It is shown that the axioms Cubitt and Sugden (1994; Economic J. 104: 798) impose on a theory of rationally justifiable play (TRJP) do not prevent the possibility that two players necessarily disagree concerning the probability they ascribe to the choice of a third player. This appears to indicate that those axioms are not sufficient for defining a `reasonable' TRJP. In addition, for the case in which a player's beliefs are statistically independent, conditions for a TRJP are suggested under which (...) the existence of a quasi-strict equilibrium is sufficient, but the existence of a consistent n-pair is not, for defining a TRJP meeting those requirements. (shrink)

Two recent papers (Cubitt and Sugden, 1994; Samuelson, 1992) have established impossibility results which cast doubt on the coherence of the assumption of ’common knowledge of rationality'. It is shown that the Cubitt–Sugden result is the more powerful of the two impossibilities. Second, it is proved that the existence of a quasi-strict equilibrium is sufficient to construct sets which satisfy the Cubitt–Sugden axioms. This fact is used to establish that their impossibility result cannot arise in 2-player games. (...) Finally, it is shown that if a weak symmetry postulate is added, a new impossibility result arises for this class of games. (shrink)

In this paper we prove strong completeness of axiomatic extensions of first-order strict core fuzzy logics with the so-called quasi-witnessed axioms with respect to quasi-witnessed models. As a consequence we obtain strong completeness of Product Predicate Logic with respect to quasi-witnessed models, already proven by M.C. Laskowski and S. Malekpour in [19]. Finally we study similar problems for expansions with Δ, define Δ-quasi-witnessed axioms and prove that any axiomatic extension of a first-order strict core (...) fuzzy logic, expanded with Δ, and Δ-quasi-witnessed axioms are complete with respect to Δ-quasi-witnessed models. (shrink)

There are two general classes of social conventions: conventions of coordination, and conventions of partial conflict. In coordination problems, the interests of the agents coincide, while in partial conflict problems, some agents stand to gain only if other agents unilaterally make certain sacrifices. Lewis' (1969) pathbreaking analysis of convention in terms of game theory focuses on coordination problems, and cannot accommodate partial conflict problems. In this paper, I propose a new game-theoretic definition of convention which generalizes previous game-theoretic definitions (Lewis (...) 1969, Vanderschraaf 1995), and which can be used to characterize norms of justice in partial conflict situations. I argue that the key structural property necessary for a social arrangement to be a convention is that it be conditionally self-enforcing, in the sense that: (i) each agent has a decisive reason to follow her end of the arrangement given that she expects all to do likewise, (ii) given a different set of expectations, some agents would have had a decisive reason to deviate, and (iii) these facts are common knowledge. This leads to a definition of convention as a strict correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974) together with appropriate common knowledge conditions. Examples are given in which it is shown how this more general account of convention can be used to analyze norms of justice as well as coordination problems. It is only a general sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules. I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually express'd, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behavior. And this may properly be call'd a convention or agreement betwixt us,.. (shrink)

Consistency and optimality together with converse consistency provide an illuminating and novel characterization of the equilibrium concept (Peleg and Tijs, 1996). But (together with non-emptiness) they preclude refinements of the equilibrium notion and selection of a unique equilibrium (Norde et al., 1996). We suggest two escape routes: By generalizing the concept of strict equilibrium we question the practical relevance of the existence requirement for refinements. To allow for equilibrium selection we suggest more complex reduced (...) games which capture the inclinations of ``players who already left''. (shrink)

A quasi-order Q induces two natural quasi-orders on $${\mathcal{P}(Q)}$$, but if Q is a well-quasi-order, then these quasi-orders need not necessarily be well-quasi-orders. Nevertheless, Goubault-Larrecq (Proceedings of the 22nd Annual IEEE Symposium 4 on Logic in Computer Science (LICS’07), pp. 453–462, 2007) showed that moving from a well-quasi-order Q to the quasi-orders on $${\mathcal{P}(Q)}$$ preserves well-quasi-orderedness in a topological sense. Specifically, Goubault-Larrecq proved that the upper topologies of the induced quasi-orders on (...) $${\mathcal{P}(Q)}$$ are Noetherian, which means that they contain no infinite strictly descending sequences of closed sets. We analyze various theorems of the form “if Q is a well-quasi-order then a certain topology on (a subset of) $${\mathcal{P}(Q)}$$ is Noetherian” in the style of reverse mathematics, proving that these theorems are equivalent to ACA 0 over RCA 0. To state these theorems in RCA 0 we introduce a new framework for dealing with second-countable topological spaces. (shrink)

: Building on recent linguistic and philosophical research on quasi-indexicals, self-consciousness, anaphora, and discours indirect libre, I argue that they raise problems for the definition of self-knowledge understood according to the Classical Definition of Knowledge. I call this extremely difficult problem the “non-detachment problem”. I show that, for this reason, self-knowledge must always be considered perspectival and non-third-personal, in the relevant cases. I also discuss and criticize the Lewis-Chierchia interpretation of de se attitudes. Furthermore, I discuss the role of (...) the self in the strict sense in an adequate account of so-called self-knowledge, and in a problem closely related to the “non-detachment problem”, that of the reconstruction of the cogito. Keywords: Indexicals; Quasi-indexicals; Classical Definition of Knowledge; Self-knowledge; Self-consciousness Considerazioni su quasi-indicali, autoriferimento e conoscenza di sé Riassunto: Sulla base di recenti ricerche linguistiche e filosofiche sui quasi-indicali, l‘autocoscienza, l’anafora e il discours indirect libre, intendo sostenere che essi sollevano difficoltà, già anticipate da Castañeda e altri, per la definizione della conoscenza di sé, se essa è pensata secondo la definizione classica di conoscenza considerata almeno come condizione necessaria della conoscenza. Chiamo questo problema di difficilissima soluzione il “problema della non distaccabilità”. Cercherò di mostrare che, di conseguenza, la conoscenza di sé deve essere intesa come sempre “prospettica” e non di terza persona, nei casi rilevanti. Intendo poi discutere criticamente l’interpretazione di Lewis e Chierchia delle attitudini de se. Inoltre, discuto il ruolo del sé in senso stretto in un resoconto adeguato della cosiddetta conoscenza di sé e in un problema prossimo a quello della “non distaccabilità”: il problema della ricostruzione del cogito. Parole chiave: Indicali; Quasi-indicali; Definizione classica della conoscenza; Conoscenza di sé; autocoscienza. (shrink)

provide a plausible alternative to utilitarianism. Rawls gives two kinds of arguments to show that his two principles of justice are more plausible or more nearly correct than utilitarianism. First, he argues that the two principles of justice provide a better match with our 'considered judgments in reflective equilibrium.' Second, he argues that his two principles would be chosen in preference to the principle of utility in 'the original position.' I shall be concerned only with the second of these (...) two arguments in this paper. According to Rawls, people in the original position choose principles on the assumption that whatever principles are chosen will be strictly complied with, i.e., they choose on the assumption that the basic institutions of their society and all of the actions of its members will be in compliance with whatever principles are chosen. (shrink)

The article is a review of A.P. Simester, ed., Appraising Strict Liability. We strongly recommend the book for the sophistication of the contributors’ analyses, and the contribution the book makes to clarifying the normative issues at stake in strict liability legal regimes. The review focuses on the more philosophical essays in the book. The specific issues from the book identified in the review are: the rights-based character of the prohibition on conviction without moral fault; the importance of the (...) principle of proportionality; due diligence defences; the instrumental worth of strict liability in relation to quasi-criminal regulation; the faultiness of genuinely creating risks. (shrink)

The core of the third chapter is the study of the P‐series. This theory is presented after a detailed discussion of the relationship of individuals to species and genus. A P‐series is a sequence of terms classified according to priority and posteriority starting from the most universal one. This theory is the result of the evolution of the Aristotelian doctrine of pros en done in order to fit with the not strictly Aristotelian notion of ‘genus’ of some Neoplatonic philosophers.

