The debate around lockdowns as a response to the recent pandemic is typically framed in terms of a tension between freedom and health. However, on some views, protection of health or reduction of virus‐related risks can also contribute to freedom. Therefore, there might be no tension between freedom and health in public health restrictions. I argue that such views fail to appreciate the different understandings of freedom that are involved in the trade‐off between freedom and (...) health. Grasping these distinctions would allow to appreciate why different people give more weight to different aspects of limitations of freedom, including whether certain options are made simply risky or impossible, whether limitations of freedom are posed intentionally or happen accidentally, whether risks are beyond a threshold of acceptability, and who gets to decide that. I provide a conceptual analysis of the relationship between different types of freedom, public health policies, viruses and diseases. As I argue, identifying what freedom‐based reasons count for and against different types of public health restrictions requires distinguishing between viruses and diseases, between lockdowns and other types of restrictive policies, and between risks posed by viruses and threats of penalties involved by restrictive policies. (shrink)

Pulvermüller restricts himself to an unnecessarily narrow range of evidence to support his claims. Evidence from neural modeling and behavioral experiments provides further support for an account of words encoded as transcortical cell assemblies. A cognitive neuroscience of language must include a range of methodologies (e.g., neural, computational, and behavioral) and will need to focus on the on-line processes of real-time language processing in more natural contexts.

This paper argues for a dilemma: you can accept liberalism or immigration restrictions, but not both. More specifically, the standard arguments for restricting freedom of movement apply equally to textbook liberal freedoms, such as freedom of speech, religion, occupation and reproductive choice. We begin with a sketch of liberalism’s core principles and an argument for why freedom of movement is plausibly on a par with other liberal freedoms. Next we argue that, if a state’s right to self-determination (...) grounds a prima facie right to restrict immigration, then it also grounds a prima facie right to restrict freedom of speech, religion, sexual choice and more. We then suggest that the social costs associated with freedom of immigration are also costs associated with occupational choice, speech and reproduction. Thus, a state’s interest in reducing these costs gives it prima facie justification to restrict not only immigration but also other core liberal freedoms. Moreover, we rebut the objection that, even if the standard arguments for a prima facie right to restrict immigration also support a prima facie right to restrict liberal freedoms generally, there are differences that render immigration restrictions – but not restrictions on speech, religion, etc. – justified all things considered. In closing, we suggest that the theoretical price of supporting immigration restrictions – viz., compromising a commitment to liberal principles – is too steep to pay. (shrink)

In Brazil, the normative landscape around advertising is complex, not the least because of limitations inherent to dispute resolution mechanisms. Focusing on unhealthy food and beverages, this case study identifies some challenges and opportunities around advertising restrictions, including in relation to freedom of speech.

This paper discusses why speech regulations are logically necessary for any account of a moral right to free speech. My argument for limiting the right to free speech (and more widely any right to freedom) will be grounded in compossibility. Rights to freedom, formally speaking, are claims by an agent that other people not interfere with them; a compossible set of rights is one where the domains of permissible actions—permitted by each claim (and its correlative duty) within the (...) set—do not contradict one another across claims. I will argue that in order for claims to be coherent, they cannot generate contradictory domains, and that for a claim to non-interference to not generate contradictory domains across multiple people with the same claim, the claim must be restricted. This account as it currently stands can at least generate conclusions on the permissibility of incitement. (shrink)

We consider how an epistemic network might self-assemble from the ritualization of the individual decisions of simple heterogeneous agents. In such evolved social networks, inquirers may be significantly more successful than they could be investigating nature on their own. The evolved network may also dramatically lower the epistemic risk faced by even the most talented inquirers. We consider networks that self-assemble in the context of both perfect and imperfect communication and compare the behaviour of inquirers in each. This provides a (...) step in bringing together two new and developing research programs, the theory of self-assembling games and the theory of network epistemology. (shrink)

