G. W. Leibniz has been praised as an exemplar of tolerance on both theological and political grounds. His irenic efforts within Christendom as well as his positive attitude towards pagans like the Chinese is well documented. He thought that “the great majority of mankind” were already “civilized”. This paper highlights Leibniz’s political treatment of the “uncivilized” peoples, whom he termed “barbarians” and “savages”. Given Leibniz’s worldly outlook and prodigious reading, including writings detailing the horrors inflicted on the natives of the (...) Americas, he blithely ignored a reality that was quite at odds with his own vision for such peoples. The dissonance between his ideas on how to treat “barbarian” peoples (whom he considered to be fully human and deserving of mutual respect) and his awareness of their actual treatment in many nascent European colonies is striking. The only conclusion that can be reached (though Leibniz never says so explicitly) is that their conversion to Christianity and the consequent enlightenment of their posterity trumped their present suffering. (shrink)

Homosexuality is not easily accepted in the Catholic Church. There are at least three major schools concerning the attitude towards homosexuality based on their respective theological methodologies (scientia fidei). The first school is encapsulated in the Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons (1986), which rejects homosexual persons and same-sex sexual relationships. The second school is put forward by John J. McNeill (1993), a moralist who embraces homosexual persons and same-sex sexual (...) relationships. The last one is represented by the document of Amoris Laetitia (2016), which accepts homosexual persons but disapproves of same-sex sexual relationships. These three major schools refer to the interpretation of the document Persona Humana article 8 (1975). A survey of 566 respondents was conducted from the 8th to the 15th of November in 2022. The results show that 74.2% of respondents have a form of acceptance in accordance with Amoris Laetitia, 14.5% with the Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons, and 5.5% with the thoughts of John J. McNeill. Our study concluded that accepting homosexual persons and rejecting homosexual acts is the reference for ad experimentum moral decisions in the context of the Archdiocese of Jakarta in 2022. Abstrak Homoseksualitas tidak begitu mudah diterima dalam Gereja Katolik. Setidaknya ada tiga aliran yang berbeda sikap terhadap homoseksualitas berdasarkan pandangan teologi (scientia fidei) masing-masing. Aliran pertama terwakili oleh dokumen Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons (1986) yang menolak pribadi homoseksual dan hubungan seksual sesama jenis. Aliran kedua diwakili oleh seorang moralis bernama John J. McNeill (1993) yang menerima pribadi homoseksual dan hubungan seksual sesama jenis. Aliran ketiga terwakili oleh dokumen Amoris Laetitia (2016) yang menerima pribadi homoseksual namun menolak hubungan seksual sesama jenis. Ketiga aliran besar ini mengacu pada penafsiran dokumen Persona Humana artikel 8 (1975). Sejak tanggal 8 sampai dengan 15 November 2022 kami melakukan survei terhadap 566 responden. Hasil survei menunjukkan sebanyak 74.2% responden memiliki bentuk penerimaan sesuai dengan Amoris Laetitia; sebanyak 14.5% responden memiliki bentuk penerimaan sesuai dengan dokumen Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons; dan sebanyak 5.5% responden memiliki bentuk penerimaan sesuai dengan pemikiran John J. McNeill. Kami menyimpulkan bahwa sikap menerima pribadi homoseksual dan menolak tindakan homoseksual merupakan rujukan keputusan moral ad experimentum dalam konteks Keuskupan Agung Jakarta di tahun 2022. Kata-kata Kunci: Homoseksualitas, Persona Humana, Amoris Laetitia, John J. McNeill, sensus fidei, scientia fidei. (shrink)

In quest’articolo, articolo prenderò in esame i passi in cui Kant descrive la monadologia leibniziana come un “concetto platonico” del mondo, ossia come una descrizione del mondo intelligibile che non ha nulla a che vedere con la spiegazione del mondo fenomenico. In generale, vorrei mostrare che quest’interpretazione non va contrapposta a quella che lo stesso Kant aveva dato nella prima Critica, dove la monadologia era caratterizzata come un “sistema intellettuale del mondo”. Per fare ciò, risponderò a due domande. La prima (...) riguarda le ragioni che possono aver indotto Kant, in diverse occasioni, a presentare Leibniz come un precursore della teoria della soggettività dello spazio. La seconda riguarda il motivo per cui Kant associa costantemente la monadologia alla teoria platonica delle idee, mostrando come, in entrambi i casi, Kant intenda criticare qualsiasi possibilità di un transito dal mondo sensibile a quello intelligibile. Infine, cercherò di mostrare che, dietro questa lettura deflazionista della monadologia, c’è anche un’implicita autocritica alle tesi che Kant stesso ha sostenuto nella Dissertatio del 1770. (shrink)

On peut, semble-t-il compter parmi les contributions liées au De motu et à ses enjeux, le texte obscur, verbeux et parfois inexact de Raffaello Caverni (1837-1900), l’Histoire de la méthode expérimentale en Italie. L’œuvre monumentale du prêtre toscan fut publiée en six grands volumes (le dernier à titre posthume) et suscita aussitôt autant d’éloges que de critiques. Au-delà des jugements extravagants et des hypothèses audacieuses, les idées de Caverni sur le De motu peuvent tout à fait s’avérer utiles, non tant (...) comme « revue critique», que comme reconstruction du cadre théorique dans lequel s’inscrivait le travail de Galilée. On en tirera des hypothèses sur la façon dont Galilée a entrepris la construction de la nouvelle physique et d’une « histoire des effets» désormais plus précise. (shrink)

