There have been many attempts to determine what makes a natural kind real, chief among them is the criterion according to which natural kinds must be mind-independent. But it is difficult to specify this criterion: many supposed natural kinds have an element of mind-dependence. I will argue that the mind-independence criterion is nevertheless a good one, if correctly understood: the mind-independence criterion concerns the unification principles for natural kinds. Unification principles determine how natural kinds unify their properties, and (...) only those natural kinds that have a mind-independent unification principle should be considered real. (shrink)

In this paper, the independence of irrelevant alternatives and the Pareto principle are simultaneously weakened in the Arrovian framework of social choice. Moreover, we also relax transitivity of social preferences. We show that impossibility remains under weaker versions of Arrow’s original conditions. Our results complement the recent work by Coban and Sanver (Soc Choice Welf 43(4):953–961, 2014).

In this paper, the author analyzes critically some of the ideas found in Karel Lambert's recent book, Meinong and the Principle of Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Lambert attempts to forge a link between the ideas of Meinong and the free logicians. The link comes in the form of a principle which, Lambert says, these philosophers adopt, namely, Mally's Principle of Independence, which Mally himself later abandoned. Instead of following Mally and attempting to formulate (...) the principle in the material mode as the claim that an object can have properties without having any sort of being, Lambert formulates the principle in the formal mode, as (something equivalent to) the rejection of the traditional constraint on the principle of predication. The principle of predication is that a formula of the form Fa' is true iff the general term F' is true of the object denoted by the object term a'. The traditional constraint on this predication principle is that for the sentence Fa' to be true, not only must the object term have a denotation, but it must also denote an object that has being. According to Lambert, the free logicians violate this constraint by suggesting that Fa' can be true even if the object term has no denotation, whereas Meinong violates this constraint by proposing Fa' can be true even when the object term denotes an object that has no being. Lambert then tries to `vindicate' the Principle of Independence, thereby justifying both the work of the free logicians and Meinong. (shrink)

The paper argues that renormalization in quantum field theory was not a radically new - and possibly ad hoc - technique to save a badly flawed theory, but rather the culmination of a methodological strategy that physicists had been applying for a long time. The strategy was to obtain reliable results from unreliable theories by making the derivation of the results independent of possible future modifications of the theory. Examples of this practice include Bohr's use of the Correspondence Principle (...) and Heisenberg's S-matrix theory. (shrink)

In a recent book, K. Lambert argues that philosophers should adopt Mally's Principle of Independence (the principle that an object can have properties even though it lacks being of any kind) by abandoning a constraint on true predications, namely, that all of the singular terms in a true predication denote objects which have being. The constraint may be abandoned either by supposing there is a true predication in which one of the terms denotes a beingless object (Meinong) (...) or by supposing there is a true predication in which one of the terms denotes nothing at all (free logic). However, Lambert's conclusions can be undermined by showing that the data he produces in support of his position can be explained by either of two recent theories of abstract and nonexistent objects, both of which are couched in languages which conform to the traditional constraint. (shrink)

We often get evidence that bears on the reliability of some of our own first-order reasoning. The rational response to such “higher-order” evidence would seem to depend on a rational assessment of how reliable we can expect that reasoning to be, in light of the higher-order evidence. “Independence” principles are intended to constrain this reliability-assessment, so as to prevent question-begging reliance on the very reasoning being assessed. However, extant formulations of Independence principles tend to be vague or ambiguous, (...) and coming up with a tolerably precise formulation turns out to be tricky. This paper aims to make some progress toward developing a more precise Independence principle, and also to highlight some of the difficulties the project entails. The hope is to take a step toward understanding how rational belief is informed by evidence bearing on agents’ cognitive reliability. (shrink)

Critical examination of Alchourrón and Bulygin’s set-theoretic definition of normative system shows that deductive closure is not an inevitable property. Following von Wright’s conjecture that axioms of standard deontic logic describe perfection-properties of a norm-set, a translation algorithm from the modal to the set-theoretic language is introduced. The translations reveal that the plausibility of metanormative principles rests on different grounds. Using a methodological approach that distinguishes the actor roles in a norm governed interaction, it has been shown that metanormative principles (...) are directed second-order obligations and, in particular, that the requirement related to deductive closure is directed to the norm-applier role rather than to the norm-giver role. The approach has been applied to the case of pure derogation yielding a new result, namely, that an independence property is a perfection-property of a norm-set in view of possible derogation. This paper in a polemical way touches upon several points raised by Kristan in his recent paper. (shrink)