Background COVID-19 has greatly impacted the health of incarcerated individuals in the US. The goal of this study was to examine perspectives of recently incarcerated individuals on greater restrictions on liberty to mitigate COVID-19 transmission.Methods We conducted semi-structured phone interviews from August through October 2021 with 21 people who had been incarcerated in Bureau of Prisons (BOP) facilities during the pandemic. Transcripts were coded and analyzed, using a thematic analysis approach.Results Many facilities implemented universal “lockdowns,” with time out of the (...) cell often limited to one hour per day, with participants reporting not being able to meet all essential needs such as showers and calling loved ones. Several study participants reported that repurposed spaces and tents created for quarantine and isolation provided “unlivable conditions.” Participants reported receiving no medical attention while in isolation, and staff using spaces designated for disciplinary purposes (e.g., solitary housing units) for public health isolation purposes. This resulted in the conflation of isolation and discipline, which discouraged symptom reporting. Some participants felt guilty over potentially causing another lockdown by not reporting their symptoms. Programming was frequently stopped or curtailed and communication with the outside was limited. Some participants relayed that staff threatened to punish noncompliance with masking and testing. Liberty restrictions were purportedly rationalized by staff with the idea that incarcerated people should not expect freedoms, while those incarcerated blamed staff for bringing COVID-19 into the facility.Conclusions Our results highlighted how actions by staff and administrators decreased the legitimacy of the facilities’ COVID-19 response and were sometimes counterproductive. Legitimacy is key in building trust and obtaining cooperation with otherwise unpleasant but necessary restrictive measures. To prepare for future outbreaks facilities must consider the impact of liberty-restricting decisions on residents and build legitimacy for these decisions by communicating justifications to the extent possible. (shrink)

This paper presents, in a more general setting, a simple approach to ‘relevant restricted generalizations’ advanced in previous work. After reviewing some desiderata for restricted generalizations, I present the target route towards achieving the desiderata. An objection to the approach, due to David Ripley, is presented, followed by three brief replies, one from a dialetheic perspective and the others more general.

Restricted quantification poses a serious and under-appreciated challenge for nonclassical approaches to both vagueness and the semantic paradoxes. It is tempting to explain as ; but in the nonclassical logics typically used in dealing with vagueness and the semantic paradoxes (even those where thend expect. If we’re going to use a nonclassical logic, we need one that handles restricted quantification better.

This chapter begins with a narration of a slave ship's arrival from the Dutch Gold Coast, today's Ghana, to a South American seaport, Suriname, with about 40 blacks. The uprooted Africans used what was at hand, both culturally and materially, to cobble together the beginnings of an African American culture. It appears that these cultures are not so much born as assembled. This introductory chapter attempts to answer four preliminary questions: to paraphrase cultural theorist and sociologist Stuart Hall: what is (...) the black in black aesthetics; in the same spirit: what is the aesthetic in black aesthetics; what good is a philosophy of black aesthetics; and why discuss any of this in terms of assembly. The idea of assembling black aesthetics presupposes that there is a responsible way of appealing to racial blackness. The chapter also indicates the content available in other chapters of the book. (shrink)

We start with an observation about implicit quantifier domain restriction: certain implicit restrictions (e.g., restricting objects by location and time) appear to be more natural and widely available than others (e.g., restricting objects by color, aesthetic, or historical properties). Our aim is to explain why this is. That is, we aim to explain why some implicit domain restriction possibilities are available by default. We argue that, regardless of their other explanatory virtues, extant pragmatic and metasemantic frameworks leave this (...) question unanswered. We then motivate a partially nativist account of domain restriction that involves a minimal view of joint planning around broad shared goals about navigating and influencing our environments augmented with cognitive heuristics that facilitate these. Finally, we sketch how the view can be extended to account for the ways non-default restriction possibilities become available when conversationalists have shared idiosyncratic goals. (shrink)

