traditions as by physiological injury and disease. (shrink)

포스트인격의 출현은 ―지난 날 인간이 동물을 마구잡이로 학대해 온 사실을 상기해 볼때― 기존의 인간에게 큰 위협이 된다. 생명보수주의자들이 생명향상에 반대하는 이유도 이 때문이다. 그것은 다음과 같이 삼단논법으로 형식화된다.BR 전제 1. 인간의 심적 능력을 기술적으로 향상시키는 것은 포스트인격적인 도덕적 지위를 갖는 존재를 탄생시킬 수 있다.BR 전제 2. 포스트인격의 창조는 향상되지 못한 일상적 인간(human)에게 해악을 끼칠 것이다.BR 결 론. 따라서 우리는 현행 인류가 포스트인격을 만들어낼 인간적 향상을 촉구하지 말아야 할 충분한 도덕적 이유를 가지고 있다.BR 하지만 오늘날 첨단 과학기술은 - “과학의 발전에는 후진기어가 (...) 없다.”는 황우석의 말처럼 - 생명향상 반대 주장을 일거에 돌파해 버릴 것이다. 그렇게 되면 우리는 한 순간에 ‘도덕적 진공상태’에 빠지고 만다. 이러한 진공상태에서는 우리가 - 독일 나치 치하에서 보듯이 - 아무 일도 할 수 없다. 이러한 도덕적 진공상태에 빠지지 않기 위해 우리는 먼저 전제1의 ‘형성 조건’에 대한 심도 있는 숙고와 다음으로 전제2를 형성하는 ‘해악의 성격’에 대해 비판적으로 검토한다. 끝으로 포스트인격 출현의 도덕성을 음미함으로써, ‘단순한 인격’과 ‘포스트인격’ 간의 공존 가능성을 모색할 것이다. (shrink)

The author observes that Plato's Republic and Job have a common premise, namely the extremely unjust treatment of a just person to prove that the person is just, proceeding with a close comparative commentary on both works.

The contemporary philosophical debate on autonomy shows several interesting perspectives that emphasize the role of social contexts for developing this human capacity. There is a shift from the classical notion of “moral” autonomy to the wider notion of “personal autonomy”, and we underscore the “substantive view” that helps to provide arguments that support a plausible notion strictly connected with socialization and language use. In this article, we consider the source of autonomy that is represented by a communicative life-world in its (...) ordinary and extra-ordinary dimensions to discuss the role of personal autonomy in a post-secular society. Moreover, we propose to adopt a pragmatic account to describe the social role of the autonomous agent in discursive contexts. (shrink)

In this work the distinguished physical chemist and philosopher, Michael Polanyi, demonstrates that the scientist's personal participation in his knowledge, in both its discovery and its validation, is an indispensable part of science itself. Even in the exact sciences, "knowing" is an art, of which the skill of the knower, guided by his personal commitment and his passionate sense of increasing contact with reality, is a logically necessary part. In the biological and social sciences this becomes even more evident. The (...) tendency to make knowledge impersonal in our culture has split fact from value, science from humanity. Polanyi wishes to substitute for the objective, impersonal ideal of scientific detachment an alternative ideal which gives attention to the personal involvement of the knower in all acts of understanding. His book should help to restore science to its rightful place in an integrated culture, as part of the whole person's continuing endeavor to make sense of the totality of his experience. In honor of this work and his The Study of Man Polanyi was presented with the Lecomte de Noüy Award for 1959. (shrink)

Discipleship is a responsibility of the Church. It is an outlet in which the regeneration of Church leadership to the younger generation is conducted. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, discipleship and mentoring of youth leaders, especially key persons of GKII (Gereja Kemah Injil Indonesia) youth were provided by means of in-person activities. During the pandemic, digital media has been utilised for various church activities, including mentoring these key persons. Hence, this research intends to explore: (1) the method by which key persons (...) practise digital discipleship and (2) the benefits of digital media in youth discipleship to facilitate faith growth. This research is a qualitative research. Data were collected by means of interviews and observations on several key persons’ digital media accounts. The research shows that social media significantly benefits the discipleship process. It was found that digital discipleship was quite often carried out during the pandemic, especially in urban areas, with WhatsApp and Zoom meetings as its two primary means. However, it slightly declined along with the lifting of social gathering restrictions. The main themes explored in the mentoring sessions were discipleship, soteriology, spiritual life, motivational and digital media materials, and youth ministry in the digital era. The discipleship practice used was the NM-SM (Nurtured, Matured, Served, Mission) pattern.Contribution: The results of this research contribute to the development of knowledge, especially in the field of youth discipleship, and digital media-based discipleship. This research also shows that digital media has become an effective theological space during the pandemic and post-pandemic periods. (shrink)

