ABSTRACT In this paper, I present data involving the use of the Romanian slur ‘țigan’, consideration of which leads to the postulation of a sui-generis, irreducible type of use of slurs. This type of use is potentially problematic for extant theories of slurs. In addition, together with other well-established uses, it shows that there is more variation in the use of slurs than previously acknowledged. I explain this variation by construing slurs as polysemous. To implement this idea, I appeal (...) to a rich-lexicon account of polysemy. I show how such a theory can be applied to slurs and discuss several important issues that arise. (shrink)

Many authors writing on slurs think that they are lexically rich, in the sense that their lexical meaning comprises both a descriptive dimension and an expressive/evaluative one, the latter accounting for their derogatory character. However, more fine-grained theories of slurs have recently been proposed, drawing on frameworks from lexical semantics. My main aim in this paper is to compare three such fine-grained rich-lexicon theories – the one put forward by myself in previous work with two (...) similar ones, Croom’s (2011, 2013) and Neufeld’s (2019, 2022). While my primary aim is to underlie the commonalities and differences between the three views, I also aim at showing that the latter views have some issues that are easily avoided in the framework I propose. (shrink)

Many authors writing on slurs think that they are lexically rich, in the sense that their lexical meaning comprises both a descriptive dimension and an expressive/evaluative one, the latter accounting for their derogatory character. However, more fine-grained theories of slurs have recently been proposed, drawing on frameworks from lexical semantics. My main aim in this paper is to compare three such fine-grained rich-lexicon theories – the one put forward by myself in previous work with two (...) similar ones, Croom’s (2011, 2013) and Neufeld’s (2019, 2022). While my primary aim is to underlie the commonalities and differences between the three views, I also aim at showing that the latter views have some issues that are easily avoided in the framework I propose. (shrink)

Framed in psychological terms, the basic question of linguistic theory is what is stored in memory, and in what form. Traditionally, what is stored is divided into grammar and lexicon, where grammar contains the rules and the lexicon is an unstructured list of exceptions. We develop an alternative view in which rules of grammar are simply lexical items that contain variables, and in which rules have two functions. In their generative function, they are used to build novel structures, (...) just as in traditional generative linguistics. In their relational function, they capture generalizations over stored items in the lexicon, a role not seriously explored in traditional linguistic theory. The result is a highly structured lexicon with rich patterns among stored items. We further explore the possibility that this sort of structuring is not specific to language, but appears in other cognitive domains as well, such as the structure of physical objects, of music, and of geographical and social knowledge. The differences among cognitive domains do not lie in this overall texture, but in the materials over which stored relations are defined. The challenge is to develop theories of representation in these other domains comparable to that for language. (shrink)

Although for many years a sharp distinction has been made in language research between rules and words—with primary interest on rules—this distinction is now blurred in many theories. If anything, the focus of attention has shifted in recent years in favor of words. Results from many different areas of language research suggest that the lexicon is representationally rich, that it is the source of much productive behavior, and that lexically specific information plays a critical and early role (...) in the interpretation of grammatical structure. But how much information can or should be placed in the lexicon? This is the question I address here. I review a set of studies whose results indicate that event knowledge plays a significant role in early stages of sentence processing and structural analysis. This poses a conundrum for traditional views of the lexicon. Either the lexicon must be expanded to include factors that do not plausibly seem to belong there; or else virtually all information about word meaning is removed, leaving the lexicon impoverished. I suggest a third alternative, which provides a way to account for lexical knowledge without a mental lexicon. (shrink)

This monograph offers a novel, neurocognitive theory concerning words and language. It explores the distinction between inferential and referential semantic competence. The former accounts for the relationship of words among themselves, the latter for the relationship of words to the world. The author discusses this distinction at the level of the human brain on both theoretical and neuroscientific grounds. In addition, this investigation considers the relation between the inf/ref neurocognitive theory and other accounts of semantic cognition proposed in the field (...) of neurosemantics, as well as some potential implications of the theory for clinical neuroscience and the philosophy of semantics. Overall, the book offers an important contribution to the debate about lexical semantic competence. It combines a strong philosophical and linguistic background with a comprehensive and critical analysis of neurosemantic literature. Topics discussed lie at the intersection of philosophical semantics, linguistics, neurolinguistics, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, cognitive neuroscience, and clinical psychology. Due to its interdisciplinary orientation, coverage is rich in introductory remarks and not overly technical, therefore it is accessible to non-experts as well. (shrink)

