This paper considers how the terms ‘objection,’ ‘rebuttal,’ ‘attack,’ ‘refutation,’ ‘rebutting defeater’ and ‘undercutting defeater’ are used in writings on argumentation and artificial intelligence. The central focus is on the term ‘rebuttal.’ A provisional classification system is proposed that provides a normative structure within which the terms can be clarified, distinguished from each other, and more precisely defined.

In the October edition of theJournal of Medical Ethics, Akabayashi and colleagues state that ’to establish a heterogeneous [induced pluripotent stem cell] iPSC bank covering roughly 80% of Japan’s population…the Japanese government decided to invest JPY110 billion (US$ 1.1 billion) over 10 years in regenerative medicine research; a quarter of this was to be allocated to the iPSC stock project'. While they claim this amount of money to be an unfair distribution of state resources, we believe their assessment is based (...) on a misunderstanding of the facts. Similarly, other criticisms by them are based on mistaken interpretations. This article is a rebuttal to the arguments that form the basis of Akabayashi and colleagues’ five criticisms by explaining their misinterpretations. (shrink)

In “Should We Strive to Make Science Bias‑Free? A Philosophical Assessment of the Reproducibility Crisis”, I argue that the problem of bias in science, a key factor in the current reproducibility crisis, is worsened if we follow Heather Douglas and Kevin C. Elliott’s advice and introduce non-epistemic values into the evidential assessment of scientific hypotheses. In their response to my paper, Douglas and Elliott complain that I misrepresent their views and fall victim to various confusions. In this rebuttal I (...) argue, by means of an examination of their published views, that my initial interpretation of their work is accurate and that, in their hands, science is generally prone to deviations from truth. (shrink)

I argue that Pardi's criticisms of Drange's version of the argument from nonbelief (ANB) do not refute ANB, although they may or may not require peripheral corrections or clarifications on Drange's part. I focus not so much on Drange's formulation, but on what I take to be the central intuitions of ANB and on the inadequacy of Pardi's objections. I assume some familiarity with Pardi's paper and with ANB, although I present what I consider to be ANB's central claims.

Recent theorizing and research concerning the pragmatics of analogy in persuasion posits that it serves two communicative functions. Specifically, rebuttal analogy instrumentally functions as argument and also as a social attack device used to demean the competence or character of opponents. The study reported here empirically investigated message receivers' perceptions of rebuttal analogy users. Participants were exposed to one of four messages employing rebuttal analogy or to one of the same four messages with a nonanalogy version of (...) the rebuttal argument. As anticipated, the findings revealed that participants perceived the communicator employing rebuttal analogy as less ethical and less competent than communicators using nonanalogy counterparts. These results are discussed and future research is proposed. (shrink)

The central argument for functionalism is the so-called argument from multiple realizations. According to this argument, because a functionally characterized system admits a potential infinity of structurally diverse physical realizations, the functional organization of such systems cannot be captured in a law-like manner at the level of physical description (and, thus, must be treated as a principally autonomous domain of inquiry). I offer a rebuttal of this argument based on formal modeling of its premises in the framework of automata (...) theory. In this formal model I exploit the so-called minimal (universal) realizations of automata behaviors to show that the argument from multiple realizations is not just invalid but is refutable, in the sense that its premises (when made formally precise) entail the very opposite of the functionalist's conclusion. (shrink)

In a recent paper, I argued that an externalist understanding of mental disorder from the philosophy of psychiatry presents an ethical challenge to the practice of medical assistance in dying (MAiD) for psychiatric illness, because it highlights the ways in which the suffering associated with psychiatric illness is sustained by features of the external environment wherein the person is embedded, including social barriers and injustices. In a response to my paper, Harry Hudson argues that addressing social inequality lacks relevance to (...) the immediate permissibility of psychiatric MAiD and that the issue of psychiatric MAiD should be informed by ‘pragmatic politics’ rather than by ‘obfuscatory philosophy’. Herein, I contend that Hudson’s response misconstrues my position and ascribes to me views I neither express nor endorse. My paper does not claim that psychiatric MAiD should be denied to people who are presently in intolerable distress. Rather, it suggests that the provision of psychiatric MAiD comes along with social responsibilities of the state to attend to the barriers and injustices that sustain and exacerbate psychiatric illness, as well as ethical responsibilities of clinicians to consider a wider range of presently available psychological and social interventions which may have been neglected under a traditional internalist approach. (shrink)

Coleman suggests three central things in her commentary: (i) SUB is just as well-suited to deal with our case as PROB SUB is; thus, there aren’t any interesting reasons to prefer PROB SUB to SUB; (ii) I may have failed to describe Feldman’s possibilist view accurately; and (iii) an “intentionally accessible” version of possibilism will solve all our problems without appealing to objective subjunctive probabilities. Let me attend to each point.