Dopo aver studiato l’argomento della divisione delle scienze speculative in Aristotele e Boezio, riprendiamo la marcia della nostra ricerca presentando il pensiero di Avicenna al riguardo. Bisogna ammettere l’importanza del suo contributo per lo sviluppo della filosofia, e in modo particolare la metafisica, nell’occidente medievale, senza il quale non si può cogliere la continuità e i cambiamenti progressivi nelle diverse edizioni di questa scienza regina del sapere razionale umano. Avicenna insisterà a ragione nell’importanza del subiectum scientiae per stabilire la divisione (...) delle scienze speculative, e metterà in rilievo il soggetto proprio della metafisica, cioè l’ente in quanto ente. In un altro contesto, vedremo come Avicenna parlerà dei diversi gradi di astrazione nelle varie facoltà conoscitive, ma senza mettere questa dottrina in rapporto con la questione della divisione delle scienze, come invece faranno successivamente altri autori, confondendo forse questi due livelli di riflessione. (shrink)

This paper’s focus is about some questions concerning the ontology of the angel and the theory of knowledge. About ontology, the main problems discussed by Albert are the metaphysical composition (despite its immateriality) of the angel, the nature of angel’s individuality and the angel’s relationship with the separate intelligences. On this last point Albert, unlike Thomas, argues that angels and intelligences are distinct entities and that the identification between them would be a denial of angel’s ministerial function. In order to (...) accomplish this function, angels must know not only God’s essence, the first object of their contemplation, but also particular things and events of human lives. This is one of the reasons why Albert considers the mind of the angel through a close comparison with the characteristics of the divine mind on the one hand, and with the human mind on the other. The angel, unlike man, is an immaterial entity, devoid of sense organs: in the terms of Aristotelian gnoseology valid for man, it is not clear how angel can know particular things. In order to resolve this difficulty, Albert hints at a cognitive mechanism per applicationem of the innate form of the thing. The angelic mind therefore appears to Albert as characterized, unlike God, by only habitual knowledge of things, which becomes in actu only after a “contact” with the things themselves. (shrink)

This interview seeks to highlight some of the main characteristics of the new pandemic world, besides the main contradictions the philosophical thought runs into in this difficult time. Between a political world which is unable to react and the scientific world which is usually moved by political aims, this work tries to understand if there is any room for a role of a long range philosophical thought, which is able to defend its clarity prerogatives but it is also able to (...) speak with other disciplines which seem increasingly deafer. (shrink)

In Vitro meat, a flywheel to build a new relationship between Sapiens and non-human animals Meat consumption is a considerable Harm for human Health, Environment, and animal Welfare. In this essay I assume that in vitro meat could be a suitable solution for each of these problems. In the first part of my inquire I focus on animal Ethics. In particular I analyze the issue of moral status of non-human animals. In the second part I take into exam the main (...) arguments against the use of IVM. I conclude by saying that IVM should be promoted although some criticalities raise up. (shrink)

ENGLISH: The author investigates whether the model prevalent today of an “humble reason” - based on fallibilism and epistemic humility - is the most appropriate to express the theological truth, even in the light of the debate within the contemporary theism (rational theology). To answer this question it is necessary to examine the epistemological status of “human truth” and the “truth of faith”, in order to develop a common approach to sciences, philosophy and theology. Finally, the author shows how the (...) communitarian dimension and the “choice” (a call for freedom) are inherent to theology understood as “critical faith”, whose peculiarity is to posit itself without nostalgia in the middle between fideism, rationalism and a certain relativism. From the path, finally, it emerges the proposal of a new “cristeologia”. ITALIAN: Il rapporto tra fede e ragione è la questione meta-teologica per eccellenza. L’autore si propone dunque d’indagare se il modello oggi prevalente di “ragione umile” – basato su fallibilismo e umiltà epistemica – sia il più adeguato per esprimere le verità teologiche, anche alla luce del dibattito interno al teismo contemporaneo (teologia razionale). Per rispondere a questa domanda è necessario esaminare lo statuto epistemologico della verità umana e della verità di fede, per poter elaborare un metodo comune alle discipline scientifiche, filosofiche e teologiche, capace di trovare un equilibrio tra fideismo e positivismo teologico. Dopo una breve panoramica storica dei rapporti tra fede e ragione nel pensiero occidentale (con particolare attenzione alla dottrina dei praeambula fidei), l’articolo cercherà di mostrare come, nel paradigma della verità relazionale e del fallibilismo sia necessario integrare il problema delle fonti, dell’autorità, del concetto di ispirazione e della nozione di “rivelazione”, giacché contraddistinguono la teologia rispetto alla filosofia. Si mostrerà infine come la dimensione comunitaria e della scelta (appello alla libertà) siano connaturate alla teologia intesa come fede critica, la cui peculiarità è di collocarsi senza nostalgie nel mezzo tra fideismo, razionalismo e un certo relativismo. Dal percorso emergerà infine la proposta di una nuova "cristeologia". (shrink)