The modern state of the Pauli exclusion principle studies is discussed. The Pauli exclusion principle can be considered from two viewpoints. On the one hand, it asserts that particles with half-integer spin (fermions) are described by antisymmetric wave functions, and particles with integer spin (bosons) are described by symmetric wave functions. This is a so-called spin-statistics connection. The reasons why the spin-statistics connection exists are still unknown, see discussion in text. On the other hand, according to the Pauli (...) exclusion principle, the permutation symmetry of the total wave functions can be only of two types: symmetric or antisymmetric, all other types of permutation symmetry are forbidden; although the solutions of the Schrödinger equation may belong to any representation of the permutation group, including the multi-dimensional ones. It is demonstrated that the proofs of the Pauli exclusion principle in some textbooks on quantum mechanics are incorrect and, in general, the indistinguishability principle is insensitive to the permutation symmetry of the wave function and cannot be used as a criterion for the verification of the Pauli exclusion principle. Heuristic arguments are given in favor that the existence in nature only the one-dimensional permutation representations (symmetric and antisymmetric) are not accidental. As follows from the analysis of possible scenarios, the permission of multi-dimensional representations of the permutation group leads to contradictions with the concept of particle identity and their independence. Thus, the prohibition of the degenerate permutation states by the Pauli exclusion principle follows from the general physical assumptions underlying quantum theory. (shrink)

Bilateralism is a theory of meaning according to which assertion and denial are independent speech acts. Bilateralism also proposes two coordination principles for assertion and denial. I argue that if assertion and denial are independent speech acts, they cannot be coordinated by the bilateralist principles.

In this paper, I consider particular attempts by E. J. Lowe and Michael Gorman at providing an independence criterion of substancehood and argue that the stipulative exclusion of non-particulars and proper parts (or constituents) from such accounts raises difficult issues for their proponents. The results of the present discussion seem to indicate that, at least for the case of composite entities, a unity criterion of substancehood might have at least as much, and perhaps more, to offer than an (...) class='Hi'>independence criterion and therefore ought to be explored further by neo-Aristotelians in search of a defensible notion of substancehood. I indicated briefly how such a unity criterion might be used by neo-Aristotelians to support the inclusion of hylomorphic compounds in the category of substance, given the traditional role of form as the principle of unity within the compound. (shrink)

To infer the state of a cause from the states of its effects, independent lines of evidence are preferable to dependent ones. This familiar idea is here investigated, the goal being to identify its presuppositions. Connections are drawn with Reichenbach's (1956) and Salmon's (1984) discussions of the principle of the common cause.

Goncharov and Peretyat'kin independently gave necessary and sufficient conditions for when a set of types of a complete theory is the type spectrum of some homogeneous model of. Their result can be stated as a principle of second order arithmetic, which is called the Homogeneous Model Theorem (HMT), and analyzed from the points of view of computability theory and reverse mathematics. Previous computability theoretic results by Lange suggested a close connection between HMT and the Atomic Model Theorem (AMT), which (...) states that every complete atomic theory has an atomic model. The authors show that HMT and AMT are indeed equivalent in the sense of reverse mathematics, as well as in a strong computability theoretic sense and do the same for an analogous result of Peretyat'kin giving necessary and sufficient conditions for when a set of types is the type spectrum of some model. (shrink)

If it is certain that performing an observation to determine whether P is true will in no way influence whether P is tme, then the proposition that the observation is performed ought to be probabilistically independent of P. Applying the notion of "observation" liberally, so that a wide variety of actions are treated as observations, this proposed new principle of belief revision yields the result that simple utihty maximization gives the correct solution to the Fisher smoking paradox and the (...) two-box solution to Newcomb's paradox. Contrary intuitions are explained as arising from mistakenly treating subjective probability as a measure of the intensity of conscious assent, whereas it ought to be regarded as measuring dispositions to action. (shrink)

Specific moral facts seem to be grounded in relevant natural facts, together with relevant moral principles. This picture—according to which moral principles play a role in grounding specific moral facts—is a very natural one, and it may be especially attractive to non-naturalist, robust realists. A recent challenge from Selim Berker threatens this picture, though. Moral principles themselves seem to incorporate grounding claims, and it’s not clear that this can be reconciled with according the principles a grounding role. This chapter responds (...) to Berker’s Challenge, utilizing a grounding pluralism. In particular, it argues that distinguishing between normative and metaphysical grounding is the key to saving the natural picture. It also shows how such a distinction is one that you have a reason to endorse independently of this challenge, as it does important work elsewhere in moral philosophy. (shrink)

Prioritization in public health has long been contentious, which necessitates ethical discussions. Despite efforts to develop frameworks that address these considerations, universally accepted models remain elusive, leaving decision-makers to manage independently. This study explores the previously underexplored topic of ethical principles guiding prioritization within different domains of health promotion and prevention at a local level. Interviews with decision-makers (n = 21) from Danish municipalities were analyzed thematically to uncover ethical dimensions of local prioritization of public health services. The study showed (...) that when confronted with resource constraints, decision-makers tended to prioritize preventive services for patients, often at the expense of broader health promotional initiatives. This decision appears rooted in ethical principles of assisting individuals who are deemed to be in the most immediate need. Analyzed against principles of justice and the broader literature on prioritization, the results reflect a prioritization common in the hospital sector: the principle of need. This contrasts with broader societal discussions of public health that are often based on principles of maximization of health benefits and equity. The study highlights the importance of weighing diverse ethical principles when prioritizing among and within initiatives and of considering the purpose of different domains of prevention and health promotion. (shrink)

