Aquinas and the problem of matter and form in the "Fons vitae."--Augustine and the problem of matter and form.--Aquinas answers Avicebron: the distinction between essence and existence.--Bibliography (p.[123]-127).

The aim of the article is to philosophically address and expand the contemporary discourse of the increasingly digitalized education by examining the problem of matter of education and its conceptualizations in this context. With the digital transformation of education a significant change occurs not only in terms of what is considered to be a matter of education, but also in the very principles of interaction between the subjects of education. In order to do this, in the first (...) section several examples of conceptual justifications of applying digital technologies in education are examined with the task of demonstrating how in such justifications the activity of education is reduced to the process of learning and what risks such instrumental interpretation engenders. Then, these issues are analyzed and contextualized utilizing the material of the philosophical discussion of the 20th century - the critique of the progressive education in the analytic philosophy of education. By outlining the relevance of the arguments of discussion on manner/matter to realities of digital education, the issue of the dominance of the logic of learning in current education is analyzed. In the last section several adjustments to the contemporary discourse on digitalization of education are proposed, aimed at finding a balance between individual and social dimensions of the problem of matter of education, given the current tendency of mass personalization in education. Particularly, the importance of the idea of education as a common good in the contemporary educational discourse is claimed. (shrink)

The creation-of-matter hypothesis of the Bondi-Gold-Hoyle steady-state cosmology requires that in an infinite time to which the first transfinite number may be assigned the number of atoms of matter produced would be equal to the cardinal number of the set of mathematical points in the continuum. The existence of a set of finite atoms with that cardinal number is physically unacceptable. The argument for the production of a non-denumerable set of atoms, in infinite time, is given in terms (...) of a model which is shown to be isomorphic with the original Cantor "diagonal" proof for the existence of a non-denumerable infinity. An alternative model which meets the requirements of the steady-state theory is presented; in this model, the number of atoms is explicitly no greater than countably infinite, and remains countably infinite as long as the past time of the universe is restricted to the unlimited set of finite unit-time intervals. If the origin of the steady-state universe is taken as being within that infinite set, expressed by the negative natural numbers, the contradiction of an atom at every mathematical point does not arise. The contradiction does arise if the origin is not within the set of finite numbers, and accordingly there is a restriction as to which concept of infinite past may properly be maintained in the steady-state theory. (shrink)

Systems exhibiting relationships between mental states and material states, briefly mind-matter systems, offer epistemological and methodological problems exceeding those of systems with mental states or material states alone. Some of these problems can be addressed by proceeding from standard firstorder approaches to more sophisticated second-order approaches. These can illuminate questions of reference and validity, and their ramifications for the topic of reproducibility. For various situations in complex systems it is shown that second-order approaches need to be employed. Considering mind- (...) class='Hi'>matter systems as generalized complex systems provides some guidelines for analyzing the problem of reproducibility in such systems from a novel perspective. (shrink)

Some problems, Aristotle remarks, are so deep it is hard not only to find solutions, but hard even to think out the difficulties well. One such is what we here term the problem of the continuant. When something is generated in the unqualified sense of the term, that is, comes to be not just blue or hot or next to something, but is generated as an entity, what is it that survives the change from the original materials? This is (...) a very old problem: it fascinated Aristotle, and was of endless interest to the medievals. Some very old problems—for example, about the nature of the matter of the unchangeable heavenly bodies—we now see rest on false presuppositions. There are other ancient problems, however, such as the problem of the continuant, which for all of our knowledge of physics and chemistry seem to retain their power to mystify and intrigue. (shrink)

This useful paperback reprints a 1934 introduction to the analytic method in philosophy according to its pre-war Cambridge usage. Professor Wisdom provides a refreshing statement of analysis in general and its customary British application to the problems of mind and body, which it tries to reduce to mental events and sense-data respectively. Incidental light is cast upon free-will, the interaction of mind and body and perception, with particular references to the views of Moore and Stout. The author now evaluates this (...) historic perspective summarily: ‘The book is clear, correct, cogent and boring except for a few places where it is not clear and correct’ but ‘an instructive failure’. (shrink)

We investigate particular cosmological models, based either on tachyon fields or on perfect fluids, for which soft future singularities arise in a natural way. Our main result is the description of a smooth crossing of the soft singularity in models with an anti-Chaplygin gas or with a particular tachyon field in the presence of dust. Such a crossing is made possible by certain transformations of matter properties. We discuss and compare also different approaches to the problem of crossing (...) of the Big Bang–Big Crunch singularities. (shrink)