In our discussions around the theme of solid fluids, we often resort to everyday words, many of them of ancient derivation and rich in association. We have decided to make a list of some of the words that come up most often – barring those that already figure as the principal characters of individual contributions – and to distribute among ourselves the task of writing a sort of mini-biography for each. The resulting lexicon with 19 entries, ranging from (...) ‘cloud’ and ‘concrete’ to ‘wave’ and ‘wood’, serves as a conclusion to the collection as a whole. (shrink)

We compare our model of unsupervised learning of linguistic structures, ADIOS [1], to some recent work in computational linguistics and in grammar theory. Our approach resembles the Construction Grammar in its general philosophy (e.g., in its reliance on structural generalizations rather than on syntax projected by the lexicon, as in the current generative theories), and the Tree Adjoining Grammar in its computational characteristics (e.g., in its apparent affinity with Mildly Context Sensitive Languages). The representations learned by our algorithm (...) are truly emergent from the (unannotated) corpus data, whereas those found in published works on cognitive and construction grammars and on TAGs are hand-tailored. Thus, our results complement and extend both the computational and the more linguistically oriented research into language acquisition. We conclude by suggesting how empirical and formal study of language can be best integrated. (shrink)

Ecological developmental biology considers the phenotype as actively produced through an environmentally informed process of individual development, rather than predetermined by the genotype. Accordingly, the genotype is viewed as one among many interactants that contribute formative elements; it is understood to do so no differently from the way other organism-internal and environmental resources do. Although the EcoDevo approach is evidently particularly apt to inform approaches to human development, which mostly takes shape in rich cultural environments, it is remarkable that, (...) at least within some highly influential circles of the linguistic sciences, the study of many distinctive human cognitive traits including language remains strongly anchored to a preformationist stance. This article brings an EcoDevo approach to the biologically focused study of language to argue that an aspect of language design commonly assumed to be “blueprinted,” namely, the lexicon-syntax interface, may instead be explained as a plastic effect of ongoing developmental processes in the mind of the child, in which designated aspects of the environment fulfill a key constructive role. (shrink)

When the term “postfeminism” entered the media lexicon in the 1990s, it was often accompanied by breathless headlines about the “death of feminism.” Those reports of feminism’s death may have been greatly exaggerated, and yet contemporary popular culture often conjures up a world in which feminism had never even been born, a fictional universe filled with suburban Stepford wives, maniacal career women, alluring amnesiacs, and other specimens of retro femininity. In _Feminism and Popular Culture_, Rebecca Munford and Melanie Waters (...) consider why the twenty-first century media landscape is so haunted by the ghosts of these traditional figures that feminism otherwise laid to rest. Why, over fifty years since Betty Friedan’s critique, does the feminine mystique exert such a strong spectral presence, and how has it been reimagined to speak to the concerns of a postfeminist audience? To answer these questions, Munford and Waters draw from a rich array of examples from contemporary film, fiction, music, and television, from the shadowy cityscapes of _Homeland _to the haunted houses of _American Horror Story_. Alongside this comprehensive analysis of today’s popular culture, they offer a vivid portrait of feminism’s social and intellectual history, as well as an innovative application of Jacques Derrida’s theories of “hauntology.” _Feminism and Popular Culture_ thus not only considers how contemporary media is being visited by the ghosts of feminism’s past, it raises vital questions about what this means for feminism’s future. (shrink)

This article explores the basic assumptions of Generative Lexicon Theory (GL) and the implications for the general theory of the linguistic sign that arise from the generative mechanisms “selective binding,” “co-composition,” and “type coercion.” The article focuses on the assumption underlying GL that interpretation and polysemy are part of lexical structure. It is shown that encoded lexical meaning and inferred non-lexical knowledge cannot be clearly distinguished in GL. In order to be consistent, GL must also be supplemented by a (...) theory of “normal language use” and be able to account for semantic underspecification in a semiotically coherent way. (shrink)