Rawls in his later philosophy claims that it is sufficient to accept political conception as true or right, depending on what one's worldview allows, on the basis of whatever reasons one can muster, given one's worldview (doctrine). What political liberalism is interested in is a practical agreement on the political conception and not in our reasons for accepting it. There are deep issues (regarding deep values, purpose of life, metaphysics etc.) which cannot be resolved through invoking common reasons (this is (...) the fact of free reason itself), and trying to resolve them would involve us in interminable debates and would hamper the practical task of agreement on the political conception. Given the absolute necessity of a political society which is stable and enduring, it is thus wise to avoid these issues in founding a political society and choosing its basic principles - this is the pragmatic part of Rawls's position. In this paper I argue that this strategy leads Rawls into a paradox: (i) although the intention is to stay independent of comprehensive doctrines, the political conception is in fact totally (and precariously) dependent on comprehensive doctrines (not just on one doctrine but on each and every major doctrine in society). It is dependent on them: for its conceptualisation as an independent idea, for its justification, for the check of its reasonability in relation to the external world, for the formation of identities and value inculcation and hence for the formation of its model citizen; (ii) the very search for independence makes the political conception more dependent on comprehensive doctrines, and by extension makes it potentially more prone to intervention in and tampering with comprehensive doctrines (it is enough to show that it is a strong conceptual possibility to cast doubt on the whole strategy). Thus, for example, the political conception relies on the hope that “firmly held convictions gradually change” and that it would “in fact . . . have the capacity to shape those doctrines toward itself”. The purpose of the Rawlsian conjecture is to give these “hopes” a concrete, practical form by giving advice to proponents of the comprehensive doctrine on how they can do all this and “try to show them that, despite what they might think, they can still endorse a reasonable political conception”. I further argue that this paradox can be overcome by making the core of political liberalism more flexible. (shrink)

New musicology's rejection of formalist precepts eclipses how the subjectivization of aesthetics institutes the schema of music's opposition to reality. Social Werktreue—fidelity to the work and to the faithful reproduction of an original intent—replaces ideals of aesthetic transcendence with analyses of a work's socially constructed meaning. Hence, absolute music's social demystification positions music criticism within a system of oppositions ratified by bourgeois culture. The power individual works exercise in contesting reality deconstructs formalist dogma and social Werktreue. The temporality evinced when (...) works address us in new situations attests to the work's independent afterlife. By confronting formalist criticism and social critique with the schema Kant initiated when he legitimated aesthetic judgment's transcendental function, this independent afterlife argues against transposing the principle of interpretive fidelity onto the social plane. Works reveal dimensions of experience in the midst of existing social and historical conditions, thereby opening new horizons for music criticism. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Two Dichotomies The Existential Mind‐Independence of Moral Principles The Strong Observational Mind‐Independence of Moral Principles Appendix.

Recent calls have been made to move professional standards to a more principles-based perspective, supposing that emphasizing broad principles would eliminate the legalistic focus that rules may encourage, and accountants’ behavior would be more ethical and uniformly so. However, this supposition has yet to be empirically tested. The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct (Code) provides guidance in both forms: principles and rules. This experiment examines how the form of the Code affects independence judgments in a client acceptance context. We (...) also examine the potential for levels of moral development to influence the effectiveness of the Code.We find that subjects are more likely to consider their independence impaired, and are more likely to reject a questionable audit engagement, when rules-based (principles-based) reasoners are provided with Code rules (principles). Given the popularity of the view that rules-based standards are undesirable, these findings have significant implications for the profession as principles-based ethical standards are discussed. (shrink)

We define an order independent version of default unification on typed feature structures. The operation is one where default information in a feature structure typed with a more specific type, will override default information in a feature structure typed with a more general type, where specificity is defined by the subtyping relation in the type hierarchy. The operation is also able to handle feature structures where reentrancies are default. We provide a formal semantics, prove order independence and demonstrate the (...) utility of this version of default unification in several linguistic applications. First, we show how it can be used to define multiple orthogonal default inheritance in the lexicon in a fully declarative fashion. Secondly, we show how default lexical specifications (introduced via default lexical inheritance) can be made to usefully persist beyond the lexicon and interact with syntagmatic rules. Finally, we outline how persistent default unification might underpin default feature propagation principles and a more restrictive and constraint-based approach to lexical rules. (shrink)

Independence as a professional virtue is included amongst the core ethical principles governing lawyers yet its precise meaning remains elusive. This article aims to examine the meaning of lawyer independence in criminal proceedings by taking as its focus the situation of criminal defence lawyers in China. The problem of lack of independence from the state is analysed against the backdrop of historical examples of extreme denial of independence such as Germany under National Socialism, South Africa under (...) apartheid and the Soviet Union. The associated issue of independence from the client is then addressed with a view to assessing where the balance of relative independence should lie. It is suggested that excessive dependence on the state, as it is experienced in China, may have the effect either of driving criminal defence lawyers towards exactly the type of human rights advocacy that the state has taken action to suppress, or of chasing them away from a career in criminal law at a time when change is underway and experienced criminal defence lawyers are most needed. The balance is therefore upset on many levels and restoring independence so as to allow lawyers the professional freedom to fulfil their role may ultimately be in the interests both of the state and lawyers working in the area of criminal justice. (shrink)