The article develops the idea of forming postcapitalist social relations as a social revolution of an individual, which consists in the fact that popularity becomes a key advantage, the “possession” of which is a desired goal and a significant resource of political influence. At the same time, it is shown that this process leads to forming a new dominant stratum — personalities (“people with personality”): celebrities, popular bloggers, social media influencers, micro- and nanosignature. It is substantiated that the personaliat domination (...) is a consequence of contradictory social relations between the new aristocracy represented by the representatives of the personaliat and many people who do not “possess” a popular personality - the impersonaliat (“extra people”, “lower” precariat, those who turn out to be outsiders in the world of social platforms). This contradiction is associated with the rooting of a celebrity’s culture, which encourages a lot of people to fight for popularity and focus on finding advantageous differences from others in the process of self-realization. However, this struggle in the end for the overwhelming majority turns into an increase in creative competition and subtraction. Various new forms of subtraction that appear in situations of widespread self-realization are revealed. Accordingly, arguments are given in favor of the fact that in the context of the “personality revolution”, the truly left will be rather an alternative that will call into question the ways of solving social problems formulated by popular personalities. In other words, it will be possible to oppose the total pursuit of popularity with the projects of society, in which the person is relied not as someone who rises above the others, but as an involved person who values life in harmony with others higher than his own “I”. (shrink)

Can a materialist look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come? Dean Zimmerman’s Falling Elevator Model is a speculative account of how persons, understood as material beings, might survive in a post-mortem resurrected state—a just-so story. It assumes endurantism, the doctrine that persons and other ordinary objects are three-dimensional beings which are wholly present at every time they exist. I argue that neither endurantism, nor purdurantism, according to which persons are four-dimensional ‘worms’ who (...) have proper temporal parts at every time that they exist, provides a plausible account of personal survival. If you want to be a Christian materialist you should embrace exdurantism, the ‘stage theory’, according which persons are instantaneous stages and are not identical to their temporal successors either in this world or in any world to come. Exdurantism provides a plausible account of survival in ordinary cases and extraordinary cases of this-worldly fission, and of post-mortem survival. (shrink)

Its wisdom and sensitivity make Personal Knowledge required reading for epistemologists. By stressing the active components in scientific knowing--appraisal and commitment--Polanyi shows that knowledge is less "objective," more complex, and more widely distributed in nature than is tacitly supposed by most epistemologies. Knowing implies a foundation in skills, a confidence in one's ability to judge beyond the range of well-formulated rules, and a commitment to the existence of an answer to one's questions before the answer is in sight. Like a (...) Platonic dialogue, this book conveys more than it states, and the broad foundation of insight embodied in the examples would support more conceptual superstructure than Polanyi provides. But that serves to make it an instance of its thesis--that we know more than we can now say.--R. F. T. (shrink)

Derived from Ruth Williams' more than 40-year immersion in spiritual practice, as well as her clinical experience as a Jungian analyst, this thought-provoking volume explores the nature of spiritual paths and trajectories in practical ways, incorporating personal anecdote and ground-breaking academic research and providing a window into how Jungian practitioners work with soul and spirit. Williams explores the nature of being a human using the Yiddish idea of a person being a 'mensch,' which means being a decent human being, having (...) humanity and living ethically with integrity. The idea of 'grace' is the thread that runs through the book-the mystery that binds things together and makes life meaningful, purposeful, potentially joyful and spiritually fulfilling. Williams sees 'grace' as being that which underpins and lies behind synchronicity and divinatory practices and as a force by which we can learn to be guided. Rooted in clinical work, Exploring Spirituality from a Post-Jungian Perspective is fascinating reading for Jungian analysts, therapists and academics, as well as for general readers interested in a spiritual journey, both personally and for clinical purposes. (shrink)

What is post-normal science? What are the reasons for, and consequences of, encountering it in one’s professional life? Here I share my own experience of readings, practices and discussions with the fathers, supporters and detractors of PNS. After a short description of PNS and of my own experience with it, I review some common criticism levelled to PNS from different authors and conclude reflecting on how PNS—difficult to explain and translate into formulae or checklists—provides its practitioners with useful keys to (...) open relevant doors to understanding, and might be especially suited to face the present intersecting crises befalling the use of science for policy. (shrink)

The publication of Personal Knowledge in 1958 shook the science world, as Michael Polanyi took aim at the long-standing ideals of rigid empiricism and rule-bound logic. Today, Personal Knowledge remains one of the most significant philosophy of science books of the twentieth century, bringing the crucial concepts of “tacit knowledge” and “personal knowledge” to the forefront of inquiry. In this remarkable treatise, Polanyi attests that our personal experiences and ways of sharing knowledge have a profound effect on scientific discovery. He (...) argues against the idea of the wholly dispassionate researcher, pointing out that even in the strictest of sciences, knowing is still an art, and that personal commitment and passion are logically necessary parts of research. In our technological age where fact is split from value and science from humanity, Polanyi’s work continues to advocate for the innate curiosity and scientific leaps of faith that drive our most dazzling ingenuity. For this expanded edition, Polyani scholar Mary Jo Nye set the philosopher-scientist’s work into contemporary context, offering fresh insights and providing a helpful guide to critical terms in the work. Used in fields as diverse as religious studies, chemistry, economics, and anthropology, Polanyi’s view of knowledge creation is just as relevant to intellectual endeavors today as when it first made waves more than fifty years ago. (shrink)