In many scientific fields, sparseness and indirectness of empirical evidence pose fundamental challenges to theory development. Theories of the evolution of human cognition provide a guiding example, where the targets of study are evolutionary processes that occurred in the ancestors of present-day humans. In many cases, the evidence is both very sparse and very indirect (e.g., archaeological findings regarding anatomical changes that might be related to the evolution of language capabilities); in other cases, the evidence is less sparse but (...) still very indirect (e.g., data on cultural transmission in groups of contemporary humans and non-human primates). From examples of theoretical and empirical work in this domain, we distill five virtuous practices that scientists could aim to satisfy when evidence is sparse or indirect: (i) making assumptions explicit, (ii) making alternative theories explicit, (iii) pursuing computational and formal modelling, (iv) seeking external consistency with theories of related phenomena, and (v) triangulating across different forms and sources of evidence. Thus, rather than inhibiting theory development, sparseness or indirectness of evidence can catalyze it. To the extent that there are continua of sparseness and indirectness that vary across domains and that the principles identified here always apply to some degree, the solutions and advantages proposed here may generalise to other scientific domains. (shrink)

The problem with elaborations of attachment theory is attachment theory itself. How would a mind that works the way the theory posits have increased its owner's fitness in hunter-gatherer times? The child's mind is more capacious and discerning than attachment theorists give it credit for. Early-appearing, long-lasting personality characteristics, often mistaken for the lingering effects of early experiences, are more likely due to genetic influences on personality.

Elman (2009) proposed that the traditional role of the mental lexicon in language processing can largely be replaced by a theoretical model of schematic event knowledge founded on dynamic context-dependent variables. We evaluate Elman’s approach and propose an alternative view, based on dual coding theory and evidence that modality-specific cognitive representations contribute strongly to word meaning and language performance across diverse contexts which also have effects predictable from dual coding theory.

Knowledge-first epistemology includes a knowledge norm of action: roughly, act only on what you know. This norm has been criticized, especially from the perspective of so-called standard decision theory. Mueller and Ross provide example decision problems which seem to show that acting properly cannot require knowledge. I argue that this conclusion depends on applying a particular decision theory which is ill-motivated in this context. Agents’ knowledge is often most plausibly formalized as an ambiguous epistemic state, and the theory of decision (...) under ambiguity is then the appropriate modeling tool. I show how to model agents as acting rationally on the basis of their knowledge according to such a theory. I conclude that the tension between the knowledge norm of action and formal decision theory is illusory; the knowledge-first paradigm should be used to actively select the decision-theoretical tools that can best capture the knowledge-based decisions in any given situation. (shrink)

The Legal Theory Lexicon series usually explicates some concept in legal theory, jurisprudence, or philosophy of law. But what are those fields and how do they relate to each other? Is "jurisprudence" a synonym for "philosophy of law" or are these two overlapping but distinct fields? Is "legal theory" broader or narrower than jurisprudence? And why should we care about this terminology? As always, this entry in the Legal Theory Lexicon series is aimed at law students, especially first-year (...) law students with an interest in legal theory. (shrink)

As scientific discoveries and technological advances continue to modify our perceptions of reality at an unprecedented rate, the traditional frameworks for understanding and organizing our experience of truth and Knowledge have become less and less adequate. David Rich comes to grips with this problem in his innovative study, which shows how both knowledge and truth are conditioned by experience and explores the dynamics of creativity that generate knowledge.

