This paper juxtaposes two conflicting positions on the justifiability of authority: Robert Wolff's philosophical anarchist argument and a response to Wolff consisting in Joseph Raz's service conception of authority. Following an introduction, I provide a brief exposition of Wolff's claim that authority is incompatible with moral autonomy (Section 2). After presenting the Razian response (Section 3), I consider what implications follow from Raz's service conception of authority assuming it is correct (Section 4). I argue that, even if the service conception (...) successfully meets the anarchist challenge, it does so not by entirely dissolving the tension between authority and autonomy, but through a balancing act whereby one aspect of our autonomy gives way to another aspect of our autonomy. Finally, I consider the service conception of authority itself and point out certain vulnerabilities thereof (Section 5). (shrink)

In his comments, Daniel Nicholls succeeds in saying more than a few things that I had scarcely realized about the ways in which I write and, therefore, of what I tend to take for granted. He sees in what I write a capacity ‘to utilize the “obvious” whilst at the same time saying something about it.’ Not every philosopher would take that as a compliment. Many philosophers and philosophies have quite other pretensions – to transcend the illusions of common (...) thought and perception towards a higher plane of metaphysical philosophy – or of physics and mathematics. I find that Nicholls’s remark both compliments and complements my work, however. The use of everyday language and example to disturb that everyday world to ‘bring it into high relief’ as Nicholls puts it – is a significant part of philosophical method. To juxtapose the esoteric language of metaphysics (being-in-itself, being-for-itself, being-for-others) with the everyday (what there is, living for oneself, living for others) is to haunt the everyday with a metaphysical imagination even as it reveals what metaphysics had erased from the coinage of common words. (I am thinking, of course, of Derrida’s remarks about Anatole France’s satirical view of philosophical language as coinage from which all marking has been erased). (shrink)

This article examines the relation between policies concerning Corporate Social Responsibility and philosophical moral theories. The objective is to determine which moral theories form the basis for CSR policies. Are they based on ethical egoism, libertarianism, utilitarianism or some kind of common-sense morality? In order to address this issue, I conducted an empirical investigation examining the relation between moral theories and CSR policies, in companies engaged in CSR. Based on the empirical data I collected, I start by suggesting some normative (...) arguments used by the respondents. Secondly, I suggest that these moral arguments implicitly rely on some specific moral principles, which I characterise. Thirdly, on the basis of these moral principles, I suggest the moral theories upon which the CSR policies are built. Previous empirical studies examining the relation between philosophical moral theories and the ethical content of business activities have mainly concentrated on the ethical decision-making of managers. Some of the most prominent investigations in that regard propose that managers mainly act in accordance with utilitarian moral theory, 166–175; Premeaux, S. and W. Mony: 1993, Journal of Business Ethics12, 349–357; Premeaux, S.: 2004, Journal of Business Ethics52, 269–278). I conclude that CSR policies are not based on utilitarian thinking, but instead, on some kind of common-sense morality. The ethical foundation of companies engaged in CSR, thus, does not mirror the ethical foundation of managers. (shrink)