In this paper I argue against what I call ‘strict evidentialism’, the view that evidence is the sole factor for determining the normative status of beliefs. I argue that strict evidentialism fails to capture the uniquely subjective standpoint of believers and as a result it fails to provide us with the tools necessary to apply its own epistemic norms. In its place I develop an interest-relative theory of justification which I call quasi-evidentialism, according to which S has (...) a justified belief that P at time t if and only if S’s evidence at time t supports P in proportion to S’s interest in P. I take interests as fixed and argue that adjusting our confidence in a proposition in the right way, given our interests, is fine-tuned through the exercise of intellectual virtue, in particular the virtue of epistemic conscientiousness. This theory refocuses epistemic responsibility in the subject and by locating agency in the cultivation of epistemic virtue it also provides a handy solution to the problem of doxastic voluntarism, insofar as the development of our epistemic virtue guides our responsiveness to reason. (shrink)

This book is addresses a topic that has received little or no attention in orthodox epistemology. Typical epistemological investigation focuses almost exclusively on knowledge, where knowing that something is the case importantly implies that what is believed is strictly true. This condition on knowledge is known as factivity and it is, to be sure, a bit of epistemological orthodoxy. So, if a belief is to qualify as knowledge according to the orthodox view it cannot be false. There is also an (...) increasingly influential group of epistemologists who argue that one ought to act only on what one knows, because truth of belief is the surest way to guarantee that our actions work out as planned. They defend what is known as the knowledge norm for action. This view is typically justified in virtue of the idea that successful intentional action should stem from knowledge because knowledge is a factive propositional attitude and it is, as a result, success-prone with respect to intentional action. In other words, true beliefs that constitute knowledge are the rationally normative standard for successful acting. But, there are clearly multitudes of cases where epistemic agents operate successfully and even rationally on the basis of beliefs that are false. That this is the case is not especially controversial. Sometimes false beliefs facilitate successful action. Of course, this can be because the agent is simply lucky. However, there is something particularly important about some false beliefs that relates to successful action but not in virtue of luck. While not strictly true, the beliefs in question are close to the truth or approximately true. This gives rise to the possibility that there are knowledge-like states that play roles very similar to knowledge but which are only quasi-factive. That is to say such states imply approximate truth and do not imply strict truth. Moreover, often such beliefs facilitate successful action in virtue of their being approximately true and this suggests a much more plausible norm for successful action that encompasses both cases of rational action guided by such quasi-factive states as well as cases of rational action guided by knowledge. The thesis of this book is that quasi-factive knowledge-like states are far more common that epistemologists have acknowledge and the book introduces a theory of such states and how they give rise to a much more reasonable account of the norms for action. This involves some tricky issues concerning approximate truth, the rationality of believing not strictly true claims, the justification of approximately true beliefs, the nature of false but approximately true evidence, the norms of belief, knowledge and quasi-knowledge, etc. (shrink)

We prove that the Wadge order on the Borel subsets of the Scott domain is not a well-quasi-order, and that this feature even occurs among the sets of Borel rank at most 2. For this purpose, a specific class of countable 2-colored posets$\mathbb{P}_{emb} $equipped with the order induced by homomorphisms is embedded into the Wadge order on the$\Delta _2^0 $-degrees of the Scott domain. We then show that$\mathbb{P}_{emb} $admits both infinite strictly decreasing chains and infinite antichains with respect to (...) this notion of comparison, which therefore transfers to the Wadge order on the$\Delta _2^0 $-degrees of the Scott domain. (shrink)

Organisational Ethics could be more effectively taught if organisational agency could be better distinguished from activity in other group entities, and defended against criticisms. Some criticisms come from the side of what is called “methodological individualism”. These critics argue that, strictly speaking, only individuals really exist and act, and organisations are not individuals, real things, or agents. Other criticisms come from fear of the possible use of alleged “corporate personhood” to argue for a possible radical expansion of corporate rights e.g. (...) to claim a right to vote. Others say that if corporate businesses were persons, and judged as such, they would be sociopaths (Bakan 2004). Large corporate businesses are one kind of organisation, and if organisations were allowed to claim to be full persons, this would mean that the latter criticisms were valid. The proposed account goes between the horns of the above dilemma: impersonal aggregates or full persons. It avoids both the reductive individualism and expansive, full personhood account. It gives grounds for attributing and distributing praise and blame to organisations as whole complex entities, and to their parts. Primarily, responsibility belongs to Board incumbents within them, on the basis of their goals; their direction of the acts of the other main internal role incumbents, managers and staff, and enablers, in the role structure; their own ethical decision methods; the impact of their acts on external stakeholders like end-users, other players in the practice or local community, and on the state. These factors are picked out on the basis of a theory of meaning Aristotle’s theory of analogy of attribution, some architectonic features of his Philosophical Anthropology; and Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics (NAVE). The paper expounds a quasi-person model of organisations, (QPM), previously described in this journal (Ardagh 2011, 2012, 2013). This model identifies functional similarities at three levels, between capacities within natural persons (NPs) on the one hand and the roles/ incumbents within the structure of organisational artificial/quasi-persons (APs on the other). In each entity, we find an architectonic direction, sub-ordered operational entities, and enablers (a DOE structure) in a communicative structure or reporting chain of authority. The common elements between natural persons (NP) and artificial persons (AP) and their ethically relevant attributes are captured in an acronym –GRAEOS. Both persons and organisations have a “top” entity capable of having/choosing worthwhile ethically permissible goals, G; of architectonically directing the use of capacities/repertoires or incumbents in designed architectonic roles, R, within a DOE-type structure, well or badly; of using ethical decision making procedures, E; of execution of good choices for the person or organisation in action, A, with good or bad impacts on others, or with others, O, in the context practice or domain; and of having good relations with the law and the state, S. Application to the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster, and public sector organisations, is briefly discussed to illustrate the potential to deal with short or long case study narratives. (shrink)