In his professional life, Richard Posner is addressed as inasmuch as he is Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. He is also a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. Finally, he is a prolific author of books and articles in scholarly journals in which he expounds at length and with copious footnotes his particular views of jurisprudence and public policy. One of his frequent intellectual adversaries, legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin, wryly described (...) Judge Posner as. (shrink)

This state-of-the-art guide to some of the most exciting work in current linguistics explores how the core components of the language faculty interact. It examines how these interactions are reflected in linguistic and cognitive theory, considers what they reveal about the operations of language within the mind, and looks at their reflections in expression and communication. Leading international scholars present cutting-edge accounts of developments in the interfaces between phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. They bring to bear a (...) class='Hi'>rich variety of methods and theoretical perspectives, focus on a broad array of issues and problems, and illustrate their arguments from a wide range of the world's languages. After the editors' introduction to its structure, scope, and content, the book is divided into four parts. The first, Sound, is concerned with the interfaces between phonetics and phonology, phonology and morphology, and phonology and syntax. Part II, Structure, considers the interactions of syntax with morphology, semantics, and the lexicon, and explores the status of the word and its representional status in the mind. Part III, Meaning, revisits the syntax-semantics interface from the perspective of compositionality, and looks at issues concerned with intonation, discourse, and context. The authors in the final part of the book, General Architectural Concerns, examine work on Universal Grammar, the overall model of language, and linguistic and associated theories of language and cognition. All scholars and advanced students of language will value this book, whether they are in linguistics, cognitive science, philosophy, artificial intelligence, computational science, or informatics. (shrink)

After critiquing chaos, catastrophe, and complexity theories, showing their limitations in the contemporary era, Rich furthers the development of crisis theory ...

The concept of person is integral to bioethical discourse because persons are the proper subject of the moral domain. Nevertheless, the concept of person has played no role in the prevailing formulation of human death because of a purported lack of consensus concerning the essential attributes of a person. Beginning with John Locke's fundamental proposition that person is a ‘forensic term’, I argue that in Western society we do have a consensus on at least one necessary condition for personhood, and (...) that is the capacity for conscious experience. When we consider the whole brain formulation of death, and the most prominent defense of it by the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, we can readily identify the flaws that grow out of the failure to define human death as the permanent loss of the capacity for conscious experience. Most fundamental among these flaws is a definition of human death that reduces persons to the capacity of the brain to regulate purely physiological functioning. Such a formulation would, in theory, apply to any member of the animal kingdom. I suggest that an appropriate concept of death should capture what it is about a particular living being that is so essential to it that the permanent loss of that thing constitutes death. What is essential to being a human being is living the life of a person, which derives from the capacity for conscious experience. (shrink)

