The twentieth century has been called the age of science. Indeed, one of its most salient features is a continuous and accelerating advance in our knowledge of nature, accompanied by progress in technology and engineering. The middle of the century witnessed a new revolution in science and technology which brought about radical changes in economic production and everyday life, which brought nature under further control on our planet and ventured into outer space. These advances in science (...) and technology in an age of automation and electronic "brains," of nuclear energy and artificial satellites, exercise a growing influence on all aspects of social life, including the way in which art develops. (shrink)

A new paradigm is emerging which places Charles Darwin's theory of evolution via natural selection into a larger conceptual framework with greater explanatory power. Darwinism needs to be reconceptualized as a scientific enterprise and philosophical worldview. A larger framework is needed to account for the immaterial laws of nature which guide evolutionary mechanisms and processes to achieve predetermined ends that reflect a superlative Intelligence, Mind or God. Curiously, Darwinism fails to explain intelligent observers who can make sense of the laws (...) of nature. Immanuel Kant's conception of man as both phenomenon and noumenon suggests that man is the missing link between science and religion, and that the two views of genesis—-evolution and creation--are complementary rather than antithetical. Evolution should be taught as science, not ideology. Teaching evolution as science means opening the theory to critical scrutiny which can correct, modify, enrich, and develop the theory in interdisciplinary perspective. But the theory of evolution reaches well beyond science narrowly defined, and broaches philosophical, ethical, and theological dimensions which can be addressed only in interdisciplinary conversation bringing to the table insights from many disciplines. Finally, Darwinism as a materialist, reductionist worldview needs to be humanized, if not Christianized, and thus reach its full potential as science. It would then also recognize human exceptionalism, the teleological imperative, the principle of tolerance, and the fundamental religious insight that we live by faith. (shrink)

Assuming that progress in science means effectiveness at problem-solving, this paper discusses how a progressive scienti?c tradition can be created by a peripheral scienti?c community. A mechanism of peripheral scienti?c growth is proposed, and it is illustrated with an Indian case study. The conclusion of the paper is that scienti?c collaboration between metropolitan and peripheral research communities is frequently characterized by a persistent inequality of intellectual authority due to inequalityin their epistemic transactions.

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In the grand tradition, philosophical ontology was considered logically and epistemologically prior to scientific ontology. Like many contemporary philosophers of science, we consider this to be a mistake. There is two-way traffic between philosophical and scientific ontologies; the more we learn about what there actually is, the more we learn about what can be and what must be, and vice versa. But that is not the present topic; here we focus on the ontology or ontologies of science, not (...) traditional philosophical ontologies or the traffic between scientific and philosophical ontologies. (shrink)

Introduction The present volume contains the proceedings of the First International Conference on Medical Ethics which took place in Nicosia, from the 24th ...

With the advent of the relativity theory science has entered a transformative period in which previous certainties are undergoing critical scrutiny and renovation. Critical movements in science arise at periods of its history when its foundations are brought into question. True it is that natural philosophers still regard science as a growing body of propositions dealing with natural events enabling them to find the structural laws of the external world. But this “external world” about them changes in (...) significance, interpretation, and meaning as new epoch-making theories are propounded and experimental verification of some of their consequences tend to give them scientific plausibility. (shrink)

An important fact about human labor is that it can result not just in reproduction of what it started with, but in something new, a surplus product. When the latter is a means of production, it makes possible a mechanism of change consisting of reproduction by means of the expanded means of production. Each iteration of the labor process can differ from the preceding one insofar as it incorporates the surplus generated previously. Over the long-term, this cyclical process can lead (...) to the self-transformation of labor and, through it, of human societies and cultures. In this paper, I argue that this mechanism of change is also at work in the history of science. I argue that the form this mechanism takes in science is that of a feedback loop between discovery and instrument construction. This process requires the integration, and transformation into material form, of different kinds of knowledge. Based on this mechanism, I defend a concept of scientific progress as transcendence of the limitations of native human epistemic abilities. I also criticize narrowly biologistic approaches to the history of science for ignoring the role of surplus generation in transforming the labor process, and discuss some problems associated with viewing science as labor. (shrink)