Trade secret theft is a problem that almost all organizations face. The greatest threat is employee mobility and potential unethical post-employment behavior. This study investigates the role of individual personality traits in judgments about trade secret misappropriation. Our hypotheses were tested in three studies addressing three different situational contexts: current employees, employees about to be laid off, and students who had quit their job. Relationships were estimated with robust regression. The results show that some personality traits predict judgment about another (...) person's trade secret misappropriation, and that the situational context in which individuals formulate their ethical judgment moderates the impact of personality traits on ethical judgment. (shrink)

Background and Objective: Understanding how trauma impacts the self-structure of individuals suffering from the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms is a complex matter and despite several attempts to explain the relationship between trauma and the “Self”, this issue still lacks clarity. Therefore, adopting a new theoretical perspective may help understand PTSD deeper and to shed light on the underlying psychophysiological mechanisms. Methods: In this study, we employed the “three-dimensional construct model of the experiential selfhood” where three major components of selfhood (...) (phenomenal first-person agency, embodiment, and reflection/narration) are related to three Operational Modules (OMs) of the self-referential brain network. These modules can be reliably estimated through operational synchrony analysis of the Electroencephalogram (EEG). Six individuals with PTSD symptoms and twenty-nine sex-, age- and demographic- (race, education, marital status) matched healthy controls underwent resting state EEG signal acquisition with the following estimation of the synchrony strength within every OM. Results: Our results indicate that subjects with PTSD symptoms had significantly stronger EEG operational synchrony within anterior and right posterior OMs as well as significantly weaker EEG operational synchrony within left posterior OM compared to healthy controls. Moreover, increased the functional integrity of the anterior OM was positively associated with hyperactivity symptoms, reduced synchrony of the left posterior OM was associated with greater avoidance, and increased right posterior OM integrity was positively correlated with intrusion and mood symptoms. Conclusion: The results are interpreted in light of the triad model of selfhood and its theoretical and clinical implications (including a new treatment approach) are discussed. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic forced us to reconsider our interactions with the world around us, shifting how we navigate public and private spaces every day. Most people in the United States previously thought nothing of touching railings or doorknobs, going to school or work while ill, or attending crowded events. Along with new health interventions and institutional practices, daily behaviors aimed at infection control, such as routine hand washing and wearing face masks when symptomatic, protected our communities from COVID-19. Many new (...) interventions and practices are here to stay, but it is unclear which personal behaviors to protect against COVID-19 and other infectious diseases we should continue. Intuitively plausible ethical arguments support individuals taking reasonable measures to avoid causing or propagating harm to other members of the community. As such, by failing to adopt easily implementable preventive behaviors, we live ethically suboptimal lives and violate our social contract to one another. As the world transitions from epidemic to endemic COVID-19, applying the lessons learned from the pandemic is crucial to mitigating old and new infectious disease threats. Along with the role of public health agencies to organize and communicate about communicable diseases, clinicians and public health workers have critical roles in establishing social norms for behaviors that prevent the spread of infectious diseases, given their professional responsibilities and statuses as trusted authority figures. (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to represent Zygmunt Bauman's formulation of personal identity and to present its cultural weight today. Bauman defines a post-modern personal identity as opposed to the modern personal identity. These conceptions of identity express views of man and the world held in two different periods—modernity and postmodernity. In modernity man is perceived as a being who in accordance with his "volitions" and "ideas" creates (and controls) the world and himself. In post-modernity man is seen as (...) a being who in the face of the defeat of the modern project refuses to create himself, in other words refuses to create his personal identity. This paper presents the poor structural integration of personal identity in the context of its creation. The author of this paper perceives philosophical considerations relating to personal identity as parallel to philosophical investigations relating to the nature of truth. (shrink)

The dual aim of this article is to show both how Heidegger’s existential philosophy enriches post-Cartesian psychoanalysis and how post-Cartesian psychoanalysis enriches Heidegger’s existential philosophy. Characterized as a phenomenological contextualism, post-Cartesian psychoanalysis finds philosophical grounding in Heidegger’s ontological contextualism, condensed in his term for the human kind of Being, Being-in-the-world. Specifically, Heidegger provides philosophical support (a) for a theoretical and clinical shift from mind to world, from the intrapsychic to the intersubjective; (b) for a shift from the motivational primacy of (...) drives originating in the interior of a Cartesian isolated mind to the motivational primacy of relationally constituted affective experience; and (c) for contextualizing and grasping the existential significance of emotional trauma, which plunges us into a form of Being-toward-death. Post-Cartesian psychoanalysis, in turn, (a) relationalizes Heidegger’s conception of finitude, (b) expands Heidegger’s conception of relationality, and (c) explores some ethical implications of our kinship-in-finitude. (shrink)