This work brings under the centrally unifying theme of 'rationality' some of the issues on values and personal responsibility he has addressed during his long ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to Leonard Tan and Mengchen Lu, “‘I Wish to Be Wordless’: Philosophizing Through the Chinese Guqin.”Chiao-Wei Liu“I wish to be wordless” connects Chinese philosophical thinking to music education at large. Through discussions of values associated with the Chinese instrument guqin, Leonard Tan and Mengchen Lu exemplified “how music serves as ‘Truth tool’ in the Chinese philosophical tradition.” Specifically, the authors explored four ideas: “Search for Truth” (求真), “Search (...) for Harmony” (求和), “Search for Ethical Awakening” (求覺), and “Search for Sagehood” (求聖). These ideas embody insights from three major Chinese philosophical traditions: Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. Time prevents me from exploring the complex issues related to the interpretation and translation of classical Chinese texts, but I will attempt to focus on some of the authors’ arguments and how they relate to the practice of music learning and teaching in the classroom.1Quoting Confucius in their article title, Tan and Lu called attention to the suspicion of language found in the conversation between Confucius and his disciple. Extending the argument, the authors referred to Daoist philosophers and argued that although language can transmit wisdom, words remain limited in their ability to capture “the grand unity of the whole” and thus can “detract us [End Page 199] away from Truth.” Tan and Lu suggested that music, unlike language, serves as a truth “tool” and allows one to arrive at the Dao (Truth). Truth is conceived as a way of understanding the world, “a universal order, a new world perspective....” I agree with the authors about the limitations of language in capturing the complexity of human experiences, yet I am perplexed at how Truth is interpreted throughout the article.For example, in their discussion of “Search for Truth,” Tan and Lu related the art of playing the guqin to the Buddhist notion of mingxin jianxing (明心見性), clearing the heart-mind, seeing the inner-self, and locating Truth within the guqin player. Truth here is framed as good moral qualities residing within one’s innermost self (xing 性). Based on Li Zhi’s argument, Tan and Lu stated that “since a guqin player is all about her heart-mind and one’s music is all about the musician, music is the heart-mind of the musician.” Assuming that the heart-mind of the guqin player and the music are one, Tan and Lu suggested that when music and the musician’s innermost self are in sync, the musician may be able to attain spiritual Enlightenment. The example of Chopin’s Nocturne Op. 9, no. 1 helps readers learn that Truth does not reside within the performer or the music, but is located in the space where the two are in sync: “An ‘authentic’ performance of Chopin is one that is not only ‘true’ to Chopin and the stylistic conventions of his times, but also ‘true’ to the performer’s innermost being.”While Tan and Lu’s argument places Truth in both music and the innermost self (xing) of the performers, herein lies an assumption that qualities aligned with the music are ethically good, whereas those that differ are not. The search for Truth is thus a task of refusing any potential influence by “unethical thoughts” in order to stay true to the music. Recognizing the existing norms guiding various music traditions, I wonder how ethical and unethical thoughts are understood in music classrooms. As a music teacher, if unethical thoughts are interpreted as materials and expressions that are different or irrelevant to the music work, how do music teachers make sense of students’ feelings—whether they are the longing for a sense of belonging in the school ensemble or the desire to excel in certain aspects of school life? Are these feelings or desires “unethical” because they are separate from the musical work? If all acts dedicated to the faithful representation of the music work are considered ethical, how about the different needs of different students?Furthermore, in describing “Search for Ethical Awakening,” Tan and Lu stated that music written for the guqin is often associated with moral stories. Learning about the stories associated with music would be mandatory for performers to be morally and spiritually attuned to the composer. While I agree with the authors... (shrink)

Calling on philosophers as the custodians of rationality to reconsider their responsibility toward their communities and the state of civilization at large, this book considers philosophy to be a practical discipline. Largely foreign to philosophers and non-philosophers alike, this conception of philosophy discloses the relevance of its unique contributions to contemporary society. The book offers a compelling and accessible analysis of philosophy also in relation to religion, psychology, the New Age Movement, and globalization, and exemplifies through a (...) wide range of current problems how philosophers can fulfil their responsibility. Its argument that responsibility lies where one is capable of doing what is needed, and even more so, when no one else can do it, targets philosophers. However, its innovative study of contemporary philosophy coupled with its original contributions to the problems at hand will engage academics and students from other disciplines, as well as a general readership. (shrink)

This essay advances the thesis that Derrida’s ethics consists in the practice of philosophical responsibility. I contend that philosophical responsibility is the historical and ethical task of establishing a critical relation to one’s tradition which deliberately avoids passively and naively taking it for granted by questioning its origin and revealing its historicity. Further, I show that Derrida learns the task of philosophical responsibility from Husserl’s own version of philosophical responsibility, which he later transforms with the help of Husserl’s own methodological (...) tools. I maintain that the difference between Husserl’s and Derrida’s respective tasks is the injunction they are responding to and, concomitantly, the sense each gives to historicity. Whereas Husserl is responding to the principle of reason so as to reawaken the historicity of universal truth and its foundation, that is, the telos of Reason, Derrida is responding for the principle of reason with the purpose of disclosing the historicity of signification – différance – whose operation reduces the telos of Reason. (shrink)

My purpose in this short response to Clinton's interesting article On Bender's orientation to models: Towards a philosophical debate on covering laws, theory, emergence and mechanisms in nursing science, which is published in this issue, is not to provide any counterargument to Clinton's interpretation of my own argument; readers are welcome to interrogate both articles at their leisure and make their own conclusions. What I will do instead is provide a brief critical assessment of my own (il)logic re bringing in (...) the notion of mechanism as conceived by Machamer, Darden and Craver into an argument for models versus theories as a carrier of nursing knowledge. (shrink)