Mizrahi (2017a) advances an argument in support of Weak Scientism, which is the view that scientific knowledge is the best (but not the only) knowledge we have, according to which Weak Scientism follows from the premises that scientific knowledge is quantitatively and qualitatively better than non-scientific knowledge. In this paper, I develop a different argument for Weak Scientism. This latter argument for Weak Scientism proceeds from the premise that academic disciplines that make progress are superior to academic disciplines that (...) do not make progress. In other words, other things being equal, it is generally better for an academic discipline to make progress than to make little or no progress, given that an academic discipline that is making little or no progress is an academic discipline that is failing to achieve its epistemic goals. Now, if there is no question among academic philosophers that science makes progress, and significantly so, but there is an open question among academic philosophers as to whether academic philosophy makes progress (and if so, how much), then academic philosophers would have to agree that science is superior to academic philosophy in terms of making progress. I develop this argument in this paper and provide empirical evidence suggesting that the premises would be acceptable to academic philosophers. (shrink)

Jonathan D. Moreno and Sam Berger, Progress in bioethics: Science, policy, and politics, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010, reviewed by James Lindemann Nelson.

This chapter raises various questions with regard to philosophy's relationship to the physical sciences and the issue whether we can mount an argument for the occurrence or possibility of progress in philosophy comparable to those raised in the scientific context. It examines cases made pro and contra the progressivist view with reference to recent debates in epistemology and philosophy of science, concluding with a qualified endorsement of the argument by analogy. This places the onus of proof very squarely (...) on the skeptics, relativists, anti‐realists, social constructivists, and other progress‐deniers. (shrink)

Leading scholars debate politically progressive perspectives on bioethics and the implications for society, politics, and science in the twenty-first century.

The question what scientific progress means for a particular domain such as medicine seems importantly different from the question what scientific progress is in general. While the latter question received ample treatment in the philosophical literature, the former question is hardly discussed. I argue that it is nonetheless important to think about this question in view of the methodological choices we make. I raise specific questions that should be tackled regarding scientific progress in the medical sciences and (...) demonstrate their importance by means of an analysis of what evidence-based medicine (EBM) has, and has not, to offer in terms of progress. I show how critically thinking about EBM from the point of view of progress can help us in putting EBM and its favoured methodologies in the right perspective. My conclusion will be that blindly favouring certain methods because of their immediately tangible short-term benefits implies that we parry the important question of how best to advance progress in the long run. This leads us to losing sight of our general goals in doing research in the medical sciences. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 10, Issue 1, pp 29 - 50 This essay discusses progress and directionality, both in nature, in science and in society, treating as its starting-point the reflections, parallelisms and comparisons of Ruse’s essay, ‘A Threefold Parallelism for Our Time? Progressive Development in Society, Science and the Organic World’, but reaching substantially different conclusions. The essay thus ranges over progress and directionality in the world of natural evolution, in the sciences and the humanities, and (...) in history and society. It defends non-relative progress in science and the humanities, criticising here both the approach to these disciplines of the strongly evolutionary epistemology of Hull and the more moderate evolutionary epistemology of Ruse. It further defends the possibility of progress and directionality in history and society, and also, following Rolston, in the course of evolution within the world of nature, where the kind of directionality to be found has multiple directions rather than being unilinear. Subsequently it relates conclusions about these fields to theological reflections about the creation of nature and society by a value-loving intelligence. (shrink)

Geologists, Paleontologists and other historical scientists are frequently concerned with narrative explanations targeting single cases. I show that two distinct explanatory strategies are employed in narratives, simple and complex. A simple narrative has minimal causal detail and is embedded in a regularity, whereas a complex narrative is more detailed and not embedded. The distinction is illustrated through two case studies: the ‘snowball earth’ explanation of Neoproterozoic glaciation and recent attempts to explain gigantism in Sauropods. This distinction is revelatory of historical (...) science. I argue that at least sometimes which strategy is appropriate is not a pragmatic issue, but turns on the nature of the target. Moreover, the distinction reveals a counterintuitive pattern of progress in some historical explanation: shifting from simple to complex. Sometimes, historical scientists rightly abandon simple, unified explanations in favour of disunified, complex narratives. Finally I compare narrative and mechanistic explanation, arguing that mechanistic approaches are inappropriate for complex narrative explanations. (shrink)

It is clear that the concept of scientific misconduct continues to evolve. As always it is the goal of Science and Engineering Ethics to move the discussion forward, to encourage and facilitate discussion of the ethical issues and problems that practicing scientists and engineers encounter in the course of pursuing their professions. This collection of articles and commentaries provides a variety of perspectives that we expect will facilitate communication among and within the groups who must participate in this evolution.