We locate winning strategies for various ${\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{3}^{0}$ -games in the L-hierarchy in order to prove the following: Theorem 1. KP+Σ₂-Comprehension $\vdash \exists \alpha L_{\alpha}\ models"\Sigma _{2}-{\bf KP}+\Sigma _{3}^{0}-\text{Determinacy}."$ Alternatively: ${\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}\phantom{\rule{0ex}{0ex}}$ "there is a β-model of ${\mathrm{\Delta }}_{3}^{1}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}+\text{\hspace{0.17 em}}{\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{3}^{0}$ -Determinacy." The implication is not reversible. (The antecedent here may be replaced with ${\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}\left({\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}\right)-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}:\text{\hspace{0.17em}}{\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}$ instances of Comprehension with only ${\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}$ -lightface definable parameters—or even weaker theories.) Theorem 2. KP +Δ₂-Comprehension +Σ₂-Replacement + ${\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{3}^{0}\phantom{\rule{0ex}{0ex}}$ -Determinacy. (Here AQI (...) is the assertion that every arithmetical quasi-inductive definition converges.) Alternatively: $\Delta _{3}^{1}{\rm CA}_{0}+{\rm AQI}\nvdash \Sigma _{3}^{0}$ -Determinacy. Hence the theories: ${\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0},\text{\hspace{0.17em}}{\mathrm{\Delta }}_{3}^{1}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}+\text{\hspace{0.17em}}{\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{3}^{0}-\mathrm{D}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\phantom{\rule{0ex}{0ex}}$ -Det, ${\mathrm{\Delta }}_{3}^{1}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}+\mathrm{A}\mathrm{Q}\mathrm{I}$ , and ${\mathrm{\Delta }}_{3}^{1}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}\phantom{\rule{0ex}{0ex}}$ are in strictly descending order of strength. (shrink)

This essay proposes a way of dealing with the strict liability of Internet sellers of other manufacturers’ products, such as Amazon under its ‘Fulfillment by Amazon’ program. I discuss and reject two approaches to the problem that have been proposed by the courts, and advance a view according to which the relevant inquiry is whether Internet intermediaries such as Amazon could have prevented a defective product from reaching the US market. This view accounts in a satisfactory manner for the (...) notion of responsibility that is at the core of US strict products liability law, and avoids the pitfalls of alternative policies. However, since this view also entails a de facto quasi-immunity to lawsuits for Internet intermediaries in many cases, safeguards to that quasi-immunity are also addressed. While the essay focuses on US law, the principles and policies under discussion should be applicable in other jurisdictions as well. (shrink)

We argue that the Soros account of reflexivity does not provide a clear-cut distinction between a social science such as economics and the physical sciences. It is pointed out that the participants who attempt to learn from refutations of conjectures in the Soros world are likely to be haunted by the Duhem–Quine problem of conjointness of hypotheses and unfocused refutation. On a more constructive note, we argue that models of inductive learning, in which participants form conjectures on the basis of (...) strictly limited information sets, can capture the basic thrust of the Soros position. The conjectures are in motion, as the participants attempt to avoid those that are systematically wrong, and there is something vague and uncertain about what can be learned from experience and refutations. The only notion of market efficiency in this world is one contingent on the strictly limited and varied information sets in play. Finally we present a mathematical model and numerical simulations that help justify the causal relationship between reflexivity and far-from-equilibrium dynamics postulated by Soros. (shrink)

Kant’s general mode of argument in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, especially his defence of human nature’s propensity to evil, is a matter of considerable controversy: while some interpret his argument as strictly a priori, others interpret it as anthropological. In dialogue with Allen Wood’s recent work, I defend my earlier claim that Religion employs a quasi-transcendental mode of argument, focused on the possibility of a specific type of experience, not experience in general. In Religion, Kant portrays (...) religious experience as possible only for beings with a good predisposition and a propensity to evil. Kant’s theory of the archetype and his theory of symbolism illustrate the same mode of argument. Taking Religion as a sequel to the third Critique more than the second, my perspectival interpretation makes room for a robust view of unsociable sociability without the absurd deception of regarding it as the source of human evil. (shrink)

The Digital Humanities project ‘CANTUS NETWORK. Libri ordinarii of the Salzburg metropolitan province’ undertakes research around the liturgy and music of the churches and monasteries of the medieval ecclesiastical province of Salzburg. Key sources are the liturgical ‘prompt books’, called libri ordinarii, which include a short form of more or less the entire rite of a diocese or a monastery. The workflow of the project is set in an environment called GAMS, a humanities research data repository built for long-term storage (...) and presentation of data coming from the humanities. Digital editions of the libri ordinarii of the province were generated with the aim of enabling a comparative analysis of the various different traditions. As a first step, the books were transcribed with strict rule-based tags in Microsoft Word and transformed to TEI using the community’s XSLT stylesheets and a Java-based script. Subsequently, Semantic Web technologies were deployed to foster graph-based search and analysis of the structured data. Possible future work on the topic is facilitated by the dissemination of content levels as Linked Open Data. Further analysis is conducted with the help of Natural Language Processing methods in order to find text similarities and differences between the libri ordinarii. (shrink)

You know the story. You have a few intuitions. You propose a few theories that fit them. It’s a living. Of course, things are more complicated than this. We are sensitive to counterexamples raised by others and wish to accommodate or explain away an ever-wider base of intuitive starting points. And a great deal of the action occurs in rational reflection that can alter what is intuitive, and in theorizing that overturns formerly justified beliefs and moves us to new justified (...) beliefs. Details aside, this method in ethics and elsewhere—of first relying on intuitions to form justified beliefs, and subsequently using best-fit (or reflective equilibrium) theorizing on all justified beliefs to move to other justified beliefs—has received a lot of critical attention lately. But it is not a bad method. It is a good method caught in a bad relationship. For its presumptive metaethical companion, realism, would have us believe that intuitions support beliefs about real, stance-independent facts of the matter. That strikes many as dubious. After sorting through some relevant concerns in this vicinity, I argue that the solution is not to reject intuitional methods but to embrace quasi-realism. (shrink)

Quel est le sens des théories physiques? Il fut une époque où le débat entre réalistes et anti-réalistes ne souffrait guère de nuances. Le réalisme scientifique était vide parce qu'il renvoyait à un ailleurs ou à un futur indéfinis ; l'anti-réalisme était aveuglé parce qu'il privait la recherche de but et de direction. Aujourd'hui, bien des réalistes ont appris à se défaire des équivalences rigides entre l'objectivité et la réalité, entre l'objet visé et la " cause " des phénomènes, entre (...) l'invariant et l'en-soi, entre la pratique structurée de la recherche et la préexistence des structures. Et les anti-réalistes, qui adhéraient à la surface des " faits ", des opérations et des interactions sociales, n'ignorent plus les projets, les engagements et les valeurs. Ni les uns ni les autres ne se satisfont désormais d'un strict dualisme entre le donné et le construit. La voie s'en trouve dégagée pour une réappréciation des " étrangetés " de la mécanique quantique : elles ne témoigneraient pas de la distance excessive qui nous sépare du réel ; elles ne nous contraindraient pas davantage à l'agnosticisme. Elles sont peut-être le signe ambigu mais récurrent de l'aveuglante proximité du réel. Reprenant en partie certains de ses propres travaux de recherche, Michel Bitbol appuie ces orientations sur des études de cas concernant l'atomisme, le " vide quantique ", le hasard, la naissance des théories physiques du XXe siècle et le concept d' " état relatif ". (shrink)