In his Essay concerning Human Understanding, John Locke explicitly refers to Newton’s Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica in laudatory but restrained terms: “Mr. Newton, in his never enough to be admired Book, has demonstrated several Propositions, which are so many new Truths, before unknown to the World, and are farther Advances in Mathematical Knowledge” (Essay, 4.7.3). The mathematica of the Principia are thus acknowledged. But what of philosophia naturalis? Locke maintains that natural philosophy, conceived as natural science (as opposed to natural (...) history), would give us demonstrations of the necessary connection between the (ultimately, simple) ideas constitutive of our complex ideas of various natural kinds of substances (e.g., gold). Indeed Locke goes so far as to suggest that a completely adequate natural science would also realize (perhaps, per impossibile) the goal of transforming the corpuscularian hypothesis into knowledge by demonstrating the necessary connection between the ‘microstructure’ (primary qualities of insensible corpuscles) of a particular natural kind of substance (e.g., gold) and the ideas of secondary qualities constitutive of the complex idea of that kind of substance. Locke’s conclusion concerning the possibility of the development of a natural science thus conceived is pessimistic: In vain therefore shall we endeavor to discover by our Ideas, (the only true way of certain and universal knowledge,) what other Ideas are to be found constantly joined with that of our complex Idea of any Substance: since we neither know the real Constitution of the minute Parts, on which their Qualities do depend; not, did we know them could we discover any necessary connexion between them, and any of their Secondary Qualities: which is necessary to be done, before we can certainly know their necessary co-existence (Essay, 4.3.14). It is understandable that, with such a conception of the science of nature, Locke found little of it in Newton’s Principia. In this paper, I further explore what might, perhaps with some hyperbole, be termed Locke’s ‘disappointment’ with the Prinicipia as a contribution to natural science. In particular, I argue that Locke’s adherence to the idealist epistemology of the Way of Ideas entails that mathematics cannot lend its certainty as a scientia to natural philosophy. Consequently, he finds more mathematics than natural philosophy in the Principia. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 517 My second concern is whether Dulles needs to develop more explicitly the liturgical dimension of the tradition as a type of tacit knowing. To be sure, Dulles is open to seeing the divine liturgy as an important source for what he refers to as " traditioning " (cf. 33-34). Furthermore, his personal commitment to the traditional liturgy's unique mode of communication can be quite passionate, as (...) when he states: In countries such as the United States young people cannot even imagine what it must have been like to live in the Catholic Church of fifty years ago. They frequently worship in churches or auditoriums barren of shrines and statues. They are ignorant of the an· swers that their parents or grandparents memorized out of a catechism. They know practically no prayers by heart, and are perhaps unable to say the Angelus or the Rosary. They are so open to the world that they are almost drowning in secularity (101; cf. also 19). Nevertheless, personal conviction seems to give rise to little theoretical reflection about why this sort of symbolism is so central to the Catholic tradition. Liturgy's function in communicating the rule of faith of Christian communities receives no separate chapter and appears as a decidedly secondary source of theological reflection. Here he could perhaps have been illuminated by Jean-Luc Marion's philosophical meditations on the symbolism of the Eucharist as presence and gift. The Craft of Theology will serve as absorbing reading for graduate students who are just beginning to study theology. That is not to say that Dulles's book is only an autobiographical retrospect on the profession which he has ably practiced for more than half a century. Whether understood as a stimulant to ·thinking judiciously about the living tradition of the Catholic church or as a guide for contemporary ecclesial communities of different confessions seeking to recover the catholicity of the Christian tradition, Dulles's system will be a no less than invaluable resource to Christian theologians. The Catholic University of America.Washington, D.C. PETER J. CASARELLA "Un maitre en theologie: Le Pere Marie-Michel Labourdette, O.P." Revue Thomiste 92, No. 1 (January-March, 1992). Toulouse: Ecole de theologie, 1992. Pp. 428. 130F. This collection of twenty essays serves as an intriguing introduction to the life and thought of the Dominican professor and moral theologian P. Marie-Michel Labourdette, who worked for most of his religious life at the Dominican studium of St. Maximin of the Province 518 BOOK REVIEWS of Toulouse. Prefaced by two contributions of biographical interest, and completed by a comprehensive bibliography, the core selections crystalize around two poles of interest. First, they explore the character of Labourdette's thought and methodology, both as a churchman and a Thomist. Especially enlightening here are the essays by M. Larive, " Quaedam impressio divinae scientiae, la theologie selon le P. Labourdette " and 5.-Th. Bonino, "Le thomisme du P. Labourdette." Second, other essays succeed in capturing this Thomistic thinker in flight, as it were, as his incisive powers of analysis and synthesis reveal themselves in his treatment of various theological questions. I would especially recommend here A. D. Mongillo's "La fin derniere de la personne humaine," C. J. Pinto de Oliveira's "La prudence, concept cle de la morale du P. Labourdette," and T.-D. Humbrecht's "Le peche originel selon le P. Labourdette." These essays skillfully coalesce and complement each other, forming, as with the variously tinted panes of a stained-glass window, a multi-colored illumination of their subject. What emerges from this well-composed assemblage is a devoted homage to a theologian creatively faithful to his inherited traditions. This creative fidelity to the depositum fidei, and to a Thomistic legacy invigoratingly alive in his own work, forms the intellectual principle by which P. Labourdette sought to perceive and understand the many new insights and developments that cannot help hut teem before any alert, twentieth-century mind. P. Lahourdette addresses himself to theological issues using an approach both classical and flexible, deep, yet clear. This clarity is of such an order that it reveals to the contemporary reader aspects of traditional theological investigation that have been... (shrink)