An intellectual history of the philosophers who grappled with the problem of evil, and the case for why pessimism still holds moral value for us today In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, philosophers engaged in heated debates on the question of how God could have allowed evil and suffering in a creation that is supposedly good. Dark Matters traces how the competing philosophical traditions of optimism and pessimism arose from early modern debates about the problem of evil, and (...) makes a compelling case for the rediscovery of pessimism as a source for compassion, consolation, and perhaps even hope. Bringing to life one of the most vibrant eras in the history of philosophy, Mara van der Lugt discusses legendary figures such as Leibniz, Hume, Voltaire, Rousseau, Kant, and Schopenhauer. She also introduces readers to less familiar names, such as Bayle, King, La Mettrie, and Maupertuis. Van der Lugt describes not only how the earliest optimists and pessimists were deeply concerned with finding an answer to the question of the value of existence that does justice to the reality of human suffering, but also how they were fundamentally divided over what such an answer should look like. A breathtaking work of intellectual history by one of today's leading scholars, Dark Matters reveals how the crucial moral aim of pessimism is to find a way of speaking about suffering that offers consolation and does justice to the fragility of life. (shrink)

If I am a material thing, there would seem to be such an entity as the matter now making me up. In that case the matter and I must be either one thing or two. This creates an awkward dilemma. If we’re one thing, then I have existed for billions of years and I am human only momentarily. But if we’re two, then my matter would seem to be a second person. Dean Zimmerman and others take the (...) repugnance of these alternatives to show that I’m not a material thing, but rather an immaterial one. This paper explores a way of avoiding the dilemma without giving up materialism: there is no such entity as the matter making me up, but only a lot of particles. (shrink)

Professor Wisdom gives an elementary introduction to the applications in philosophy of the analytical method. He believes that the aim of analysis is clarity, whereas the aim of speculative philosophy is truth. After a brief introduction on what analysis is, he discusses the relation of body and mind and seeks for causal relations between mental and material events. He concludes this section with a chapter on Free will, before turning to perception and the external world.

In the Principles of Philosophy, Descartes attempts to explicate the well-known phenomena of varying bodily size through an appeal to the concept of "solidity," a notion that roughly corresponds to our present-day concept of density. Descartes' interest in these issues can be partially traced to the need to define clearly the role of matter in his natural laws, a problem particularly acute for the application of his conservation principle. Specifically, since Descartes insists that a body's "quantity of motion," (...) defined as the product of its "size" and speed, is conserved in all material interactions, it is imperative that he explain how solidity influences the magnitude of this force. As a means of resolving this problem, Descartes postulated an idealized condition of "perfect solidity" which correlates a body's "agitation" force (a forerunner of Newton's concept of non-accelerating, or "inertial" motion) with the interplay of its volume, surface area, and composition of minute particles. This essay explores this often misunderstood aspect of Descartes' physics, as well as the special function of idealized conditions in his collision rules. Contrary to those commentators who regard "perfect solidity" as a stipulation on bodily impact, this notion, it will be argued, is primarily concerned with the internal composition of macroscopic bodies, and only indirectly with their collision characteristics. Along the way, many of Descartes' hypotheses will be shown to display a level of sophistication and intricacy that, despite their essential incompatibility, belie several of the common misconceptions of Cartesian science. (shrink)

A recent argument in the neuroethics literature has suggested that brain-mental-state identities promise to settle epistemological uncertainties about nonhuman animal minds. What’s more, these brain-mental-state identities offer the further promise of dismantling the deadlock over the moral status of nonhuman animals, to positive affect in such areas as agriculture and laboratory animal science. I will argue that neuroscientific claims assuming brain-mental-state identities do not so much resolve the problem of other animal minds as mark its resolution. In the meantime, (...) we must rely on the tools available to us, including those provided by such behavioral sciences as cognitive ethology, comparative psychology, and ethology as well as the neurosciences. Focusing on captive animal research, I will also argue that humane experimentalists do not doubt that many of their research subjects have minds. In that light, to suggest that the resolution of the problem of other animal minds would change the scientific use of animals misses the point at issue. Instead, what is required is a ‘sea change’ in the perceived grounds for human moral obligations to nonhumans. It is difficult to see how brain-mental-state identities could be the deciding factor in this continuing issue in applied ethics. (shrink)