Science and mathematics continually change in their tools, methods, and concepts. Many of these changes are not just modifications but progress---steps to be admired. But what constitutes progress? This dissertation addresses one central source of intellectual advancement in both disciplines: reformulating a problem-solving plan into a new, logically compatible one. For short, I call these cases of compatible problem-solving plans "reformulations." Two aspects of reformulations are puzzling. First, reformulating is often unnecessary. Given that we could already solve (...) a problem using an older formulation, what do we gain by reformulating? Second, some reformulations are genuinely trivial or insignificant. Merely replacing one symbol with another does not lead to intellectual progress. What distinguishes significant reformulations from trivial ones? According to what I call "conceptualism" (or "conceptual empiricism"), reformulations are intellectually significant when they provide a different plan for solving problems. Significant reformulations provide inferentially different routes to the same solution. In contrast, trivial reformulations provide exactly the same problem-solving plans, and hence they do not change our understanding. This answers the second question about what distinguishes trivial from significant reformulations. However, the first question remains: what makes a new way of solving an old problem valuable? Here, a bevy of practical considerations come to mind: one formulation might be faster, less complicated, or use more familiar concepts. According to "instrumentalism," these practical benefits are all there is to reformulating. Some reformulations are simply more instrumentally valuable for meeting the aims of science than others. At another extreme, "fundamentalism" contends that a reformulation is valuable when it provides a more fundamental description of reality. According to this view, some reformulations directly contribute to the metaphysical aim of carving reality at its joints. Conceptualism develops a middle ground between instrumentalism and fundamentalism, preserving their benefits without their costs. I argue that the epistemic value of significant reformulations does not reduce to either practical or metaphysical value. Reformulations are valuable because they are a constitutive part of problem-solving. Both science and mathematics aim at solving all possible problems within their respective domains. Meeting this aim requires being able to plan for any possible problem-solving context, and this requires reformulating. By reformulating, we clarify what we need to know to solve problems. Still, one might wonder whether the value of reformulations requires underlying differences in explanatory power. According to "explanationism," a reformulation is valuable only when it provides a better explanation. Explanationism stands as a rival middle ground position to my own. However, it faces numerous counterexamples. In many cases, two reformulations provide the same explanation while nonetheless providing different ways of understanding a phenomenon. Hence, reformulating can be valuable even when neither formulation is more explanatory. Methodologically, I draw on a variety of case studies to support my account of reformulation. These range from classical mechanics to quantum chemistry, along with examples from mathematics. Symmetry arguments provide a paradigmatic example: the mathematics of symmetry groups radically recasts quantum mechanics and quantum chemistry. Nevertheless, elementary approaches exist that eschew this additional mathematical apparatus, solving problems in a more tedious but less mathematically-demanding manner. Further examples include reformulations of quantum field theory, Arabic vs. Roman numerals, and Fermat's little theorem in number theory. In each case, my account identifies how reformulations change and improve our understanding of science and mathematics. (shrink)

This article contributes to the discussion regarding the relationship between idealisation, de-idealisation and cognitive scientific progress. In this, I raise the question of the significance of the gradual de-idealisation procedure for constructing political science theories. I show that conceptions that assume the reversibility of the idealisation process can be an extremely useful theoretical perspective in reconstructions of political science modelling and analyses of scientific progress in political science. I base my position on the results of (...) the methodological reconstruction of Richard Jankowski’s theory of voting. My reconstruction and results of empirical studies show that by gradually removing simplifying assumptions, models can emerge that more accurately identify the determinants of the voting decision and the corresponding relationships. In the case I analysed, the transition from coarse-grained to fine-grained models likely demarcates the line of scientific progress. (shrink)