Propono hic conversionem in linguam Anglicam conclusionis Collegii Logici, anno 1608–1609 semestri studiorum spatio hiberno a Johanne Rudbeckio Wittenbergæ habiti. Hic commentarius prooemium in conversionem est. Rudbeckius primus Suecus erat, qui librum didacticum de logica publicavit. Maiorem partem libri iam anno 1606 scripserat, cum Mathesis Professor Upsaliensis esset, sed Logica ex optimis et præstantissimis autoribus collecta & conscripta non ante annum 1625 edita sit. Cum Johanne Canuti Lenæo, collega suo, Rudbeckius primas partes agebat in inducenda in Sueciam scholastica Lutherana, cuius (...) rei scopus defensio erat fidei Lutheranæ per logicam et metaphysicam Aristotelicam. In primo capite condiciones conclusionis Rudbeckii commentor. Secundum caput brevem Rudbeckii vitæ descriptionem offert. Tertium quartumque capita de scripto converso et de ipsa conversione observationes quasdam continent.This note is an introduction to the English translation of the concluding speech of the Collegium Logicum that Johannes Rudbeckius taught in Wittenberg during the winter semester 1608–1609. Rudbeckius was the first Swede to publish a textbook on logic; his Logica ex optimis et præstantissimis autoribus collecta & conscripta appeared in 1625. The first version of the textbook was completed already in 1606 when Rudbeckius was professor of mathematics at Uppsala University in Sweden. Together with his colleague Johannes Canuti Lenæus, Rudbeckius played a key role in the introduction of Lutheran scholasticism in Sweden; this was a movement within the Lutheran Church whose aim was to defend the Lutheran faith by making use of Aristotelian logic and metaphysics. In Section 1, I comment on the context of Rudbeckius’s discourse. Section 2 offers a short biography of Rudbeckius. Sections 3 and 4 contain, respectively, some remarks about the text translated and about the translation itself. (shrink)

Las Disputaciones metafísicas de Suárez son el punto de encuentro de dos líneas ontológicas, energetista y dinamicista, amenazadas por el nominalismo ockhamista, sin otra tangencia posible que una original reelaboración de la unidad formal (in natura rei ante operationem intellectus) al esse simplicissimum et primum omnium en aras de una autónoma scientia perfecta et a priori. La distinctio rationis ratiocinatae entre esencia y existencia en los seres creados, la individuación per intrinsecum y la posibilidad de su noticia directa o la (...) comprensión del ente ut sic como conceptus obiectivum (ratio obiectiva entis ut sic), contracta representación quoad nos (sub denominatione intellectus) del motivo basal de la metafísica con rigurosa prioridad cognitiva (prima et abstractissima omnium) cuyo contenido revelaría la reconducción del esse reale a esse essentiae, son deudas con uno u otro programa delatoras de un esfuerzo de síntesis que se perfila umbral de la modernidad. (shrink)