As visual technologies become increasingly networked online, websites like YouTube provide a space to share vlogs online, suggest related content for viewers, and help in/form virtual communities, including those of mental illness. Within this space, vlogs of schizophrenia and comments generated about them by other users can represent transitional, dialogical states of illness that speak back to the analog body and affect a body’s way of being in the world. Moreover, as vlogs create resistance against static definitions of schizophrenia, they (...) may foster a creativity, experimentation, and inventiveness that transforms understandings of schizophrenia within the sciences and humanities. (shrink)

[1] Diaspora, imagined in terms of a people that belong both to a place of departure and to a place of arrival, is implicitly transitive. Narrated in these terms, a diasporic people is defined by being in-between two places, by a transitive zone of indeterminacy. It is marked, at its arrival-place, by its belonging to another place, and thus as not fully belonging to the place; it is marked, at its departure-place, by its belonging to another place, and thus as (...) not fully belonging to the place.1 To be in-between departure and arrival is to be in-between places of belonging. This in-between is simultaneously articulated as a belonging-too-much (belonging to more... (shrink)

I develop and defend a novel answer to Peter van Inwagen’s ‘Special Composition Question,’ (SCQ) namely, under what conditions do some things compose and object? My answer is that things will compose an object when and only when they exist simultaneously relative to a reference frame (I call this ‘Temporally Restricted Composition’ or TREC). I then show how this view wards off objections given to ‘Unrestricted Mereology’ (UM). TREC, unlike other theories of Restricted Composition, does not fall prey to worries (...) about vagueness, anthropocentrism, or arbitrariness. TREC also has advantages over all the other answers to the SCQ. TREC is an account an A-theorist anti-Eternalist who wants an unrestricted mereology should accept. I also engage in some conceptual hygiene by showing how UM, as it should be used, should not, in itself, entail or contain a commitment to either Eternalism or Four-Dimensionalism. (shrink)

Few issues in business ethics are as polarizing as the practice of risk classification and underwrit­ ing in the insurance industry. Theorists who approach the issue from a background in economics often start from the assumption that policy-holders should be charged a rate that reflects the ex­ pected loss that they bring to the insurance scheme. Yet theorists who approach the question from a background in philosophy or civil rights law often begin with a presumption against socalled “actuarially fair” premiums (...) and in favor of “community rating,” in which everyone is charged the same price. This paper begins by examining and rejecting the three primary argu­ ments that have been given to show that actuarially fair premiums are unjust. It then considers the two primary arguments that have been offered by those who wish to defend the practice of risk classification. These arguments overshoot their target, by requiring a “freedom to under­ write” that is much greater than the level of freedom enjoyed in most other commercial transac­ tions. The paper concludes by presenting a defense of a more limited right to underwrite, one that grants the legitimacy of the central principle of risk classification, but permits specific deviations from that ideal when other important social goods are at stake. (shrink)

The argument in this essay is twofold. (1) Procedural justice requires,in particular cases, that we restrict property rights in natural resources, e.g., California agricultural land or Appalachian coal land. (2) Conditions imposed by Locke's political theory and by dense population require,in general, that we restrict property rights in finite or non-renewable natural resources such as land. If these arguments are correct, then we have a moral imperative to use land-use controls (such as taxation, planning, zoning, and acreage limitations) to restructure (...) land ownership and land use in a far more radical way than has ever been accomplished in the past. (shrink)