My first experience as a clinician was in a Therapeutic Community for service users with personality disorder. As well as having personality disorder, many of the Community members also suffered from related conditions, such as addiction and eating disorders. Broadly speaking, these conditions are what we might call ‘disorders of agency’. Core diagnostic symptoms or maintaining factors of disorders of agency are actions and omissions: patterns of behaviour central to the nature or maintenance of the condition. For instance, borderline personality (...) disorder is diagnosed in part via deliberate self-harm and attempted suicide, reckless and impulsive behaviour, substance use, violence, and outbursts of anger; addiction is diagnosed via maladaptive patterns of drug consumption; eating disorders involve eating too much or too little. If a service user is to improve let alone recover from these disorders, they must change the diagnostic or maintaining pattern of behaviour (cf. Pearce and Pickard, 2010). For instance, service users with borderline personality disorder must stop self-harming; addicts need to quit using drugs or alcohol; anorexics must eat. (shrink)

What attitude should we take toward a scientific theory when it competes with other scientific theories? This question elicited different answers from instrumentalists, logical positivists, constructive empiricists, scientific realists, holists, theory-ladenists, antidivisionists, falsificationists, and anarchists in the philosophy of science literature. I will summarize the diverse philosophical responses to the problem of underdetermination, and argue that there are different kinds of underdetermination, and that they should be kept apart from each other because they call for different responses.

When Fat Boy, the first atomic bomb was detonated at Los Alamos, New Mexico in 1945, moral responsibility in science was forever thrust into the forefront of philosophical debate. The culmination of the famed Manhattan Project, which employed many of the world's best scientific minds, was a singular event that signaled a new age of science for power and profit and the monumental responsibility that these actions entailed. Today, the drive for technological advances in areas such as pharmaceuticals, biosciences, communications, (...) and the defense industry channels the vast majority of scientific endeavor into applied research. In _The Responsible Scientist,_ John Forge examines the challenges of social, moral, and legal responsibility faced by today's scientists. Focusing on moral responsibility, Forge argues that scientists have a responsibility not to do work that has harmful outcomes and that they are encouraged to do work that prevents harm. Scientists also have a backward-looking responsibility, whereby they must prevent wrongful outcomes and omissions that they are in a position to foresee. Forge presents a broad overview of many areas of scientific endeavor, citing the responsibility of corporations, employees, and groups of scientists as judged by the values of science and society's appraisals of actions and outcomes. He maintains that ultimate responsibility lies in the hands of the individual-the responsible scientist-who must exhibit the diligence and foresight to anticipate the use and abuse of his or her work. (shrink)

Experimental philosophers have recently questioned the use of intuitions as evidence in philosophical methods. J. R. Kuntz and J. R.C. Kuntz (2011) conduct an experiment suggesting that these critiques fail to be properly motivated because they fail to capture philosophers' preferred conceptions of intuition‐use. In this response, it is argued that while there are a series of worries about the design of this study, the data generated by Kuntz and Kuntz support, rather than undermine, the motivation for the (...) experimentalist critiques of intuition they aim to criticize. (shrink)

This article responds to Philip Walsh’s defence : 179-200) of the traditional Lockean “underlaborer” conception of the role of philosophy against Norbert Elias’s sociology of knowledge. The article argues, contra Walsh, that the “post-philosophical” status of sociology is already a historical fait accompli. The author challenges Walsh’s contention that Elias’s perspectival sociological theory of knowledge is fatally flawed by its improper use of the concept of process as a central principle. The response concludes that Walsh’s article is a formidable mobilization (...) of logical, conceptual, analytical, and other theoretical resources tacitly designed to save the autonomy of philosophy at all costs in the face of the advanced sociology of knowledge of Elias. (shrink)

In a recent article, van Fraassen has taken issue with the use to which Perrin’s experiments on Brownian motion have been put by philosophers, especially those defending scientific realism. He defends an alternative position by analysing the details of Perrin’s case in its historical context. In this reply, I argue that van Fraassen has not done the job well enough and I extend and in some respects attempt to correct his claims by close attention to the historical details.