“And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep” Genesis This article examines the problem of belief as it relates to radical negativity and as such engages with two positions in regard to the Real of the void. The first, drawing from speculative realism seeks to conceptualise this void in positive terms, as something that can be reached and in a sense overcome. The second, Hegelian account, by contrast, situates the void as (...) something inherent to the very coordinates of reality and being itself. As such the following discussion specifically examines the status of objective reality within the continental philosophical paradigm. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Place: Towards a Geophilosophy of Photography by Ali ShobeiriElizabeth. L. CoxPlace: Towards a Geophilosophy of Photography BY ALI SHOBEIRI Leiden, The Netherlands: Leiden University Press, 2021In his most recent work, Place: Towards a Geophilosophy of Photography, Ali Shobeiri skilfully demonstrates both the importance of, and fluid ways in which, place plays a dynamic role in the understanding and stories nestled within the seeing and evaluating of photographs and (...) photography. Bringing together the worlds of photography, geography, and philosophy to create an interdisciplinary theoretical understanding of place in relation to photography, Shobeiri has expertly unearthed a nuanced, exciting way of considering the photographic process and images.Shobeiri, an Assistant Professor of Photographic Studies and Visual Arts Theory at Leiden University, brings his knowledge and expertise of visual culture, photographic theory, human geography, and philosophy to the fore in his latest publication. His knowledge, passion, personal interest in photography, and his critical thought come through nicely in his writing, and it is clear that the development of Shobeiri’s ideas and framework have been given a lot of thought, time, and energy. This book meaningfully speaks to those interested in a discussion of place within the realm of photography, evidenced through the depth of knowledge and sheer detail explored within this book.Inspired by his own experience as a photographer and influenced by Edward Casey’s “delimited” definition of place, Shobeiri explores how place is never simply presented or fixed (11). It is here that he expertly uses photography to do this across six different yet clearly complimentary chapters. Critically, there is no way to give a succinct overview of the chapters of this book without losing meaning and diluting Shobeiri’s message; the book is rich, deeply detailed, embedded within philosophical thought, and is nuanced throughout, which is important to remember when reading this non- fiction piece of work.In the first chapter, Shobeiri provides a phenomenological exploration of the importance of the photographer’s body both as a lived experience and a physical entity. He then juxtaposes this duality to the lived [End Page 136] place of the photograph, returning to the notion of fixedness and using the idea of belonging to explore the photographer’s body and the photographic experience as a lived place. The next chapter discusses spatiality and time, and the way in which space is temporalized, using key influences such as Roland Barthes and Susan Collins to illustrate the argument. Central to this is the idea that a photograph captures time, but also aims at space, which raises questions about what this means for the space before the lens. In chapters 3 and 4, the author argues that the photograph itself travels through space, and highlights the importance of the photographic place, allowing us to “bestow meaning upon that space on the photograph’s surface” (67). Interestingly, Shobeiri points to philosophy to help the reader understand this, such as Jacques Derrida, and uses more familiar images and scholarly thought from NASA to discuss blind field and the liminality of photographic place. Chapter 5 moves away from location and journeys the reader to a discussion of places viewed as moment of encounter, specifically considering the spectator and the photograph. This evolves further in the sixth and final chapter insofar as it explores the transition and translation of the photographed place to the communication of the content of the image and the agency of the photograph. Shobeiri finishes with a simple yet engaging epilogue, several helpful notes, and a plethora of references which are useful for further reading.Place: Towards a Geophilosophy of Photography is genuinely interesting, centred within academic scholarship, and employs the thought of theorists that readers of Environment, Space, Place will undoubtably recognise. Scholarly figureheads such as Jacques Derrida, Alain Badiou, and Michel Foucault, space and place authorities such as Tim Cresswell, Tim Ingold, and Doreen Massey, and art aficionados such as Roland Barthes, Susan Collins, and John Berger frequent the pages. Familiar artistic names are also drawn upon, including Ansel Adams, Gert Jan Kocken, and Gerhard Richter, which soften the strong academic tones that this book voices. This work is clearly sophisticated in terms of lexicon and ideas, however... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Prudence: Classical Virtue, Postmodern PracticeFrancis A. BeerPrudence: Classical Virtue, Postmodern Practice. Ed. Robert Hariman. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003. Pp. xi + 337. $65.00, cloth."Would it be prudent?" The phrase echoes in memory, linking Dana Carvey from Saturday Night Live to the presidency of the first George Bush. Robert Hariman has been wrestling with prudence for over a decade, and he has now produced a powerful (...) volume that brings together not only his thoughts but also those of a number of other distinguished authors. The result is a book that will become a standard reference for those interested in prudence.The subtitle, Classical Virtue, Postmodern Practice, and the title of the first chapter, "Theory without Modernity," give some idea of the subtexts that drive the book. This is a book about prudence, and more. It is about virtue in classical, modern, and postmodern settings. It is about the dynamic complexity of practice—decision, judgment, and action in public and private life.Hariman gives us a definition: "Prudence is a mode of reasoning about contingent matters in order to select the best course of action" (5). That would be too easy. He also surrounds prudence with a penumbra of related words to broaden our understanding of the complex lattice of semantic meaning. Our legacy from the Greek and Roman lexicon includes words like phronesis and prudentia. Contemporary nouns involve cautiousness, circumspection, and care. Related adjectives are "careful, judicious, tactful, discerning, sensible, frugal, wise, sage, level-headed, balanced, moderate, politic, practical pragmatic, expedient" (vii). These synonyms, for Hariman, describe a narrow, modern form of prudence, part of the calculative tradition inherited from Aristotle, that ultimately leads to the saddle points of rational choice. They are, however, only a part of the story. Hariman aims to relieve their "stodginess" by recovering the performative tradition of prudence from Cicero. Prudence, from this perspective, is defined not just abstractly as a set of rules but more dynamically as a set of roles. Prudence includes character, and is performed by characters. Pericles in Athens is an iconic example of superb political leadership that blends the honor of the leader with the glory of the state. Prudence combines integrity of the self with respect for others. This is a broad, ambitious interpretation [End Page 176] of prudence. It recuperates not only a classical vision of prudence but also one of politics. It rearranges other virtues to revolve in a constellation around prudence. In this reconstituted form, prudence reemerges to shine as "a crucial element of political leadership," the central political virtue.The book is divided into three parts: "Conceptual Frameworks," "Rhetorical Structures," and "Provisional Networks." All three of the sections are identified in structural terms, which is interesting since Hariman's conception of prudence as a primary political virtue is very agent-centered. The structures, however, provide the settings in which the political observers and actors perform. The first section provides a sample of the rich literature that focuses on philosophical concepts of prudence in earlier times and places. It begins with a chapter by Robert W. Cape Jr. that discusses "Cicero and the Development of Political Practice in Rome." This chapter is critical to the book, since it lays a part of the foundation. It is the first substantive essay and it must also make the case for combining calculative and performative prudence. Cape gives us a fine exposition of prudentia in the Roman context. Interestingly, he suggests that "prudentia is a contraction of providentia, "'foresight.'" (37).The virtue of prudence was typically associated with age and experience. Imprudence, on the other hand, was associated with youth, recklessness, and impropriety (37). Prudence involved knowledge of practical matters, law, and custom as well as proper speech, including rhetoric, and behavior. Prepon mattered. Prudence for Cicero, however, was much more than simply knowing how things work: it was ultimately the extended performance of justice on the public stage. The next chapter, by Eugene Garver, entitled "After Virtù: Rhetoric, Prudence, and Moral Pluralism in Machiavelli," moves the story of prudence from the late classical to the early modern period. As the title indicates, Garver's concern is also with the relation of... (shrink)