Although Hurricane Katrina precipitated considerable reflection across various media, a practice crucial to our capacities to apprehend and interpret the disaster has not yet been analyzed as such. I call this practice generative assembly. I don’t mean the events of emergency and political gathering that took place in response to the massive storm and fatal, preventable levee failures—although I will propose connections between different forms of assembly. Instead I mean a kind of documentary practice. That practice, which can (...) be undertaken individually or in collaboration, and sometimes at anonymous remove, involves the work of assembling records and signifiers related to the disaster into particular kinds of media artifacts. Those artifacts— which take shape in formats as varied as comics, photobooks, paintings, films, exhibitions, and multithousand-item online archives—characteristically maintain the active appearance and interactive potential of selection and arrangement. In exhibiting such qualities, or so I will argue, these assembly-based artifacts support various articulable and often highly effective kinds of generativity. And thus, I will further suggest, these artifacts can constitute especially powerful means of intervening in prevailing conditions of representation and remembrance around events of environmental and social violence. Crucially, those material legacies of generative assembly can also fall short, fail, and deceive, and this is especially true of those assemblies that take digital forms. It is my contention, however, that we would be misguided if we thus entirely dismissed such assemblies or if we refused their potential for dissident reuse or generative reassembly. (shrink)

Nurses working in outreach capacities frequently encounter disaffiliated or ‘hard to reach’ populations, such as those experiencing homelessness, those who use substances, and those with mental health concerns. Despite best efforts, nurses regularly fail to find meaningful engagement with these populations. Mobilizing the work of Deleuze and Guattari, this paper will critically examine conventional outreach nursing practices as rooted in the royal science of psychiatry, which many ‘survivors’ of psychiatric interventions reject. The field of Mad Studies offers an understanding of (...) patient resistance to outreach nursing interventions. Delueze and Guattari's concepts of packs and sorcerers provide a framework to envision alternative nursing practices as a form of resistance and creativity, where new alliances may be formed outside the coercive confines of traditional practices. In response to patient resistance, outreach nurses themselves must assemble packs and engage in acts of sorcery. (shrink)

The paper reviews a number of approaches for handling restricted quantification in relevant logic, and proposes a novel one. This proceeds by introducing a novel kind of enthymematic conditional.

In their comprehensive article, Bayefsky and Berkman outline a framework for limiting access to certain types of fetal genetic information through professional self-regulation. Given the rap...

Historically, the most persuasive argument against external reasons proceeds through a rationalist restriction: For all agents A, and all actions Φ, there is a reason for A to Φ only if Φing is rationally accessible from A's actual motivational states. Here I distinguish conceptions of rationality, show which one the internalist must rely on to argue against external reasons, and argue that a rationalist restriction that features that conception of rationality is extremely implausible. Other conceptions of rationality can (...) render the restriction true, but then the restriction simply fails to rule out external reasons. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe aim of this paper is to draw attention to an issue which has been largely overlooked in contemporary just war theory – namely the impact that the conditions under which an army is assembled are liable to have on the judgments that are made with respect to traditional principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. I argue that the way in which an army is assembled can significantly alter judgments regarding the justice of a war. In doing (...) so, I present and defend a principle of ‘just assembly’ and argue that satisfying this principle is an essential part of any deliberation regarding the justice of a particular conflict. (shrink)

Most of us believe that partiality applies in a broad range of relationships. One relationship on which there is much disagreement is co-nationality. Some writers argue that co-national partiality is not justified in certain cases, like killing in war, since killing in defense of co-nationals is intuitively impermissible in other contexts. I argue that this approach overlooks an important structural feature of partiality—namely, that its scope is sometimes restricted. In this essay, I show how some relationships that generate reasons of (...) partiality are restricted in scope—that is, they generate reasons within particular contexts or with respect to particular goods. I then argue that co-national partiality is scope restricted. I then show how this fact helps proponents of co-national partiality overcome the aforementioned objection to its application in cases like war. (shrink)

This paper investigates how naive theories of truth fare with respect to a set of extremely plausible principles of restricted quantification. It is first shown that both nonsubstructural theories as well as certain substructural theories cannot validate all those principles. Then, pursuing further an approach to the semantic paradoxes that the author has defended elsewhere, the theory of restricted quantification available in a specific naive theory that rejects the structural property of contraction is explored. It is shown that the theory (...) validates all the principles in question, and it is argued that other prima facie plausible principles that the theory fails to validate are objectionable on independent grounds. (shrink)

This is a reply to H. Ben-Yami, 'Generalized quantifiers, and beyond' (this journal, 2009), where he argues that standard GQ theory does not explain why natural language quantifiers have a restricted domain of quantification. I argue, on the other hand, that although GQ theory gives no deep explanation of this fact, it does give a sort of explanation, whereas Ben-Yami's suggested alternative is no improvement.