In this ambitious study, Alexander W. Hall examines the two preeminent figures of the golden age of natural theology: Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus. Hall is not so much concerned with retracing particular proofs of the existence of God and derivations of the divine attributes—well-worn paths in discussions of medieval natural theology—as with investigating the larger philosophical issues that are raised by the project of natural theology, such as the nature of scientia and demonstrative arguments, and accounts of signification (...) and the meaningfulness of theological discourse.Hall's opening chapter offers an overview of natural theology in the High Middle Ages, summarizing the conclusions he will defend at greater length over the course of the book. In chapter 2 Hall relies primarily on Aquinas's commentary on the Posterior Analytics to get clear on his account of scientia, or scientific knowledge. "For Aquinas," Hall writes,"paradigmatic scientia is the result of syllogistic reasoning . . . Syllogisms productive of scientia use either real or nominal definitions as their middle, and thus the conclusion tells us what belongs to the subject through itself or per se". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE RECTITUDE OF INCLINATION NICHOLAS INGHAM, 0.P. Provincial Archives Providence, Rhode Island 0 F THE MOST plausible mainline treatments of the relation of inclination to action and of their combination to moral estimation-Kantian, Classical Utilitarian, and Aristotelian-Thomist--only the third, remarkably enough, provides for the possibility of intrinsic rectitude as regards inclination. For Kant, of course, inclination is not only indifferent to morality but censurable as a criterion for action; (...) indeed, any act done from inclination is, for Kant, pre-moral at best and immoral at worst. Classical Utilitarianism would appear to hold that the desire for pleasure, since it is correct by nature, must also be indefectibly and intrinsically correct. But this is not so, since in any choice situation an inclination toward a given pleasure, right by nature, may be counterbalanced by competing claims, whether these claims themselves arise from other inclinations within the one moral subject or from distinct subjects with differing claims. Hence, Classical Utilitarianism must accept a doctrine of extrinsic correctness as regards the evaluation of any inclination unless the version in question can establish a universally valid overriding principle of right-in which case it is Utilitarianism no longer but some form of deontological ethics. Only in the moral thought of Aristotle and Aquinas do we actually find a plausible case for the rectitude of inclination. And it is therefore surprising that so little attention has been paid this and that so many doctrinal Aristotelian-Thomists seem unaware of it. For many scholars, otherwise well acquainted with the basic philosophical views defended by St. Thomas Aquinas in his 417 418 NICHOLAS INGHAM, O.P. Aristotelian commentaries, remain surprisingly unfamiliar with one of the most interesting parts of his metaphysics of morals: right appetite, inclination, or emotion as an integral part of moral science, moral activity, and reflexive knowledge of the morality of conduct and of disposition.' I should like to set out what seem to me to be the general Aristotelian-Thomist views, as expressed in the commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, and to develop from them a full account of intrinsic, extrinsic, stable, and per se rectitude as regards inclination or appetite. The first step in this development requires us to consider whether a moral science is possible and, if so, of what kind it must be. I Initially both St. Thomas and Aristotle appear to neglect altogether the problem whether there can be moral science as such. In listing the five intellectual virtues (understanding, science, wisdom, prudence, and art) neither mentions a science of right action. Would such a discipline be theoretical? Ordinarily the theoretical sciences in Aristotle and Aquinas perfect only theoretical powers. Does right action fall only under prudence? Prudence ordinarily is taken to be a practical virtue, not one specifically pertaining to the sciences. Three solutions to the difficulty offer themselves at once: first, moral science belongs essentially among ·the theoretical disciplines, even where allowance is made for the inclusion of practical elements in some methodologically defensible way; second, it is science but only in a highly derivative and improper sense and, in fact, is more correctly treated as providing something like a schema for the exercise of the cardinal virtues, especially prudence; third, it is thoroughly scientific in the strict and unqualified sense of the term, yet essentially not a theoretical but a practical discipline. 1 It is surprising how little serious attention seems to have been paid to Aristotle's remark in Ethics VII, 3, 1147a26-28, that, while the immediate conclusion of theoretical reasoning is affirmation, the immediate result of practical reasoning is action. THE RECTITUDE OF INCLINATION 419 The first solution, as one might easily imagine, has been championed by many of the most illustrious commentators. John of St. Thomas appears to hold that moral science is, as such, purely theoretical, even though it has practical application in prudential application.2 Maritain seems to believe that it is the theoretical treatment of a subject matter intrinsically practical in nature.3 Lottin holds that it is speculatively practical-a mixture 2 "Scientia moralis potest dupliciter considerari; uno modo, ut etiam includit prudentiam, alio modo, ut earn excludit et solum versatur circa cognitionem virtutum... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS ON RESOLUTION IN METAPHYSICS MICHAEL TAVUZZI, O.P. Angeliaum University Rome FOR AQUINAS a sequence of thoughts, even if interconnected in some manner, does not DJutomatically constitute a scientific discipline. To justify a daim to scientific status such a sequence will have ito he characterized by those properties which raise mere thinking to the level of reasoning : it wiH have to proceed rationabiliter,. in all senses of the (...) term. The sequence wiM havie to he concerned with a 1corresponding obiectum speculabile, with a universal concept or ratio.1 It wi11 have to be endowed with a direct object of in1 " Et ideo oportet scientias speculativas dividi per differentias speculabilium, in quantum speculabilia sunt." In Boethii de Trin., q. 5, a. l; "... scientia est de aliquo dupliciter. Uno modo et principaliter, et sic scientia est de rationibus universalibus..." In Boethii de Trin., q. 5, a. 2, ad 4um. The term ratio in Aquinas has a remarkable multiplicity of senses. L. Schutz, ThomM-Lexikon (reprinted N.Y., 1957), pp. 679-690, enumerates eighteen principal significations. Without going into detail, I would like to point out that I am employing the term ratio in the sense of a universal concept (Schlitz's 'i '). This is not the universal concept taken as a particular psychological fact or mental event, with the ontological status of an accident inhering in the rational soul as in its subject, but rather the universal concept in the sense of its notional content, taken as a particular psychological fact. The term ratio, therefore, denotes the notional content which: (l) represents the intellect's understanding of the nature or essence which is instantiated in a multiplicity of particulars (the nature or essence is itself denoted by the term ratio according to another of its senses, Schlitz's sense 'k '); (2) is endowed with the intentio universalitatis whereby the multiplicity of particulars in which the corresponding nature or essence is instantiated falls under the concept as its genus or species; (3) is verbally expressed by a definition. This sense of the term ratio is, of course, not to be confused with that wholly different sense (also of great importance for an understanding of metaphysical resolution) whereby it denotes tbe intellect's 199 ~00 MICHAEL TAVUZZI, O.P. vestigation, with ·a proportionate subiectum scientiae, which is at foast formally distinct from that of any other scientific discipline. Aquinais affirms thrut this is indeed the case with the sequence of interconnected reasonings which consititutes the science of metaphysics. In the Prooemium to the oommentary on the Metaphysics of A~istotle, he states that metaphysics is concerned, in the first place, with being as sUJCh-with being as being and the properties which are immediately consequent upon it.2 The diroot subject matter of metaphysics, its obiectum spooulabile as such, is the ratio which is the content of the concept of being in general (ens commune) and which is instantiated in everything which falls under this quasigeneric concept. But just how does the mind have access to this obiectum speculabile? How does the intellect form the concept of being in geneml and sei:z;e its content? After aH, the 1 content of this concept which e~resses the " nature " of being as such, the ratio entis, is neither readily nor immediately gmsped by,the intellect. If it were, there wouM indeed be no need for the discipline of metaphysics. Just how then does the intellect attain it? This question represents the crucial probfom of the very possibility of the science of metaphysics as envisaged by Aquinas. Aquinas is ce:vtainly aware of this and in the same Prooemium does not neglect to answer it. The content of the concept of being in general, the obiectum speculabile of metaphysics, is attained by means of a process of resolut:io.8 In this paper I shall examine this process of metaphysical resolution. I shall first trace Aquina;s's gradual clarification of the nature of resolutive reasoning by commencing with its most primitiv. (shrink)