The primary goal of modern linguistic theory (at least in the circles I inhabit) is an explanation of the human language capacity and how it enables the child to acquire adult competence in language.1 Adult competence in turn is understood as the ability (or knowledge) to creatively map between sound and meaning, using a rich combinatorial system – the lexicon and grammar of the language. An adequate theory must satisfy at least three crucial constraints, which I will call (...) the Descriptive Constraint, the Learnability Constraint, and the Evolutionary Constraint. (shrink)

Models of content-sharing behavior on online social media platforms typically represent content spread as a diffusion process modeled on contagious diseases; users’ behavior is modeled with single-agent decision theory. However, social media platforms are interactive spaces where users care about reactions to, and further spread of, the content they post. Thus, social media interaction falls under the intended use cases for game theory. In contrast to existing models leaving strategic reasoning out, we capture agents’ social media decisions within a cognitive (...) hierarchy framework, which can be interpreted as making formally precise how agents make strategic choices based on mutual expectations of rationality. Analytically, we identify limit cases in which a platform can be swamped with content that no agents personally like but all expect to elicit reactions (think obvious fake-news). We then use agent-based simulations to show that a range of more realistic cases give rise to similar outcomes. (shrink)

Carpendale & Lewis 's critique of traditional accounts of “theory of mind” is well taken, but the alternative theory they propose is premature at its best, unconvincing at its worst. The proposed theory is ad hoc and confirmatory in its findings; vague and generic in its claims; and unjustified and unnecessary in its novelty.

Information cascades are troubling and well studied because apparently individually rational responses to evidence can lead entire communities to conform (participate in cascades), and hence to converge on the wrong answer. Yet existing theory cannot explain why a robust, substantial minority of people in experimental studies do not conform. Groups achieve improved reliability thanks to these non-conformists. I use simulations to study cascade problems in an evolutionary setting. The results show that although conforming maximizes expected fitness, non-conformists can persist and (...) often flourish in the population. The reason is that by its nature, conformity carries an evolutionary cost. (shrink)