In scientific work we rightly attach great importance to the testing of predictions from theoretical ideas. We should also attach great importance to the generation of those ideas since these are necessary precursors to advancement in science. Insight plays a substantial role in the generation of ideas and is correspondingly important. It seems that insights are difficult to form and often delayed. We should study how constraints on insight can be reduced and whether the customary objectives in science (...) give enough weight to procedures that may generate insights. This paper offers some suggestions on how to achieve this :334–340, 2017). That way, there would be more to test. Subsequently, we thought that the paper could have spent more time on the circumstances underpinning insight and this paper is the outcome of that thinking). (shrink)

Causation is the main foundation upon which the possibility of science rests. Without causation, there would be no scientific understanding, explanation, prediction, nor application in new technologies. How we discover causal connections is no easy matter, however. Causation often lies hiddenfrom view and it is vital that we adopt the right methods for uncovering it. The choice of methods will inevitably reflect what one takes causation to be, making an accurate account of causation an even more pressing matter. This (...) enquiry informs the correct norms for an empirical study of the world. In Causation in Science and the Methods of Scientific Discovery, Rani Lill Anjum and Stephen Mumford propose nine new norms of scientific discovery. A number of existing methodological and philosophical orthodoxies are challenged as they argue that progress in science is being held back by an overlysimplistic philosophy of causation. (shrink)

Izard’s claim that the term emotion works well as an adjective is closer to B. F. Skinner’s position than is acknowledged. Based on Izard’s survey of scientists, I argue that the lack of consensus on emotion as a unitary construct could be considered to represent the dissolution of emotions. Given that something similar has happened in biology with the dissolution of the unitary gene construct, this development in psychology may not be as problematic as it initially sounds.

Based on an analysis of ten popular introductions to social psychology, we will show that Karl Popper's philosophy of ‘critical rationalism’ so far has had little to no traceable influence on the epistemology and practice of social psychology. If Popper is quoted or mentioned in the textbooks at all, the guiding principle of ‘falsificationism’ is reduced to a mere ‘falsifiability’ and some central elements of critical rationalism are left out – those that are incompatible with positivism and inductivism. Echoing earlier (...) attempts to introduce Popper to social psychology by Paul Meehl and Tom Pettigrew, we will argue that a discussing Popper's ideas in more depth could help social psychology to move forward in view of the ‘crisis of confidence’ that has emerged recently in view of the ‘Stapel affair’ and the reports of failures to replicate social psychological experiments in high-powered replication attempts. (shrink)

The fact that philosophy has not made much progress in finding answers to its big questions is often demonstrated with a comparison to natural sciences. Some have recently argued that the state of progress in philosophy is not so different than the sciences: there are many unresolved big questions in the sciences too, and philosophy has made progress on its smaller questions just like the sciences. I argue that this comparison is misleading: the situation in the two (...) fields looks similar only if we focus on unresolved scientific questions that have philosophical import. The sciences have made progress on many questions that are significant but that are not ‘big’ in a philosophical sense, while philosophy has made less progress on its own significant questions. Moreover, ‘smaller’ questions in the sciences are significant in themselves, while smaller questions in philosophy do not have much significance beyond their contribution to the bigger debates. I conclude with brief remarks about what underlies the disparity between the two fields: to understand the slow pace of progress in philosophy we should pay attention to factors that are at the intersection of the nature of philosophical questions, current philosophical methodology and the sociology of academic philosophy. (shrink)

In this article, I want to show that the concept “rationality”, which is important for the French school of epistemology of science, has a dual content and is not very successful. This is the main point of my polemic with Tatyana Sokolova. On the one hand, there seems to be general rationality in it, understood as a preference (in the broad sense) for benefits over costs. Benefits include true knowledge. On the other hand, there is a historical socio-cultural context (...) in which scientific knowledge arises and in which the parameters of practice are determined, which serves as the final instance for testing knowledge. At the same time, there are many such contexts in society, which I call human interfaces. The world, for its part, offers many of its interfaces as collections of interaction tools. When some interface of a person and some interface of the world assimilate each other, knowledge arises, that is confirmed by practice. It can be considered rational. But with a change in the sociocultural context, the human interface also changes, so that a search for new assimilation takes place. It is carried out by science. I agree with Tatyana Sokolova’s characterization of the progress of science, but I suggest at least differentiating the levels of rationality. One operates in the historical sociocultural locus, the other ensures the change of such loci and the adaptation of knowledge to them. I consider the progress of science to be an evaluative characteristic; no objectively recorded phenomenon corresponds to it. The disciplinary distinction of science is derived from the concepts of “object” and “method”, which have a performative content. (shrink)