Da lungo tempo è stato riconosciuto il carattere scotista dell'Expositio in libros Metaphysicorum di Antonio Andrea, a tal punto che essa figura tra le opere di Scoto nelle edizioni del Wadding e di Vivés. Anche ora che la paternità di Antonio Andrea per quest'opera è stata comunemente riconosciuta, accade spesso che si faccia ricorso all'Expositio al fine di illuminare questo o quel punto oscuro del pensiero di Scoto. Tuttavia, una volta analizzata, quest'opera mostra di essere un adattamento puntuale del commento (...) alla Metafisica di Tommaso dal punto di vista delle teorie di Scoto. Attraverso l'introduzione sistematica nelle formulazioni di Tommaso delle nuove dottrine scotiste dell'univocità dell'ente e della natura communis, Antonio realizzò il progetto di fornire ai primi discepoli di Scoto un manuale della scienza dell'ente come scientia transcendens. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:[Quaestio prima: quomodo est anima omnia]“Anima quodammodo est omnia.”2Verbum Philosophi est et abbreviatum; non autem omnibus satis manifestum. Quid me, Vir Dei,3 iam sollicitas in isto? Scis enim quod imperitussum scientia, et iste sermo profunda forte indiget exquisitione. Quaeris ergo specificari tibi illud quod dico ‘quodammodo’; quomodo enim erit anima omnia? Istum modum velles tibi specificari: autin summa dictione una, aut secundum singula entia singulos modos explicare.Videtur ergo ipse (...) Philosophus declarare istam propositionem inductive sic:‘sensus est quodammodo sensibilia, intellectus est quodammodo intelligibilia’,4igitur etc.[Obiectiones]Hic statim duo obicis:Primum quod cum anima tres partes habeat – vegetativam, sensitivam,intellectivam – in hac ostensione Philosophi ipsum vegetativum nulli entium attribuitur per quodammodo essendi idem, ergo videtur quod non debeatdicere: anima simpliciter quodammodo est omnia, sed secundum aliquas parteseius solum.Item, videtur quod debeat dici quod solum intellectivum sit quodammmodo omnia; nam omnia omnino sunt intelligibilia: universalia, singularia. Omnes naturae vere et simpliciter intelligibiles sunt quantum in ipsis est, licet prima et remotissima principia a nobis non intelligantur. Defectus enim in nobis est sicut in oculis vespertilionis, quibus non videt solem.[2] Item, quomodo est sensus ipsa sensibilia et intellectus ipsa intelligibilia?Aeque enim ignotae sunt hae assumptiones sicut et conclusio. Nam sensitivum res vivens est et substantia; sensibilia, res non-viventes et accidentia, qualitates de tertia specie qualitatis.5 Quomodo ergo est haec illa? Iam enim patet quod non conveniunt nisi in esse et ente tantum; in nullo enim genereomnino. Igitur videtur quod nihil sit dictu ‘sensus est quodammodo sensibilia’.Nam multo magis proprie et vere dictum videretur si diceret quis ‘homoquodammodo est asinus’, nam haec conveniunt in genere et generibus.Similiter, quaeris ex parte intellectus et intelligibilium. Intelligibilia enimsunt et substantiae et accidentia, et res viventes et non-viventes; ipsum autem intellectivum, solum substantia et res vivens.[Prima responsio Philosophi ad obiectionem secundam: Sensus est in potentia tale quale sensibile in actu]6Vir Dei, dices mihi, colligendo ex ipso eodem auctore, et respondebis |A 281vb| mihi cum quaero: sensus quomodo est ipsum sensibile? Respondebis cum Philosopho, quia hoc modo, scilicet quod ‘sensus est in potentia tale quale est ipsum sensibile in actu’,7 et illud pertractabis ad singulos sensus et sensibilia. Sic visus est in potentia tale quale est ipsum visibile in actu, et ita de aliis.Sed ego contra: Vir Dei, si ‘sensus est in potentia tale etc.’, ergo aliquando erit in actu tale, etc.Ad idem: sentire quoddam pati est et quaedam alteratio. Est enim sensus de genere virtutum passivarum secundum eundem Philosophum.8 Agens autem et patiens in principio sunt dissimilia; in fine vero, cum passum est, sunt similia.Igitur sensitivum ex quo sentiendo quodammodo patitur et passivum est. Infine cum passum est, simile erit ipsi activo, scilicet sensibili. Tunc igitur erit‘sensus tale in actu quale est etiam ipsum sensibile in actu’.Sed nunc quaero quid hoc sit dictu, scilicet quod aliquando ipsum sensitivum in actu sit tale quale ipsum sensibile. Quid dicis ‘tale quale’? Numquid si actu video colorem, est virtus visiva oculi mei actu color? Aut non dicis talis estcolor? Quaero, si in qualitate assimilabitur illa virtus visiva actu colori, nihil videtur huiusmodi expositio. |E 107vb| Sicut enim superius dictum est, non videntur convenire nisi in solo ente et esse.9Confiteor, Vir Dei, quia haec ultimo obiecta tentativa sunt, sed necessaria tamen ad propositum si recte dissolvantur, per gratiam ergo Dei et per orationes tuas, Vir Dei, spero ad haec quandoque redire.[Secunda responsio Philosophi ad obiectionem secundam: homo ut mundus minor]Sed nec illud quod legimus videtur sufficere ad propositum problema, Vir Dei: ‘homo est quodammodo omnis creatura et mundus’, minor scilicet,10 et communicans cum omnibus creaturis, hoc modo: “esse cum lapidibus, vivere cum plantis, sentire cum brutis, intelligere cum angelis,” et tandem cum Deo.11Si secundum hunc modum velim praedictum sermonem exponere, non erit.. (shrink)