Theorists who endorse a subjunctive formulation of consequentialism with a “possibilist”-modified similarity relation are not plagued by this problem of incompatible obligations. Without some other interesting theoretical support, the burden is upon the actualists. Here’s a sketch of my favorite objective, weakly-centered, subjunctive brand of consequentialism containing the appropriate possibilist injection.

Kant’s argument in the First Analogy for the permanence of substance has been cast as consisting of a simple quantifierscope mistake. Kant is portrayed as illicitly moving from a premise such as (1) at all times, there must exist some substance, to a conclusion such as (2) some particular substance must exist at all times. Examples meant to show that Kant makes this mistake feature substances coming into and out of existence, but doing so at overlapping times. I argue that (...) Kant offers an argument against this kind of example in the following passage. Kant’s claim is that, were substances to be created and destroyed as in the example, the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another (A188–9/B231–32). (shrink)

An explanatory coherence theory of justification is sketched and then defended against a number of recent objections: conservatism and relativism; wild and crazy beliefs; reliability; warranted necessary falsehoods; basing; distant, unknown coherences; Sosa's “self- and present-abstracts”; and Bayesian impossibility results.

This essay replies to critics since 1995 of my “biostatistical theory” of health. According to the BST, a pathological condition is a state of statistically species-subnormal biological part-functional ability, relative to sex and age. Theoretical health, the total absence of pathological conditions, is then a value-free scientific notion. Recent critics offer a mixture of old and new objections to this analysis. Some new ones relate to choice of reference class, situation-specificity of function, common diseases and healthy populations, improvements in population (...) health, the practice of pathologists, “Cambridge changes” in health status, and comparative vs. absolute health concepts. I make no changes in doctrine, except to consider treating “normal aging” as pathological by taking young adults as the standard for all adults. (shrink)

According to Giles Scofield, ethicists can provide expert testimony in descriptive ethics and metaethics, but not normative ethics. Lawrence Schneiderman appears to disagree with this view, and presumably believes that it is appropriate for an expert witness in ethics to provide ethics testimony in all three areas. I draw this conclusion from several claims made in his commentary which aim to show that we would be contending experts if both invited to testify on a case involving claims about futile medical (...) treatment. This disagreement aside, taken together both commentaries suggest that my testimony in the case of Andrew Sawatzky is wanting.In the response that follows I do not engage in a debate about the content of my testimony. (shrink)

2.1 The Myth of Religious Neutrality ………………..………..………………… 2 2.2 ID and Creationism …………………………………………………………… 7 2.3 Methodological Materialism ……………………………….………………… 9 2.4 ID’s Contribution to Science ……………………………..………………… 13 3 Robert Pennock ………………...…..………………………….……..…………….. 17 4 John Haught ………………………………………………….……..…..………….. 23 5 Kevin Padian …………………………………………………..…….…..………….. 27 6 Kenneth Miller …………...……………………………………………..………….. 34..

This is a rebuttal to Fiona Probyn-Rapsey’s criticisms of the original furry research conducted in 2006 and published in 2008. Her focus on gender identity disorder misses the main point of the study, which was that it was the first empirical study to collect data scientifically and report findings on the furry fandom, an often misrepresented subculture.

One challenge for those reading methodological debates in low consensus fields is determining the outcome when participants do not share standards. When parties to a debate do not agree on the standards to be used in assessing their arguments (i.e., quality), it may be useful to ask first if parties’ contributions meet their own expectations (i.e., integrity). Most protocols for review of qualitative research specify some form of quality assessment. These protocols normally require some test of internal coherence. Coherence is (...) also relevant when describing the match between a rebuttal and the argument it answers. In 2019,Nursing Inquirypublished a critique and rebuttal of the methods used by the Joanna Briggs Institute. In this essay, we attempted to use the Joanna Briggs Institute's own quality assessment standards to assess their rebuttal of this fundamental critique. We found it possible to use the Joanna Briggs Institute's own quality assessment standards to assess this rebuttal, and we found that JBI's rebuttal did not meet their own standards. (shrink)

A Special Issue of this journal, edited by Lynch et al., was published critiquing research in conversation analysis on epistemics and on oh. It would be more accurate to say that the articles in that Special Issue critique the work of Heritage on epistemics and oh. Their principal criticism is that Heritage’s analyses of epistemics and oh are cognitivist. Other criticisms are that his analysis of each of these phenomena is not sequential, that it does not attend to the details (...) of turn design, and that his analyses are not truly conversation analytic – indeed that he does not comprehend CA, that his analyses are false and unwarranted, that he has adopted an ‘informationist’ perspective of knowledge transfer, and that epistemics represents some ‘hidden order’ invisible at the surface of conversation. Underlying these criticisms is their contention that Heritage has not adhered to the ‘radical’ agenda of ethnomethodology which, they claim, underlies the origins of CA. In this Introduction, I outline some of the principal reasons for regarding the criticisms in The epistemics of Epistemics to be misguided, inaccurate and scurrilous. In doing so, I am setting out in very broad outline the arguments made by the contributors to this Special Issue rebutting those criticisms of Heritage’s work, and of CA more generally. (shrink)