This paper examines the problem of normativity in contemporary legal theory, paying particular attention to the relationship between the conception of the problem and related explanations of behaviour. The first part of the paper shows how the problem of normativity, conceived of as a matter of determining how legal norms function as reasons for action, is linked to an explanation of behaviour that is posited or assumed to be capable of being guided by reasons. More importantly (...) for the purposes of the paper, the first part also shows the problem of normativity plays a certain function thanks to which a theorist can, e.g., evaluate lawmaking and adjudication practices ; scrutinise the reasonabless of norms ; critically examine the circumstances under which law is authoritative ; or make distinctions between certain kinds of phenomena that influence conduct. The second part of the paper offers the sketch of an alternative relationship between a conception of the problem of normativity and an explanation of behaviour. The general aim of the paper is to endorse an engagement with the works of others that pays attention to the relationship between problems and explanations, and to the implications of any one way of drawing that relationship for images and practices of theorising. (shrink)

A discussion of the problem of contradiction in mechanical motion has been in progress for a long time in the pages of Filosofskie nauki. The attention given that problem is no accident. In our day, problems concerning contradictions involved in rest and motion, the continuous and the discontinuous, the finite and infinite, etc., have moved from the realm of abstract consideration to that of the concrete and current handling of the subject matter of modern physics, mathematics, and (...) other fields. It is natural that the present stage of knowledge of objective reality should occasion a revived interest on the part of logicians and philosophers in these problems, including the question of how objective contradictions may be expressed in scientific theories. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Dark Matters: Pessimism and the Problem of Suffering by Mara van der LugtStefano BrogiMara van der Lugt. Dark Matters: Pessimism and the Problem of Suffering. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021. Pp. xi + 450. Hardback, $37.00.Mara van der Lugt's book (awarded Honorable Mention for the JHP Book Prize in 2022) has the merit of bringing attention to some crucial yet often overlooked topics by providing (...) a contribution that cannot fail to elicit broad interest. Her book does not simply discuss the theodicy and anti-theodicy of the modern age; against this background, she also brings out the often-ignored tradition of philosophical pessimism. What interests van der Lugt, however, is not "future-oriented" pessimism, which is opposed to "progressivist" theories of history, but an ontological or "value-oriented" pessimism that stresses "the terrible side of [End Page 163] life" in order to answer a series of crucial questions in a way very different from Leibniz's or Pope's approaches: Are there more evils than goods in our lives? Is life worth living for all of us, for any of us? Why do some people choose death despite their blessings? Why do some people choose life despite their sufferings? Do animals suffer as we do? Are we responsible for our own happiness? Is it better never to have been? According to van der Lugt, "The various ways in which these questions have been answered throughout the centuries have created the competing philosophical traditions known as optimism and pessimism. This book traces the intersection of the debate on the problem of evil with the debate on pessimism from the late seventeenth century onwards, seeking throughout to evaluate pessimism on its own terms" (20).A reassessment of this kind of pessimism serves an explicitly theoretical and moral purpose: van der Lugt herself states that her book is not exclusively a contribution to the history of philosophy, but "partly ethical or evaluative" (18). Indeed, pessimism and optimism "go hand in hand": they stem from a moral need and aim to respond to the evil present in the world by opening up glimmers of "hope, compassion, and consolation" (12, emphasis in original). Pessimism, in particular, is not intended to be "a philosophy of despair"; rather, it draws its strength from an "ethical commitment." Stemming from the latter is a tradition that "may be reinterpreted as a moral source" (22) and which "has not only its own epistemological and methodological concerns and presuppositions but, crucially, its own sets of virtues and moral aims" (13).The theoretical/moral purpose of Dark Matters is evident through its unfolding, even though eight of its nine chapters are roughly devoted to providing an accurate historical-philosophical reconstruction. Here, in brief, are the titles of the chapters that make up the over four hundred pages of this volume, which provide a good idea of the main authors discussed: (1) "The Complaint: Bayle and Malebranche on Physical Evil"; (2) "The Optics of Optimism: Leibniz and King Respond to Bayle"; (3) "Of Hope and Consolation: Voltaire and the Deists"; (4) "When Stoicism Meets Pessimism: La Mettrie and Maupertuis"; (5) "The Dispositional Problem of Evil: David Hume"; (6) "The Art of Suffering: Jean-Jacques Rousseau"; (7) "The Failure of Theodicy: Immanuel Kant"; (8) "The Flute-Playing Pessimist: Arthur Schopenhauer"; and (9) "Dark Matters: Pessimism as a Moral Source." To some extent, the rich itinerary provided by van der Lugt may be compared to those studies that have long undermined the idea of a monolithic and compact Enlightenment, characterized by unlimited faith in reason and its potential for liberation, and—more specifically—by a fundamental optimism with regard to human nature and the possibility of reformulating social and political structures in such a way as to enable each person to pursue happiness. However, the historical reconstruction provided here is based on an attempt to bring out the recurrent theoretical core of a philosophical perspective that first emerges with Pierre Bayle and runs through the modern and contemporary age, resurfacing in an evident way in the present-day antinatalism of David Benatar (often cited in the footnotes).According to van der Lugt, it is with Bayle (and not... (shrink)