Is logic normative for belief? A standard approach to answering this question has been to investigate bridge principles relating claims of logical consequence to norms for belief. Although the question is naturally an epistemic one, bridge principles have typically been investigated in isolation from epistemic debates over the correct norms for belief. In this paper we tackle the question of whether logic is normative for belief by proposing a Kripkean model theory accounting for the interaction between logical, doxastic, epistemic and (...) deontic notions and using this model theory to show which bridge principles are implied by epistemic norms that we have independent reason to accept, for example, the knowledge norm and the truth norm. We propose a preliminary theory of the interaction between logical, doxastic, epistemic and deontic notions that has among its commitments bridge principles expressing how logic is normative for belief. We also show how our framework suggests that logic is exceptionally normative. (shrink)

Summary Gestalt Theoretical Psychotherapy, in the broader sense of the term, has developed in various forms on both sides of the Atlantic since the 1920s. Gestalt Theoretical Psychotherapy, in the narrower sense of the term, came into being in the second half of the 1970s in German-speaking countries. In Austria, it is a state-approved, independent scientific psychotherapy method since 1995, and an integrative psychotherapeutic approach based on the Gestalt theory of the Berlin School. With reference to this comprehensive, consistent, scientific (...) theory, this article presents the basic concepts of therapeutic practice in the field of Gestalt psychotherapy. Starting from the overarching whole to the parts, the paper first examines the concept of therapeutic relationship and therapeutic attitude, and then describes the basic principles of the practical design of the therapeutic process. (shrink)

In a definition (∀ x )(( x є r )↔D[ x ]) of the set r, the definiens D[ x ] must not depend on the definiendum r . This implies that all quantifiers in D[ x ] are independent of r and of (∀ x ). This cannot be implemented in the traditional first-order logic, but can be expressed in IF logic. Violations of such independence requirements are what created the typical paradoxes of set theory. Poincaré’s Vicious Circle (...) Principle was intended to bar such violations. Russell nevertheless misunderstood the principle; for him a set a can depend on another set b only if ( b є a ) or ( b ⊆ a ). Likewise, the truth of an ordinary first-order sentence with the Gödel number of r is undefinable in Tarki’s sense because the quantifiers of the definiens depend unavoidably on r. (shrink)

A New Route to the Necessity of Origin’ (2004, henceforth ‘NR’), we offered an argument for the thesis that there are necessary connections between material things and their material origins. Much of the philosophical interest lay in our claim that the argument did not depend on so-called sufficiency principles for crossworld identity. It has been the verdict of much recent work on the necessity of origin that valid arguments for the thesis require some such sufficiency principle as a premise (...) but that such principles are deeply problematic.1 Finding an argument free of such principles would advance both our understanding and the plausibility of that thesis. These claims are now the subject of a pair of insightful critiques by Teresa Robertson and Graeme Forbes (2006, henceforth ‘RF’) and by Ross Cameron and Sonia Roca (2006, henceforth ‘CR’), and we welcome the opportunity to clarify and improve our account of the matter. (shrink)

It is well known that the validity of Choice Principles is problematic in non-standard Set Theories which do not abide by the Limitation of Size Principle. In this paper we discuss the consistency of various Choice Principles with respect to the Generalized Positive Comprehension Principle . The Principle GPC allows to take as sets those classes which can be specified by Generalized Positive Formulae, e.g. the universe. In particular we give a complete characterization of which choice principles (...) hold in Hyperuniverses. Hyperuniverses are structures which arose independently in Non-well-founded Set Theory and in Mathematical Semantics of Concurrent Programming Languages and are hitherto the only existing models of GPC. Hyperuniverses are naturally endowed with a κ-compact uniform κ-topology and are uniformly isomorphic to their exponential space, i.e. the space of their closed subsets endowed with the Exponential Uniformity. (shrink)

The Sure-Thing Principle famously appears in Savage’s axiomatization of Subjective Expected Utility. Yet Savage introduces it only as an informal, overarching dominance condition motivating his separability postulate P2 and his state-independence postulate P3. Once these axioms are introduced, by and large, he does not discuss the principle any more. In this note, we pick up the analysis of the Sure-Thing Principle where Savage left it. In particular, we show that each of P2 and P3 is equivalent (...) to a dominance condition; that they strengthen in different directions a common, basic dominance axiom; and that they can be explicitly combined in a unified dominance condition that is a candidate formal statement for the Sure-Thing Principle. Based on elementary proofs, our results shed light on some of the most fundamental properties of rational choice under uncertainty. In particular they imply, as corollaries, potential simplifications for Savage’s and the Anscombe- Aumann axiomatizations of Subjective Expected Utility. Most surprisingly perhaps, they reveal that in Savage’s axiomatization, P3 can be weakened to a natural strengthening of so-called Obvious Dominance. (shrink)