Cet ouvrage s’inscrit délibérément en dehors des études médiévales traditionnelles si bien que, pour en donner une idée, je suis obligé de le décrire de façon un peu détaillée. Il se présente comme une histoire de la « balance » des années 1250 à 1375. Mais quel sens a ici le mot « balance »? L’auteur –J.K.- donne « équilibre » comme quasi synonyme. L’introduction va plus loin. Elle en parle comme d’un sentiment non exprimé de la façon dont (...) les choses sont ou doivent être arrangées, d’une ap.. (shrink)

In this article, I analyze the circumstances of justice, that is, the background conditions that are necessary and sufficient for justice to exist between individual parties in society. Contemporary political philosophers almost unanimously accept an account of these circumstances attributed to David Hume. I argue that the conditions of this standard account are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for justice. In particular, I contend that both a Hobbesian state of nature and a prisoner’s dilemma are cases in which the conditions (...) of the standard account obtain and yet no justice exists between parties. I propose an alternative set of generic circumstances of justice motivated by examples from game theory. Parties are in these generic circumstances with respect to each other when: (1) they are engaged in a conflictual coordination game with multiple strict Nash equilibrium points where, at any of these equilibria, some parties do not receive their greatest payoffs, and (2) they have common knowledge that each party is rational and follows her end of a strict equilibrium where no party receives her greatest payoff. These two conditions reflect the idea that justice requires all parties to make some sacrifices so that others can have more of the goods they need and want. I argue that these generic circumstances are necessary and sufficient conditions for parties to follow generic norms of justice, that is, mutually beneficial practices that require some sacrifices. Key Words: common knowledge • conflictual coordination • correlated equilibrium • moderate selfishness • moderate variable scarcity • rough equality. (shrink)

Involuntary eye movement during gaze fixation, referred to as fixational eye movement, consists of two types of components: a Brownian motion like component called drifts-tremor and a ballistic component called microsaccade with a mean saccadic amplitude of about 0.3° and a mean inter-MS interval of about 0.5 s. During GZ fixation in healthy people in an eccentric position, typically with an eccentricity more than 30°, eyes exhibit oscillatory movements alternating between centripetal drift and centrifugal saccade with a mean saccadic amplitude (...) of about 1° and a period in the range of 0.5–1.0 s, which has been known as the physiological gaze-evoked nystagmus. Here, we designed a simple experimental paradigm of GZ fixation on a target shifted horizontally from the front-facing position with fewer eccentricities. We found a clear tendency of centripetal DRT and centrifugal MS as in GEN, but with more stochasticity and with slower drift velocity compared to GEN, even during FEM at GZ positions with small eccentricities. Our results showed that the target shift-dependent balance between DRT and MS achieves the GZ bounded around each of the given targets. In other words, GZ relaxes slowly with the centripetal DRT toward the front-facing position during inter-MS intervals, as if there always exists a quasi-stable equilibrium posture in the front-facing position, and MS actions pull GZ intermittently back to the target position in the opposite direction to DRT. (shrink)

The objective of this thesis – Reflective Equilibrium as a Form of Life – is to contribute to the deepening of understanding of the method of reflective equilibrium – a method of internal epistemic justification. In the first part of the study, four paradigmatic conceptions of the method will be analyzed in order to carve out a conceptual core: The ones by John Rawls – who coined the name of the method – Norman Daniels, Michael DePaul and Catherine (...) Elgin. I will argue that the conceptual core of the method contains four elementary rules: 1) A minimalistic fallibilism, 2) a moderate holism, 3) a minimalistic rationality, and 4) a weak foundationalism. Compliance with these rules is necessary and jointly sufficient for any epistemic procedure of justification to be in accordance with the method of reflective equilibrium. The second part of the study is intended to answer some of the open questions concerning this definition of the conceptual core of the method. It will be argued that the a minimalistic fallibilism, as a very central element of the method, is justified since there is no belief whose truth is transparent to an epistemic agent. Even if it were the case that such beliefs exist, there would be attractive options of retreat which provide a quasi-universal justification of minimalistic fallibilism. It will also be argued that all alternative methods of justification are either compatible with the method of reflective equilibrium or are not justified. While a metajustification of the method – understood as a justification of the method employing the method itself – is on the one hand not completely satisfactory, as it presupposes the acceptance of the method before it is justified, it is epistemically acceptable on the other hand, since it allows for a critical inquiry and is open-ended. It will be pointed out that a moderate foundationalism can be justified by the method for some specific area of inquiry insofar as basic beliefs can be identified. Yet, the default-position of the method is only a weak foundationalism (often also termed “coherentism”). With regard to the possibility of a formal interpretation of the method with which one could specify key terms used in the definition of the conceptual core, I will sketch general ways such a formalization might take. However, I will argue that the informal interpretation of the method has priority over any formal interpretation. In the third and concluding part of the study, I will present the claim that one should interpret the method of reflective equilibrium as a form of life. This means that the method is at least implicitly accepted by some epistemic agents: they have developed a disposition and ability to act according to the method. This interpretation of the method can be related to the notion of critical thinking, which, as a civic virtue and educational ideal, is subject of empirical research and practical application. A possible misunderstanding with respect to the method of reflective equilibrium as a form of life should be avoided: To interpret the method as a form of life does not indicate that it must be a comprehensive form of life. Acknowledging it in private life is optional. According to the proposed understanding of the method it is primarily a public and political form of life. (shrink)

The use of statistical methods to model gravitational systems is crucial to physics practice, but the extent to which thermodynamics and statistical mechanics genuinely apply to these systems is a contentious issue. This paper provides new conceptual foundations for gravitational thermodynamics by reconsidering the nature of key concepts like equilibrium and advancing a novel way of understanding thermodynamics. The challenges arise from the peculiar characteristics of the gravitational potential, leading to non-extensive energy and entropy, negative heat capacity, and a (...) lack of standard equilibrium. Hence it has been claimed that only non-equilibrium statistical mechanics is warranted in this domain, whereas thermodynamics is inapplicable. We argue instead that equilibrium statistical mechanics applies to self-gravitating systems at the relevant scale, as they display equilibrium in the form of metastable quasi-equilibrium states. We then develop a minimal framework for thermodynamics that can be applied to these systems and beyond. Thermodynamics applies in the sense that we can devise macroscopic descriptions and explanations of the behaviour of these systems in terms of coarse-grained quantities like energy and temperature within equilibrium statistical mechanics. (shrink)

How can players reach a Nash equilibrium? I offer one possible explanation in terms of a low-rationality learning method called probe and adjust by proving that it converges to strict Nash equilibria in an important class of games. This demonstrates that decidedly limited learning methods can support Nash equilibrium play.

We calculate the Lebesgue–measures of the stability sets of Nash-equilibria in pure coordination games. The results allow us to observe that the ordering induced by the Lebesgue–measure of stability sets upon strict Nash-equilibria does not necessarily agree with the ordering induced by risk–dominance. Accordingly, an equilibrium selection theory based on the Lebesgue–measure of stability sets would be necessarily different from one which uses the Nash-property as a point of orientation.