The starting point for the contemporary debate about theories of health should be the holistic theory of Lennart Nordenfelt, claims George Khushf, not the refuted theory of Christopher Boorse. The present paper is an attempt to challenge Nordenfelt and to present an alternative theory to his and other theories, including Boorse’s. The main problems with Nordenfelt’s theory are that it is relativistic, that it leads to counter-intuitive results as to what goals can count as healthy, that it focuses on the (...) wrong kind of abilities, that it makes measuring health extra difficult, and that it does not give us a sufficient account of health, at most a necessary one. The alternative theory proposed is two-dimensional. First, health is to have developed the abilities and dispositions that members of one’s culture typically develop, and be able to use them, in acceptable circumstances; and second, health is to experience positive moods and sensations, the kinds that have internal causes. The theory solves the problems attached to Nordenfelt’s theory by not being individual relativistic, by eliminating the goals in the definition, by giving an alternative interpretation of “ability,” by making health easier to measure, and by adding the dimension of well-being that, together with health as ability, not only gives us a necessary, but also a sufficient, account of health. (shrink)

The present paper is a commentary on an article by Larry Churchill [1]. Churchill has argued that the negative attitudes and adverse behavior we commonly encounter in connection with AIDS patients may be understood in terms of a dualistic myth inspiring a ritual avoidance of dirt, of dirt as something that does not belong to a clean world order. The deep-seated mythical character of attitudes and behavior here makes them less accessible to the kind of rational argument commonly employed in (...) ethics. Churchill also proposes a remedy for the dualistic mythical-ritual behavior he has focused — a remedy that may be overly intellectualistic.Three further comments are made: on the metaphorical meaning of myth, on a reductionist tendency in Churchill's deep-looking project, and on an ethically crucial ambiguity in the meaning of the other person's otherness. These comments do not, however, detract from a positive overall evaluation of Churchill's basic idea that we will understand more about adverse attitudes and behavior in connection with AIDS if we think in terms of myth, ritual, dirt, and cleanliness. (shrink)

Once relegated to the margins of the responsibility debate, moral influence theories have recently been rehabilitated. This paper offers a moral influence theory with two parts: a theory of responsibility as influenceability and an act-consequentialist justification of blame. I defend this account against six concerns commonly raised both by opponents and by advocates of similar views. Some concerns target act consequentialism, claiming that it 1) permits blaming innocents; 2) permits coercion, manipulation, and other objectionable forms of influence; and 3) fails (...) to capture intuitions about desert. Other concerns target responsibility as influenceability, claiming that influenceability accounts are 4) unsophisticated, 5) make ascriptions of responsibility dependent on assessments of permissible blame, and 6) have various counterintuitive implications. (shrink)

In this article, we defend two claims about the precautionary principle. The first is that there is no ‘core’ precautionary principle that unifies all its different versions. It is more plausible to think of the different versions as being related to each other by way of family resemblances. So although precautionary principle x may have much in common with precautionary principle y, and y with z, there is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions that unify all versions of the (...) principle. Our second claim is that it is sometimes appropriate to think of the precautionary principle as a midlevel principle in the sense proposed by Beauchamp and Childress in their Principles of Biomedical Ethics, i.e. as a non-rigid moral principle. We argue that if the precautionary principle is conceived as a non-rigid principle that needs to be balanced against other principles before a moral verdict can be reached, then this enables us to address some standard objections to the principle. (shrink)

This paper investigates the possibility of understanding the rudimentary elements of clinical sensitivity by investigating the works of Edmund Husserl and Emmanuel Levinas on sensibility. Husserl's theory of intentionality offers significant reflections on the role of pre-reflective and affective intuition as a condition for intentionality and reflective consciousness. These early works of Husserl, in particular his works on the constitution of phenomenological time and subjective time-consciousness, prove to be an important basis for Levinas’ works on an ethics of alterity and (...) infinite responsibility for the other person. In fact, it is difficult to understand the core of Levinasian ethics, of vulnerability as proximity, of ethical sensitivity as passivity and a suffering for the suffering of another, without understanding the influence from Husserl's work. Crucially, the paper will, on the basis of Levinasian ethics, establish an understanding of sensibility as vulnerability and receptivity that is fundamental also for understanding significant intuitions in clinical nursing. Clinical sensitivity and carefulness in nursing are shaped by the concrete and also bodily expressions of vulnerabilities in a receptivity that is pre-reflective and pre-ontological. (shrink)