I argue that hanink's account of the principle of double effect ("some light on double effect," "analysis", volume 35, number 5) is inadequate, and rests on the mistaken assumption that the criteria for distinguishing acts from each other, intention from foresight, acting from refraining, can be specified independently of any moral perspective. i try to indicate the way to a better understanding of these distinctions, and the essential features of the kind of absolutist morality which invokes them--its concern with (...) "agency", with "transcendent values", and with "limits" on human action. i illustrate these points by a brief discussion of suicide. (shrink)

DAVID WARD, in his interesting essay, advances a number of propositions: -/- That moral (including evil) behavior must be governed by a principle. That the principles involved in evil actions are unconscious. That these unconscious evil principles may be the product of malignant narcissism. And somewhat tentatively, that evil is driven "independent of any conscious desires" and by implication the evil person may be stripped of moral responsibility for their behavior. -/- To begin with common ground: Those who act (...) in an evil manner, in my experience, do not usually acknowledge that they acted on an evil principle (nor do those who commit good acts, excepting the terminally self-righteous, usually explain their behavior in terms of adherence to principles). Among serious offenders, self-justification in terms of having no choice is more common or the hapless claim that "I don't know why I did that" or even "I can't believe I did that" (which all too often becomes "I can't remember doing that" for as Nietzche (1886) wrote "I have done that—says my memory. I could not have done that—says my pride and remains inexorable. Eventually memory gives in"). Those who do appeal to principle to justify their evil actions almost inevitably cite value systems that have considerable, if not universal, acceptance. I have encountered men who proudly declared their killings to be part of the pursuit of righteous aims, such as protecting children from pedophiles, stopping the killing of the unborn child, reducing AIDS, and cleansing their city of vice. Interestingly the combination of dreadful, and in many cases repeated, violence with self-righteous superiority often attracts from fellow prisoners and prison staff a label of evil. (shrink)

This paper investigates three morphosyntactic alternations in Estonian – those between the exterior locative cases allative, adessive and ablative and the corresponding postpositionspeale‘onto’,peal‘on’ andpealt‘off’. Based on the Complexity Principle (e.g., Rohdenburg, Günter. 2002. Processing complexity and the variable use of prepositions in English. In Hubert Cuyckens & Günter Radden (eds.),Perspectives on prepositions, 79–100. Tübingen: Niemeyer), we expect cognitively more complex constructions to use more explicit (i.e., morphologically more substantial) marking by means of a postposition. Further, we expect variation to (...) be conditioned similarly in all three semantic categories. For each of the three alternations, a random sample of the two outcomes (case vs. postposition) from the Estonian National Corpus is used, resulting in 3,000 data points. Using properties of the Landmark phrase as independent variables in Bayesian mixed-effects logistic regression models, we predict the choice of postpositions over case-marked realisations. Of the patterns found, only the frequency-related one supports our complexity-related hypothesis. We conclude that the Complexity Principle, in its general form, has little explanatory power for the Estonian constructions at hand and, in particular, that the derived principle of ‘analytic support’ is not generally applicable. We show, however, that the grammatical knowledge of Estonian exterior locative cases and the corresponding postpositions is regulated by our three factors in a relatively uniform way. (shrink)

SummaryInternationally renowned as a novelist, Ignazio Silone also played an important role in the political history of the twentieth century, including the rise and fall of international communism, the struggle against fascism in Europe, the consolidation of the post-World War II order, and the Cold War. Through a series of remarkable biographical twists, Silone became a model for generations of intellectuals—a rare synthesis of engagement and independence, politics and morality. The first Silone ‘case’ followed a series of stunning revelations (...) concerning his services to the fascist police as a leading figure of international communism. This article examines a second Silone ‘case’, dealing with a later period when his international reputation as an intellectual was formed. While cultivating a public image of genuine and hard-won independence after his break with communism, Silone secretly collaborated with the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. My examination of this less well-known episode contributes to a more complete understanding of this significant figure, while also addressing a series of broader questions. These include the ethical responsibilities of public intellectuals, the relationship between political principle and action, and the historical record of certain forms of nominally democratic opposition to totalitarianism. (shrink)

Current discussions of science—both popular and philosophical—often represent the development of science in our civilization as a gradual process of purification from superstitious, religious, and metaphysical elements. This purification is usually presumed to be complete by now—although there may be occasional lapses on the part of individual scientists. That science has changed in character over the centuries is a truism; that it has increasingly loosened ancient ties with magic, religion, and speculative philosophy is an easily substantiated historical thesis. This much (...) admitted, however, an interesting question remains over for discussion: is science by its very nature independent of philosophy? This question has only as much meaning as its two key words. According to one common view, “science” would signify some cumulative heritage of methods, principles, and results, while “philosophy” would signify a certain tradition of writings in which the later constantly refer to the earlier, but which otherwise exhibit no discernible uniformity of methods, principles, or results. On this view, then, science is essentially monistic while philosophy is essentially pluralistic. (shrink)