The use of statistical methods to model gravitational systems is crucial to physics practice, but the extent to which thermodynamics and statistical mechanics genuinely apply to these systems is a contentious issue. This paper provides new conceptual foundations for gravitational thermodynamics by reconsidering the nature of key concepts like equilibrium and advancing a novel way of understanding thermodynamics. The challenges arise from the peculiar characteristics of the gravitational potential, leading to non-extensive energy and entropy, negative heat capacity, and a (...) lack of standard equilibrium. Hence it has been claimed that only non-equilibrium statistical mechanics is warranted in this domain, whereas thermodynamics is inapplicable. We argue instead that equilibrium statistical mechanics applies to self-gravitating systems at the relevant scale, as they display equilibrium in the form of metastable quasi-equilibrium states. We then develop a minimal framework for thermodynamics that can be applied to these systems and beyond. Thermodynamics applies in the sense that we can devise macroscopic descriptions and explanations of the behaviour of these systems in terms of coarse-grained quantities like energy and temperature within equilibrium statistical mechanics. (shrink)

In the Divide-the-Dollar (DD) game, two players simultaneously make demands to divide a dollar. Each player receives his demand if the sum of the demands does not exceed one, a payoff of zero otherwise. Note that, in the latter case, both parties are punished severely. A major setback of DD is that each division of the dollar is a Nash equilibrium outcome. Observe that, when the sum of the two demands x and y exceeds one, it is as if (...) Player 1's demand x (or his offer (1−x) to Player 2) suggests that Player 2 agrees to λx < 1 times his demand y so that Player 1's demand and Player 2's modified demand add up to exactly one; similarly, Player 2's demand y (or his offer (1−y) to Player 1) suggests that Player 1 agrees to λyx so that λyx+y = 1. Considering this fact, we change DD's payoff assignment rule when the sum of the demands exceeds one; here in this case, each player's payoff becomes his demand times his λ; i.e., each player has to make the sacrifice that he asks his opponent to make. We show that this modified version of DD has an iterated strict dominant strategy equilibrium in which each player makes the egalitarian demand 1/2. We also provide a natural N-person generalization of this procedure. (shrink)

We define an evolutionary process of “economic Darwinism” for playing the field, symmetric games. The process captures two forces. One is “economic selection”: if current behavior leads to payoff differences, behavior yielding lowest payoff has strictly positive probability of being replaced by an arbitrary behavior. The other is “mutation”: any behavior has at any point in time a strictly positive, very small probability of shifting to an arbitrary behavior. We show that behavior observed frequently is in accordance with “evolutionary (...) class='Hi'>equilibrium”, a static equilibrium concept suggested in the literature. Using this result, we demonstrate that generally under positive (negative) externalities, economic Darwinism implies even more under- (over-)activity than does Nash equilibrium. (shrink)

Abstract: Knowledge requires more than mere true belief, and we also tend to think it is more valuable. I explain the added value that knowledge contributes if its extra ingredient beyond true belief is tracking . I show that the tracking conditions are the unique conditions on knowledge that achieve for those who fulfill them a strict Nash Equilibrium and an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy in what I call the True Belief Game. The added value of these properties, intuitively, (...) includes preparedness and an expectation of survival advantage. On this view knowledge is valuable not because knowledge persists but because it makes the bearer more likely to maintain an appropriate belief state—possibly nonbelief—through time and changing circumstances. When Socrates concluded that knowledge of the road to Larissa was no more valuable than true belief for the purpose of getting to Larissa, he did not take into account that one might want to be prepared for a possible meeting with a misleading sophist along the way, or for the possibility of road work. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a wealth of literature arguing the need for empirical and interdisciplinary approaches to bioethics, based on the premise that an empirically informed ethical analysis is more grounded, contextually sensitive and therefore more relevant to clinical practice than an ‘abstract’ philosophical analysis. Bioethics has (arguably) always been an interdisciplinary field, and the rise of ‘empirical’ (bio)ethics need not be seen as an attempt to give a new name to the longstanding practice of interdisciplinary collaboration, but (...) can perhaps best be understood as a substantive attempt to engage with the nature of that interdisciplinarity and to articulate the relationship between the many different disciplines (some of them empirical) that contribute to the field. It can also be described as an endeavour to explain how different disciplinary approaches can be integrated to effectively answer normative questions in bioethics, and fundamental to that endeavour is the need to think about how a robust methodology can be articulated that successfully marries apparently divergent epistemological and metaethical perspectives with method. This paper proposes ‘Reflexive Bioethics’ (RB) as a methodology for interdisciplinary and empirical bioethics, which utilizes a method of ‘Reflexive Balancing’ (RBL). RBL has been developed in response to criticisms of various forms of reflective equilibrium, and is built upon a pragmatic characterization of Bioethics and a ‘quasi-moral foundationalism’, which allows RBL to avoid some of the difficulties associated with RE and yet retain the flexible egalitarianism that makes it intuitively appealing to many. (shrink)

In computer ethics, as in other branches of applied ethics, the problem of the justification of moral judgment is still unresolved. I argue that the method which is referred to as “The Method of Wide Reflective Equilibrium” (WRE) offers the best solution to it. It does not fall victim to the false dilemma of having to choose either case‐based particularist or principle‐based universalist approaches to the problem of moral justification. I claim that WRE also provides the best model of (...) practical moral reasoning available for computer ethics. It does not pretend to provide quasi‐algorithmic procedures for moral decision‐making, but neither does it abandon the regulative ideal of communicative transparency in discursive public justification. (shrink)

The search for the statistical mechanical underpinning of thermodynamic irreversibility has so far focussed on the spontaneous approach to equilibrium. But this is the search for the underpinning of what Brown and Uffink have dubbed the ‘minus first law’ of thermodynamics. In contrast, the second law tells us that certain interventions on equilibrium states render the initial state ‘irrecoverable’. In this article, I discuss the unusual nature of processes in thermodynamics, and the type of irreversibility that the second (...) law embodies. I then search for the microscopic underpinning or statistical mechanical ‘reductive basis’ of the second law of thermodynamics by taking a functionalist strategy. First, I outline the functional role of the thermodynamic entropy: for a thermally isolated system, the thermodynamic entropy is constant in quasi-static processes, but increasing in non-quasi-static processes. I then search for the statistical mechanical quantity that plays this role—rather than the role of the traditional ‘holy grail’ as described by Callender. I argue that in statistical mechanics, the Gibbs entropy plays this role. (shrink)

Game-theoretic solution concepts describe sets of strategy profiles that are optimal for all players in some plausible sense. Such sets are often found by recursive algorithms like iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies in strategic games, or backward induction in extensive games. Standard logical analyses of solution sets use assumptions about players in fixed epistemic models for a given game, such as mutual knowledge of rationality. In this paper, we propose a different perspective, analyzing solution algorithms as processes of learning (...) which change game models. Thus, strategic equilibrium gets linked to fixed-points of operations of repeated announcement of suitable epistemic statements. This dynamic stance provides a new look at the current interface of games, logic, and computation. (shrink)

There are well-known quasi-formal arguments that identity is a "strict" relation in at least the following three senses: (1) There is a single identity relation and a single distinctness relation; (2) There are no contingent cases of identity or distinctness; and (3) There are no vague or indeterminate cases of identity or distinctness. However, the situation is less clear cut than it at first may appear. There is a natural formal theory of identity that is very close to (...) the standard classical theory but which does not validate the formal analogues of (1)-(3). The core idea is simple: We weaken the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals from a conditional to an entailment and we adopt a weakly classical logic. This paper investigates this weakly classical theory of identity (and related theories) and discusses its philosophical ramifications. It argues that we can accept a reasonable theory of identity without committing ourselves to the uniqueness, necessity, or determinacy of identity. (shrink)

We prove Fraïssé’s conjecture within the system of Π11-comprehension. Furthermore, we prove that Fraïssé’s conjecture follows from the Δ20-bqo-ness of 3 over the system of Arithmetic Transfinite Recursion, and that the Δ20-bqo-ness of 3 is a Π21-statement strictly weaker than Π11-comprehension.