The two notions of “globalization” and “knowledge society” are often assumed to be relatively neutral descriptions of contemporary social and cultural developments, although they are embedded in discourses on power and domination. In this paper the argument is made that both these notions can be understood as expressions of an ideology of neo-colonialism and that they assume an ethnocentric or Eurocentric bias rather than being neutral descriptions of the “natural” unfolding of social and political changes. The thesis of the “knowledge (...) society”, in particular, needs to be demythologized as a vehicle for the rebirth of nations and regions in the context of increasing global challenges. A critical perspective such as this is a desired complement to the otherwise glossy versions of the future of “knowledge work” and “creative work” based on a doctrine of “fundamentalism of education”. The critical understanding of contemporary regimes for knowledge, learning and education on the international scene provide a necessary counterpoint to the dominating political and educational discourses advocating the advent of “knowledge society”. (shrink)

During the last decade, the populist radical nationalist party, the Sweden Democrats, has gone from being a minor party to become Sweden’s third largest party in parliament. In this article, the author shows how the category of Christianity has come to play a pivotal role in the party’s political identification. Drawing on Ernesto Laclau’s analysis of populism, the author argues that Christianity should be understood as a projection surface for fantasies of an ethnically and culturally superior homogenous nation vis-à-vis constructed (...) national others. In a populist logic, Christianity has thus become a way to distinguish the SD from its articulated external and internal political foes. By appropriating Christianity, the SD articulates itself as the guardian of true Christianity, the future savior of a Church allegedly hijacked by external and internal foes, and in the long run, the Swedish nation. (shrink)

Gadow's understanding of nursing as a relational narrative anchored in a dialectic between the fundamental subjectivity of the individual client and the objectification of his illness poses some interesting questions for nursing ethics and care. For Gadow, nursing is an encounter with the immediate vulnerability of the client and also lends it responsibilities to the medical objectification of illness aiming at disease treatment and control. Hence, nursing agency is divided between its responsibilities induced by the personal vulnerability of the patient (...) and the more impersonal, but benevolent intention shaped by medical knowledge. Medical knowledge is impersonal in the sense that it is knowledge detached from the subjectivity of the patient. But how is nursing able to reconcile the interests derived from personal and experienced vulnerability with the more impersonal and often conflicting demands of medical knowledge? This question is even more intriguing because there seems to be an objective dimension within a patient's subjectivity itself: an autonomous person can critically evaluate his own subjectivity as a basis for informed self‐interest. The sick person is thus confronted with objectivity on two important levels: the objective facts of his disease and his detachment from his own experiential vulnerability when engaged in the critical evaluation of his self‐interest. This paper will discuss the normative dimensions of these complex and, frequently, conflicting perspectives from the theoretical perspectives of Thomas Nagel's normative responsibility and Sally Gadow's clinical epistemology and relational narratives. The empirical basis for the discussion will be an ongoing study of the ethical dimensions of pain relief and sedation in an intensive care unit. (shrink)

The purpose of the present thesis is to apply philosophical methods to the ongoing debate of the precautionary principle, in order to illuminate this debate. The thesis consists of an Introduction and five papers. Paper I con-cerns an objection to the method of conceptual analysis, the Charge from Psychology. After a brief characterisation of conceptual analysis, I argue that the Charge from Psychology is misdirected. In Paper II, the method of conceptual analysis is applied to the concept of precaution which (...) is ana-lysed in terms of precautionary actions. The purpose is explicatory. A definition involving three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions is proposed, and the implications of this analysis for the debate on the pre-cautionary principle are discussed. Paper III attempts to provide an ana-lytical apparatus which may be used for finding improved formulations of the precautionary principle. The approach is lexicographical. Several exist-ing and possible formulations of the precautionary principle are examined, and four common elements and a common structure of the precautionary principle are identified. It is suggested that the analytical apparatus pre-sented can be used in negotiations of the precautionary principle. Paper IV questions the soundness of some arguments against the precautionary prin-ciple. Five common arguments are discussed and rejected. In Paper V, two of these arguments are further discussed. I argue that an attempt at rejec-tion of the precautionary principle delivered by John Harris and Søren Holm is unwarranted, because their arguments against it are based on in-terpretations of the precautionary principle that ignore context. Paper VI deals with the idea of de minimis risk. After a discussion of the distinction between disregarding a risk and accepting it, I examine one way of deter-mining how small a risk ought to be in order to be disregarded, namely the use of natural risk levels as benchmarks. I argue that this approach fails, even if the distinction between what is natural and what is not natural can be upheld. (shrink)

The first part of this paper seeks to clarify how interpersonal relationships are generally rooted in considerations about trust, vulnerability and interpersonal dependence. However, for nurse–patient relationships, and from the point of view of justice and fair rationing, it is essential to investigate their distinct moral nature. Hence, the second part of the paper argues that nurse–patient relationships, as a special kind of interpersonal relationship, raise particular normative issues. I will discuss dilemmas facing nurses and professional care‐givers in general who (...) are torn between their obligations to existing patients and more general and impartial considerations regarding the distribution of nursing care. This discussion concerning the normative claims of immediacy and mercy vs. fairness in health care is a pressing issue for nursing care. The claims that arise from particular relationships in nursing care are typically associated with closeness to a person's vulnerabilities. The pressing issue is how considerations of mercy and protection of individual patients can be safeguarded within today's nursing and health‐care practices in which distributivist considerations are crucial. (shrink)

An important way to become self-deceived, omitted by Mele, is by intentionally ignoring and avoiding the contemplation of evidence one has for an upsetting conclusion, knowing full well that one is giving priority to one's present peace of mind over the search for truth. Such intentional self-deception may be especially hard to observe scientifically.