In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MFNS) Kant develops a conception of matter that is meant to issue in an alternative to what he takes to be the then reigning empiricist account of density. However, in recent years commentator after commentator has argued that Kant’s attempt on this front is faced with insuperable difficulties. Adickes argues that the MFNS theory of density involves Kant in a vicious circle; Tuschling argues that the circle is part of what led Kant (...) to abandon the theory of matter developed in the MFNS; Förster argues that recognition of this circularity played a significant role in Kant’s development of the project now known as the Opus Postumum; and Westphal argues that the circularity problem serves to demonstrate the “untenability of Kant’s metaphysical method” and therefore helps to explain “the radical revision of the relation between mathematics and metaphysics Kant undertakes in his opus postumum.” Indeed, even Kant seems to think that his theory of density is circular: as noted by all of these commentators, in correspondence with one of his former students Kant declares that this theory “seems to lead however to a circle out of which I am not able to come.” Against this growing tide (and even, it seems, against Kant himself) I defend Kant’s theory of density. I argue that the suspicion of a circle results from a confusion of logical relations with causal conditions, and I argue that even Kant seems to have been taken in by this confusion. (shrink)

By formalizing the problem of mental causation, we first prove rigorously that the premises of the problem are jointly incompatible. Before the background of the formalizations, we clarify and assess the anti-physicalist argument by Scott Sturgeon and the supervenience argument by Jaegwon Kim. We demonstrate that, contrary to what has sometimes been contended, the negation of the non-identity premise of Kim's version of the supervenience argument is not tantamount to the claim that all mental events are identical to (...) physical events, that a premise implicitly invoked by Kim is actually required for the validity of the first stage of his supervenience argument, that precisely this premise makes an epiphenomenalism with respect to mental events an impossible position, and that there are good reasons to believe in the falsity of this implicit premise which in turn shows that Sturgeon's critique of the supervenience argument is substantive. (shrink)

Given the common assumption that measurement plays an important role in the foundation of science, the paper analyzes the possibility that Measurement Science, and therefore measurement itself, can be properly founded. The realist and the representational positions are analyzed at this regards: the conclusion, that such positions unavoidably lead to paradoxical situations, opens the discussion for a new epistemology of measurement, whose characteristics and interpretation are sketched here but are still largely matter of investigation.

This article details philosophical responses to the problem posed by the existence, whether real or perceived, of priestcraft, a problem that boiled down to a fear that if the custodians of God’s tabernacle were corrupt, so too were the contents of the tabernacle. It first explores the attempts of Edward Herbert and Thomas Hobbes to guarantee the truth of revealed matters of faith in response to their perception of widespread priestcraft, arguing that, while each sought to undermine sacerdotal (...) authority, they ultimately exempted matters of faith from the litmus test of reason. This resulted in a less-than-satisfactory solution to the problem. It turns next to Locke’s Essay (1690) and The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), exploring how empirical notions of evidence, fact, and probability, as framed in these works, enabled a radical re-evaluation of the grounds of Christian faith, which subsequently influenced the writings of John Toland, Anthony Collins, and Peter Annet between the 1690s and 1740s. These “Lockean free-thinkers,” it argues, were in fact closer to the position of the Essay and Reasonableness than to the deism of Edward Herbert in their efforts to tackle priestcraft. Concluding, this article proposes that the problem of priestcraft served as a catalyst for early modern British philosophers to increasingly narrow the grounds of faith, until faith was deemed legitimate only when grounded upon fact. (shrink)