Are there really beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuroscience and psychology, presumably) that, strictly speaking, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a superceded ontology? Philosophers generally regard such ontological questions as admitting just two possible answers: either beliefs exist or they don't. There is no such state as quasi-existence; there are no stable doctrines of semi-realism. Beliefs must either be vindicated along with the viruses or banished along with the banshees. A bracing conviction prevails, then, to (...) the effect that when it comes to beliefs (and other mental items) one must be either a realist or an eliminative materialist. (shrink)

BACKGROUND: Delusions in schizophrenia are commonly approached as empirical false beliefs about everyday reality. Phenomenological accounts, by contrast, have suggested that delusions are more adequately understood as pertaining to a different kind of reality experience. How this alteration of reality experience should be characterised, which dimensions of experiential life are involved, and whether delusional reality might differ from standard reality in various ways is unclear and little is known about how patients with delusions value and relate to these experiential alterations. (...) This study aimed to investigate the nature of delusional reality experience, and its subjective apprehension, in individuals with lived experience of delusions and a schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis. METHODS: In this qualitative phenomenological study, we recruited individuals with lived experience of delusions and a schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis from two psychiatric-hospital services in Belgium using homogenous sampling. Criteria for participation were having undergone at least one psychotic episode with occurring delusional symptoms, present at least 1 year before participation, on the basis of clinical notes assessed by the attending psychiatrist; a schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis, ascertained through clinical interview by the attending psychiatrist upon admission; being aged between 18 years and 65 years; and having the capacity to give informed consent. Exclusion criteria included worries concerning capacity to consent and risk of distress caused by participation. We did phenomenologically driven semi-structured interviews with the participants to explore the nature of delusional reality experience and their subjective valuation of these experiences. We used interpretative phenomenological analysis, a qualitative method tailored to the in-depth exploration of participants’ first-person perspective, to analyse their accounts. FINDINGS: Between March 2, 2020, and Sept 30, 2020, 18 adults participated in the interview study. The findings suggest that delusions are often embedded in wide-ranging alterations of basic reality experience, involving quasi-ineffable atmospheric and ontological qualities that undermine participants’ sense of the world as unambiguously real, fully present, and shared with others. We also found that delusional reality experience can differ from standard reality in various ways, across multiple dimensions, and that participants are often implicitly or explicitly aware of the distinction between delusional and standard reality. Delusional experience can have an enduring value and meaning that is not fully captured by a strictly medical perspective. INTERPRETATION: Increased awareness and recognition of the distinctive nature of delusional reality experience, in both clinical and research settings, can improve diagnostic accuracy, explanatory models, and therapeutic support for individuals with delusions whose lived realities are not always evident from an everyday perspective. FUNDING: FWO Flanders. TRANSLATION: For the Dutch translation of the abstract see Supplementary Materials section. (shrink)

We present a formal derivation of the Mino–Sasaki–Tanaka–Quinn–Wald (MSTQW) equation describing the self-force on a (semi-) classical relativistic point mass moving under the influence of quantized linear metric perturbations on a curved background space–time. The curvature of the space–time implies that the dynamics of the particle and the field is history-dependent and as such requires a non-equilibrium formalism to ensure the consistent evolution of both particle and field, viz., the worldline influence functional and the closed- time-path (CTP) coarse-grained effective (...) action. In the spirit of effective field theory, we regularize the formally divergent self-force by smearing the local part of the retarded Green’s function and employing a quasi-local expansion. We derive the MSTQW–Langevin equations describing the perturbations of the particle’s worldline about its semi-classical trajectory resulting from interactions with the quantum fluctuations of the linear metric perturbations. Finally, we demonstrate that the quantum fluctuations of the field could, in principle, leave imprints on gravitational waveforms expected to be observed by gravitational interferometers, thereby encoding information about tree-level perturbative quantum gravity. (shrink)