Red-2 is a computer program for red-cell antibody identification, a piece of "normal science". Abstracting from Red-2, a general problem solving mechanism is described that is especially suited for performing a form of abductive inference or best explanation finding. A problem solver embodying this mechanism synthesizes composite hypotheses by combining hypothesis parts. This is a common task of intelligence, and a component of scientific reasoning. The work addresses the question, 'How is science possible?' by showing how a simple but powerful (...) form of hypothesis synthesis is computationally feasible. (shrink)

(2010). Restricting CPR to Patients Who Provide Informed Consent Will Not Permit Physicians to Unilaterally Refuse Requested CPR. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 82-83.

Smooha argues that Joppke's thesis in his paper on comparative citizenship in Europe—there is no restrictive turn in citizenship and immigration laws and practices in Europe—is questionable. This is true not only for the pre-enlargement 15 EU countries during the years 1980-2006 under Joppke's study, but also for the post-enlargement 27 EU countries. When the time range is broadened to the post-1945 period, it is clear that the historical trend of liberalization has come to an end in Europe and this (...) is in spite of Europe's dire need of immigrants and the great desire of non-Europeans to immigrate to Europe. Europe is particularly fearful of Moslems, Arab Moslems, and Black Africans. Nevertheless, the comparison between Israel and the EU countries can put the discussion on Europe in perspective. Israel can be representative of non-European countries that claim to be Western or European countries that are latecomers to the West. When these countries are compared to the 15 EU countries, as described and analyzed by Joppke, it is evident that the EU core is liberal and Israel and non-core European countries are not liberal in their laws and practices. EU laws on immigration and naturalization are motivated only partially by ethnicity while those of other countries are more shaped by ethnic considerations and those of Israel are mainly determined by ethnicity and ethnicity-based fear. According to Smooha the EU might move in Israel's highly restrictive direction when it feels that its Western civilization, national cultures, and internal security are more significantly and increasingly threatened by non-European immigrants and their descendants. (shrink)

According to many philosophers, the world should embrace open borders – that is, let people move around the globe and settle as they wish, with exceptions made only in very specific cases such as fugitives or terrorists. Defenders of open borders have adopted two major argumentative strategies. The first is to claim that immigration restrictions involve coercion, and then show that such coercion cannot be morally justified. The second is to argue that adopting worldwide open borders policies would make the (...) world a much better place, particularly by improving average well-being. This essay contends that both of these argumentative strategies fail. Some immigration restrictions are not only morally justified, but morally required. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a theory of interaction between definiteness and quantifier structure, where the definite determiner (D) performs the function of contextually restricting the domain of quantificational determiners (Qs). Our motivating data come from Greek and Basque, where D appears to compose with the Q itself. Similar compositions are found in Hungarian and Bulgarian. Following earlier work (Giannakidou 2004, Etxeberria 2005, Etxeberria and Giannakidou 2009) we define a domain restricting function DDR, in which D modifies the Q and (...) supplies the contextual variable C to intersect with Q’s domain. DDR can also modify the NP in which case it works like an intersective modfier— and we suggest that this is the case in St’át’imcets Salish (drawing on data from Matthewson’s work). The result of DDR will be restricting the domain of Q by C, a weakly familiar property (in the sense of Roberts 2003, 2010), i.e. it is entailed in the common ground of the context. As a result of intersecting with this property, the Q that undergoes DDR becomes presuppositional, and we hypothesize that all presuppositional Qs (each-like Qs) have an underlying derivation of the domain restriction via D that we see in Greek and Basque overtly. Our analysis provides support for the program that domain restriction is grammatically represented, but we propose an important refinement: domain restriction can affect the Q itself (in agreement with von Fintel 1998, Martí 2003, Giannakidou 2004; pace Stanley 2002), and in fact quite systematically. We also show that the Q that is affected by DDR is a strong one, and explain the inability of weak Qs to undergo DDR as following from their status as adjectival. (shrink)