Some investigations into the algebraic constructive aspects of a decision procedure for various fragments of Relevant Logics are presented. Decidability of these fragments relies on S. Kripke's gentzenizations and on his combinatorial lemma known as Kripke's lemma that B. Meyer has shown equivalent to Dickson's lemma in number theory and to his own infinite divisor lemma, henceforth, Meyer's lemma or IDP. These investigations of the constructive aspects of the Kripke's-Meyer's decision procedure originate in the development of Paul Thistlewaite's “Kripke” theorem (...) prover that had been devised to tackle the decision problem of the Relevant Logic R. A. Urquhart's pen and paper solution that relies on a sophisticated algebraic and geometric treatment of the problem shows the usefulness of an algebraic approach in Logic. Here, the study of the constructive aspects of the Kripke-Meyer decision procedure relies on various algebraic constructive results in the theory of polynomials rings. (shrink)

Acting as part of a corporation may allow an individual more easily to rationalize participating in a harmful act, but there are countervailing forces in corporate action that increase moral oversight and accountability. Making use of group agency to explain membership as a special feature of some corporate agents, I argue that when someone becomes a member of an organized group like a company, their own moral responsibility becomes entangled with the decisions of other members of the company, whether or (...) not they intend this effect. This moral entanglement in corporate decision-making explains why individuals have a moral obligation to act in their role as a corporate officer when they would not have an obligation to act in a personal capacity even if they had identical knowledge. The entanglement affects the individual’s own moral status and the moral status of the company itself. Moral entanglement of corporate decision-makers provides a principled explanation for a rule that is present in corporate criminal law that corporate officers with knowledge that another employee is about to commit a crime must actively intervene, and cannot rely on their status as bystanders. (shrink)

Voting is a collective activity: it requires more than one person to win a vote. In a corporation, voting allows the winning idea to become an intention of the corporate group once the vote is concluded. In this paper, argue that unlike in corporate boards, in a democratic election, the voting process does not create a group intention. The difference between the two processes is an oft-overlooked moment directly after the corporate vote in which members on the losing side ratify (...) the decision of the group and move on with the group into the future. In state elections, because of the high cost of renouncing membership, there is typically no ratification moment. While different groups do have collective intentions prior to an electoral vote, the vote itself does not manifest the intention of a group agent such as ‘the People.’ This conclusion has implications for minority rights. (shrink)

“Beggar that I am, I am even poor in thanks.”— Hamlet, II.ii.272About four years ago, we at the Journal of Bioethical Inquiry realized the thankless don’t get thanked enough. It is, of course, built into the very definition of the category. And, yet, all those who fit this bill ceaselessly beat on—be it reviewing articles namelessly and without reward; offering guidance on papers and protocols; managing and editing manuscripts; taking on the tiring role of taskmaster; processing, paginating, promoting, and publishing; (...) and generally engaging excitedly in the scholarly pursuit.We thus began an annual tradition of taking a few paragraphs every year in an attempt to thank our peer reviewers by name and all those who make the Journal of Bioethical Inquiry possible. We know that it is not much and that we are “even poor in our thanks.” As Colley Cibber once pointed out, “[w]ords are but empty thanks” and offer little real compensation and r .. (shrink)

Richness theory offers a promising axiology. In this paper, I discuss how to translate it into a deontology. To do so, I recruit the concept of moral distance from a recently developed epistemology, and construe it in terms of causal power. Finally, I apply the resulting decision-theoretic framework to the question of how best to avert ecological disaster over the next 36 years and achieve ecological harmony over the next 986.

Causal decision theory is one of our most prominent theories of rational choice and the “why ain’cha rich?” argument is one of the most prominent objections to this theory. According to WAR, CDT is not an adequate theory of rational choice because it leads agents to make decisions that foreseeably leave them less well off than agents that decide in some other manner. Some philosophers take WAR to decisively undermine CDT. On the other hand, others take WAR to (...) fail to resolve the debate over CDT’s adequacy. In this paper, I will defend this second view: WAR does not resolve the debate at hand but instead leads to deadlock. Then, in the second half of this paper, I will show that this deadlock is not broken by a recent variant on WAR due to Caspar Hare and Brian Hedden. Not only does this result have implications for the debate over CDT’s adequacy but this discussion also casts light on the broader success/rationality link. (shrink)