ISBN 978-5-86007-556-6. (in Russian). -/- In the book we can find the analysis of some closely related problems – of the origin and essence of life, the universal world process and the global evolution. Examination of fractal nature of carriers through the distribution of terrestrial and space objects on the steps of scale staircase, depending on the masses and sizes, shows an appropriate relationship with the masses and sizes of live organisms. One of the conclusions is the complementarity of living (...) and nonliving carriers in universe, and the main difference between a living from nonliving matter is an independent source of ordering inherent in living forms and managing all of its reactions. Tables 9. Fig. 11. Ref. 60 titles. (shrink)

The problem of the development of a Marxist-Leninist theory of value, and the need for a precise and rigorously scientific definition of the subject matter to be investigated, its conceptual apparatus and individual categories, and the determination of the place of these categories in the system of scientific knowledge, are matters which present themselves in connection with a number of pressing problems now engaging the attention of many Marxist philosophers. By no means of least importance in this regard (...) is the fact that these questions occupy a very prominent place in contemporary bourgeois philosophical and sociological literature. The various bourgeois axiological theories that now exist, which include not only "value concepts" but "value approaches" , deal with a large range of social problems - political, economic, socio-psychological, ethical, esthetic, religious, and others. These problems are distorted by bourgeois ideologists in idealist fashion, while their interpretation increasingly acquires an anticommunist tone, and continues to exert a stultifying influence on millions of philosophically unsophisticated persons in capitalist countries. (shrink)

The paper aims at reconsidering the problem of existence and recognition of the past in modernistic philosophy. For Henri Bergson, duration is one of the most enigmatic constituents of human existence. In 1896, when he tackled the question of memory, Bergson reached for the basic philosophical questions posed at the very beginning of the Early Greek thought, then asked by Berkeley’s radical empiricism (so called Berkeley’s razor) and subsequently by Kantian Transcendentalism. All these questions have led to the existential (...) analysis of duration which allows for the new foundation of the idea of remembrance and finally the phenomenon of memory. Bergson has treated memory as one of the most important manifestations of vital force (fr. élan vital). The paper culminates with the analysis of artefact as the foundation of the Archaeology of Knowledge. Polish bergsonism and its references to the issue of memory were presented in a poem written by Bolesław Leśmian. (shrink)

The problem of evil has recently gained renewed attention. As before, what is so mind-boggling is not just the horrific aggression of man against man but the fact of offenders not easily being demonized into new versions of Iago or Macbeth. Somehow, what Hannah Arendt terms “the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banality of evil” has to be dealt with, but the very effort to do so can be problematic if the idea of original sin is somehow resurrected. To examine the issue (...) beyond the conventional framework of Christian-Platonism, it is important to remember the wider international context of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries when the matter first came up for discussion and when the philosophical and religious ideas received from the Far East provided for it a provocatively different frame of reference. (shrink)

Our universe features a harmonious match between laws and states: applying its laws to its states generates other states. This is a striking fact. Matters might have been otherwise. The universe might have been stillborn in a state unengaged by its laws. The problem of nomological harmony is that of explaining the noted striking fact. After introducing and developing this problem, we canvass candidate solutions and identify some of their virtues and vices. Candidate solutions invoke the likes of (...) a designer, axiarchic meta-laws, multiverses, essential causal powers, and Humean laws. (shrink)

Aquinas is standardly thought to endorse a hylomorphic account of change—that is, one on which all change can be analyzed in terms of the reception of distinct forms by matter. But Aquinas’s views about local motion raise a serious problem for this interpretation. Local motion, as he understands it, is a type of change that cannot be analyzed in hylomorphic terms. In this paper, I examine Aquinas’s views about change and local motion with the aim of clarifying and (...) resolving this problem. In doing so, I provide a novel interpretation of these same views and highlight their implications for Aquinas’s understanding of several related issues—including extrinsic denomination, spatial location, potentiality, actuality, and efficient causation. (shrink)