From the viewpoint of the independence axiom of expected utility theory, an interesting empirical dynamic choice problem involves the presence of a “global risk,” that is, a chance of losing everything whichever safe or risky option is chosen. In this experimental study, participants have to allocate real money between a safe and a risky project. Treatment variable is the particular decision stage at which a global risk is resolved: (i) before the investment decision; (ii) after the investment decision, but (...) before the resolution of the decision risk; (iii) after the resolution of the decision risk. The baseline treatment is without global risk. Our goal is to investigate the isolation effect and the principle of timing independence under the different timing options of the global risk. In addition, we examine the role played by anticipated and experienced emotions in the choice problem. Main findings are a violation of the isolation effect, and support for the principle of timing independence. Although behavior across the different global risk cases shows similarities, we observe clear differences in people’s affective responses. This may be responsible for the conflicting results observed in earlier experiments. Dependent on the timing of the global risk different combinations of anticipated and experienced emotions influence decision making. (shrink)

The Wide-Scope view of instrumental reason holds that you should not intend an end without also intending what you believe to be the necessary means. This, the Wide-Scoper claims, provides the best account of why failing to intend the believed means to your end is a rational failing. But Wide-Scopers have struggled to meet a simple Explanatory Challenge: why shouldn't you intend an end without intending the necessary means? What reason is there not to do so? In the first half (...) of this paper, I argue that the Wide-Scope view struggles to meet this challenge because it takes the principles of instrumental reason to have unlimited application—to apply to all agents, in all circumstances. I then go on to offer a new account of these principles. The new account is very much in the spirit of the Wide-Scope view, and shares its central advantages, but lacks its unlimited application. This view should, therefore, find the Explanatory Challenge more tractable. In the second half of the paper, I argue that this prediction is confirmed. If the requirements of instrumental reason apply only when a means is, or is believed to be, necessary for your end, then plausible independent claims, about reasons, rationality, and intentions, explain why failing to intend the necessary means to your ends is a rational failing. (shrink)

In their excellent monograph, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs, Andrew Simester and Andreas von Hirsch argue for an account of legitimate criminalisation based on wrongfulness, the Harm Principle and the Offence Principle, while they reject an independent anti-paternalism principle. To put it at its simplest my aim in the present paper is to examine the relationship between ‘the harms’ and ‘the wrongs’ of the authors’ title. I begin by comparing the authors’ version of the Harm and Offence (...) class='Hi'>Principle with some other influential accounts. After examining the role wrongfulness plays in their work, I ask what there is left for their Harm and Offence Principles to do. In the light of the understanding and foundations of the Harm and Offence Principles proposed by the authors, I suggest that the answer is little or nothing. The wrongfulness constraint the authors place on their Offence Principle comes close to swallowing it up entirely. Furthermore the part of their Offence Principle that is not thus swallowed by wrongfulness leaves the account with a commitment that is probably best dropped. As far as their Harm Principle is concerned I suggest that the authors’ account of ‘harm’ is so broad that it lacks the resources to distinguish harm-based reasons from wrongfulness- or immorality-based reasons in any principled way. Among other things, I ask in this context, first, whether one can be harmed as one’s character deteriorates and, secondly, whether one is harmed by virtue of the serious wrong one does to another. What really drives the authors’ account of legitimate criminalisation, I believe, is wrongfulness together with an important, amorphous set of potential defeating conditions. They themselves accept such a picture so far as paternalism is concerned. I conclude that their account, which I think has considerable force, would lose little of any significance were their Harm and Offence Principles simply excised. More generally I suspect that a strong role for wrongfulness in an account of legitimate criminalisation is likely to put into serious question the plausibility of an independent principled role for harm and offence. (shrink)

My Ph.D. dissertation written under the supervision of Prof. Tomasz Placek at the Institute of Philosophy of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. In one of its most basic and informal shapes, the principle of the common cause states that any surprising correlation between two factors which are believed not to directly influence one another is due to their common cause. Here we will be concerned with a version od this idea which possesses a purely probabilistic formulation. It was introduced, (...) in the form of a general principle, by Hans Reichenbach in his posthumously published book "The Direction of Time". The central notion of the principle in Reichenbach's formulation, and of the current essay, is that of screening off: two correlated events are screened off by a third event if conditioning on the third event makes them probabilistically independent. Reichenbach's principle marks also the beginning of a new field of philosophy: namely, that of ``probabilistic causality''. For the most part, the current essay can be seen as an effort at checking how far one can go with the purely statistical notions revolving around Reichenbach's idea of common cause. In short, the answer is ``surprisingly far''; in some classes of probability spaces all correlations between ``interesting'' events possess explanations of such sort. However, this fact lends itself to opposing interpretations; more on that in the conclusion. Chapters 6 and 7 contain mathematical results concerning these issues. The screening-off condition requires an equality of a probabilistic nature to hold; chapter 8 is a short discussion of slightly weakened versions of the condition, which hold if the sides of the above mentioned equality differ to a small degree. In chapter 2, after some mathematical preliminaries, we study the various formulations of the principle which might be said to stem from the original idea of Reichenbach. We also examine a few of the most salient counterarguments, which undermine at least some of the formulations. Chapter 3 is of a formal nature, dealing with various probabilistic notions which can be thought of as generalizations of Reichenbach's concept of common cause. The next chapter concerns the relationship between the idea of common causal explanation and the Bell inequalities. In chapter 5 we briefly present the form of Reichenbach's principle which can be found in the field of representing causal structures by means of directed acyclic graphs. (shrink)