If we cannot define science using only analysis or description, then we must rely on imagination to provide us with suitable objects of philosophical inquiry. This process ties our intellectual findings to the particular ways in which we philosophers think about scientific practice and carve out a cognitive space between real world practice and conceptual abstraction. As an example, I consider Heather Douglas’s work on the responsibilities of scientists and document her implicit ideal of science, defined primarily as (...) an epistemic practice. I then contrast her idealization of science with an alternative: “technoscience,” a heuristic concept used to describe nanotechnology, synthetic biology, and similar “Mode 2” forms of research. This comparison reveals that one’s preferred imaginary of science, even when inspired by real practices, has significant implications for the distribution of responsibility. Douglas’s account attributes moral obligations to scientists, while the imaginaries associated with “technoscience” and “Mode 2 science” spread responsibility across the network of practice. This dynamic between mind and social order, I argue, demands an ethics of imagination in which philosophers of science hold themselves accountable for their imaginaries. Extending analogous challenges from feminist philosophy and Mills’s. “Ideal Theory’ as Ideology,” I conclude that we ought to reflect on the idiosyncrasy of the philosophical imagination and consider how our idealizations of science, if widely held, would affect our communities and broader society. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to Tony Palmer, “Music Education and Spirituality: A Philosophical Exploration II”Lenia SerghiMy response to Anthony Palmer's paper on "Music Education and Spirituality" consists of certain thoughts and relevant literature aiming to support the ideas presented in the paper from a different perspective.Exploring spirituality and music education Palmer examines (a) the Santiago Theory of Cognition, which acts as a connection between cognition and the process of life, (b) why (...) music education can benefit from ideas of spirituality, and (c) music education and the paths that might be traveled to bring a higher level of consciousness to students, including special attention to process and product.My comments and thoughts derive from ancient Greek Philosophy and mainly the ideas of Aristotle on organic nature and the living being, as well as the ideas of more recent philosophers and educationists like Robert Ulich on self-transcendence. These ideas, I believe, support Palmer's paper in relation to music education processes.The Structure of the Living BeingAccording to Huberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, the theoretical biologists who originated the Santiago Theory of Cognition,The perturbation of the environment does not determine what happens to the living being; rather it is the structure of the living being that determines what change occurs in it. This interaction is not instructive, for it does not determine what its effects are going to be.... The changes that result from the interaction between the living being and its environment are brought about by the disturbing agent but determined by the structure of the disturbed system.1The structure of the living being, Soul, Mind, Emotions, and Body are terms that have occupied philosophical thought for centuries.Soul, psyche in philosophical writings of the Greeks such as Aristotle, is a [End Page 216] general term for all those powers which plants and animals possess, but lifeless elements do not. Psyche is therefore of wider range than life (zoe), which is the power of self-maintenance common to plant and animal and is merely the foundation upon which higher physical capacities can be imposed.2Plato in Phaedrus relates soul, Psyche-anima, with motion, kineses. Inanimate objects only move if motion is imparted to them by an outside force. Anything that can move itself on its own initiative we regard it as animate, that is having psyche. This power of moving itself is, indeed, in Plato's words "the essence and definition (ousia kai logos) of soul."3Mind in Greek vocabulary is the word Nous which had been variously used. Anaxagoras and Empedokles had used it to cover all conscious processes. Later philosophers restricted Nous to that intellectual power which, as far as our certain knowledge extends, men alone display.4In the course of time two problems were bound to arise for philosophers: the relation between the soul (psyche) and the body (soma) and the relation between nous in rational beings and psyche. Aristotle's central proposition is that soul and body are aspects of a single substance, standing to one another in relation of form to matter.5Basic matters of Aristotle's psychology are (a) his account of sense- perception, (b) his account of the initiation of movement, and (c) his theory of the operation of Nous in human knowledge.6Aristotle outlines a general theory for the functioning of the senses. Aesthesis (sense) is what we perceive through the senses and these could be images, sounds, flavors, or things touched. Aesthesis consists of the imprints on the mind of the particulars of the world in a variety of ways, whereas Noesis grasps the world of universals.7Emotions and feelings and their relation to the mind were also problems that concerned philosophers. The Greek mystical philosopher, Plotinos, considers feelings of happiness or unhappiness reactions of the soul to its own states of perfection and imperfection. Herbart, one of the founders of modern learning, believes that our emotions and desires result from modifications occurring in our conceptual representations. In other words, feeling is a kind of pre-intellectual or post-intellectual state of mental life. Kant too considers emotion to be related to cognition, although he recognizes the sensuous origin of the... (shrink)