In this paper I present a range of substructural logics for a conditional connective ↦. This connective was original introduced semantically via restriction on the ternary accessibility relation R for a relevant conditional. I give sound and complete proof systems for a number of variations of this semantic definition. The completeness result in this paper proceeds by step-by-step improvements of models, rather than by the one-step canonical model method. This gradual technique allows for the additional control, lacking in the (...) canonical model method, that is required. (shrink)

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Jc Beall has made several contributions to the theory of restricted quantification in relevant logics. This paper examines these contributions and proposes an alternative account of restricted universals. The alternative is not, however, a theory of relevant restricted universals in any real sense. It is, however, a theory of restricted universals phrased in the most plausible general quantificational theory for relevant logics—Kit Fine’s stratified semantics. The motivation both for choosing this semantic framework and for choosing the particular theory of restricted (...) quantification we use is because they are the best way of dealing with these topics from Beall’s theory-building theory picture of logic, establishing a second point of contact with Beall’s work. (shrink)

According to representationalism, the qualitative character of our phenomenal mental states supervenes on the intentional content of such states. Strong representationalism makes a further claim: the qualitative character of our phenomenal mental states _consists in_ the intentional content of such states. Although strong representationalism has greatly increased in popularity over the last decade, I find the view deeply implausible. In what follows, I will attempt to argue against strong representationalism by a two-step argument. First, I suggest that strong representationalism must (...) be _unrestricted_ in order to serve as an adequate theory of qualia, i.e., it must apply to all qualitative mental states. Second, I present considerations to show that an unrestricted form of strong representationalism is problematic. (shrink)

It is a common practice for family members to bring food to hospitalized loved ones. However, in some cases, this food contravenes a patient's dietary plan. Such situations can create significant tension and distrust between health care professionals and families and may lead the former to doubt a family's willingness or ability to support patient recovery. This case‐study essay offers an ethical analysis of these situations. We draw on Hilde Lindemann's work to argue that providing food to family members is (...) an important way that families discharge their moral functions of caring for their members and holding them in their identities. When family members are hospitalized, other means of performing these functions are limited. Acknowledging the ethical importance of feeding family members alongside the medical need for dietary restrictions, we offer strategies for creative problem‐solving that center diet as a subject for shared decision‐making and regular, ongoing communication among health care professionals, patients, and families. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the ethics of restricting visitation to hospitals during an infectious disease outbreak. We aim to answer three questions: What are the features of an ethically justified hospital visitor restriction policy? Should policies include scope for case‐by‐case exemptions? How should decisions about exemptions be made? Based on a critical interpretive review of the existing ethical literature on visitor restrictions, we argue that an ethically justified hospital visitor restriction policy has the following features: proportionality, comprehensiveness, (...) harm mitigation, exemptions for specific patient populations, visitation decisions made separately from a patient's treating clinicians, transparency, and consistency in application. We also argue that an ethical policy ought to include scope for case‐by‐case exemptions for individual patients. We propose a process for ethical decision‐making that provides a shared language and structure to decrease the risks and burdens of decision‐making when clinicians or managers are considering requests for exemptions. (shrink)

Starting with the view that methodological constraints depend upon the nature of the system investigated, a tripartite division between theoretical, semitheoretical, and empirical discoveries is made. Many nanosystems can only be investigated semitheoretically or empirically, and this aspect leads to some nanophenomena being weakly emergent. Self-assembling systems are used as an example, their existence suggesting that the class of systems that is not Kim-reducible may be quite large.