Can there be an obligation to obey laws produced by patently illegitimate political institutions, or are these laws like rules of etiquette – rules we might have reasons to follow but which we are not obligated to obey?2 Exclude from the scope of this question laws that recapitulate or contradict independently valid moral principles. Let us instead query only whether there is an obligation to obey laws that (i) do not recapitulate or contradict valid moral principles, and (ii) are products (...) of illegitimate political authorities. In this paper, I argue that there can be such an obligation even if the laws’ “parent” political institution is not legitimate. I do so by showing how the law (whatever its provenance) can generate interpersonal relationships that have deep moral significance – relationships that in turn ground an obligation to obey the law. (shrink)

This chapter is about a classical Indian debate about the Independent Check Thesis, the thesis that, if an agent is to rationally believe (or judge) that she knows that p, she must rely on some source of information that provides her independent evidence about the truth or reliability of her belief (or judgement) that p. While some Buddhists and Nyāya philosophers defended this thesis, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas rejected it. Here, I reconstruct the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas’ arguments against the Independent Check Thesis. (...) I show that these arguments reveal a tension between this thesis and a plausible principle that connects knowledge and action. (shrink)

This paper is a reply to George Boolos's three papers (Boolos (1987a, 1987b, 1990a)) concerned with the status of Hume's Principle. Five independent worries of Boolos concerning the status of Hume's Principle as an analytic truth are identified and discussed. Firstly, the ontogical concern about the commitments of Hume's Principle. Secondly, whether Hume's Principle is in fact consistent and whether the commitment to the universal number by adopting Hume's Principle might be problematic. Also the so-called (...) `surplus content' worry is discussed, which points out that the conceptual resources to grasp Hume's Principle vastly outstrip the conceptual resources employed in arithmetical reasoning. And lastly whether Hume's Principle is in bad company with other unsuccessful implicit definitions. In the last section, an account towards our entitlement to Hume&'s Principle is sketched. (shrink)

Inspired by Hintikka’s ideas on constructivism, we are going to ‘effectivize’ the game-theoretic semantics for independence-friendly first-order logic, but in a somewhat different way than he did in the monograph ‘The Principles of Mathematics Revisited’. First we show that Nelson’s realizability interpretation—which extends the famous Kleene’s realizability interpretation by adding ‘strong negation’—restricted to the implication-free first-order formulas can be viewed as an effective version of GTS for FOL. Then we propose a realizability interpretation for IF-FOL, inspired by the so-called (...) ‘trump semantics’ which was discovered by Hodges, and show that this trump realizability interpretation can be viewed as an effective version of GTS for IF-FOL. Finally we prove that the trump realizability interpretation for IF-FOL appropriately generalises Nelson’s restricted realizability interpretation for the implication-free first-order formulas. (shrink)

Background: Psychological abuse of older people is difficult to recognise; specifically, nursing home residents have been documented to be at higher risk of psychological abuse during daily care, such as during feeding. Healthcare professionals adopt positive and negative verbal prompts to maintain residents’ eating independence; however, negative prompts’ purposes and implications have never been discussed to date. Research aims: To critically analyse negative verbal prompts given during mealtimes as forms of abuse of older individuals and violation of ethical principles. (...) Research design: This is a secondary analysis of three cases of negative prompts that emerged in a large descriptive study based upon focus group methodology and involving 13 nursing homes and 54 healthcare professionals. Participants and research context: This study included 3 out of 13 nursing homes caring for residents with moderate/severe functional dependence in self-feeding mainly due to dementia; in these nursing homes, we conducted three focus groups and 13 healthcare professionals participated. Ethical considerations: This study was conducted in accordance with the Human Subject Research Ethics Committee guidelines after being approved by the Review Board of the Trust. Findings: With the intent of maintaining self-feeding independence, negative verbal prompts have been reported as being used by nursing home teams. By critically analysing these negative prompts, it turned out they could trigger intimidation, depression and anxiety and thus could be considered as forms of abuse; moreover, negative prompts can threaten the ethical principles of (1) autonomy using a paternalist approach, (2) beneficence and non-maleficence as with the intent to act in the best interests of residents (to maintain self-feeding independence) they are harmed in their dignity and (3) justice, given that residents who received negative prompts are treated differently from those who received positive prompts. Discussion: Eating should be a pleasant experience with a positive impact on physiological, psychological and social well-being. However, negative prompting can lead to abuse and violation of basic ethical principles, destroying the healthcare professional resident and relative relationships strongly dependent on trust. Conclusion: Negative verbal prompting must be avoided. (shrink)