In 2016, Discourse Studies published a special issue on the ‘epistemics of epistemics’ comprising six papers, all of which took issue with a strand of my research on how knowledge claims are asserted, implemented and contested through facets of turn design and sequence organization. Apparently coordinated through some years of discussion, the critique is nonetheless somewhat confused and confusing. In this article, I take up some of more prominent elements of the critique: my work is ‘cognitivist’ substituting causal psychological analysis (...) for the classic conversation analytic focus on the normative accountability of social action, my work devalues and indeed flouts basic tenets of CA methodology such as the ‘next-turn proof procedure’, my analysis of epistemic stance introduces unwarranted themes of conflict and hostility into CA thinking, various concepts that I have introduced involve the invocation of ‘hidden orders’ of social conduct that is inimical to the traditions of our field and that my work rests on an unwarranted ‘informationism’ – the discredited idea that much of human interaction is driven by a need to traffic in information. In this rebuttal, I refute all of these commentaries and correct many other ancillary mistakes of representation and reasoning that inhabit these papers. (shrink)

The essay presents Saul Kripke's argument for mind/body-dualism and makes the suppositions explicit on which it rests. My claim, inspired by Richard Boyd, is that even if one of Kripke’s central suppositions - the principle of necessity of identities using rigid designators - is shared by the non-traditional identity theorist, it is still possible for her to rebut Kripke’s dualism.

Readers of “Falsificationism Redux” (the rejoinder) may have found it to be another waffling non-explanation of induction and the alleged falsity of falsificationism—or even self-refuting, as its title indicates (redux: brought back, revived, restored). However, it seems worth another round of replies if only because the arguments are fairly typical of the would-be ‘inductivist’ and it might help some people who have yet to see how these arguments fail.

Given advances in the science of fertility preservation and the link between fertility choices and wellbeing, it is time to reframe our ethical thinking around fertility preservation procedures for children and young people with cancer. The current framing of fertility preservation as a possible offer may no longer be universally appropriate. There is an increasingly pressing need to discuss the ethics of failing to preserve fertility, particularly for patient groups for whom established techniques exist. I argue that the starting point (...) for deliberating about a particular patient should be a rebuttable presumption that fertility preservation ought to be attempted. Consideration of the harms applicable to that specific patient may then override this presumption. I outline the benefits of attempting fertility preservation; these justify a presumption in favour of the treatment. I then discuss the potential harms associated with fertility preservation procedures, which may justify failing to attempt fertility preservation in an individual patient's particular case. Moving from a framework of offer to one of rebuttable presumption in favour of fertility preservation would have significant implications for medical practice, healthcare organizations and the state. (shrink)

Corroborative evidence has a dual function in argument. Primarily, it functions to provide direct evidence supporting the main conclusion. But it also has a secondary, bolstering function which increases the probative value of some other piece of evidence in the argument. This paper argues that the bolstering effect of corroborative evidence is legitimate, and can be explained as counter–rebuttal achieved through inference to the best explanation. A model (argument diagram) of corroborative evidence, representing its structure and operation as a (...) schematic pattern of defeasible argument is also supplied. In addition to explaining the operation and theoretical foundation of corroborative evidence, the model facilitates the correct analysis and guides the evaluation (assessment and critique) of corroborative evidence as it occurs in argument. (shrink)

Here I examine Bernard Suits’s definition of games and explain why that definition is in need of reference to representation or, put more generally, to semiosis. And, once admitting the necessity of the representational in games, Suits’s definition must also then admit the essential paradoxy of games.

This paper explores some of the benefits informal logic may have for the analysis of mathematical inference. It shows how Stephen Toulmin’s pioneering treatment of defeasible argumentation may be extended to cover the more complex structure of mathematical proof. Several common proof techniques are represented, including induction, proof by cases, and proof by contradiction. Affinities between the resulting system and Imre Lakatos’s discussion of mathematical proof are then explored.

Bourdieu carved out a distinctive analytical niche for his reflexive sociology. His epistemological tool of field analysis, sometimes coupled with statistical correspondence analysis, is particular...

In this paper, I argue that ad hominem arguments are not always fallacious. More explicitly, in certain cases of practical reasoning, the circumstances of a person are relevant to whether or not the conclusion should be accepted. This occurs, I suggest, when a person gives advice to others or prescribes certain courses of action but fails to follow her own advice or act in accordance with her own prescriptions. This is not an instance of a fallacious tu quoque provided that (...) such circumstantial ad hominem arguments are construed as rebuttals to appeals (administrative) authority (of expertise), or so I argue. (shrink)