Should philosophers address the needs of their societies? If the answer is affirmative, and if today's needs are being inadequately answered within the New Age movement for lack of viable alternatives, philosophers' minimal response could be teaching critical thinking outside the academe, and maximal response would be providing relevant wisdom for the world. The first option requires construing logic and epistemology as practical fields. The second requires reforming part of Philosophy as social thinking which provides relevant wisdom for (...) the world. I expose here the maximal response based on an analysis of society's needs forcosmology and spirituality, the New Age Movement's role in providing for those needs, its dangers and imperviousness to criticism, and philosophers' possible responsibility for and interest in answering the needs for a synoptic vision. (shrink)

I analyze the potential a link between the problem of plagiarism and academic responsibility. I consider whether or not the way teachers and students view each other, education, and the writing process is irresponsible wherein producing papers becomes more valuable than the genuine learning that paper writing is originally intended to indicate and facilitate. This irresponsibility applies to both students and teachers who allow writing papers to be industrialized into meaningless tasks done in order to obtain a grade / pass (...) a course. In this irresponsible situation, plagiarism can appear an efficient, albeit dishonest, gamble to succeed. Using the thought of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Jan Patoèka to philosophically assess and respond to this academic situation, I argue for a way to restore the teacher-student relationship to a proper state of care and responsibility. (shrink)

This book offers a unique collection of philosophers engaging in public philosophy, offering responses to, and reflections on, the moral, political, social, and medical dilemmas born of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Pre-natal-diagnosis technologies allow parents to discover whether their child is likely to suffer from serious disability. One argument for state funding of access to such technologies is that doing so would be “cost-effective”, in the sense that the expected financial costs of such a programme would be outweighed by expected “benefits”, stemming from the births of fewer children with serious disabilities. This argument is extremely controversial. This paper argues that the argument may not be as unacceptable as is often assumed. (...) In doing so, it sets out a more general framework for assessing the relevance of efficiency calculations to policy-making. The final section also investigates the relationship between the paper’s arguments and claims about parental responsibility for child-bearing and rearing, with reference to Scanlon’s work on “substantive responsibility”. (shrink)