Similarity is a philosophically much-maligned concept. Bertrand Russell claimed that its ineliminability forces on us the admission of at least one universal, thereby undermining nominalism. But even if things must be supposed to be similar if our language functions publicly by way of using finitely many terms repeatedly for purposes of designation, reference, and predication, Russell’s insistence has as such no bearing at all on the epistemological questions of sorting the actual similarities among things and of fixing the grounds on (...) which we may be sure that they are what they are alleged to be. It need not even affect nominalism. Speculation about universals oscillates between the metaphysical and the epistemological. No one doubts that things must be similar in some respect if natural languages behave as they do. But the concession is thought to be a vacuous one precisely because the respect required need never be specified in that admission. On the other hand, it is characteristically said to be epistemologically superfluous because to say that a set of things are similar in respect R is just to say that they are R’s, and to know that—so the argument goes—is to out-flank the original need to inquire whether they are merely similar, thereby restoring the viability of nominalism. This, briefly, is Nelson Goodman’s strategy laid out compellingly in The Structure of Appearance and collected, with explicitly greater scope as far as his own work is concerned but not essentially altered, in a comparatively recent paper. Of course, the legitimacy of terming a set of things R’s, predicatively, invites us to consider whether, on some theory, things really are such. This, the problem of realism, signifies that however vacuous the admission of similarity may be, the putative finding that a set of things are R’s threatens to be epistemically arbitrary unless we have a reasonable theory regarding the validity of so construing them. On Goodman’s account, realism concerns a system’s admitting or not admitting “non-particulars as individuals”—which is to say, Goodman views the issue neutrally as between platonism and nominalism. On that view, “an individual is particular if and only if it is exhaustively divisible into unrepeatable complexes; while an individual is universal if and only if it contains no unrepeatable complex.” The denial of platonism is the denial that there are nonindividuals, not nonparticulars. Alternatively put, “universality is … a matter of multiplicity of instances.” And “repeatability” occurs if a complex “occurs with some two individuals of one category. A color, for example, is repeated if it occurs at two places, even at the same time; and a time is repeated if two qualia of some one kind occur at that time.” Qualia, then, colors for instance, are complexes. (shrink)

Group decisions must often obey exogenous constraints. While in a preference aggregation problem constraints are modelled by restricting the set of feasible alternatives, this paper discusses the modelling of constraints when aggregating individual yes/no judgments on interconnected propositions. For example, court judgments in breach-of-contract cases should respect the constraint that action and obligation are necessary and sufficient for liability, and judgments on budget items should respect budgetary constraints. In this paper, we make constraints in judgment aggregation explicit by relativizing (...) the rationality conditions of consistency and deductive closure to a constraint set, whose variation yields more or less strong notions of rationality. This approach of modelling constraints explicitly contrasts with that of building constraints as axioms into the logic, which turns compliance with constraints into a matter of logical consistency and thereby conflates requirements of ordinary logical consistency (such as not to affirm both a proposition and its negation) and requirements dictated by the environment (such as budgetary constraints). We present some general impossibility results on constrained judgment aggregation; they are immediate corollaries of known results on (unconstrained) judgment aggregation. (shrink)

Problems of the history of philosophy, no matter what aspect of that science they deal with, are always very important. Today, when idealist philosophy seeks to give an exaggerated picture of the importance of the major spiritual values created by the peoples of the West, these problems are acquiring particular significance. In the postwar period, the number of works published abroad on the history of philosophy has increased sharply. The most popular of the older works are being revised and (...) reissued. A great number of writings on methodology have appeared. The influence of philosophy is spreading to other fields of knowledge and to their history. Specifically, historians of culture, science, technology and art are striving, influenced by the materialist concept of history, to shed the light of philosophy upon the problems that inevitably arise in these fields when their history is studied, but which cannot be resolved by the cognitive resources of the special sciences. This circumstance renders problems of the methodology of the history of philosophy particularly important and places greater responsibility upon researchers in this field. (shrink)

Whether or not quantum physics can account for molecular structure is a matter of considerable controversy. Three of the problems raised in this regard are the problems of molecular structure. We argue that these problems are just special cases of the measurement problem of quantum mechanics: insofar as the measurement problem is solved, the problems of molecular structure are resolved as well. In addition, we explore one consequence of our argument: that claims about the reduction or emergence (...) of molecular structure cannot be settled independently of the choice of a particular resolution to the measurement problem. Specifically, we consider how three standard putative solutions to the measurement problem inform our under- standing of a molecule in isolation, as well as of chemistry’s relation to quantum physics. (shrink)