A dynamic description model of the flight path a dragonfly takes is required in order to derive the encounter frequency of the dragonfly males visiting a pond. It is considered as the first part of a realistic description of the regulation of dragonfly density at the pond by behavioural interaction. Since the dragonfly males fly strictly along the shoreline of the pond, their displacement may be perceived as a quasi linear movement. The flight paths of dragonflies were recorded in (...) field by registering at regular time intervals the number of the shoreline section. in which the dragonfly was staying at that moment. The recorded flight paths show a wide variety from circling around the pond or flying widely to and fro to remaining in a narrow sector of the shoreline . The records were classified into 9 flight style groups. The flight style is temperature dependent, but there are also individual differences between the dragonflies. The strategy adopted for model building is to start with the most simple assumptions and parameters. The dynamic performance of each model is assessed by simulations. The model has to be extended until the simulated flight path patterns resemble the observed patterns. In a model with one parameter the displacement for every time interval is given by a stochastic decision using the probabilities evaluated from the observed frequencies of step length . This model was run with different sets of data. The simulated patterns using the data from all records together slightly resemble some observed patterns. They represent, however, only a small range of the variability observed. With data from the different style groups or the single records the simulated patterns are much more variable, but they are too irregular and contain too many turns . Therefore the description model was extended by a second parameter determining the direction of each step. The probability of turning is dependent on the number of steps already taken in the same direction . The probabilities are evaluated from the observed frequencies of step series. With the data from all records together, this model yields patterns more similar to the observed flight paths but they still represent only a restricted range of the observed variability. The patterns obtained using the data from the different style groups or from the single records cover the full range of the observed variability and they resemble closely the observed patterns even in minute details . Thus this description model together with the data from the flight style groups is accepted as fully sufficient for the present purpose. The simulations allow the assessment of the range of chance variability . The assumptions implied in the description model were corroborated by statistical tests. The approach developed here for the quantification of the behaviour of dragonflies is generally applicable to stochastic behaviour. Um die Häufigkeit der Kämpfe zwischen Libellenmannchen am Gewässer vom Verhalten der einzelnen Individuen ableiten zu können, wurde ein dynamisches Modell des Flugverhaltens einzelner Libellen aus Freilandbeobachtungen abgeleitet. Das Modell soll ein erster Schritt zu einer realistischen Beschreibung sein, wie bei Libellen die Individuendichte durch Verhaltensinteraktionen geregelt wird. Da die Libellenmannchen streng an der Uferlinie entlang fliegen, kann ihre Flugbahn als quasi eindimensionale Bewegung aufgefaßt werden. Die Flugbahnen einzelner Männchen registrierte ich, indem ich in regelmäßigen Zeitintervallen die Nummer des'Uferabschnitts , in dem sich die Libelle gerade aufhielt, auf Tonband sprach. Die registierten Flugbahnen sind sehr verschiedenartig. Zwischen Bahnen, bei denen die Libellen immer in einer Richtung um das Gewässer kreisten, bis zu solchen, bei denen sie in einem engen Uferbereich hin and her flogen, gibt es alle Übergänge . Die Flugbahnen warden in 9 Gruppen verschiedener Flugstile eingeteilt. Der Flugstil ist temperaturabhängig and individuell verschieden. Die Strategie der Modellentwicklung war, mit einem Modell mit möglichst einfachen Voraussetzungen and Parametern zu beginnen, seine dynamische Leistung mit Simulationen zu prüfen, und die Modellbeschreibung so lange zu erweitern, bis die simulierten Flugbahnmuster den tatsächlich beobachteten Mustern gleichen. Im ersten Modell wurde die Ortsveränderung in jedem Zeitintervall mit einer stochastischen Entscheidung bestimmt, bei der Wahrscheinlichkeiten verwendet warden, die sich aus den beobachteten Haufigkeiten der Schrittweiten ergaben . Simulationen dieses Modells mit den aus allen Flugbahnregistrierungen gemeinsam ausgewerteten Daten ergaben Flugbahnmuster, die zwar manchen beobachteten ähnelten, aber nur einen kleinen Bereich der beobachteten Vielfalt darstellten. Mit den Daten aus den einzelnen Flugstilgruppen ergab sich insgesamt eine grofie Variabilitat, die simulierten Flugbahnen waren aber zu unregelmäßig and enthielten zu viele Richtungswechsel . Deshalb wurde das Modell durch einen Parameter erweitert, der für jedes Zeitintervall die Flugrichtung bestimmt. Die Wahrscheinfchkeit umzukehren hängt davon ab, wieviele Zeitintervalle bereits die gleiche Richtung beibehalten wurde . Die Wahrscheinlichkeitswerte dafür warden aus den beobachteten Haufigkeiten der Schrittserien in eine Richtung bestimmt. Dieses Modell ergibt in Simulationen mit den aus allen Registrierungen gemeinsam ausgewerteten Daten Flugbahnen, die den Originalen ähnlich sind, aber nur einen beschränkten Bereich der vielfalt darstellen. Simulationen mit den Daten aus den einzelnen Flugstilgruppen dagegen ergeben die vollebeobachtete Variabilitat and die erhaltenen Flugbahnmuster gleichen den beobachteten Originalen auch in kleinen Einzelheiten . Dieses Modell kann deshalb zusammen mit den Daten der einzelnen Flugstilgruppen als befriedigende Beschreibung des Flugverhaltens angesehen werden. Die Simulationen erlauben, den Bereich der zufälligen Variabilitat abzuschätzen . Die im Modell gemachten Annahmen warden durch statistische Tests bestätigt. Der hier zur Beschreibung des Verhaltens von Libellen entwickelte Ansatz ist allgemein anwendbar auf stochastisches Verhalten. (shrink)

In this paper, we revisit a host–parasite system with multiple parasite strains and superinfection proposed by Nowak and May :81–89, 1994), and study its global dynamics when we relax the two strict conditions assumed therein. As for system with two parasite strains, we derive that the basic reproduction number $$R_0$$ is the threshold condition for parasite extinction and the invasion reproduction number $$R_i^j\ $$ is the subthreshold condition for coexistence of two parasite strains. As for system with three parasite (...) strains, we are surprised to discover the global stability of parasite-free and coexistence equilibrium, which is distinct from the previous result. Furthermore, for system with n strains, we obtain the global asymptotical stability of the parasite-free equilibrium, conjecture a general result on the global stability of coexistence equilibrium and provide two numerical examples to testify our conjecture. (shrink)

This paper investigates a quasi-variety of representable integral commutative residuated lattices axiomatized by the quasi-identity resulting from the well-known Wajsberg identity → q ≤ → p if it is written as a quasi-identity, i. e., → q ≈ 1 ⇒ → p ≈ 1. We prove that this quasi-identity is strictly weaker than the corresponding identity. On the other hand, we show that the resulting quasi-variety is in fact a variety and provide an axiomatization. The (...) obtained results shed some light on the structure of Archimedean integral commutative residuated chains. Further, they can be applied to various subvarieties of MTL-algebras, for instance we answer negatively Hájek's question asking whether the variety of ΠMTL-algebras is generated by its Archimedean members. (shrink)

Conflicts within the tsetse fly belt revealed a strong correlation between the dynamics of bovine trypanosomosis and the insurgency involving farmers and herders in Nigeria and parts of West Africa. This study examined the history, causes and influence of farmers-herdsmen conflicts on banditry, terrorism and food security as it relates to the epidemiology of African animal trypanosomosis (AAT). A combination of literature database searches, semi-structured questionnaires, and mathematical modeling was employed. The study found that transhumance contributes significantly to conflicts between (...) farmers and herdsmen. An average of 6.46 persons per attack were reported between 2005 and 2021. Only 8.4 $$\%$$ (95 $$\%$$ CI: 5.0 $$-$$ 12.9) of farmers and 18.2 $$\%$$ (95 $$\%$$ CI: 12.4 $$-$$ 25.4) of herdsmen have engaged in conflict resolution efforts. The study shows that both conflict and the spread of trypanosomosis can be effectively controlled when $$R_0 < 1$$, ensuring that the sub-population remains in the basin of attraction of the trypanosomosis-conflict-free equilibrium ( $$T_{0c}$$ ). The partial derivative of the basic reproduction number, $$R_0$$, with respect to improved conflict resolution, suggests that halting transhumance can prevent a portion of the cattle recruitment rate ( $$\Lambda_c$$ ) from becoming infected with AAT. Climate change exacerbates these issues, leading to settlement and resettlement strategies within the fly belt regions. The model indicates that the basic reproduction number can only be reduced to less than one ( $$R_0 < 1$$ ) to become globally asymptotically stable if there is effective conflict resolution involving both farmers and herders. The study advocates for the establishment of ranching in tsetse-free zones with adequate social amenities, improved marketing strategies for animals and animal products led by government agencies through public-private partnerships, the banning of open grazing, and strict enforcement of policies against violators. (shrink)