A full third of the book is devoted to "Buddhist themes," and although I am unfortunately unqualified to comment on its exegetical and interpretative quality, I can report that I found the discussion fascinating and enlightening. Priest gives us clear, precise, technical, and philosophically sophisticated theorizing based around these thinkers, giving the lie to the not-uncommon trope among analytic philosophers that so-called "continental" and Eastern thought are inherently wooly, without rigor.1At the start of her insightful and disconcerting essay, Amy (...) Olberding mentions that "while responsibility for the conversational practices" that "exclude" and are forms of boundary policing "are... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to Krista Riggs, “Foundations for Flow: A Philosophical Model For Studio Instruction”Patrick K. FreerKrista Riggs has written a provocative paper examining the relationship between psychology and pedagogy within the applied music studio. The sources Riggs employs as the basis for her arguments reflect some of the most enduring voices in educational psychology and philosophy (including music), and performance practice/preparation in music. Riggs draws important connections between these occasionally (...) disparate fields. I appreciate this opportunity to add to the discussion.As the foundation of this model, Riggs employs the study of optimal experience, known as 'flow theory,' as researched by Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi1 over the past three decades. The flow experience is only possible when an individual's personal capacities are congruent with the opportunities and goals afforded by the environment.2 When coupled with the necessary congruency between challenges and skills inherent in the flow model, Riggs' analysis raises questions concerning the definition of success within applied studio instruction, the position of studio instruction within the totality of a student's experience, and the ways in which teachers and students negotiate learning within applied music instruction.Three QuestionsIs the definition of success different for students than it is for teachers?At first blush, this paper concerns the "how" of music education—how we teach and how we encourage student motivation. Oftentimes, "how" we teach is dependent upon "why" we teach and "what" we teach. This becomes clear in the paper's introduction when success is defined as an outcome of education. Is the purpose of music education to build toward success using a very narrow, career-specific definition or is the purpose of music education to build toward broader success in many facets of musical knowledge and skill?Of course, this paper is contextualized to teaching within the applied studio and it may be that success in studio teaching is somewhat narrowly defined. But, at core is a potential conflict in the definition of success as defined by the teacher and the definition of success as appropriate for the student. In the model presented here, the definition of success is clearly student-centered and the success of the instructor is measured by the degree to which the student is supported on that pathway toward success. This is not to say that the instructional content of [End Page 225] the studio experience becomes less rigorous in any way, but rather that the instruction itself is modified to better ensure the success of students in learning and applying that content. Riggs implies, and Csikszentmihalyi would agree, that teachers cannot create flow experiences in students, but can create the conditions within which flow experiences can occur. The question is: What are those conditions and are they in conflict with the definition of success used by many studio teachers?The conditions necessary for flow experience have been identified through research and are embedded throughout Riggs' paper. The conditions are stated here in a purely student-centered manner. But, there are two players in this scene and it is the relationship between the student and teacher that most determines the experience of each. I am an unabashed proponent of attempts to optimize the quality of experience for students. However, the needs of the instructor seem to be missing from this discussion. It might be argued that this model is purely about studio instruction itself and an exploration of the instructor's needs is better suited for a different paper. Even so, the instructor's experiences, both in the past and in the present, do have bearing upon the student experience of the present. For example, it is probably a fair assumption that each instructor has, at some point, been a student in a studio. Might there be substantial value in a process of reflective analysis of that experience? Riggs does invoke the roles of reflection-in-action and reflection-on-action from the student viewpoint, but it might be illuminating to discern the instructor's reflections as well—and for these to be selectively shared with the student. In this way, studio teachers would be closer to fulfilling another necessary exemplar role: that of "master" teacher (or "mentor" teacher). If... (shrink)

The suggestion that philosophers are responsible for global warming seems, on the face of it, absurd. However, that we might cause global warming has been known for over a century. If we had had in existence a more rigorous kind of academic inquiry devoted to promoting human welfare, giving priority to problems of living, humanity might have become aware of the dangers of global warming long ago, and might have taken steps to meet these dangers decades ago. That we (...) do not have academic inquiry of this type, giving priority to problems of living and able to warn humanity of the impending disaster of global warming, is the result of a philosophical mistake – a mistake about what constitutes rigorous intellectual inquiry. This is a mistake of philosophers. Thus philosophers, in failing to grasp the profound intellectual and humanitarian failings of academia as it is at present organized (the outcome of implementing a seriously defective philosophy of inquiry) can perhaps be said to be responsible for global warming. (shrink)

It has at various times been said, both before and since the fall of apartheid, that philosophers in South Africa are neglecting to do certain sorts of work. Behind this accusation lies a general claim that philosophers have responsibilities to their contexts. This essay is dedicated to (i) defending this claim against objections, and (ii) offering a positive argument for there being moral pressure on philosophers to increase understanding. My aim is not to accuse any philosopher (...) or community of philosophers of neglect. It is rather to defend an understanding of both philosophy and ethical responsibilities that makes room for philosophers to have moral responsibilities. Whether or not it has ever in fact been appropriate to accuse philosophers in South Africa, or indeed anywhere else, of neglect, philosophers do indeed have responsibilities to their contexts. (shrink)

In this article we respond to the reviews, which appear in this issue, by Harry Brighouse, David Bakhurst, and Sheron Fraser-Burgess of our edited book Gareth B. Matthews, The Child’s Philosopher (Routledge 2022a). We are grateful for their sympathetic yet critical perspectives, which we take to be the very kind of engagement the philosophy for children movement requires in order to become more integrated with professional philosophical and educational theory and practice. We particularly value this opportunity to dialogue with scholars (...) outside the movement, which has generated the insights we address here. In what follows, we think with our reviewers about what Matthews’ work reveals about areas of promise and of concern in the movement. (shrink)

This is a philosophical study by a group of scholars discussing issues related to globalization, its challenges and opportunities as well as how philosophy can provide constructive suggestions, especially from African experiences and perspectives. Thematic concerns include relationship between African and Western philosophies, ecological problems, religious extremism and pluralism, freedom and ethics, climate change in Africa, environmental ethics, ubuntu ethics and business management, dialogue of cultures and traditions, etc.