A general duality connecting the level of a formal theory and of a metatheory is proposed. Because of the role of natural numbers in a metatheory the existence of a dual theory is conjectured, in which the natural numbers become formal in the theory but in formalizing non-formal natural numbers taken from the dual metatheory these numbers become nonstandard. For any formal theory there may be in principle a dual theory. The dual shape of the lattice of projections over (...) separable Hilbert space is exhibited. The crucial ingredient of this dual theory is set-theoretical (Cohen) forcing. Then, some attempts have been made to exhibit the dual shape of the exotic smooth (small) structures on topological ℝ4. There are striking similarities of both pictures. Nonstandard solutions of the equations of motion of 10-dimensional superstring of IIB type are described as a model theoretic extension of standard ones. Based on Brans conjecture one can predict the existence of sources of gravity in 4 dimensions. By their dual origins they carry quantum information as well. The generalized Maldacena conjecture appears naturally, which sheds light on a definition of background independent string theory. (shrink)

Reichenbach's principles of a probabilistic common cause of probabilistic correlations is formulated in terms of relativistic quantum field theory, and the problem is raised whether correlations in relativistic quantum field theory between events represented by projections in local observable algebrasA(V1) andA(V2) pertaining to spacelike separated spacetime regions V1 and V2 can be explained by finding a probabilistic common cause of the correlation in Reichenbach's sense. While this problem remains open, it is shown that if all superluminal correlations predicted by the (...) vacuum state between events inA(V1) andA(V2) have a genuinely probabilistic common cause, then the local algebrasA(V1) andA(V2) must be statistically independent in the sense of C*-independence. (shrink)

I extend theorems due to Roy Cook on third- and higher-order versions of abstraction principles and discuss the philosophical importance of results of this type. Cook demonstrated that the satisfiability of certain higher-order analogues of Hume's Principle is independent of ZFC. I show that similar analogues of Boolos's new v and Cook's own ordinal abstraction principle soap are not satisfiable at all. I argue, however, that these results do not tell significantly against the second-order versions of these principles.

We investigate how the just cause principle is applicable to contingency planning about armed interventions in civil wars that are somewhat likely to occur in the future. According to a 2005 peace agreement that formally ended a civil war between the Sudanese government in Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, a referendum on South Sudan independence is to be held no later than January 9, 2011. Close observers of Sudan warn that this promise of an independence (...) referendum might not be correctly fulfilled, and that a North-South civil war is somewhat likely to recur. Focusing on the case of Sudan, we discuss the following key question, from the temporal standpoint of August 2010, the month this paper was completed: How may the just cause principle be used prospectively to decide whether there would be a just cause for armed intervention in Sudan, if a renewed North-South civil war were to occur there during the years 2010–2014? To illuminate this question of application, we also discuss a question of theory. What is the just cause principle? A core thesis is that the deterrent threat of armed intervention is an essential tool for preventing such a civil war. By means of deterrent threats of limited forms of armed intervention—for instance, the deterrent threat of imposing no-fly zones—the balance of cost/benefit calculations by the Sudanese government about the prospect of civil war might be tipped in favor of acceptance of South Sudan independence. We recommend that responsible actors in the international community should plan contingently about such armed intervention in Sudan, with the goal of preventing a renewed North-South civil war there. (shrink)

The question of what role social and political practices should play in the justification of normative principles has received renewed attention in post-millennium political philosophy. Several current debates express dissatisfaction with the methodology adopted in mainstream political theory, taking the form of a criticism of so-called ‘ideal theory’ from ‘non-ideal’ theory, of ‘practice-independent’ theory from ‘practice-dependent’ theory, and of ‘political moralism’ from ‘political realism’. While the problem of action-guidance lies at the heart of these concerns, the critics also share a (...) number of methodological assumptions. Above all, their methodology is practice-dependent in the sense that an existing practice is assumed to put substantial limitations on the appropriate normative principles for regulating it. In other words, we cannot formulate and justify an appropriate principle without first understanding the practice this principle is supposed to govern. The aim of this paper is to map out and analyze the common denominators of these debates with regard to methodological commitments. We will investigate how this practice-dependent method may be understood and motivated. In particular, we point to challenges that must be met in order for the position to remain both distinct and attractive. (shrink)

In an earlier paper I argued that Alvin Plantinga's defence of pure experiential theism (a theism epistemically based on religious experience) against the evidential problem of evil is inappropriately circular. Eric Snider rejects my argument claiming first that I do not get Plantinga's thought right. Second, he rejects a key principle my argument relies on, viz. the 'independence constraint on neutralizers'. Finally, he offers an alternative to the independence constraint which allows the pure experiential theist to deal (...) successfully with the evidential problem of evil. In this paper I argue that: (a) I have correctly characterized Plantinga's argument; and (b) that Snider's proposed counter-example to the independence constraint fails. Finally, I argue (c) that Snider's proposed alternative to the independence constraint is not a plausible epistemic principle. (shrink)