We further develop a recent new proof (by Greenberger, Horne, and Zeilinger—GHZ) that local deterministic hidden-variable theories are inconsistent with certain strict correlations predicted by quantum mechanics. First, we generalize GHZ's proof so that it applies to factorable stochastic theories, theories in which apparatus hidden variables are causally relevant to measurement results, and theories in which the hidden variables evolve indeterministically prior to the particle-apparatus interactions. Then we adopt a more general measure-theoretic approach which requires that GHZ's argument be (...) modified in order to produce a valid proof. Finally, we motivate our more general proof's assumptions in a somewhat different way from previous authors in order to strengthen the implications of our proof as much as possible. After developing GHZ's proof along these lines, we then consider the analogue, for our proof, of Bohr's reply to the EPR argument, and conclude (pace GHZ) that in at least one respect (viz. that of most concern to Bohr) the proof is no more powerful than Bell's. Nevertheless, we point out some new advantages of our proof over Bell's, and over other algebraic proofs of nonlocality. And we conclude by giving a modified version of our proof that, like Bell's, does not rely on experimentally unrealizable strict correlations, but still leads to a testable “quasi-algebraic” locality inequality.“... to admit things not visible to the gross creatures that we are is, in my opinion, to show a decent humility, and not just a lamentable addiction to metaphysics.”J. S. Bell. (shrink)

In his book, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls suggests that a theory of social justice is satisfactory only if it has both of two characteristics. First, it must be capable of serving as the “public moral basis of society”. That is, it must be reasonable to suppose that it would be strictly complied with while serving as the public conception of justice in a society which is in favourable circumstances—a society in which the people would strictly comply with any (...) public conception of justice if the strains of commitment to it were not too great, given the general facts of psychology and moral learning. Second, a theory of justice must characterize “ … our considered judgements in reflective equilibrium”. (shrink)

Starting dialysis at an advanced age is a clinical challenge and an ethical dilemma. The advantages of starting dialysis at “extreme” ages are questionable as high dialysis-related morbidity induces a reflection on the cost- benefit ratio of this demanding and expensive treatment in a person that has a short life expectancy. Where clinical advantages are doubtful, ethical analysis can help us reach decisions and find adapted solutions. Mr. H is a ninety-year-old patient with end-stage kidney disease that is no longer (...) manageable with conservative care, in spite of optimal nutritional management, good blood pressure control and strict clinical and metabolic evaluations; dialysis is the next step, but its morbidity is challenging. The case is analysed according to principlism (beneficence, non-maleficence, justice and respect for autonomy). In the setting of care, dialysis is available without restriction; therefore the principle of justice only partially applied, in the absence of restraints on health-care expenditure. The final decision on whether or not to start dialysis rested with Mr. H (respect for autonomy). However, his choice depended on the balance between beneficence and non-maleficence. The advantages of dialysis in restoring metabolic equilibrium were clear, and the expected negative effects of dialysis were therefore decisive. Mr. H has a contraindication to peritoneal dialysis (severe arthritis impairing self-performance) and felt performing it with nursing help would be intrusive. Post dialysis fatigue, poor tolerance, hypotension and intrusiveness in daily life of haemodialysis patients are closely linked to the classic thrice-weekly, four-hour schedule. A personalized incremental dialysis approach, starting with one session per week, adapting the timing to the patient’s daily life, can limit side effects and “dialysis shock”. An individualized approach to complex decisions such as dialysis start can alter the delicate benefit/side-effect balance, ultimately affecting the patient’s choice, and points to a narrative, tailor-made approach as an alternative to therapeutic nihilism, in very old and fragile patients. (shrink)

This article traces the lived occurrence of a spontaneous, improvisatory event. Using choreographer Jeanine Durning’s performance of inging as both a touchstone and a springboard, the affects of spontaneity are transversally mapped through a variety of generative operations. This diagrammatic approach reveals a topology of entangled concepts that convolve to a biogrammatic hypothesis on the in situ fielding of composition. Concepts such as the quasi-cause, counter-actualization, the concresence of prehensions, middling, stuttering, thermodynamic entropy, proprioception, far from equilibrium states, (...) risk-taking, and machinic autopoiesis are folded into a speculative proposition on the forces that potentially excite an affective event through the practice of improvisational composing. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ius Gentium as Publicly Articulated Moral ScienceMatthew K. MinerdAmong the various types of law discussed in St. Thomas's theological "treatise on law"—questions 90–108 of Summa theologia [ST] I-II—the classification known as the "law of nations" (ius gentium) holds an ambiguous epistemological position. Marking a kind of halfway point between the natural law and civil law, it seems to straddle both domains. In fact, in a particularly important text dedicated (...) to this topic in the ST (I-II, q. 95, a. 4), Aquinas classes the ius gentium as being closely connected to the natural law, though in a way that is somewhat derivative, not as immediately flowing from human nature (especially in its animality) as does the natural law, but also not as marked by human contingency as is human civil law.As was recently discussed in a well-documented and insightful article by Barrett H. Turner in The Thomist, there have historically been two main lines of Thomist interpretation concerning the exact character of the "law of nations." Very broadly stated, what he refers to as the "Salamancan" line, indebted to Francisco de Vitoria, "interprets Thomas's doctrine of the ius gentium as a body of universal positive institutions (that is, specifications, determinationes) added to the natural law by agreement of the human race."1 [End Page 1043] This position, which would be common for several centuries among members of the Thomist school, would locate the law of nations essentially in the domain of nearly universally adopted customs and institutions, not strictly deduced from the natural law, but rather grounded on "the quasi-political authority of the entire human race, which promulgates the ius gentium by customs whose utility for attaining the ends of the natural law under a certain set of social conditions is easily recognized by rational creatures."2Turner calls the other line of thought "Maritain's Neo-Thomist Line,"3 an outlook that would be shared with various nuances by thinkers like Jean-Marie Aubert, Yves Simon, Marie-Michel Labourdette, John Finnis, and others. Setting aside my qualms about his appellation "neo-Thomist," which does more to obscure than to illumine (for it covers a host of Thomistic figures who have significantly different views on what constitutes "Thomism"), Turner does fairly lay out the major lines of Jacques Maritain's position, which is most directly articulated in Man and the State and La loi naturelle ou loi non-écrite.4 Basing himself on his particular view of knowledge of the natural law through connaturality,5 Maritain contrasted this sort of moral cognition with that which develops in the line of conceptual articulation, thus having a different "gnoseological" character from our knowledge of the natural law, while nonetheless still sharing the same "ontological" foundation. Such conceptually articulated law would be the ius gentium.Rather than add my voice to the dialectic of the various thinkers arrayed by Turner into the two aforementioned camps, I would like to propose a slightly different approach to the "moral epistemology of the law of nations," though one that I believe lies in line with the best aspects of Maritain's approach. Continuing a series of reflections that I have undertaken [End Page 1044] concerning moral epistemology during the past few years,6 I propose that it is most helpful to consider the "law of nations" as being a form of reasoning pertaining to what Scholastic vocabulary would refer to as "moral science,"7 namely discursive philosophical reasoning concerning the essences, properties, effects, and various other essential relationships that belong to a human acts, morally considered (the principal subject of moral philosophy), along with other subjects that are studied in relation to this principal subject (e.g., the principles of human acts, most particularly, the structure of human acts and the moral virtues). Moral science is the activity of reasoning that can be undertaken by knowing agents living together in community, seeking to discursively articulate and explain the moral truth that forms the essential basis for the contingent determinations that will then be codified in particular civil laws, the latter of which are not concerned with questions like "what are the ultimate foundations for property... (shrink)