John Lemos' _Freedom, Responsibility, and Determinism_ offers an up-to-date introduction to free will (and associated) debates in an engaging, dialogic format that recommends it for use by beginning students in philosophy as well as by undergraduates in intermediate courses in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and action theory.

This is a response to issues raised by Martin De Nys in his article, “Conceiving Divine Transcendence,” dealing with Hegel’s God: A Counterfeit Double? The response focuses especially on the question of religious representation, the issue of the autonomy of philosophy, the issue of creation, the actual practice of Hegel in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, and Hegel as a contemporary resource for philosophical theology.

As a pioneer Christian apology written as early as 1862, this work previously titled differently such as Hindu Philosophical Systems : A Rational Refutation (1862). A Rational Refutation of the Hindu Philosophical Systems (1897) and A Mirror of the Hindu Philosophical Systems (1911), is rated as scholarly as Krishna Mohun Banerjea's Dialogues on the Hindu Philosophy of 1861. The approach of both these works to the Hindu philosophical systems was negative and it is not acceptable to Indian Christians any more. (...) There have been many later works from Indian Christians scholars emphassing the possible contributions of one or other school of Indian philosophy to Christian thought. Whereas the merit of these two pioneering works was that they provide a Christian response to all the six systems of Hindu philosophy together comprehensively. For the later Indian Christian scholars to follow Inclusivism in Theology of Religious, somebody had to start at the school of Exclusivism and the two pioneers Goreh and Banerjea undertook this task. (shrink)

To date, the most substantial accounts of our engagement with literature have focused on prose-fiction, in particular the novel, drawing on issues of plot, character and narrative in explaining our understanding of literary works. These accounts do not consider how the poetic features of a literary work may affect our reading experience and how this contributes to the meaning of the work. In this thesis I show the philosophical importance of the experience of reading poetry for the role it can (...) play in inquiry, in particular, how such an experience can facilitate philosophical thinking and active inquiry. Adopting a reader-response view of our engagement with poetry, I argue that the experience of reading lyric poetry can make a valuable contribution to philosophical inquiry by enriching our conceptual understanding. The reading experience helps us to forge explicit awareness of our concepts and the networks of associations and beliefs that determine our use of them. Understanding poetry necessarily requires attending to the unity of form and content, and the particular perspectives on offer in the poem. This complex whole sustains perspectives and emotions where character and narrative are lacking. I argue that the perspectival nature of our reading experience is important for philosophical inquiry into aspects of human life. Encountering the perspectives of the poem helps to activate our own perspectives through our emotional and intellectual responses, bringing into focus what we value. I apply this argument to the moral domain, arguing that poetry can facilitate moral inquiry in particular by exposing moral significance in our concepts, helping us to feel what is at stake, and by testing our moral understanding. The way in which the poetic examples discussed engage us emotionally, imaginatively and cognitively (through the reading experience) help us address moral questions from distinctive and valuable perspectives, which provide us with moral insights of value in philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

People disagree about the causes of social inequality and how to most effectively intervene in them. These may seem like empirical questions for social scientists, not philosophers. However, causal explanation itself depends on broadly normative commitments. From this it follows that (moral) philosophers have an important role to play in determining those causal explanations. I examine the case of causal explanations of poverty to demonstrate these claims. In short, philosophers who work to reshape our moral expectations also (...) work, on the back end, to restructure acceptable causal explanations—and hence solutions—for social inequality. Empirical and normative inquiry, then, are a two-way street. (shrink)

Through a close reading of Plato’s Euthyphro, I reopen an old question: what would it look like to think piously? Although the dialogue itself is aporetic with regard to the definition of piety as such, I show that a specifically philosophical piety emerges: namely, the capacity to deal well with sameness and difference. A look at central features of the dialogues that provide the Euthyphro’s dramatic context confirms this claim.