In 1979, on the thirty-ninth anniversary of the closing of the Franco-Spanish border at Port Bou and one day before the anniversary of the suicide of Walter Benjamin, Jacob Taubes and Carl Schmitt opened the Bible in the Sauerland. The two men sat down in Plettenburg to read St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, chapters 9-11. As if in memory of Benjamin, they spoke “under a priestly seal”: Schmitt, the most important state law theorist of the twentieth century, a Roman (...) Catholic and sometime member of the Nazi Party; Taubes, a Jewish philosopher of a Messianic and oddly left-wing disposition.…. (shrink)

In conversation with Emmett Harsin Drager and Andrea Long Chu's “After Trans Studies,” this collaborative essay also turns to questions of field formation and the ethos of trans studies. Situating the growth of the field in the material conditions of precarity under which trans knowledge-workers work, the authors argue that trans studies can't be “over” because, in fact, it isn't yet here. Rather than viewing this as only a dismal proposition, however, they insist that the tenuousness of trans studies provides (...) us with the opportunity to envision and enact more sustaining ways of being “in the field.”. (shrink)

What is the foundation of consent in the criminal law? Classically liberal commentators have offered at least three distinct theories. J.S. Mill contends we value consent because individuals are the best judges of their own interests. Joel Feinberg argues an individual’s consent matters because she has a right to autonomy based on her intrinsic sovereignty over her own life. Joseph Raz also focuses on autonomy, but argues that society values autonomy as a constituent element of individual well-being, which it (...) is the state’s duty to promote. The criminal law’s approach to the problem of non-contemporaneous consent—prospective consent and retrospective consent—casts a unique light on the differences among these three justifications. Peter Westen claims neither Mill’s nor Feinberg’s justifications for consent fully explains how non-contemporaneous consent is treated in the criminal law. Specifically, Mill’s “self-interest” conception explains the criminal law’s limited recognition of prospective consent, but cannot explain its total rejection of retrospective consent. Conversely, Feinberg’s “sovereign autonomy” conception explains why the criminal law rejects retrospective consent, but cannot explain why the law recognizes irrevocable prospective consent only in limited circumstances. I resolve this dilemma by explaining that Raz’s “autonomy is good” conception is consistent with both the criminal law’s limited recognition of irrevocable prospective consent and its total rejection of retrospective consent. This suggests the existing criminal law embodies Raz’s theory that it is the duty of the state to promote morality, in particular the moral good of individual well-being through living autonomously. In contrast, the criminal law’s treatment of consent would have to be modified if it were to reflect Mill’s “self-interest” conception, or Feinberg’s “sovereign autonomy” conception. (shrink)

Understanding the changes in our language abilities along the lifespan is a crucial step for understanding the aging process both in normal and in abnormal circumstances. Besides controlled experimental tasks, it is equally crucial to investigate language in unconstrained conversation. I present an information-theoretical analysis of a corpus of dyadic conversations investigating how the richness of the vocabulary, the word-internal structure, and the syntax of the utterances evolves as a function of the speaker's age and sex. Although vocabulary diversity increases (...) throughout the lifetime, grammatical diversities follow a different pattern, which also differs between women and men. Women use increasingly diverse syntactic structures at least up to their late fifties, and they do not deteriorate in terms of fluency through their lifespan. However, from age 45 onward, men exhibit a decrease in the diversity of the syntactic structures they use, coupled with an increased number of speech disfluencies. (shrink)

Within the academic community there has been debate around whether business ethics should be taught as a stand-alone course or rather integrated across the business curriculum. A different tack is taken here as we head in the direction of integrating business ethics beyond the traditional bounds of the business curriculum and into theatre arts. The collaboration outlined herein was established when an inter-College alliance was formed to create the devised play Cheat, a mainstage theatre production for Western Washington University (WWU), (...) in which theatre became the ground and moral theory from business ethics became the figure. The following is a detailed deconstruction of the variety of ways in which business ethics concepts and models informed the construction of Cheat. (shrink)