The Term 'Practical Progress' in Biomedical Sciences. A Structuralistic Approach to the Reconstruction of Epistemological Terms in Medicine. An attempt is made to elucidate the structure of the term 'practical progress' and to reconstruct it logically. The importance of discovery and confirmation of new regularities as well as of practical rules arising from them depends on their contribution to the solution of practical problems. The application of this structuralistic definition of 'practical progress' is demonstrated with an example (...) from cardiac surgery concerning the solution of the practical medical problem of myocardial protection during open heart surgery. (shrink)

In all disciplines there is the question of how to promote progress and offset decline. But, what are progress and decline ? For this short article, the main discussion centers on biology. A solution called functional specialization begins to emerge as relevant to all of the sciences, technologies and arts. This introductory article ends with some heuristics on various follow-up issues.

The papers presented here derive from the 4th International Confe:--ence on History and Philosophy of Science held in Blacksburg, Virginia, U. S. A., November 2-6, 1982. The Conference was sponsored by the I nternational Union of History and Philosophy of Science and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech). Particular thanks go to L. Jonathan Cohen, Secretary of the Union, as well as to Dean Henry Bauer of the College of Arts & Sciences, Wilfred Jewkes and the (...) Center for Programs in the Humanities, Arthur Donovan and the Center for the Study of Science in Society and the Department of Philoso­ phy and Religion at Virginia Tech. Not only did they come through with the necessat"y funds, but they were all always ready with a helping hand when things got confusing. Two additional groups of individuals require a special note of thanks. First, considerable appreciation is due the mem­ bers of the Joint Commission of the I nternational Union of History and Philosophy of Science: Maurice Crosland, Risto Hilpinen and Vladimir Kirsanov. They were more than gen­ erous in thei r advice and co-operation. The Local Organizing Committee (Kenneth Alpern, Roger Ariew, Arthur Donovan, Larry Laudan, Ann La Berge, Duncan Porter, Eleonore Stump and Dennis Welch) not only demon­ strated efficiency and insured a pleasant stay for' all participants, but also went out of their way on numerous occasions to make everyone feel at home. (shrink)

The epistemic conception of scientific progress equates progress with accumulation of scientific knowledge. I argue that the epistemic conception fails to fully capture scientific progress: theoretical progress, in particular, can transcend scientific knowledge in important ways. Sometimes theoretical progress can be a matter of new theories ‘latching better onto unobservable reality’ in a way that need not be a matter of new knowledge. Recognising this further dimension of theoretical progress is particularly significant for understanding (...) scientific realism, since realism is naturally construed as the claim that science makes theoretical progress. Some prominent realist positions are best understood in terms of commitment to theoretical progress that cannot be equated with accumulation of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

This book examines the philosophical foundations of the realist view of the progress of science as cumulative. It is a view that has recently been faced with a number of powerful attacks in which successive scientific theories are seen, not as extending their scope and honing their explanations, but as incommensurable. There is, it is held, in principle no way of establishing that they are about the same things. From the voluminous literature on the topic, Dr Smith has (...) selected relevantly and incisively and his exposition of the contending arguments is vigourous and clear, without undue technicality. As an explication and defence of realism it will interest all those concerned with this basic question in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. (shrink)

Crime is a serious social problem, but its causes are not exclusively social. There is growing consensus that explaining and preventing it requires interdisciplinary research efforts. Indeed, the landscape of contemporary criminology includes a variety of theoretical models that incorporate psychological, biological and sociological factors. These multi-disciplinary approaches, however, have yet to radically advance scientific understandings of crime and shed light on how to manage it. In this paper, using conceptual tools on offer in the philosophy of science in (...) combination with theoretical work represented in this special volume of Psychology, Crime and Law, I provide some perspective on why explanatory progress in criminology has remained elusive and evaluate some positive proposals for attaining it. -/- . (shrink)