In a recent issue of Bioethics, Bernard Gesang asks whether a moral philosopher possesses greater moral expertise than a non-philosopher, and his answer is a qualified yes, based not so much on his infallible access to the truth, but on the quality of his theoretically-informed moral justifications. I reject Gesang's claim that there is such a thing as moral expertise, although the moral philosopher may well make a valid contribution to the ethics committee as a concerned and educated citizen. I (...) suggest that wisdom is a lot more interesting to examine than moral expertise. Again, however, moral philosophers have no monopoly on wisdom, and the study of philosophy may even impede its cultivation. (shrink)

The first case of COVID-19 infection in Africa was recorded in Egypt on 14 February 2020. Following this, several projections of the possible devastating effect that the virus can have on the population of African countries were made in the Western media. This paper presents evidence for Africa’s successful responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and under-reporting or misrepresentation of these successes in Western media. It proceeds to argue for accounting for these successes in terms of Africa’s communitarian way of life (...) and conceptions of self, duty, and rights; and that a particular orientation in theorizing on global justice can highlight the injustices inherent in the misrepresentation of these successes and contribute shared perspectives to formulating a framework of values and concepts that would facilitate the implementation of global policy goals for justice. The paper is thus grounded in a rejection of the insular tenets of theorizing prevalent in the global justice debate and to persistent inclinations in Western scholarship to the thinking that theorizing in the African context that draws inspiration from the cultural past has little to contribute to the quest for justice globally. On the contrary, it argues that reflexive critique of cultural history is a necessary source of normative ideals that can foster tolerant coexistence and a cooperative endeavour toward shared conceptions of justice in the contemporary world. (shrink)

R. Jay Wallace argues in this book that moral accountability hinges on questions of fairness: When is it fair to hold people morally responsible for what they do? Would it be fair to do so even in a deterministic world? To answer these questions, we need to understand what we are doing when we hold people morally responsible, a stance that Wallace connects with a central class of moral sentiments, those of resentment, indignation, and guilt. To hold someone responsible, he (...) argues, is to be subject to these reactive emotions in one's dealings with that person. Developing this theme with unusual sophistication, he offers a new interpretation of the reactive emotions and traces their role in our practices of blame and moral sanction. With this account in place, Wallace advances a powerful and sustained argument against the common view that accountability requires freedom of will. Instead, he maintains, the fairness of holding people responsible depends on their rational competence: the power to grasp moral reasons and to control their behavior accordingly. He shows how these forms of rational competence are compatible with determinism. At the same time, giving serious consideration to incompatibilist concerns, Wallace develops a compelling diagnosis of the common assumption that freedom is necessary for responsibility. Rigorously argued, eminently readable, this book touches on issues of broad concern to philosophers, legal theorists, political scientists, and anyone with an interest in the nature and limits of responsibility. (shrink)

Brouwer’s intuitionistic program was an intriguing attempt to reform the foundations of mathematics that eventually did not prevail. The current paper offers a new perspective on the scientific community’s lack of reception to Brouwer’s intuitionism by considering it in light of Michael Friedman’s model of parallel transitions in philosophy and science, specifically focusing on Friedman’s story of Einstein’s theory of relativity. Such a juxtaposition raises onto the surface the differences between Brouwer’s and Einstein’s stories and suggests that contrary to Einstein’s (...) story, the philosophical roots of Brouwer’s intuitionism cannot be traced to any previously established philosophical traditions. The paper concludes by showing how the intuitionistic inclinations of Hermann Weyl and Abraham Fraenkel serve as telling cases of how individuals are involved in setting in motion, adopting, and resisting framework transitions during periods of disagreement within a discipline. (shrink)

Ralph Weber’s recent criticism sheds light on the methodological predicament of comparative philosophy. I examine Weber’s analytical tool and argue that its general applicability and potential unbridled use can lead to a conflict between its own legitimacy and the legitimacy of comparative philosophy as an established sui generis sub-discipline of philosophy which largely functions as “intercultural” or “trans-cultural philosophy”. I defend the cultural approach, and argue that comparative philosophy should be viewed as philosophical data analysis from different spatiotemporal origins, in (...) order to achieve better explanatory power for philosophical study. I point out that philosophy in China has its own peculiar methodological predicament. The comparative study of philosophy is a joint project of inter-cultural dialogue that rests on the collective effort of global participants. (shrink)

Indian Christian thinkers have responded both negatively and positively to the diverse schools of Indian Philosophy. It is the contention of this work that the negative responses alone will stand out in history in the reconstruction of Indian Christian thought. Also, Indian Christian thought developed in terms of the contributions of Indian philosophical schools can be first step in the articulation of an Indian Christian philosophy.